




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
pt 10



G. E. I.







# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

### JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

### S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN  
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL  
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND  
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
RELATING THERETO

---

### PART 10

FEBRUARY 15, 16, 18, 19, AND 20, 1946

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Printed for the use of the  
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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## HEARINGS

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SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

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(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)

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UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1946

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1946  
Pt. 10

## JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois	
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine	BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan	FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina	

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### COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*  
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*  
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*  
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*  
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*  
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*  
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*  
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

## NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS IN ITALICS ENCLOSED IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 15, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
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[12278]<sup>1</sup>

# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[12279] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time before the examination of the witnesses?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions that I want to ask from Colonel Bratton.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, last night the Senator from Michigan, in questioning the witness on the stand, read from paragraphs of his testimony on page 1 of the Clarke Report, under the heading of "Lieutenant O'Dell," about a certain dispatch from Australia.

On page 2 there is testimony to the effect that that telegram or dispatch had been sent to Hawaii, and that there was no mention of Pearl Harbor whatsoever in the telegram, that they expected an attack on the Philippines and the Indies.

I think, in view of part of the statement of the witness having gone into the record, that the rest of the statement of the witness should be incorporated at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The testimony referred to follows:)

[12280] COLONEL CARTER W. CLARKE, COLONEL E. W. GIBSON, AND LT. O'DELL—  
6 OCTOBER 1944, 9 A. M.

CWC. All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect; so you can start telling us what you know.

O'D. Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought might not have come out through other sources. There was a cable that was sent on the fifth of December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese Task Force in the South China Sea. The information had come to the Military Attaché through the

<sup>1</sup> Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

Australian Government, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office.

CWC. You were then Merle Smith's assistant?

O'D. That's right. There were the two of us, and he is now dead. That's the reason I stuck my nose in this. We were called over on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, myself, and Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies. The information was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, to the Indies, and, as I say, principally concerned itself with the movement of a Jap Task Force [12281] in the South China Sea. However, within an hour after we had gotten there some additional information came in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went out, Colonel Merle Smith had me prepare a cable which he revised to send out and the principal part of that other, than the movement of this convoy, was that the Dutch had ordered the execution of the Rainbow Plan, A-2. I remember, it's been almost three years now, and I can distinctly remember that particular part of the cable where it said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part of the joint Abducun plan only to be taken in the event of war. It provided for specific occurrences they would counteract by certain other action. In other words, A-1 would have been some other direction expected attack, A-2 was from a particular direction, and they ordered the execution of this A-2. That was significant because the plan called for joint operations for the Australians, and the Dutch and to the best of my knowledge our Navy if nothing else. That was to go into effect only in case of war and here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite information that it had gone into effect. There was a bit of flurried excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked us not to send that cable and Colonel Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said that he [12282] would wait twelve hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific request. In other words, they didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say they probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it.

CWC. Let me ask you—now that was on December 5?

O'D. Sir, that was Thursday, the 4th, and we held it.

CWC. In other words that's the 3rd our time.

O'D. That's right, sir.

CWC. And you didn't send it actually until the 5th?

O'D. Well, the reason for the delay was that there was a War Cabinet Meeting at which Sir Charles Burnett was to report this information to the Australian War Cabinet which was meeting in Melbourne that evening, and he went from his office to the War Cabinet meeting. We, on our part, held the cable twelve hours, and I coded it and had it ready for dispatch and held on to it. In the cable (it was extremely urgent) this convoy, they had it doped out, could get to somewhere, either the Philippines or the Indies within, I believe it was, 60 hours, and that is the way that we had figured it. So we sent the cable one copy to General MacArthur in his code that we had then and another copy in a different code to Hawaii with a repeat to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the request to repeat it to Washington. In other words, we sent none direct to [12283] MILID as we would have done if time hadn't been such a factor. But, we were extremely laborious in writing—

CWC. In other words, you fellows instead of having a drop copy for Hawaii, you have it to Hawaii and told them—

O'D. And told them to repeat it here, sir, and then send another copy to the Philippines. There was no hint of Pearl Harbor in this whatsoever. It wholly concerned itself with the Philippines and the Indies, and it looked like the Indies at that precise moment would be the first to get it! Now, we sent that cable, that would be the morning of the 5th their time, and I see in the papers where Dixon denied that his country had any information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was reported to the press in that way, which is so. But they did have a warning of action in the Philippines or in the South Pacific Area. I would say it is inescapable that they did. I don't know—we never had any acknowledgment of the cable from either Hawaii or the Philippines, and we never heard anything from MILID to let us know whether or not it had reached them. Of course, the subsequent events were such that it might have been overlooked. The file copy was destroyed—ah, this looks like it. That's it, sir, Netherlands Far East Command on Execution of Plan A-2. Naval moves in Mindanao—(interrupted)

[12233] CWC. General Osmun, this is Lieutenant O'Dell.

RAO. O'Dell.

O'D. How do you do, sir.

RAO. Mighty glad to know you.

O'D. Pleased to meet you, sir.

CWC. He's giving us some information here in connection with this Pearl Harbor business.

RAO. I've heard about it.

CWC. You've heard about Pearl Harbor?

RAO. Ha! Ha! I'll tell you sometime about a year from now at Christmas we'll all get together and celebrate that. I'm glad to have met you.

O'D. Thank you, sir.

O'D. What made us particularly angry about this was that the next morning the newspaper came out in the early edition with a certain part of this information about the Indies. And, after we had held the cable up at their request, Colonel Merle-Smith naturally raised a great deal of trouble over why we had had to hold our cable and the press had gotten an inkling of it; they hadn't gotten the words, sir, but they had an inkling. That is the message in particular, sir. That is the one

CWC. Notice the footnote down there.

O'D. (Reading from message:) "And relayed to War Department message center."

[12284] (Interrupted by telephone. CWC talked for some time with General Strong.)

O'D. We expected action to take place on Sunday, our time, and we all went down to the office on Sunday and waited with bated breath, and nothing happened Sunday. That led us to believe that, well, this was another of those scares. As you can probably guess, sir, we had had several previous warnings of impending action in time to reflect that in the reports and cables that we had sent. One other positive action was that Kopang—2 days before this happened—received 50 (the Japanese Consul received) cases which he wished to have in under Diplomatic privilege and it was refused by the Dutch and opened by the Dutch before he could get them back on this Japanese ship. I think that was the trouble, there wasn't a Japanese ship that he could put it on. And, when they opened it, they found a complete, well not radar because radar wasn't in the state that we now know it, but it was a sending and receiving radio set, and we had had information about that. Also, of course, all the Japanese shipping had been pulled back into Japanese waters for at least sixty days before. And, then on the afternoon that this was sent, we sent that in the morning, the Japanese consul in Melbourne, who was under surveillance, was [12285] seen to burn all of his codes in the back yard. Nobody, of course, was able to make a move to stop him, but they saw that.

CWC. You're sure this was sent out from Singapore, or where was it sent from?

O'D. From Melbourne, sir.

CWC. Melbourne on the fifth.

O'D. The fifth, in the morning, sir.

EWG. According to this copy, Colonel, this was received by Signals Hawaii, don't know when, but it was relayed to the War Department, arriving here at the night of Pearl Harbor day, December 7, with a memo on it that this was addressed to CG, Hawaii and relayed here with request for decipherment and repeat back to them.

CWC. Well, we got that in there with old man Smith's note.

EWG. Yes, we have that. The only thing is, it is curious why Signals Hawaii held that so long. They couldn't decipher it; maybe they thought they could. I don't know.

O'D. It was sent positively in a code which Hawaii had.

CWC. What did you use?

O'D. The information that was on the code and cipher. We used the secret book with the cipher table.

VWC. Did you use the black book or the red book? Do you remember?

O'D. If I saw it, of course, I could identify it. As I [12286] remember it, it was gray. I don't remember. There was a thick confidential and a thin secret and then there were the cipher tables that were changed every thirty days, and we were very careful to pick one. That's why we had to code it twice, once in a code that we knew Hawaii had and once in one the Philippines had because the Philippines had different codes entirely from Hawaii, and we had to—well, you can imagine, that is a rather laborious job, a message like that.

CWC. The message we got in said it was held for 17 hours.

O'D. That was 17 hours, sir, from one afternoon until the next morning. I see they have a question mark under what government. It was the Australian Government. We put that in the message.

EWG. Did you ever in Australia hear of any information indicating that there was a task force sailing toward Pearl Harbor?

O'D. Not toward Pearl Harbor, sir. We never had any information or anything in that direction. We knew of a task force in the South China Sea, and whether it was headed for the Philippines or whether it was headed for any part of the Indies, the reconnaissance information that was available to us did not specify.

CWC. Did you know about the build up of a task force in the Marshalls?

[12287] O'D. Yes, sir.

CWC. You did know about that.

O'D. Yes, sir, through the Australian Government again. Mostly the RAAF. They were the ones rather than the Army or the Navy, it was the RAAF that was feeding us what information of value—

CWC. How far in advance of Pearl Harbor did you know that, do you recall?

O'D. I should say it was in that same week. Probably early in that week. That was toward the latter part of the week. I should say in the early part of that week, sir. We had been following the Japanese disposition of troops and had sent a report, a regular M/A report on the disposition of all Japanese divisions about a month before all this came up, which was used merely to confirm what other reports were here. It was just how the Australians had the disposition of the Japanese Army and which we sent in confirming the other information here. Shipping, as I say, we knew that all the Japanese shipping had been moved back into its own territorial waters. Most of our information led us to the definite and inescapable conclusion that war was going to break here, nothing about Pearl Harbor, sir.

CWC. Well, of course, that is a typical Jap stunt. Now, who [12288] is this Sir Charles Burnett again?

O'D. He was Chief of Staff of the RAAF. He has been sent back to England now. He is an RAF officer who was on loan, and it was through him and Air Commodore Hewett, he was an intelligence officer, that we had disposal of whatever information they had, and they did, of course, cooperate a great deal with us. But the message that you have there, sir, which is the same one exactly as we sent it out, and a pretty good decipherment as well, Col. Merle Smith was exceedingly careful, and he was the opposite of an alarmist. He would not put anything in a cable that he didn't have absolutely down under his thumb perfectly.

CWC. Yes; I knew Merle Smith. I knew him very well.

[12289] O'D. And you can see from that cable, sir, that he put nothing that would tend to alarm that wasn't definite fact that he could attribute to something precise.

EWG. Do you know whether or not Hawaii knew what this plan A-2 was?

O'D. We believed that they did. That point came up because of the naval, because of Pearl Harbor being the naval headquarters and the Plan A-2 being for United States participation mostly in a naval manner. We certainly assumed that if anybody knew A-2, Pearl Harbor did know it. Now, whether the Army would show that to the Navy and that sort of thing, we naturally left up to them. But this naval plan, you see there was a naval attache in Melbourne, Captain Coursey, and we informed him of that and curiously enough Captain Coursey did not send any message like that. I do not believe he did. I'm not qualified to say for certain, but he was not in the same state that we were about it. What I am trying to say is that what we sent back might not have seemed such a positive indication, but that everything where we were definitely led to the assumption that war was going to break out. This was about the third or fourth time it had happened, but this time it really seemed in a state where in 60 hours that task force was going to be somewhere and with all this code [12290] burning and various other indications from all sorts that I knew about and no doubt they knew more than I did, it looked like this time it was going to be the end, and, as I say, we expected it on our Sunday and that Sunday came and went and nothing happened, and we had a let down, and then of course it was Monday, our time, that it happened. He put nothing in that cable that wouldn't be—

EWG. Well, this cable says the Netherlands command at 8 a. m. on 7 December reported planes to have reached Kopang. Could you have sent it before?



O'D. That was added, sir, on the morning as was the fact that it was delayed. In other words we had to rewrite it because the situation was changing momentarily.

EWG. Then you don't think that it was——

O'D. No, sir; that went out on Friday.

EWG. Do you think that might have been a mistake in deciphering?

O'D. Yes, sir. You see the meat of the thing: the suggestion that the RAAF likewise take reciprocal action. In other words "we're going to live up to our obligation——".

EWG. This date bothered me. That's all.

O'D. Well, it bothers me a bit, sir. That is the only copy that I know of in existence. The file copy was destroyed by the present military attache with all old papers, about two [12291] years ago.

CWC. Do you think that the Australians notified their people here? Do you have any way of knowing that, or any opinion?

O'D. I know that our own Minister was not informed of the situation. You see, of course, the capitol, sir is in Canberra, and we were stationed in Melbourne because that was the scene of activity. The War Cabinet met the previous night. That's when Sir Charles Burnett had told them this information. Whether the War Cabinet, who would be the body then who would have instructed them to let Washington know—. Sir Owen Dixon wasn't here then. He was a shipping man in Australia, and Mr. Casey was here.

CWC. Casey was the guy that was here then.

O'D. That's right, sir. Mr. Casey.

CWC. I know there was a roar about it when they pulled him out of here.

O'D. Yes, sir; that's right, sir, jealousy I think. Whether or not they sent a cable to—I rather doubt that they did, sir, because, as I say, the Australian Government wasn't too happy about our sending this out even after the delay. I mean they realized that it was inescapable, and we had to keep our Government informed, but——

CWC. Well, there is one thing I'd like to get straight in my [12292] own mind. Now, when Burnett gave Merle Smith this information, he gave it to you with the understanding that you not transmit it.

O'D. No, sir; when he told it to us we were getting ready to send it out. It was only after we had the cable—you see, we were there over an hour, over 2 hours, that afternoon, and the information was dribbling in in spurts, and we had that and it was only when we were getting ready to go, which was around 7 o'clock, that the War Cabinet meeting was called. I shouldn't say before 6:30, at the time we came out there, it wasn't scheduled. They called this emergency meeting and at that time when we had prepared the cable and were getting ready to go code it, Sir Charles Burnett requested very specifically that it not be sent, that we hold it up until he had informed the War Cabinet. I rather think that that is why he didn't want the information to leave Melbourne. In other words, he hadn't told his own Government yet.

CWC. In other words, he wanted to spring it on his people first.

O'D. Before there was any chance of our sending anything out, sir.

CWC. That's logical.

O'D. I might say, sir, that because there were only two of [12293] us and because everything was happening day and night then, that was one of the last messages that we sent out in our own code. From then on we used the Australian cipher section back and forth.

CWC. Why?

O'D. Well, sir, we weren't too sure of our codes to the Philippines. We knew they had the cipher device, but we weren't sure of the security afforded by the cipher device.

CWC. You mean the cylindrical?

O'D. That's right. After the outbreak of war, you see, sir.

CWC. But it was secure before the outbreak of war?

O'D. Once the show broke and we were going back and forth between General MacArthur's headquarters and Australia, we were given the use of the Australian code and it was mostly of a liaison nature, anyway, as to whether General MacArthur could send a plane here on reconnaissance or a plane there or what could be expected in one way or another. There were so many messages coming and going. General MacArthur would send us messages. Sir Charles Burnett would ask us for certain information from the Philippines. You see Washington was pretty far removed from us at that time. We didn't know what delays

would be encountered in the cables going through Hawaii to Washington, which was the only means of sending any message here, and there were matters which would [12294] come up which we would want answered in 5 or 6 hours, which we knew we'd never get to Washington and back in that time, and it concerned what General MacArthur would be able to tell us and what Washington would only have to ask someone else for. So, we had quite a bit of correspondence back and forth by cable and wireless from the Philippines to Australia as soon as the war broke out. We simply didn't have the means, I mean it would take at least 3 hours to do a job like that message there. By that time the information was not even wanted. So, we had this coming and going. We moved our office right into the RAAF headquarters.

CWC. They had the machines then, too, didn't they?

O'D. No, sir, they did not. They had—I can assure you that Col. Merle Smith went into it to the last detail, no violations of any security.

CWC. Oh, no; I wasn't think about that. Mine was just a question of the time factor. There is one question I want to ask you. This has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Were you aware of that convoy which was at sea when Pearl Harbor hit?

O'D. Yes, sir.

CWC. Were you aware of the correspondence when they sent it all over the whole damned South Pacific?

O'D. Then, sir, we started getting messages from General [12295] Marshall in a code that was, at first one message came and we didn't have the code. They repeated the message in a different code, and we had that code, and curiously went through that and got that, it was a double transposition which, of course, didn't use the book. We got that, and, of course, that was a long one there again. We were having our troubles. We got that deciphered, and it was from General Marshall, and we called that the *Pensacola*, sir, that was under escort by one cruiser, which was the *Pensacola*. We would do about 10 of those in 1 message, sir. One little error in the first, and you go back and do the whole thing over again, and you can't tell until after you've finished that you've made an error, when you start to get your word groups. But we had heard, we got several cables about the arrival of the *Pensacola* convoy, including what was on it. As I remember, there were A-24's and P-40's. There were, I think, 26 P-40's and 18 A-24's. Immediately Sir Charles Burnett wanted to know what was the A-24. Well, sir, frankly the means at our disposal there, the Air Force manuals on what the A-24's were, we didn't get far, and that was a little annoying.

CWC. That was that Mitchell dive bomber?

O'D. That's right, sir; single engine, and, of course, the [12296] A-20 was a twin engine, and the question in Sir Charles Burnett's mind was, is it a single engine or is it a twin engine. They wanted those planes, and they had to make arrangements for staging areas for them and discharge and so forth, and it was rather difficult to do without that information. Still, by the time we wired to Washington to ask them (we didn't of course, because, with everything happening all over) they were going to land. They were due on the 23d of December, sir. They arrived in Brisbane, and we went up to Brisbane to meet the convoy.

CWC. Some of my old gang in the Second Air Force were on that. That interceptor outfit that came out with them.

O'D. Yes, sir; they were destined, of course, for the Philippines and South Hawaii. General Brereton had sent a mission down. General MacArthur had sent General Brereton with a mission of about eight men, eight officers, from the Philippines in the latter part of November, and General Brereton had arrived at Darwin and Col. Merle Smith went up to Darwin and flew over to Rabaul with them, and I met them in Brisbane and they went on this mission. They were primarily concerned with the fueling facilities for B-17's being flown out from Hawaii via Rabaul, Darwin, and then up through the Indies to the Philippines. They were trying [12297] to arrange for petrol from the Shell Oil Co. and airports, airports principally. That was where we got about a 60-day start, not quite that, about a 45-day start on building airports around Darwin which were later used when they evacuated the B-17's, these strips through the jungle. General Brereton, of course, had come down in plain clothes. He wouldn't have been allowed in the country in uniform at that time. He had flown down here, and we took them all around looking for airports where we could land them. Then, of course, this *Pensacola* convoy came in.

CWC. Yes; I remember all those things. Well, I don't think there is anything else unless you have something you want to add to what you have said.

O'D. No, sir; I just wanted you to have—

CWC. All right. Well, I'm awfully glad you came in, and I appreciate your taking the trouble. It's nice to have seen you.

O'D. Thank you very much, sir.

[12298] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee finished with Colonel Bratton last evening.

Mr. Keefe, Senator Ferguson said he thought you might want to ask him some questions. I went over and asked Mr. Gearhart, and he said he did not know of any questions you wanted to ask him, and we excused Colonel Bratton.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think it should appear that I stated to you before that time—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you allow me to finish my statement, I am covering that, Senator. If you look at last night's record you will see where I said Senator Brewster had suggested to me that Mr. Keefe might want to ask some questions.

Senator BREWSTER. I said he did want to ask some questions. There is no "might" about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I went over to ask Mr. Gearhart.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Gearhart and I, all three of us made statements that appear in last night's record. There isn't any difficulty about the matter. I excused Colonel Bratton with the understanding that he would come back this morning if Mr. Keefe did want to ask some questions.

Will you please step aside, Colonel Sadtler, and let Colonel Bratton come forward, if he is here?

[12299] **TESTIMONY OF COL. RUFUS S. BRATTON, UNITED STATES ARMY—(Resumed)**<sup>1</sup>

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel, Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.

Mr. KEEFE. I regret, Mr. Chairman, that it was impossible for me to be here last evening, but I think my attendance in previous hearings justifies my being away for a couple of hours last night.

Colonel Bratton, when you testified before the Army board you were under oath, were you not, to tell the truth?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You understood that oath?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you undertook to tell the truth to that board?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew at that time, did you, that the testimony which you were giving before that board might affect the lives and welfare of many men?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you knew that that board might use your testimony that you gave as the basis of assessing responsibility for the tragedy at Pearl Harbor?

[12300] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And with that full knowledge you went before that board and testified in answer to specific questions that were propounded to you, did you not?

<sup>1</sup> Col. Bratton's testimony begins in Hearings, Part 9, p. 4508.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12301] Mr. KEEFE. I understand your explanation to be, and if I am in error, you correct me, that you endeavored to give the impression to this board that when you testified before the Army board, you had not had an opportunity to refresh your recollection by examination of documents and consultation with other people, and that you were flown over here from Europe, that you were tired and dirty and dusty and that you went before the Army board somewhat cold without sufficient preparation; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, granted that all of those things were true, in the face of the realization that what you testified to was supposed to be the truth, I want to call your attention to the examination appearing on page 237 and subsequent pages of the Army board transcript, and to questions that were asked you by Colonel Toulmin.

You understand that as a witness, Colonel Bratton, if you do not recall a fact, that you are interrogated about, it is always the privilege of the witness to say, "I do not remember"?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or "I have no recollection on the subject"?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But when a direct question is asked, and [12302] you testify without equivocation and without qualification, under oath, the people who hear that testimony should have a right to rely upon the fact that you have told the truth. Isn't that true?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then [reading]:

Colonel TOULMIN. —

Colonel BRATTON. May I ask, sir, what page you are reading from?

Mr. KEEFE. I am starting at the bottom of page 236. I will ask you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers:

Colonel TOULMIN. I am aware of that, but you don't answer my question. Why weren't the first thirteen parts, which were considered important enough by the Navy to be delivered to the President and to everyone of the important Admirals in the Navy Department delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of Staff, and his attention called to it, so he could have taken some action upon it? That's what puzzles me.

Colonel BRATTON. You are referring, now, to the Japanese reply?

Colonel TOULMIN. To the 13 parts.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes—not to the short message?

[12303] Colonel TOULMIN. Not to the short message. I am talking about the evening of December 6, and they were in English by 9 or 10 o'clock. The President of the United States and the leading Admirals of the Navy Department all had that message before midnight, most of them by ten or eleven o'clock. You had it in the early evening also.

What I am trying to find out is why it was that the Chief of Staff was not called and advised, as were others, that this important document had been received. In view of the tenor of its contents, it hardly needed the 14th paragraph to be conclusive as to its intent and contents; and why did not the Chief of Staff get that message?

Colonel BRATTON. I am trying to remember, sir, what I did with the copies that went to General Miles and General Marshall and General Gerow. I can't verify it or prove it at this time, but my recollection is that those three officers got their copies the evening of the 6th.

Colonel TOULMIN. By "the three officers" you mean whom?

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall, General Miles, and General Gerow. Now it was my practice to deliver them their copies before I went to the State Department.

Colonel TOULMIN. That was your practice?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12304] Colonel TOULMIN. Did you deliver this copy, for instance, to General Marshall personally on the evening of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. No; I very seldom delivered it to him in person. I gave it to his secretary, in a locked bag.

Colonel TOULMIN. And you gave it to General Miles in that way, on the evening of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. I generally took them into his office and handed them to him, and if he wasn't there, I left it with the executive secretary, Major, now Colonel, Smith.

Colonel TOULMIN. We are now talking about the evening before, Saturday evening, December 6.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. Is it your recollection that you handed this important, long, 13-part message to General Miles on that evening?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Is it your recollection you handed that long 13-part message on that evening to the secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And it is your recollection that you handed it on that evening of December 6 to General Gerow, [12305] or some representative of General Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you hand it to General Gerow directly, or to his secretary.

I am reading on page 238.

Colonel BRATTON. To his executive secretary.

Colonel TOULMIN. Who was he?

Colonel BRATTON. The executive?

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Gailey.

Colonel TOULMIN. And what is the name of the secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now lieutenant general.

Colonel TOULMIN. And after this, you then went over and delivered it to the Secretary of State in the locked pouch for and on his behalf, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; to the watch officer in the State Department.

Colonel TOULMIN. To the watch officer, about 10 or 10:30 on that Saturday evening, December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct.

Colonel TOULMIN. Now, having made these deliveries, Colonel, to these four recipients, the Chief of Staff, the [12306] Chief of G-2, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of State, did you get any reaction to that message until the following day?

Colonel BRATTON. What do you mean by "reaction," Colonel?

Colonel TOULMIN. Did they answer it? Did they act upon it, did they mention it, did they discuss it, did they call you, did they look at it, to your knowledge? Or, put it in the negative—did they do nothing about it, so far as you know?

Colonel BRATTON. I had some discussions of the message, as I remember now, with General Miles, indicating to him that the final part was yet to come. It did not come in until the following morning. The reaction from General Marshall was a reading and a discussion of the entire communication.

General FRANK. That night?

Colonel BRATTON. No.

General FRANK. Or the following morning?

Colonel BRATTON. The following morning.

Colonel TOULMIN. Let us confine ourselves to the night of December 6, now.

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Colonel TOULMIN. Let us confine ourselves to the night [12307] of December 6, for the moment, at least.

Now, did you talk to General Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not talk to General Marshall the night of the 6th.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you talk to General Miles on the night of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection is that I did, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. You talked to him on the phone, or in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. No; I believe I talked to him in his office.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk to him in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. My memory on that is not clear even today, sir, but I do know that I talked to him over the telephone because I have conferred with General Miles on that subject; we have both refreshed our memories on the point, and I now know that I did talk to him on the telephone that night at about 11:30. I don't believe I talked to him in his office on the night of the 6th. I did talk to him in his office on the afternoon of the 6th in connection with another message, the so-called pilot message.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I am intrigued somewhat by the fact that Captain Kramer testified that he had no recollection that General Miles was at the home of Admiral Wilkinson [12308] until he was told later. His first testimony was that only Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner were there. Then he was refreshed by someone later to the effect that General Miles was there.

Now, you testified before the Army board that General Miles was at his office, and you talked with him.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, this was Saturday afternoon.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it true?

Colonel BRATTON. Saturday afternoon, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I am talking about Saturday evening when you delivered this message.

Colonel BRATTON. I think I have already answered that question. My recollection is now that I did not talk to him in his office on Saturday night, but I did talk to him over the telephone.

Mr. KEEFE. When do you expect the members of the committee are going to know when the truth is being told in this proceeding?

Colonel BRATTON. I was telling the truth on all occasions in which I testified before any board in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair to the best of my ability, and I am still doing so.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is truth dependent upon a man's ability to say a thing?

[12309] Colonel BRATTON. No; it is dependent upon his ability to recollect details of events.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me read these questions to you, and ask you if you made these answers. Page 241:

Colonel TOULMIN. And how about General Smith? Did you get any reaction from him, or any reaction, rather?

Colonel BRATTON. No. General Smith did not have access to these pouches. You mean General Bedell Smith?

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. He didn't have a key to the bag.

General RUSSELL. What was his relation?

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall's secretary.

General RUSSELL. Well, he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's copy, was he not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall had the key.

You didn't qualify your answer and say:

I don't recollect whether I gave it to him or not, but my present recollection is that I did.

Colonel BRATTON. I beg your pardon, I did.

Mr. KEEFE. In this answer?

Colonel BRATTON. On page 307 in the same document you are looking at, the third line:

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir; to the best of [12310] my knowledge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was Colonel Smith—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, your recollection is that it was Colonel Smith and your recollection is that it might have been somebody else, but your recollection is positive that you delivered that message to the office of the Chief of Staff that night; that is what you testified before this Army board wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. In one sense, yes, sir; but I qualified—

Mr. KEEFE. You gave no reservations.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Let the witness finish.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, this witness is entitled to respect.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him answer. Complete your answer, Colonel.

Colonel BRATTON. I qualified that statement, and a number of other statements throughout the testimony of mine before the Army board by saying that that was the best of my belief, I thought so; it was the way I recollected it at the time, or that I was not sure, or some other such [12311] qualification, some other such qualifying phrase.

Mr. KEEFE. What changed your belief?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. What changed your belief?

Colonel BRATTON. A number of facts that were presented to me subsequent to this.

Mr. KEEFE. When were they presented to you?

Colonel BRATTON. That I had not recollected at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. When—

Senator LUCAS. Let him answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel BRATTON. As I stated to the committee last night, there were a number of facts that were brought to my attention subsequent to this date which materially modified my recollection of the details of events on the night of the 6th, and the morning of the 7th of December, 1941.

In the first place, when I testified before the Army board I did not at that time remember that Colonel Dusenbury was working with me in the office that night. When I worked over this stuff, this magic, alone, there was one standard operating procedure that was followed with respect to its processing and delivery. When I had help in the person of [12312] Colonel Dusenbury, of one of my other assistants, we used another method, particularly with respect to the delivery of the pouches.

When I had two assistants, there was still another standard operating procedure.

Now, that is one fact that was brought to my attention.

When Colonel Clausen interviewed me in Europe he invited my attention to a number of affidavits signed by General Gerow, General Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Gailey, and a number of other officers, to the effect that they did not receive these pouches from G-2 on the night of the 6th.

As I stated to the committee last night, I know all of these officers; they are men of honor, and integrity, and if they say that they didn't receive the pouches from me, or Colonel Dusenbury, or one of my assistants, then my recollection must have been at fault and I so admit.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to read these questions to you and ask you whether they were submitted to you, and did you make these answers.

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. I want to ask you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers.

General RUSSELL—

[12313] Colonel BRATTON. What page, may I ask, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Page 242.

General RUSSELL. Well he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's copy, was he not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall had the key.

General RUSSELL. Did you know what Bedell Smith did with it?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you tell him that it was an important document in the locked pouch?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that the Chief of Staff should know about it.

Colonel BRATTON. Should see it right away.

Colonel TOULMIN. What was General Smith's response—that he would get in touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not?

Colonel BRATTON. It must have been because if it had been otherwise, it would have registered on my memory.

Colonel TOULMIN. And about what time in the evening was it when General Smith was told there was an important document in that locked pouch for General Marshall, and that his attention should be called to it?

[12314] Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember that, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that was on the evening of December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Were those questions asked you, and did you make those answers?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[12315] Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, then, the next time that you had any discussion about this matter was when you were interviewed by Colonel Clausen, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When was the next time?

Colonel BRATTON. If you will turn over, sir, to page 279—

Mr. KEEFE. No; I mean the next time after that Army Board report. Do you want to refer to some other evidence in the Army Board?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. If you will turn over to page 279 you will see further reference to this incident in the middle of the page. [Reading:]

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. When I last appeared before the Board I was somewhat puzzled by what I considered at that time an over-emphasis placed by the Board on two messages. One was the implementation of the winds-weather code. The other was this fourteen part ultimatum. I was considerably puzzled at the time by the insistence of the Board that these were vitally important documents, and I had the feeling that there was something missing, that they had no longer the significance after the 3rd of December, in my mind, that the Board attributed to them. I find, I think I know now [12316] why I had this feeling.



A search of the files in G-2 as of the day before yesterday and yesterday brought to light a carbon copy of a chronologically arranged series of extracts from intercepted Japanese communications which I prepared sometime after Pearl Harbor for the Chief of Staff. In glancing through this document I find that there was a message which I had forgotten when I appeared before you last; dispatch from Tokyo on the 2nd of December, to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. It was interpreted, or rather it was translated on the 3rd and presumably placed in my hands on that date.

General FRANK. During what month?

General RUSSELL. December 3, 1941, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. December 1941, sir. And it is listed here on my paper as S. I. S. 25640, and the extract that I have on this paper reads as follows:—

Then the message is quoted.

After the receipt of this translation any further intercepts that were brought to me would simply contribute toward the climax that I saw coming. That was it.

Then we branched off into a long discussion of this winds code business and I never did get back to an explanation of the 13 parts of the 14-part ultimatum. It [12317] slipped my mind and that of the board apparently.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you telling us this to imply that if you had gotten back to the 13th part you would have changed the testimony that you had given before the board?

Colonel BRATTON. Exactly that.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that what you want to tell us?

Colonel BRATTON. Exactly that, and as I testified before the committee yesterday, if I had had an opportunity to review or edit this testimony before leaving Washington in the fall of 1944 I would have corrected many of the conflicting and contradictory statements that now appear therein. I did not have that opportunity.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is it your understanding that witnesses testifying in important matters before boards or commissions or courts have the right to examine their testimony that they have given under oath and correct it from time to time and day to day?

Colonel BRATTON. Certainly. I was told that I had that privilege by the president of the board.

Mr. KEEFE. When was that?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember the exact date. It was on the occasion of one of my appearances before the Army board. I asked that specific question, if I would be given an opportunity to review my testimony and make such corrections [12318] as were necessary.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you knew at the time you had concluded your testimony before the Army board that your testimony was in error as to the delivery of the first 13 parts of this Japanese reply, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. No; I did not know that and I did not say that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I understood you to say that had you had the opportunity to correct your testimony you would have corrected it in that particular. Did I misunderstand you?

Colonel BRATTON. I think I would have corrected many of the contradictions and conflicting statements that appear in this record, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the most conflicting statement that appears in this record in conflict with your affidavit given to Colonel Clausen is with respect to the delivery of this 13-part message.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to ask you the direct question: Do you mean to tell this committee that you were not given the right to correct your testimony before the Army board and that had you had that opportunity and not gone off on a tangent discussing the winds code and gotten lost in a mirage of discussion relating to the winds code that you would have [12319] corrected your testimony in respect to the delivery or failure of delivery or lack of delivery of the 13-part message? That is what I would like to get clear.

Colonel BRATTON. I did not say that I did not have the opportunity to review this testimony. As I testified before the committee yesterday, I was accorded that right. I also testified before the committee that my commanding general in Europe had instructed me to return as soon as I could be released from temporary duty in Washington. The testimony was not available for my review on the two occasions that I returned to the Grunert board for the purpose of checking over typographical and other errors therein and as time was passing by I left Washington without reviewing this testimony. I was anxious to get back to my command post.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you did not answer my question at all. Colonel. You are just rambling. I want to ask this question of you now:

You have stated to this board this morning and specifically referred to the testimony which you read at some length into the record, that you got into a discussion before the board relating to the winds message and that you did not get a chance to talk about the 13-part message. Did I misunderstand you?

Colonel BRATTON. You misunderstood me, sir. I did not [12320] say that I did not get a chance. I said that my initial reference to the second message, which was the Japanese reply, slipped my memory later on in the course of the questioning. I did not get back to it because we had gotten way off the track and I forgot about it. Apparently no member of the board remembered that that was one of the messages that I wanted to discuss.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, how many times did you appear before the Army board?

Colonel BRATTON. Three times.

Mr. KEEFE. You had three opportunities to tell your story or make any corrections you wanted to, didn't you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, and I think if you will examine this testimony you will see that I made a number of corrections and changes each time I appeared.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. I have read it and studied it very carefully and I am very familiar with it, I assure you.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you went back to Europe?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were there confronted by or met Major Clausen?

Colonel BRATTON. About a year later.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And you finally got to Paris where you [12321] discussed this matter with him?

Colonel BRATTON. I gave my affidavit in Paris; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, didn't you discuss anything with him before you gave that affidavit?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, sir, just to clear up any misapprehension that may be in your mind, sir, I would like to explain why I gave my affidavit in Paris.

Mr. KEEFE. No, I would like to have you answer my question, please, if you will. Before you made this affidavit or signed it did you discuss the facts with Major Clausen?

Colonel BRATTON. On numerous occasions, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now go ahead, Colonel. If you want to make an explanation, you are entitled to make it.

Colonel BRATTON. When I first encountered Colonel Clausen I was on the autobahn encircling Berlin on my way to the British sector headquarters. A British car overtook me and pulled over to the right of the road and flagged me down.

Colonel Clausen stepped out and he presented me with his credentials, identified himself, said what his mission was, said that he was looking for me and that he had authority to interrogate me. I took him and his baggage into my car and after I had completed my business up in the British sector took him to my billet, which was the billet of the Chief of Staff and the officers on the General Staff of the United States [12322] District Headquarters. We put him up there; he became a part of our mess.

It developed that the papers that he had had been left in Paris locked up in a safe at G-2 of the same base sector. He sent a radiogram to G-2 in Paris requesting that these papers be flown up by officer courier to Berlin so that they could be utilized in his questioning of myself. G-2 of the same base sector refused to do this on the ground that they were top secret material and for security reasons could not be flown over enemy territory for fear the plane would crash and the documents would fall into the wrong hands. It then became necessary for Colonel Clausen and myself to go to where the papers were so that I could see what it was he wanted to question me about, look at the affidavits that he had and make such correction of my previous testimony as might be necessary or make such comment as seemed called for upon the affidavits which were in Paris. That is why the affidavit was given in Paris.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your evidence on this?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that all you want to say?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

[12323] Mr. KEEFE. All right. When you got to Paris, then, you had all these affidavits before you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you in a hotel room?

Colonel BRATTON. I was in one of the officers' billets of the same base sector. That headquarters had taken over a number of hotels in Paris for that purpose. They were run as billets for officers.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Colonel BRATTON. This happened to be the Hotel Prince of Wales.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I will refer to it as a hotel. You can refer to it as a billet.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. It was a hotel, wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. It was a hotel.

Mr. KEEFE. And you and Clausen sat down in a room in that hotel, did you not?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And discussed the testimony that you had given before the Army Board?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, do you remember that discussion?

Colonel BRATTON. Not in any detail; no, sir.

[12324] Mr. KEEFE. Do you remember what Colonel Clausen said to you?

Colonel BRATTON. He showed me the statements and affidavits made by various officers that he had reached and run down all over the world, bearing upon the delivery of the 13 parts of this 14-part message, among other things.

He had some notes in his possession, transcribed notes from my testimony before the Grunert Board. He said:

Now, after you have read these affidavits and considered the matter and tried to refresh your memory on the thing, do you wish to make any comment on this point that you covered in your testimony before the Grunert Board?

Mr. KEEFE. And then he gave you these affidavits, the affidavits of Clyde Dusenbury, Moses Pettigrew, Ralph Smith, Charles Gailey, Tom Betts, Walter B. Smith, Leonard T. Gerow, Robert Schukraft, John F. Stone, and George Renchard, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. I read them all, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You read those affidavits?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when you got through reading the affidavits, what happened then?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I made some statement to Colonel [12325] Clausen to the effect that in the light of the evidence before me now it seems advisable for me to modify some of the statements that I gave before the Grunert Board.

Mr. KEEFE. Anything else?

Colonel BRATTON (reading):

All right. Suppose we draft up what it is you would like to say now?

Mr. KEEFE. That is Colonel Clausen speaking?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

All right, suppose we draft up what you want to say now.

Colonel BRATTON. Then he got a pencil and paper and, as I remember it, I dictated what I thought I should say in modification of my original statement and I made corrections as we went along and he made suggestions as to arrangement of the material. Finally we got it all in shape in pencil. Then he put a piece of paper into the typewriter and typed it. I read the thing over and as I recall now I made a number of suggestions and corrections in the typewritten copy. I don't remember now whether it was retyped or not.

After I was satisfied that the document before me represented my best recollection at that time, I signed it.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you sworn?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you signed it?

[12326] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is the affidavit that is before us?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, but I want to make it perfectly clear that no pressure was put on me.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes.

Colonel BRATTON. I was not coerced in any way whatsoever.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes.

Colonel BRATTON. The statement or affidavit that I gave was given freely, of my own accord.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I understand that, you said that. It appears quite clear.

Well, now, in your affidavit which has been offered in evidence you say this:

The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when I was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office.

Is that correct, that it was coming in in the evening?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes. By "evening" I mean somewhere from 5 o'clock on.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I find that in some portions of the country they refer to "evening" as any time after 12 o'clock noon. Now, just what did you have in mind when you said it started coming in in the evening?

[12327] Mr. RICHARDSON. He just told you, Congressman. Five o'clock.

Mr. KEEFE. Did I understand you to say some time after 5 o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. Or thereabouts, sir. I don't remember the exact hour when any one of the parts first reached my desk.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

We assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o'clock P. M.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you made that statement in your affidavit had you read the affidavit of Dusenbury?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I had read all the affidavits that Colonel Clausen had with him.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Dusenbury's affidavit in that respect says:

I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 P. M. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being [12328] the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did that statement of Dusenbury's refresh your recollection any when you were talking with Colonel Clausen?

Colonel BRATTON. Not at all. Colonel Dusenbury is at present on duty in Washington in G-2, War Department General Staff. He is available as a witness before this committee. If you call him I think he will contradict every statement that he made in that affidavit be-

cause his recollection now as to what happened on the evening of Saturday the 6th is even worse than mine.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, but, Colonel—

Colonel BRATTON. There are obvious errors in that affidavit. It has been proved—

Mr. KEEFE. Did you recognize them as errors when you read his affidavit over there in the hotel in Paris?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Read him the question, please.

(Question read.)

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; I recognized at that time that several of the statements he made in there could not be correct.

[12329] Mr. KEEFE. So his affidavit did not refresh you any as to the events, did it?

Colonel BRATTON. Only to the extent of reminding me that he was with me in the office that evening. Up until that moment I had forgotten that Colonel Dusenbury and I were working together that evening.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in your affidavit you say further:

After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe was either Colonel Schukraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was not, as there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then assembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients.

That was your normal practice, wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. When the two of us worked together that was our operating procedure; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when a message of this kind came in it was operating procedure to deliver it to those who were entitled to receive that message?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And so your affidavit is as given to Colonel Clausen that you did assemble this information for the pur- [12330]  
pose of making delivery to the authorized recipients.

Colonel BRATTON. That is the statement that I made in my affidavit, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you say in your affidavit:

I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff to his home in Fort Myer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. This was about ten o'clock P. M.

Colonel BRATTON. That was our—

Mr. KEEFE. Did you deliver it to Colonel Dusenbury?

Colonel BRATTON. That was our normal practice and procedure, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you deliver this pouch to Colonel Dusenbury and instruct him to deliver it to General Marshall's home at Fort Myer?

Colonel BRATTON. That was my recollection when I made that statement. I know now that I did not and I just—

Mr. KEEFE. So again we go from one step to the other. So the affidavit that you gave to Colonel Clausen was in error then?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you find that out?

Colonel BRATTON. Upon my return to Washington this time, sir.

[12331] Mr. KEEFE. Who told you?

Colonel BRATTON. No one told me. I deduced that from conversations that I had had with General Miles, Colonel Dusenbury, Colonel Pettigrew, General Gerow and from an examination of documents in the files of the War Department which up to that time I had not had access to.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, that is a very general statement, Colonel. I am referring now to a situation that involved yourself and Colonel Dusenbury.

You state that you two assembled this material and that you gave that material to Colonel Dusenbury with instructions that he deliver it to the Chief of Staff at his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. Now, either you did or you did not, give that information to him and those directions. What is the fact now? Did you or did you not give those directions?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then your affidavit in that respect was false, was it not?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute. Just for the sake of the committee I think that we should have some understanding with reference to the use—Mr. Keefe did it before with a witness— [12332] as to whether he is charging the witness with committing perjury or whether he is charging that the witness made an incorrect statement.

Now, I don't care how it is but I really think it would be for the advantage of our proceedings if when a charge of falsity based upon perjury is made the witness is given to understand that is the point of it, as distinguished from calling the witness' attention to an incorrect statement in the testimony.

Now, we had that word the other day with Kramer I think, which had to be corrected later and I simply bring it up now, not as criticism of the Congressman at all, but simply if that is his purpose in asking the question that the witness be given that definite information.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the distinguished counsel, I think, is very familiar with the fact that there is a great distinction between perjury and false swearing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is no—

Mr. KEEFE. There couldn't by any possible stretch of the imagination be any charge of perjury when there is false swearing in the making of an affidavit.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not know, sir, that there is any difference between—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there is a difference under any rule of [12333] law.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute. I don't understand there is any difference in this proceeding between a charge of false swearing and a charge of perjury.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand there is in the law of the land and I will demonstrate it to you conclusively. I will go further and say that this man when he made the statement before Colonel Clausen and took an oath in an affidavit that he could not be guilty of perjury. Perjury must be willful and knowing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So must false swearing.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Both perjury and false swearing are indictable offenses, and it does not make much difference what the technical difference in definition may be.

Mr. KEEFE. One is a felony and the other is a misdemeanor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It depends upon the particular State.

The CHAIRMAN. It depends on the State. Proceed, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, we may get the law—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Either one is a misdemeanor in any State.

Mr. KEEFE. We may get the law defined in a short time [12334] from what I read in the paper this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what that has to do with this hearing, whether it has any relation to this testimony or this investigation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. KEEFE. Let us not split hairs about it, Colonel.

Colonel BRATTON. My answer to your question was "No, sir."

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is it your testimony today that when you read these affidavits that Colonel Clausen had submitted to you that your memory was refreshed and that is what prompted you to change the testimony you had given before the Army Board?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I am limiting it to Colonel Dusenbury's affidavit.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You say that there isn't anything that is true in that affidavit?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I did not say that.

Mr. KEEFE. What did you say?

Colonel BRATTON. I said that there are several statements therein that are obviously incorrect and can be so proved.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you make a distinction between truth [12335] and incorrect statements, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. Very definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. I see; all right. We are getting into very fine distinctions now.

Senator LUCAS. The Congressman makes the fine distinctions.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to turn to the affidavit of Bedell Smith. Did that influence you to any extent in changing your testimony?

Colonel BRATTON. Why, yes, sir. If Colonel Smith stated that he was not on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff Saturday night I accept that statement as being the truth and I could not have delivered this pouch to him that night. I know Colonel Smith. Obviously, my memory had been at fault when I made the original statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you referred to the fact that—I have some difficulty in finding Bedell Smith's affidavit, but in view of the fact that you referred also to the affidavit of Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith as one of the affidavits that refreshed your recollection I want to refer to that affidavit. What was there in his affidavit that refreshed your recollection?

Colonel BRATTON. I could not possibly have given a pouch to Gen. Ralph Smith on the night of Saturday, December the [12336] 6th because at that time Gen. Ralph Smith was on a train headed for Fort Benning, Ga. I was to have been a member of that same group.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you testify that you had delivered it to Gen. Ralph Smith?



Colonel BRATTON. I did in the proceedings before the Grunert Board; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So when Gen. Ralph Smith said he was not there, he was on a train going to Fort Benning, Ga.—

Colonel BRATTON. I know that he was.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he says that in his affidavit.

Colonel BRATTON. I would have been with him.

Mr. KEEFE. He says that in his affidavit.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you find that out?

Colonel BRATTON. Find what out?

Mr. KEEFE. That he was on a train going to Fort Benning that night? You indicated that you were supposed to be on that same train.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I remembered it when I read his affidavit. I said, "Why, of course this is correct, I remember now."

Mr. KEEFE. And that is the refreshing that you got from his affidavit?

[12337] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Those facts did not come to you when you were testifying before the Army board?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not remember them at that time, no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What was there in the affidavit of Charles Gailey that refreshed your recollection?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember now what General Gailey said.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he says this:

Specifically with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941 I do not recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from any other person.

He is testifying from his recollection he did not recall it. You did recall it before the Army board.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I may be able to clear this up a little bit by saying that what I told this Army board was my best recollection at the time. I was repeating to them a procedure that I had followed over and over and over again. I was remembering the delivery of some other message. I had done it that way countless number of times.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Bedell Smith's affidavit with respect to this incident, Colonel Bratton, reads as follows:

[12338] To the best of my recollection I left the office at about the usual time the evening of 6 December 1941, that is about seven P. M., turning over to the night duty officer. I am quite certain I was not at the office after ten P. M.

I repeat that:

I am quite certain that I was not at the office after ten P. M. If the intercepted radio messages referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or the night duty officer it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which I have previously described and unless the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel Bratton he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents, as neither I nor any other officer in the secretariat was classified as "Ultra." If he had been informed of the contents or of the urgent nature it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or someone other than myself.

Now, just how did that refresh your recollection?

Colonel BRATTON. I accept that as his best recollection when he made that statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he says that to the best of his recollection he was not there after seven and then he says that he [12339] is certain that he was not there after 10 p. m. He may have been there up to 10, however, up to 10 p. m.

Colonel BRATTON. All right, he may have been there then, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you may have delivered it to him there then up to 10 p. m., isn't that true?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't think now that I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, at least according to his affidavit he has no clear recollection when he left the office and that the only thing he is certain about in his affidavit is that he was not there after 10 p. m.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So it is possible he may have been there when you, as you testified, delivered it to him about 10 p. m.

Colonel BRATTON. That is what I testified to before the Grunert Board; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you want to say that that affidavit refreshed your recollection so that you now are of the opinion that you did not make any such delivery to him?

Colonel BRATTON. That was one of the contributing factors; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now I refer to the affidavit of General Gerow and this is what he says:

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is [12340] stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect:

(3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843. My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows:

And then he referred to 3:

I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me.

Now, he says:

I did not receive or see any parts of the message. I did not receive or see the 13 parts of the message or the fourteenth part until the morning of December 7—and if he had seen it on the evening of the 6th he would have immediately warned the overseas commanders.

Now, is it because General Gerow makes that statement that your recollection was refreshed so that you can now state with certainty that neither Colonel Dusenbury or you delivered the first 13 parts to him on the evening of the 6th of December 1941?

[12341] Colonel BRATTON. Mr. Keefe, the preponderance of evidence indicates that my memory was at fault when I made these statements before the Grunert Board. To say that any one statement made by any one man got me to change my mind is not correct. If General Gerow said that he did not receive the 13 parts or the fourteenth part until the morning of the 7th of December 1941, then I probably did not deliver that message to him or to his executive officer on Saturday

night. I know General Gerow, I have known him for a long time. He would make no such statement as that unless it represented his best belief at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, when Colonel Clausen showed you these affidavits you became convinced that the preponderance of evidence was that you were in error?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then you tried to set down meticulously to Colonel Clausen what the facts were, that is correct, isn't it, as you then remembered them?

Colonel BRATTON. I tried to modify my statement to make it what was my best recollection when I signed that affidavit.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is when you made the statement that you directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at Fort Meyer on his way home to Arlington?

[12342] Colonel BRATTON. That is so, sir. We had done that on numerous previous occasions and I was simply remembering something that had happened before.

Mr. KEEFE. You did deliver them to the State Department, you remember that?

Colonel BRATTON. Definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. That night?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what was there in the affidavits that were shown you by Clausen that got you to make this statement in your affidavit that you had directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the 13-part message to General Marshall?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, the fact that it was recalled to my memory that Colonel Dusenbury was with me that evening. When the two of us worked together and it was necessary to make delivery at an unusual hour, because I lived in one direction from my office and he lived in another direction, we divided the work. On several previous occasions I had made deliveries to the State Department late at night and he had made delivery to General Marshall in his quarters at Fort Meyer. I was remembering one of those previous occasions when I made that statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you were attempting to just reconstruct in your mind something that may have happened, is that right, [12343] when you made that statement?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, and as I have stated to this committee anything beyond what I said to the Grunert Board must necessarily be an attempt on my part to reconstruct the details of events based upon my knowledge of what was my operating procedure at the time under various sets of circumstances.

Mr. KEEFE. And then after you got back to Washington and got to digging into the matter you found that the statement which you made to Colonel Clausen was not in accord with the facts?

Colonel BRATTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you certain that the statements you are making to this committee are in accord with the facts now or might they be refreshed at some later time and be changed?

Colonel BRATTON. They are true to the best of my knowledge and belief at this time.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a question. Do I understand that the Chair recognizes me?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yesterday or last evening you indicated that the winds message as a message did not come into your department. [12344] You heard the testimony under which the Navy had set it up on cards so that it would be telephoned rather than delivered in the usual manner?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have a similar system of cards or any memorandums or papers?

Colonel BRATTON. Not exactly, but—

Senator FERGUSON. What did you have?

Colonel BRATTON. At General Miles' request I wrote out for the office on paper either the Japanese phrase or the English translation or both, indicating below the meaning, so that if I had to call him up at any unusual hour in his quarters I could repeat one of these phrases to him in a guarded way and he would know what I was talking about. I also carried one of those slips of paper around in my pocket; I believe Colonel Dusenbury did, too. I don't know whether I gave one to Colonel Sadtler or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give one to the Secretary of State?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. I knew that if the imple- [12345] mentation of the winds code ever came in and came to the attention of Colonel Dusenbury, myself, or General Miles, we would know what to do about it with respect to those other officers.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not set up a system then the same as the Navy?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you handed it on to two or three officers, you had a system whereby you gave them memoranda that they could refer to if you telephoned them?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask one question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. There was a good deal of flurry yesterday about this fellow Lieutenant O'Dell. Who was he, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. As I understand it, sir, he was an assistant to Col. Merle Smith, who was our military observer out in Australia.

Senator LUCAS. Well, what authority did Merle Smith have with respect to sending cables to Australia or communicating with any foreign government with respect to tense situations between this country and Japan or any other nation?

Colonel BRATTON. His position was analogous to that of [12346] a military attaché, sir, and before we sent him down there he was

accredited to the Australian Government as a military observer and he was furnished with certain codes and ciphers for use in communicating with G-2 or the War Department in Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. In the record this morning I placed the rest of the O'Dell testimony to the effect that the dispatch from Australia was sent to the Philippines and Hawaii, that they anticipated an attack on the Indies, somewhere down in there, and never anticipated any on Pearl Harbor. That is in the record offered this morning.

Senator LUCAS. What I was trying to get clear in my own mind is with respect to this testimony that O'Dell gave before someone in connection with one of these investigations.

Colonel BRATTON. Before the Clarke inquiry, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. What I want to find out is this. Now, O'Dell testified as follows:

However, within an hour and a half after we had gotten there some additional things came in, the exact nature of which I was not told at the time, but when we went out Colonel Merle Smith said that he had prepared a cable which he had to send out and the principal part of [12347] it was that the movement of this convoy was there and that the Dutch had ordered the execution of Rainbow Plan A-2—

and so forth.

What I want to find out is, what authority, if any, did Colonel Smith have as a colonel to send out a cable of this importance? Wasn't that up to somebody else? Wouldn't that have to go through somebody higher than Colonel Smith to send a cable of this kind?

Colonel BRATTON. He was the highest ranking American officer in Australia, sir, and was a representative of G-2.

Senator LUCAS. Well, do I understand that Smith at the time was serving in Australia, Colonel Smith was serving in Australia?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And was O'Dell serving with him out there?

Colonel BRATTON. That is my belief; yes, sir; as his assistant.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. That is what I wanted to get straightened out in my mind. Now, just wait, Colonel, one thing more.

[12348] Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel, I want to get myself oriented in connection with Congressman Keefe's examination.

If either the 13 part message or the 14th part message was to be delivered to General Marshall on the evening of the 6th of December it would have to be delivered by either you or Dusenbury?

Colonel BRATTON. Through us, yes, sir; out of my office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And either you or Dusenbury would know how the delivery of that message to Marshall was to be made?

Colonel BRATTON. We ought to; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You did not make any delivery to Marshall that evening of either the 13 parts or the 14th part message?

Colonel BRATTON. Not in person; no, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you now have been convinced, by your contact with Dusenbury, that he did not?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then am I to understand that it is your present recollection and belief that no copy of either the 13 parts or the 14th part message went to General Marshall on the evening of December 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. That is my present belief; yes, sir.

[12349] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that the first time General Marshall saw either the 13 parts message or the 14th part message was when he got to his office sometime between 11 and 12 o'clock on Sunday morning, December 7?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not think General Marshall saw either the 13 or the 14th part of the 14-part message until sometime in the morning of the 7th of December.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that occasion was when he came, after his horseback ride, to his office, and found the message there then?

Colonel BRATTON. Presumably so; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As far as you know?

Colonel BRATTON. As far as I know.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, one question on that point, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not deliver the message to General Marshall on the morning of the 7th, the 13 parts or the 14th part, did you?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know whether Colonel Dusenbury did?

Colonel BRATTON. He has no definite recollection of it, either.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, could it have been delivered to General [12350] Marshall by anybody else other than you and Dusenbury?

Colonel BRATTON. It could have, but I do not see how at this time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, how did General Marshall get that message then? How did it get on his desk when he came there?

Colonel BRATTON. I think it must have been given by Colonel Dusenbury to Colonel Deane, who was the secretary on duty there on the morning of December 7; and I think Colonel Deane must have taken it in and placed it on General Marshall's desk so it would be there when he arrived.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know this to be a fact?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not know it; no, sir. Colonel Deane has no recollection of it and Colonel Dusenbury has none, and I know I did not put it there.

Mr. KEEFE. He could not have gotten it from General Gerow because there had not been any delivery to General Gerow, as you say.

Colonel BRATTON. By that time in the morning the pouch had been delivered to the War Plans Division; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And had been delivered to General Miles also?

Colonel BRATTON. And General Miles had seen it and read it in his office.

Mr. KEEFE. But you are unable to throw any light, other than what you have said now, on the point as to where [12351] this magic, which was so highly secret, came from that was found on General Marshall's desk when he came into his office that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. I am unable at this time to throw any additional light on that subject, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us the hour that the War Plans received the 13 parts?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not know when the War Plans Division got their 13 parts or the 14th part. As I testified before, the moment I received the 1 p. m. delivery message at about 9 o'clock Sunday morning I left all other deliveries in the hands of my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and took off with this 1 p. m. message and tried to follow it through from that time on.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you give the 1 p. m. message to the War Plans?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not give it to them. General Gerow saw it when he came in with us to General Marshall's office.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked to him on the telephone so that you told him the contents of it?

[12352] Colonel BRATTON. As I testified, sir, I do not remember whether I talked to him on the telephone or whether General Miles did. One of us did.

Senator FERGUSON. At what hour?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, sometime about 9:30, after I had made my initial call trying to trace General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. So the War Plans had notice of the 1 p. m. message at 9:30 either through you or Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I did not say that.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that happen?

Colonel BRATTON. I said I don't think General Gerow knew anything about the 1 p. m. delivery message until he came into the office where General Miles and I were with General Marshall at 11:25.

Senator FERGUSON. 11:25. Now have you any knowledge as to when Gerow or the War Plans got the 13 parts?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about the fourteenth part.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say "no"?

Colonel BRATTON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any knowledge as to when they got the fourteenth part?

[12353] Colonel BRATTON. Only what I heard him say in testimony before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Of your own knowledge, you haven't any?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When counsel asked you the question as to when General Marshall first saw the thirteenth or the fourteenth part, you have no personal knowledge except that you saw them on his desk that morning when he was reading them?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you haven't any other knowledge that he may have seen them before somewhere else?

Colonel BRATTON. I have not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Colonel, for your cooperation in trying to elicit the facts in this case. You are now excused.

Is there any further statement that you wish to make, or any further information that has not been elicited by the questions?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. I have no other testimony to give.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much.

The committee will go into executive session and our [12354] guests will depart as rapidly as possible.

(The witness was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The hearing will be resumed at 1:30.

Colonel Sadtler will please be here at 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the committee recessed to meet in executive session, and to reconvene at 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[12355]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed with the examination of Colonel Sadtler.

### TESTMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER, UNITED STATES ARMY

(Resumed)<sup>1</sup>

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, what is your full name?

Colonel SADTLER. Sadtler, Otis K., colonel, Signal Corps.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How long have you been in the Army, Colonel?

Colonel SADTLER. Thirty-seven years the 1st day of March.

Mr. KEEFE. You will have to speak a little louder, Colonel, so we can hear you.

Colonel SADTLER. Thirty-seven years the 1st day of March.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What was your assignment during the months of November and December 1941?

Colonel SADTLER. I was on duty in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, in charge of the military branch of [12356] the Signal Corps, which duties comprised the supervisory operation of the communication services, the signal intelligence service, the Army pictorial work, military training, and the signal schools.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That included the division that received messages for signal intelligence?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Are you familiar with the set-up of the so-called winds codes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That are referred to in Exhibit 1, Japanese Circulars 2353 and 2354?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When were they first called to your attention?

Colonel SADTLER. About November 28, 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what did you do after that set-up was called to your attention?

Colonel SADTLER. I sent my liaison officer, Colonel Guest, to the Federal Communications Commission, and asked them to make a special watch on that broadcast frequency, and that they make arrangements so that Colonel Bratton, our liaison officer with G-2, could be reached by telephone at any hour of the day or night.

<sup>1</sup>At the time of Colonel Sadtler's previous appearance before the committee, the oath was administered to him, but he gave no actual testimony. See Hearings, Part 9, p. 4599.



[12357] Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you get any communication from the Federal Communications Commission of an implement to either one of those two circulars?

Colonel SADTLER. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you ever receive a call from anybody in the Navy?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us when it was that you received a call from the Navy?

Colonel SADTLER. About 9 or shortly thereafter on Friday, December 5, Admiral Noyes telephoned me to the effect that the message was in.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How do you fix the date of December 5.

Colonel SADTLER. On December 4 I attended, as an alternate to the Chief Signal Officer who was then absent in Panama, the weekly meeting of the Defense Communication Board, which met every Thursday at 10 a. m., and that was December 4.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you know it was after that meeting that you received that call from Admiral Noyes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell the committee as fully as you can the conversation that you had with Admiral Noyes?

[12358] Colonel SADTLER. Admiral Noyes telephoned to say that the word was in. I asked him which one, and he told me that it was the word that implied a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain.

I then went to General Miles' office—

Mr. KAUFMAN. Before you went to General Miles' office, was that the entire conversation you had with Admiral Noyes?

Colonel SADTLER. Practically, yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then what did you do?

Colonel SADTLER. I went to General Miles' office and informed him that the word was in. He then sent for Colonel Bratton, and when Bratton came in, I told him that the word had been received from Admiral Noyes to the effect that diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain were in danger.

He pulled out a little slip of paper from his pocket and asked me which one of those words it was. I told him I did not know any Japanese, but it was the one that indicated Japan and Great Britain.

We discussed that to the extent of some few words, as to whether or not it was a false alarm, and he asked me to verify the receipt of that message.

I went back to my office, which was several doors down [12359] the hall, where the secret telephone between Admiral Noyes' office and the Chief Signal Officer was located.

I then called Admiral Noyes again and asked him to verify the Japanese word. He replied that he did not know any Japanese, but it was the one that meant Japan and Great Britain.

I asked him if he could verify that for me at that moment, and he said "no," that he had an engagement to go immediately either to the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations' office for a conference, and he would do it at a later time.

I then returned immediately to General Miles' office and told him that Admiral Noyes could not verify the word at that moment; that he would do it later, but it was the one definitely meaning Japan and Great Britain.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you try to get in touch with Admiral Noyes after that?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you have any further connection with this winds code execute after that?

Colonel SADTLER. Well, in view of the "Haruna" message which had just come in, the winds message at that time made a great impression on me. In fact, I think it is the most important message I ever received. So I went back to my [12360] office and decided to go to see General Gerow, who was the head of War Plans, and tell him that the word was in.

I saw General Gerow and told him that the winds implement was in, and we discussed it something to the effect of notifying various people, and he told me, as I recall it, that the various departments had been adequately warned.

I then went over and talked to Colonel Bedell Smith, who was the Secretary of the General Staff, and told him that the winds implement was in. He asked me what I had done, and I told him I had seen General Miles and General Gerow, and he did not wish to discuss it further. That ended the conversation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You talked a moment ago about the winds implement, or what you thought was the winds implement, coming on top of the "Haruna" messages.

Will you tell us what they were?

Colonel SADTLER. About December 2nd—you will find it on page 215 of this exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is Exhibit 1, Colonel, of this hearing?

Colonel SADTLER. Of Exhibit 1, message No. 867.

Mr. KEEFE. 8-6-7?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel SADTLER. Page 215, message No. 867:

Among the [12361] telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped, burn all but those now used with the machine—

and so forth. They were to be burned and destroyed, and when that was done, they were to reply by the one word "Haruna," to Tokyo.

That message indicates at the bottom it was translated on the 3rd, corrected on the 4th, and is Army 25640.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How many messages, to your knowledge, were intercepted from various parts of the world to Tokyo, using the word "Haruna"?

Colonel SADTLER. I recall seeing several from New Orleans, San Francisco, Seattle, and I have since seen the record produced showing that there were 16 of these words "Haruna" received up until the 6th of December.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, do you know what facilities were available in Hawaii to the Army for the breaking down of Jap codes, or ciphers?

Colonel SADTLER. The Army had no means of breaking down any of the more difficult codes.

[12362] Mr. KAUFMAN. Did they have the means to break down any of the codes in Hawaii?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not think so, except some very simple ones they may have had, but I do not recall any real crypt analyses that were in Hawaii at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I do not believe I have any questions at the moment.

Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Did you ever see the message, Colonel, that Admiral Noyes reported to you?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You never examined it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Was it ever in your immediate office, so far as you know?

Colonel SADTLER. As far as I can ascertain, it did not come over.

Senator GEORGE. It did not come over?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. No further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark is not here at the moment?

Senator LUCAS. He is not here at the moment.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one additional [12363] question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Kaufman.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The fact that a copy of this so-called winds execute failed to come over to the Army was an unusual thing, was it not?

Colonel SADTLER. Most unusual, yes, sir, because it was a routine matter that any message would come over in the normal interchange of business between the two services.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You mean any message that came to ONI would go to the Signal Intelligence Service, and correspondingly, any message that SIS received would go to ONI?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, who was your counterpart in the Navy?

Colonel SADTLER. Admiral Noyes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice on page 248 of the Army Pearl Harbor hearing the question by General Russell:

Did you give attention to the substance of those messages at any time, or were you primarily or solely interested in a proper deciphering, interpretation, and delivery?

[12364] Colonel SADTLER. In general my position was one of operations only. In other words, we were concerned primarily with the collection of data that came to our attention through various intercept means, and we were not concerned with the evaluation or the analysis of the content of those messages.

Does that describe your duties?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now on page 249 you testified that you expected a declaration of war, at the bottom of page 249. Do you have a copy of your testimony, Colonel?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not know that there is an extra copy available.

Mr. KAUFMAN. There is not.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read it slowly, Colonel. You say on the bottom of the page:

General Mauborgne, the retired Chief Signal Officer at that time.

I will go back a little bit:

General RUSSELL. What was the history as it relates to the number of messages reaching you, or those associated with you, for processing, late in November and early in December, 1941, relating to the Japanese-American [12365] negotiations? Did they become more numerous or fewer?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; the messages regarding the relations between Japan and the United States did increase materially.

General FRANK. On what date? Leading up to what date, about?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know. It seems to me that when I first came to the office, I was warned that the messages beginning to come, on the relations between Japan and the United States, were getting more tense, the condition.

General FRANK. Who warned you of that?

Colonel SADTLER. General Mauborgne, the retired Chief Signal Officer at that time. The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number of messages about warnings of conditions that might obtain in case of hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a "dud", and on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code [12366] word when they had so complied with their directive. If I recall correctly, that word was "haruna". It is the same name as that battleship that Colin Kelly was alleged to have sunk.

You made that answer and that is a true statement, as I understand it, of the situation at that time?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there anything in particular which made you feel there might be war on November 30? Was it the dead line message?

Colonel SADTLER. It was the message of November 22 which stated after the 29th things were going to automatically happen.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you also stated:

About December 3, Tokyo notified the Embassy pertaining to the destruction of their codes, at once.

General FRANK. The Embassy in Washington?

Colonel SADTLER. The Japanese Embassy in Washington, regarding the destruction of their codes. Now, those messages were important as showing the trend of conditions.

You made that statement at that time?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now you testified at page 253:

Some time about—I don't know whether it was the [12367] 5th or 6th of December, or at that period, Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at Washington to destroy their remaining codes, which was done on Saturday afternoon, and duly reported in the Sunday Star on December 7.

Was it in the Sunday Star?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, it was in the Monday Star.

Mr. MURPHY. The Monday Star?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said Sunday Star.

Colonel SADTLER. I am sorry to say I looked it up.

Mr. MURPHY. It was Monday?

Colonel SADTLER. It was Monday; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In the Monday Star there was word about the Japs destroying their codes?

Colonel SADTLER. There was a picture in the paper of their burning their codes on the Embassy grounds up on Massachusetts Avenue.

Mr. MURPHY. That was on Monday, December 8, 1941, the Washington Star?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. A good paper, by the way.

Now, then, as to the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, you have no familiarity with those messages, because you did not work on the night of the 6th or the [12368] morning of the 7th? Isn't that right? The 6th of December?

Colonel SADTLER. The 6th we worked. The 7th I did not go to work, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I refer you to your testimony on page 255. This was by General Russell:

It has come to the attention of the Board that sometime on the evening of December 6, probably around 9:00 or 10:00 o'clock, there were received by some Government agency the first 13 of 14 parts of the reply of the Japanese Government to Mr. Hull's note of November 26, 1941. Did that clear through your agency?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

General RUSSELL. It is also in the record that sometime in the morning, December 7, the last, the 14th part of this reply, reached War Department agencies, and the time for delivery of the entire reply was received in a message, as well as some further instructions about the destruction of codes or code machines. Do you have any recollection of those December 7 messages which I have described?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not go to work on the morning of December 7.

General GRUNERT. How about the night of the 6th? Were you there?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I was not. I heard about [12369] these things after that, on about the 8th or 9th, General. I did not know anything about them at the time.

Was that a true reflection of your testimony?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct. I left the office usually on Saturday afternoon, I imagine around 6 o'clock. That is when I generally left. I did not stay there until 9 or 10 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster would be next. He is not present at the moment.

Mr. Gearhart would be next, but he is not present at the moment.

Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, may I just ask one question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 252 you describe those present in the office when you discussed the message with Noyes as General Miles, Colonel Bratton, Colonel Sadtler, and General Roderick, who is now dead.

Colonel SADTLER. I have been told that it was General Roderick, Mr. Murphy. I did not know the man at the time; I did not know who he was.

Mr. MURPHY. But in the record you said you thought it was "General Roderick, who is now dead".

[12370] Colonel SADTLER. I think my memory was refreshed at the time that I made that statement.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 252 you said that; did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me read the exact words:

[12371] I went immediately to General Miles' office and told him that the word was in. He said, "Wait a minute. I will call Colonel Bratton," and in

a very short while Colonel Bratton came into the office, and we sat down at General Miles' desk. There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton; some officer, I don't know who it was. I think he has since been identified as General Rod-erick, who is now dead; and myself.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Sadtler, what hours did you work on the 6th? From what time?

Colonel SADTLER. From about 8 a. m. to about 6 p. m.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you left your work?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you went back to work Sunday morning?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not go back to work Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not work Sunday?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had nothing to do with the receipt of the 13 parts?

[12372] Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I had nothing to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing to do with that.

Did you know whether or not there had been a special line run to Colonel Bratton's home so that he might get the winds message if it came in?

Colonel SADTLER. I did not know of a special line. I knew that the FCC had been given his telephone numbers so he could be reached at any time, day or night, by telephone, if that message came in.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not know of any special line?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any special set-up about the winds code as far as you were concerned?

Colonel SADTLER. Except the arrangement that we made with the FCC to monitor that frequency, and the special arrangements that were made by both the Army and Navy to attempt to catch that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you talked to Admiral Noyes, did he call you or did you call him?

Colonel SADTLER. He called me the first time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say why he was calling you?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes; he said "The message is in."

[12373] Senator FERGUSON. At that first conversation, did he say whether it was with the British or the Dutch, or Russia?

Colonel SADTLER. He said it was between Japan and Great Britain.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you ask him whether it was between America and Japan at all?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just Japan and Great Britain?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what did that mean to you? That there was going to be war between Great Britain and Japan? How was America concerned with that message?

Colonel SADTLER. Senator, these intercepts are a very difficult thing to obtain. You either get it or you don't get it. It is very easy to

get part of a message, and I assumed that, having gotten the British part, that they had somehow missed the American part, and thought no more about it.

I knew that those "Haruna" messages were being sent back to Tokyo, indicating destruction of codes at various consulates in the United States and Great Britain, Singapore, Hongkong, and therefore that the indication was that there was going to be a break between Japan and Great Britain and there must necessarily be one between Japan and the [12374] United States.

Senator FERGUSON. So you felt the British part meant a break also with the United States, and that is why you became so concerned?

Colonel SADTLER. In view of everything that had gone before; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were concerned, as I understand it, because you went to General Gerow?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And told him about it?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And told him about it. You went to Miles—or Bratton, which was it?

Colonel SADTLER. Both.

Senator FERGUSON. Both. To Miles and Bratton. How did you get in to see Col. Bedell Smith, the secretary to General Marshall?

Colonel SADTLER. Just walked in his door.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you want to see him on this code message?

Colonel SADTLER. Colonel Smith was secretary of the General Staff and he had direct access to General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. And you felt that this was a message that should reach General Marshall?

[12375] Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you tell Bedell Smith that, Colonel Smith?

Colonel SADTLER. Everybody in the War Department knew about that winds message as far as I know. Everybody was talking about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him finish.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you finished?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you explain to them that in your opinion, that because the way the messages were received, getting the British part and what other things you knew, that that by necessity meant war with America?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you say to Colonel Bedell Smith, "The part is in about the British"?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I said, "The winds message is in," as I recall the wording.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't explain to him what part of the winds message was in?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall doing that, no sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you told him the winds message [12376] was in. And did you ask him to get it to General Marshall, that word, that it was in?

Colonel SADTLER. As I remember it, he asked me what I had done and I told him I had talked to General Miles and General Gerow.

Senator FERGUSON. And told them?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Colonel SADTLER. He said he didn't care to discuss it further.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that really mean, that he didn't care to discuss it further?

Colonel SADTLER. That I was through.

Senator FERGUSON. That you had completed your job?

Colonel SADTLER. Had done as much as I could possibly do.

Senator FERGUSON. You had done all you could do?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say as to whether or not he would convey this to General Marshall?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, I assume, you thought your mission had been performed, when you told them that the winds message was in?

[12377] Colonel SADTLER. I think I had gone a little too far in talking to either General Gerow or Col. Bedell Smith.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least you had gone as far as you could go?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then, I take it from what you say in your previous testimony, that having done that, you never tried to ascertain in detail whether this was a fake message or not?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You considered it was genuine message?

Colonel SADTLER. I did, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that continued until after the attack?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So far as you were concerned, the winds message was in and it meant war?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, war within what length of time?

Colonel SADTLER. When the winds message was first brought to my attention by Colonel Bratton, he emphasized the destruction of codes, that it could mean one thing, and that was war. Here we had practically all codes in the United [12378] States destroyed except the one left in the Embassy in Washington, Japanese Embassy in Washington. That meant that we were going to have war in a very short time.

Senator FERGUSON. And at one time I think you used the expression "within 48 hours"?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; that is not my expression.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now:

Just before that meeting, Mr. Gaston asked me what I thought about war being declared, and I said that I thought they would have war within 48 hours. He turned to Captain Redman who represented Admiral Noyes at that meeting and asked him what he thought and he said he agreed with Colonel Sadtler.

You are testifying.



Colonel SADTLER. That is true, yes, sir; but I have since verified it with Captain Redman, and Mr. Gaston, member of the committee, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, said it to Captain Redman, and Captain Redman replied, "I think we will have 48 hours," and I have just been reversed.

Senator FERGUSON. You agreed with Captain Redman?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What date was that?

Colonel SADTLER. That was December 4.

[12379] Senator FERGUSON. December 4. Then you did feel that there would be war within 48 hours of December 4?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were not surprised when the war came at 1 o'clock; 1 o'clock Washington time?

Colonel SADTLER. Not a bit; no, sir. I was only surprised that the attack was in Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

You were not surprised that there was an attack?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How, why were you surprised that there was an attack in Hawaii?

Colonel SADTLER. During the entire——

Senator FERGUSON. That is where the fleet was, wasn't it?

Colonel SADTLER. Where the fleet was was no concern of mine. I didn't know where it was.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel SADTLER. All the discussion that I heard in the War and Navy Departments, I never heard the word Pearl Harbor or Hawaii discussed in connection with an attack by Japan on the United States in the event of war.

There was a great deal of conversation about the Philippines, Indochina, and Panama Canal.

[12380] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you know as late as the 5th, General Miles had sent a message to Panama after the war warning message, after the message of the 27th telling them that when the break of diplomatic relations became imminent they would notify them?

Colonel SADTLER. I did not know of that message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is to this effect:

U. S.-Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Signed "Miles."

Do you know how such a message could be sent on the 5th after you had told him that the wind message was in, and you had discussion about the destruction of codes?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I don't recall that message to Panama at all, nor should it have been my business to have even seen it, except as officer in charge of Army communications.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The 48-hour incident occurred 24 hours before he saw the winds message, so-called winds message. That was at the meeting

on Thursday. I mean the conversation was at the security meeting 24 hours before the call from Noyes, as I understand it.

[12381] Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, Mr. Murphy; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You told us about Colonel Bratton discussing it with you, that the discussion of these codes, the wind code message, and so forth, meant war?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that there were any files destroyed or lost?

Colonel SADTLER. I heard some gossip to that effect; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I want to ask you, down in the Army, how you determined between gossip and non-gossip, the real thing. You say you heard it by gossip.

Colonel SADTLER. In 1923, I think—

Senator FERGUSON. No, no.

Colonel SADTLER. I mean 1943. I think it was at Fort Bragg, N. C., in a casual conversation with Gen. Isaac Spalding, he told me that nothing could be found about Pearl Harbor because the records had been destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Spalding?

Colonel SADTLER. Gen. Isaac Spalding.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you anything more?

Colonel SADTLER. And he told me that Colonel Bissell, Jack Bissell, J. T. Bissell, had told him that he had destroyed certain evidence, certain documents.

[12382] Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you what documents were supposed to have been destroyed?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall that he did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, why did you tell me that was gossip? He was attempting to tell you a fact, was he not?

Colonel SADTLER. Well, it was a casual conversation between two men who have known each other for a great many years.

Senator FERGUSON. And you hadn't any reason to discount that this gentleman was speaking to you and telling you what he considered to be a fact that he had heard?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And was it gossip?

Colonel SADTLER. It turned out to be; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you tell me it turned out to be gossip; what investigation was made, to your knowledge?

Colonel SADTLER. By General Carter Clarke.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you come back here and tell anyone about what you had been told?

Colonel SADTLER. I may have; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know how the investigation of Carter Clarke got started?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I was just told to appear before it. I appeared before it twice, to be exact.

[12383] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why the Army Board didn't investigate that gossip?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell the Army Board that?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't think so. I don't know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. It wasn't mentioned in that hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't think you told the Army Board?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only knowledge that you have concerning the missing of any files or papers in the War Department?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I am interested in knowing whether or not this thing that you refer to as gossip is that which my boys always referred to in the service as being "scuttlebutt"?

Colonel SADTLER. That is another name for it.

Mr. KEEFE. Isn't that the same thing?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Saying "according to scuttlebutt", so and so, that is what you refer in the service as meaning gossip?

[12384] Colonel SADTLER. Well, it is referred to by a lot of names, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. That is quite a familiar word, isn't it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, not "scuttlebutt." in the Army; it is a Navy term.

Mr. KEEFE. That is a Navy term.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. One of my boys was a marine and he was always referring to "scuttlebutt."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want you to explain part of your testimony about this message of the 7th. It isn't clear to me.

The circumstances attending that message are about as follows—

You are testifying—

I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the General Staff, inquiring as to the operation of radar on December 7. Upon receipt of that message Colonel Colton, Acting Chief Signal Officer, personally took a copy of it into General Marshall's office. I gave a copy to General Gerow. Colonel Colton, upon his return from General Marshall's office, said that he wanted all copies of that message collected and held intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl Harbor were secret at that time, the information was [12385] not to be disclosed. General Gerow kept his message and I think that Colonel Handy had it and he held it.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you talking about?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator give the page of the record and where from?

Senator FERGUSON. That is volume 2 of the Clarke Report.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you talking about? That isn't clear to me.

Colonel SADTLER. We were trying to find out whether our radar sets were working in Hawaii at the time of the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you make an investigation on that question as to whether or not the radar was working just prior to the attack?

Colonel SADTLER. I talked to Colonel Powell in Hawaii on the night of December 7 and asked him the question as to the operation of his radar, and he did not answer as it was secret, and he said he would let us know later, and the next day Mr. Bundy gave me permission to send that message—I think it was Bundy because he accused me of being in charge of it—to find out whether the radar was working in Hawaii on the morning of December 7. We sent a telegram [12386] to make an inquiry. The reply to the effect that it was working came in and was delivered to me and I gave it to Colonel Colton, who took it in to General Marshall personally.

When he came out he said:

I want all copies collected and held intact so that this information cannot get out.

That was merely a precautionary move to preserve secrecy as to the effect of what happened in Pearl Harbor and also the secrecy of radar at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, that radar was working that morning was to be held a secret? That was to be held a secret?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir. Any information regarding radar was to be held a secret.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you had in mind by that testimony?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was to be held a secret, that radar had been working?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I don't think we should draw inferences.

Senator FERGUSON. You tell us what you meant again.

Colonel SADTLER. We were trying to find out whether radar was working on December 7 and when the information came in we wanted to keep it as secret as possible, any [12387] information regarding radar.

Senator FERGUSON. Not necessarily that it had been working but the fact that radar was there was to be kept a secret?

Colonel SADTLER. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know what was done with those messages, did you file them, or keep them?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. Those messages are on file today.

Senator FERGUSON. They are on file?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever keep a diary or a log sheet in your office?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I have kept some notes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have those notes?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where they are?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any in a safe? Did you at one time state that you may have had them in a safe? In your Clausen affidavit I notice that you say—have you got the Clausen affidavit? I will get it.

Have you identified as much as you can who Spalding was and who Bissell was?

[12388] Colonel SADTLER. Bissell was on duty in G-2. Spalding was on duty in G-1.

Senator FERGUSON. One was in G-1, intelligence, and the other in G-2?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Mr. MURPHY. For a correction. I think you will find Spalding wasn't in Washington but he was under a tree down in North Carolina.

Colonel SADTLER. May I explain that at the time of December 7 Colonel Spalding was in Washington in G-1. Bissell was in G-2. In 1943 the conversation was, I think, at Jackson or Fort Bragg, N. C. Colonel Bissell was overseas at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time of Pearl Harbor they were both in Washington?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. One in Intelligence and the other in G-1?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is Bissell's first name?

Colonel SADTLER. He has three initials. J. T. Jack Bissell, we call him.

[12389] Senator FERGUSON. Jack Bissell?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, who is presently the head of G-2? Isn't there a Bissell there now?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. General Vandenburg is head of G-2. Bissell was. That is an entirely different Bissell.

Senator FERGUSON. An entirely different Bissell.

Now, you said here in this affidavit:

"I have not collected any such material in a safe deposit box although I thought I had done so."

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How would a man think that he had done so if he hadn't?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you say this?

Colonel SADTLER. Because I thought I had.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought you had.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account for that kind of thinking, that you had collected it and put it in a safe deposit box?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you put any papers in a safe deposit box, collected in any way, about Pearl Harbor, [12390] memorandums or notes?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; because there are none in there now, and I looked to find them, so I couldn't have put them there.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. What you mean is you thought you had put them in the safe deposit box but when you went there to look for them you didn't find them and then you considered that you were mistaken?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you tried to think since where you would have put them?

Colonel SADTLER. I had a little tin box I used to keep in my desk and I think I kept them there.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, they were there on the 7th, then?

Colonel SADTLER. Evidently not; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when do you consider that they were removed?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any memorandums in relation to the winds message?

Colonel SADTLER. I made some notes on the whole subject; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You made some notes on the whole subject. Now, when did you make those notes?

[12391] Colonel SADTLER. After talking with General Drum in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. And what year was that?

Colonel SADTLER. 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1942 after the happening of this event you made a memorandum putting down on paper these various things that happened so that you would be able to remember them?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What conversation had you with Drum?

Colonel SADTLER. I told him the story.

Senator FERGUSON. You told him the story?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that, an investigation?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And who was General Drum?

Colonel SADTLER. Commanding General of the Eastern Defense Command of the First Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how that conversation came about that you related the story to him?

Colonel SADTLER. He just asked me one day what happened.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield? Get General Drum's assignment at this time. Where is he now?

Colonel SADTLER. He is retired now.

[12392] Mr. MURPHY. Is he retired or is he in a military position? Isn't he Military Aide to Governor Dewey?

Colonel SADTLER. That I don't know, Mr. Murphy. At that time he was Commanding General of the Eastern Defense Command.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Better be careful. That is a serious charge. You better be careful about it, Mr. Witness.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, may I have the last answer read?

(The last question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct, is that all you want to say on that?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir, that is about all.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, when you told him, did you at that time make this memorandum?

Colonel SADTLER. It was the time that I was being relieved from duty at Governors Island to go to the Second Army at Memphis, Tenn., and that was around about the latter part of 1943, about November.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how did this get into your tin box here in Washington?

Colonel SADTLER. I had this little box with me, to carry with me. I am not sure that it was ever in the tin box, Senator.

[12393] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, was what you put on the memorandum the same as you are testifying to here, do you know?

Colonel SADTLER. Essentially; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any other memorandum?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the only one and you haven't any idea now where that could be or what happened to it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever make any investigation of one of the cable companies in relation to any messages?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't think I understand the question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever make any investigation in relation to any files of a cable company?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall any; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever go to any of the various intercepting monitoring stations or did you know of anyone going to inspect their files as to whether or not any wind message did come in?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You know nothing about that?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the so-called [12394] pilot message?

Colonel SADTLER. Only in a general way.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what was the general way?

Colonel SADTLER. That there was a long message coming in on Saturday.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did that first come to your attention, that the long message was coming in and there would be a time of delivery?

Colonel SADTLER. There was never any notice came to me of any hour of delivery.

Senator FERGUSON. No, not the specific hour, but that there would be a time of delivery. Did you ever see the pilot message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear about it?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you hear about the pilot message?

Colonel SADTLER. That there was a long message coming in.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that about all?

Colonel SADTLER. Except that we would keep people on at night to see that the thing was received.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, sometime prior to the long message coming in you had information that it was coming [12395] in and you kept your staff on at night to intercept it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I hadn't kept anybody on to intercept it. It was to be covered at night until the message was intercepted. And I think we can thank one civilian, Mr. Rowlett, who stayed down and did that work of his own accord with Colonel Schukraft. I think they are better witnesses than I am on that question.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't make any plans in the Department to have someone stay on?

Colonel SADTLER. I knew there would be someone on.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you concerned at one time about getting messages out to the theaters?

Colonel SADTLER. On what subject, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. On the question of alerting them.

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; except as the Army Communications Service would handle those messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Not that you were personally talking with any other officers about the various services to be notified?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no such conversations?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

[12396] Mr. KEEFE. May I have the book of affidavits again, the Clausen report. Colonel Sadtler, you gave an affidavit to Colonel Clausen, did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Here at Washington on the 13th day of August 1945?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if I understand your testimony here today, it is that Admiral Noyes called you on the morning of the 5th of December 1941 and in substance told you that the message was in, referring to the wind execute message?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you explained to us how you definitely recalled the date because of the meeting which you had had the day before?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If I understand your testimony here, it is that you immediately informed General Miles?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he sent for Colonel Bratton?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And Colonel Bratton pulled out a slip of paper from his pocket and asked what words were used on [12397] this message?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did not know and you were instructed by General Miles to go back to Admiral Noyes and find out the exact words, and Admiral Noyes said he was going to attend a meeting and you didn't get the exact words?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You then discussed the matter with General Gerow?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And advised General Gerow of the receipt of this winds message?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And discussed it some with him?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you then went to the secretary of the general staff, General Bedell Smith?



Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And advised him that this winds execute message was in?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And advised him that you had talked to General Gerow and General Miles and that upon his learning that you discussed the matter with them he said he didn't [12398] care to discuss it further with you?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you left?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the story that you tell us here today?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in this affidavit which you gave to Colonel Clausen use this:

I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of the transcript mentioned, without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and without informing any representatives of G-2.

That is correct, isn't it?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. (reading):

I was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a considerable period of time—

And you have referred to these intercepts with reference to the destruction of codes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

—and the mounting tension, and the information which [12399] Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows and quoted herewith from memory:

"C. G.—P. I., Hawaii—Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future Stop Take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur Stop Notify the Navy. Marshall."

Now, is that statement correct?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you want us to understand that to be your testimony here before this committee?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That you did prepare such a warning message?

Colonel SADTLER. I did, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did it because of the mounting tension and flow of information which you had together with the winds execute message which you believed was the true winds execute message at that time?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, yes, sir.

[12400] Mr. KEEFE. You were very apprehensive that war was going to strike immediately?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And I understood your apprehension that war would come to the United States was based in part at least upon the fact that the Japanese code word that was being sent out from the consular offices here in the United States indicated the destruction of all codes and ciphers and secret papers except the one code here in the Embassy at Washington; is that correct?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Your affidavit further says:

I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recollection of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not show it to anyone. I do not know where the message is now, and I made no copy at the time. After I had typed this message, I conferred with General Gerow and General Smith as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did not show them the warning message I had typed.

What became of your message?

Colonel SADTLER. That is what I don't know, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Your mind doesn't reach back that far?

Colonel SADTLER. I know that I had it, and I thought [12401] I had put it away to keep, and when I went to look for it, it was gone.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew you had put it away?

Colonel SADTLER. I put it away for safekeeping.

Mr. KEEFE. Why wasn't the message sent?

Colonel SADTLER. General Gerow informed me that he thought they had been adequately warned, and General Smith refused to discuss it any further.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you suggest to General Gerow that a message of that character should go?

Colonel SADTLER. No. I talked to him to the effect that the winds message was in and didn't he think there should be some warning sent out.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss this particular message that you had drafted?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I understand your testimony to be that you asked him whether he did not think that an additional warning should be sent.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he advised you that in his opinion they had sufficient warning?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when you told that to General Smith— [12402] I guess it was Colonel Smith at that time?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; Colonel Smith.

Mr. KEEFE. He refused to discuss the matter further with you?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you thought you put this message, this proposed message, away some place for safekeeping?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you put it away with these memoranda that you have told us about?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; because the memorandum was not made until later, and that was made at the time?

Mr. KEEFE. Where did you last see this proposed message?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know where it was, sir. I have no idea where it is.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the last time you saw it you had it in your hand?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was sometime on the morning of the 5th of December, 1941?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have it in your hand when you talked to Bedell Smith?

Colonel SADTLER. I think I did.

[12403] Mr. KEEFE. Did you have it in your hand when you talked to General Gerow?

Colonel SADTLER. I think so; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You perhaps went back to your office and from that point on you do not recall what became of that proposed message?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. It never became an official message because it never was sent?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. With the approval of the proper authorities?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in this affidavit that you gave to Colonel Clausen, you say this:

I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941.

Now, I want you to listen to this next:

I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

[12404] "General GEROW. I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer, and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of magic. I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection I did not receive prior to 7 December, 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese winds code. If I had received such a message or notice thereof I believe I would not recall the facts, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the facts, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened."

If I understand your affidavit, you state:

I believe the comments by General Smith contained in his affidavit are correct statements of fact.

[12405] In his affidavit he says he has no recollection that you ever talked to him at all, and believes you are entirely mistaken.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. How can you make a statement that you did talk to him, before this committee, and make an affidavit before Colonel Clausen that you believed that Colonel Smith or rather General Gerow,

is correct, when he says he doesn't believe that you talked to him at all, and that you must be mistaken? You seem to be taking two different positions in the same affidavit.

Colonel SADTLER. I realized when I got through talking to Miles that I had made no impression to the effect that the winds message was in view of the "Haruna" messages going back to Tokyo and the reason I went to Gerow was to arouse somebody that I thought should be aware of what was happening.

I made no impression on Gerow at the time I was there and for that reason I went to Colonel Smith, and he shut it off to the effect "I don't care to discuss it further."

I don't believe I made any impression on any one of those three men.

[12406] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I can well believe that and I think that is the absolute truth that you are telling us now, Colonel Sadtler, but the difficulty that confronts me is the affidavit which you gave to Colonel Clausen.

Colonel SADTLER. Isn't that essentially what I said just now?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, General Gerow says, "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken", and you say in your affidavit that you believed the comments of General Gerow contained in his affidavit are correct statements of fact.

Colonel SADTLER. Insofar as he goes I think they are essentially absolute statements of fact.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Colonel SADTLER. I am absolutely positive that General Gerow said that to me.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, we get down to this, Colonel Sadtler. that your interpretation of this affidavit and the one that you would like to have this committee understand is that when you said you believed that General Smith and General Gerow in their affidavits stated correct statements of fact that you are of the impression that they could not recall or recollect that you talked to them at all and that, perhaps, that was a correct statement of fact, is that it?

[12407] Colonel SADTLER. Practically that; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But you mean to tell this committee positively and without any question at all of faulty recollection is that you did talk to both of them as you have indicated here?

Colonel SADTLER. Absolutely, I talked to both of them.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you remember the circumstances under which this affidavit was given to Colonel Clausen?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you state them?

Colonel SADTLER. It was in a room in the Pentagon Building. He sent for me and asked me to come up and talk to him, as I recall it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, tell me just what took place.

Colonel SADTLER. He showed me the affidavits of Gerow and Smith and asked me to comment on them, which I have done. Anything further that I cared to add to the testimony or anything that I wanted to say that could help clear up anything.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I note that you added to this affidavit this language, in your own handwriting, I assume it is.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading) :

Other than the persons mentioned, namely, General Miles, Colonel Bratton, General Gerow, Colonel Smith and whoever may have been in General Miles' office at [12408] the time, to the best of my recollection up to December 7, 1941 I did not give any other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is your testimony today, Colonel?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in this statement you say—a statement given to Clausen :

I deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes and reiterate that other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes.

Now, did you have a discussion with Colonel Clausen as to the testimony of everybody that had testified that seemed to contradict your statement?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not recall all the conversation with Colonel Clausen, but if that is what it says that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, as a matter of fact, then, in reading your affidavit meticulously it impresses me that it is not exactly correct because you have testified to us that you [12409] did go back to Admiral Noyes after you had talked with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, at the direction of General Miles, I assume, to get verification of the message.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is in addition to the telephone call?

Colonel SADTLER. That is the telephone call.

Mr. KEEFE. What is that?

Colonel SADTLER. That is the telephone call.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, you did not go; you just called up?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, I see. Well, then, that clears it up, Colonel. You did not actually go to Noyes' office then?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You simply called him on the phone and asked for verification?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And did not get it?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did not want to give the impression that Noyes had refused to give you that message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He said he was going to a meeting and was busy and you did not press the matter thereafter?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

[12410] Mr. KEEFE. Well, personally I want to thank you. We have at least got one witness that has some clear recollection without refreshing. That seemed to be the case in each case. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions in connection with the questions asked you by Senator Ferguson.

Now, this conference that you spoke of in response to Senator Ferguson's question with Redmond, Gaston, and whoever else it was, that was on December 4, 1941?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the time that the question of 48 hours was discussed?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the day before the so-called winds execute message was supposed to have reached Admiral Noyes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that this conference in which the 48-hour question was mentioned had nothing to do with the winds execute message at all?

Colonel SADTLER. Nothing at all; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And whatever discussion occurred [12411] there in which the 48-hour question was mentioned was solely with relation to the information you had about the burning of Japanese codes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; and the other information that had gone before, Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But it had nothing to do with any winds message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; not a thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, your reason for thinking that war with Britain would also probably mean war with the United States was because the Japanese were destroying their codes in both the United States and in Britain?

Colonel SADTLER. And in British possessions; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. And that had nothing to do with any winds message at all?

Colonel SADTLER. Not a thing; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, this message written by you on December 5 which is mentioned in your affidavit to Colonel Clausen, I believe you state was never shown to General Gerow or General Miles or Colonel Bedell Smith or Colonel Bratton.

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not show it to anybody else?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

[12412] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You simply wrote it out and kept it yourself?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And did not show it to any of these other officers.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you never did see the so-called winds execute message and all you know about it is what Admiral Noyes told you?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You never did at any time see it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And as far as you know of your own knowledge there never was any winds execute message received?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, as I understand it then, because you had a phone call from Admiral Noyes about which there was some doubt and concerning which you could not get confirmation you, who had charge of the collection of data and not the evaluation or analysis of data, took it upon yourself to go to the Chief of War Plans and the Secretary of the Chief of [12413] Staff in order to have a message sent out to Hawaii and the other possessions, is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. That is essentially correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know at that time of the war warning message of November 27?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; I knew about that.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you read—you had read the Navy's message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I knew the one that General Short had sent into the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you know about the Navy's message, "This is a war warning" on the 27th?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I knew nothing of that message.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know about the message of the 24th of November that hostilities might commence at any moment?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know about the message of the 27th of November to General Short from General Marshall?

Colonel SADTLER. To which General Short replied that he was on a sabotage alert?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not talking about his reply. I am talking about the message of Marshall to Short, did you know about that?

[12414] Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I don't identify it; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that you, not knowing that there had been a warning message on the 24th of November and the Army message of the 27th of November and the Navy message of the 27th of November, were feeling disturbed that no warning message had gone out, is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. I thought that additional warning should go out, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you know what had gone out?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that you took it upon yourself, not knowing what the Chief of Staff and the other officers in charge of such functions had done and not knowing what the Navy officers in charge of such functions had done, decided that you would write the kind of a message that should go out, is that it?

Colonel SADTLER. I intended that to be some sort of a model that if they wanted to send a message they could use that to start out with.

Mr. MURPHY. And you expected General Gerow, after you came into his office as head of Signal Corps, to discuss with you the kind of a message that should go out, is that it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you expected that he would take your [12415] suggestion that a message should go out?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then when you didn't get any satisfaction from General Gerow you then went to the Chief of Staff's office, is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, did you tell the Chief of Staff at that time that you had already conferred with General Miles and you had already conferred with General Gerow? Did you ever tell that to Colonel Smith?

Colonel SADTLER. I think you mean Colonel Smith, the Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You told him that you had discussed the matter with General Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence, G-2, and that you had already discussed the matter with General Gerow and that you did not get any satisfaction from them, and didn't he then tell you, "Well, don't bother me about it," or something to that effect?

Colonel SADTLER. Essentially, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Now, then, we come to your conversation with General Drum. I would like to get some more details on that. This material that you got was of a highly confi- [12416] dential nature, wasn't it?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And what did you tell General Drum about it? Did he have any right to know about this magic?

Colonel SADTLER. He had been my commanding general.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't care what he was. You knew that he did not have any right to know about magic, didn't you?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir, I knew that.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And did he as your commanding general presume as your general to ask you to reveal such information to him?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. It was the time of my relief from duty under General Drum to go to duty with the Second Army.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Colonel SADTLER. And he said—he asked me, "Weren't you on duty in the Chief's office at the time this trouble occurred?"

Mr. MURPHY. What else?

Colonel SADTLER. And asked me to tell him the circumstances.

Mr. MURPHY. And did you discuss magic with him and the messages?

Colonel SADTLER. I told him about the winds message.

[12417] Mr. MURPHY. What else?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir, I have forgotten exactly, but I essentially told him what was done at that time about that, what had happened.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he tell you why he wanted to know?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then after you talked with him you went out and made a memorandum?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I left for Tennessee almost immediately.

Mr. MURPHY. But you have already told us that after you talked to General Drum you made some notes. That is what you said in this record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. A few months later he said.



Colonel SADTLER. I don't know whether it was the same day or a week later or a month later.

Mr. MURPHY. After you talked to General Drum you made some notes. Why did you make the notes? Did General Drum suggest it or not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He suggested that you make some notes?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he say why?

Colonel SADTLER. He said, "You had better remember this."

[12418] Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Colonel SADTLER. He said, "You had better remember this."

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. What else?

Colonel SADTLER. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. And was it he who suggested you make notes?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you tell General Drum about magic?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I don't think so.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean you just confined it to that one incident?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall telling him anything else; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you have already testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and you have testified before this Board that you felt on the 4th of December 1941, 24 hours before any talk of a conversation with Admiral Noyes, that you felt war was coming in 48 hours.

What was there about the winds intercept that you singled out, since you felt it was coming the day before, that you would talk about only that one instance to General Drum? How do you explain that?

Colonel SADTLER. I can't explain it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, have you any idea?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

[12419] Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman from Wisconsin said your memory was clear. Now I would like to have your memory on it. Why would you discuss that one little incident when you said you felt the "Haruna" message meant war, when you knew the consuls were being told to destroy their codes, when you knew the ambassador was being told to destroy his codes, when you felt that war was coming, why would you single out this one incident to talk to General Drum about?

Colonel SADTLER. I cannot answer that question, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Who brought up the subject?

Colonel SADTLER. When I went in to say good-by to General Drum he asked me the circumstances surrounding the events at Pearl Harbor at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. You said you only told him about one little incident after he asked you about the conditions surrounding Pearl Harbor. Is that so, now? He asked you what were the conditions surrounding Pearl Harbor and out of all this important mass of detail you just singled out one little item. Is that so?

Colonel SADTLER. The winds message, Mr. Murphy, as I said before, was the most important message that I think I ever handled in my life.

Mr. MURPHY. Why? Will you tell the committee?

Colonel SADTLER. The whole thing. We knew on the 29th, [12420] we knew of the disappearance of the Japanese fleet, we knew of Mr. Hull's ultimatum, we knew on December 1st these code machines were being destroyed, we knew the "Haruna" messages, and then this final winds message came in to cap the whole climax.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, what did the winds message mean to you? You said before in your testimony that it meant a break in diplomatic relations.

Colonel SADTLER. It meant destruction of codes, papers, and so forth.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't they already destroyed?

Colonel SADTLER. That was the final word to me that everything had happened, because that winds message was also predicated upon the fact, upon the interruption of international communications that they would certainly have.

Mr. MURPHY. But, sir, didn't you already testify that there were sixteen "Haruna" messages?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, I did not. I said after that date there have been found sixteen. I saw two or three at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. But at any rate you did say—let me get it exactly. Let me get your exact words.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and answer it if you can.

Mr. MURPHY. Page 250.

[12421] The CHAIRMAN. It seemed to be in the form of a question that required an answer.

Mr. MURPHY. You did expect a declaration of war on the 30th of November, didn't you?

Colonel SADTLER. Well, we expected something to happen.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't you say before the Army board that we were of the opinion there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November the 30th?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

This, as you all know, proved to be a "dud" and on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive. If I recall correctly, that word was "Haruna." It is the same name as that battleship that Colin Kelly was alleged to have sunk.

About December 3, Tokyo notified the embassy pertaining to the destruction of their codes at once.

Now, if you had all those messages that the consuls were to destroy their codes and if you had on the 5th the message about the Embassy burning their codes, what did the winds [12422] intercept do?

Colonel SADTLER. It capped the climax.

Mr. MURPHY. In what way?

Colonel SADTLER. That everything is here. Now we have the whole thing.

Mr. MURPHY. What was here that you did not have before?

Colonel SADTLER. Nothing, not a thing. Now, there was nothing but the winds message, which was a message that we had been straining every nerve to get; we had everybody listening for that message.

Mr. MURPHY. You did intercept certain messages after the 5th, did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Were the codes destroyed when you were intercepting those messages?

Colonel SADTLER. Practically all the codes were destroyed except the one in the Japanese Embassy.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't you kept busy all day on the 5th and on the night of the 5th and all day on the 6th and on the evening of the 6th and on Sunday intercepting messages?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. New messages?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, they were not destroyed then on the 5th, were they? [12423]

Colonel SADTLER. What was not destroyed on the 5th?

Mr. MURPHY. You said that it capped the climax. The message to destroy the codes came on the 5th. You still received intercepted messages the afternoon of the 5th and the night of the 5th and the 6th and the 7th?

Colonel SADTLER. That is true, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if that capped the climax they did not destroy the codes, did they? Do you understand me?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; I understand you perfectly, but they had destroyed practically all of their codes by that time except the one in the Japanese Embassy.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you knew that there were messages to different parts of the world that we intercepted, too, did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. Not at that time, I did not, no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you give me Exhibit 1? Will you show that to the witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. If he doesn't know, why show him anything?

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know about the message of December 7th coming in?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. About relations with England?

[12424] Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't know about that?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't know that we did intercept a message on the 7th of December about relations between Japan and England not being in accordance with expectations?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, I do not; that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, in view of all of that you still say that you only told General Drum about that one little message?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir, I will not. I think that is about all we discussed, though, as to what happened in Washington at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, what happened to your notes?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you certainly don't want to create any inference that anybody in Washington is responsible for your notes being destroyed, do you?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. How many times did you talk to Captain Safford before you were a witness?

Colonel SADTLER. I have never talked to Captain Safford but once or twice in my life and that was before December 7, 1941.

[12425] Mr. MURPHY. Did you talk to anybody about this except General Drum?

Colonel SADTLER. You mean discuss what has happened?

Mr. MURPHY. About the winds intercept, yes; or your notes?

Colonel SADTLER. I remember telling General Carter Clarke the story.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, about Carter Clarke: That has come into the record three times and the Clarke exhibit is not in the record as yet.

As I understand it, you were talking to General Spalding, and General Spalding gave you some gossip about certain papers being destroyed, did he not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you learn that General Spalding learned it from Bissell?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And did you learn that Bissell learned it from Friedman?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you learn where Bissell got it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you familiar with the Clarke report that investigated that whole incident and dismissed it?

Colonel SADTLER. I am familiar with the part of my testimony and I listened to General Spalding when he gave his testimony. [12426]

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you had heard from General Spalding certain things; and then the gossip you got from General Spalding, who did you give it to?

Colonel SADTLER. It is going to get down to Mr. Friedman; isn't it?

Mr. MURPHY. It is going to get to wherever you put it.

Colonel SADTLER. I did, in conversation with Mr. Friedman, tell him that; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. It was you, then, who told Friedman?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then Friedman told other people?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that you are the one responsible for Friedman having this so-called information; is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. May I see the Clarke report, please? I refer to your testimony. You testified before General Clarke on the 14th of July 1945; is that right?

Colonel SADTLER. I think that is about right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were questioned by Colonel Gibson [reading]:

Colonel Sadtler, you realize that you are under oath [12427] and you are fully aware of what your rights are?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes.

Colonel GIBSON. I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called winds execute message?

Colonel SADTLER. I did not.

Colonel GIBSON. To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the War Department?

Colonel SADTLER. It was not.

Colonel GIBSON. And all that you know about that message and all contact that you had with it is in your former testimony?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right. I might further add that the information came from Admiral Noyes.

Colonel GIBSON. Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Admiral Hewitt of the Department of the Navy recently as follows: "Then if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall."

You were the one, then, that told——

Colonel SADTLER. I did not. Those words were Mr. Friedman's words.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he said you did.

Colonel SADTLER. Mr. Friedman tells it in his words.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had been told by somebody that the copies of the winds execute message had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall?

Colonel SADTLER. I will make an absolute flat denial of that statement made by Mr. Friedman because, as far as I know, that message was never in the War Department and I never made any statement that General Marshall ordered it destroyed or that anyone told me that General Marshall ordered it destroyed.

Colonel GIBSON. When did you return to duty in Washington this last time?

Colonel SADTLER. About March 28, 1944.

Colonel GIBSON. After your return during the following summer and fall on occasion did you visit with Mr. Friedman?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes.

Colonel GIBSON. And did you visit about Pearl Harbor, amongst other things?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes. We had discussed what had [12429] happened at that time.

So that you did talk to more than Drum, didn't you? You did say Friedman, did you not, before?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, I talked to a lot of people who I assumed would get this message.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Colonel GIBSON. Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Friedman's office?

Colonel SADTLER. Well, I assume they did because I have been in his office several times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had happened, not only in his office but at his house.

Colonel GIBSON. At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to the Pearl Harbor affair were being destroyed?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes. Sometime during 1943 General Isaac Spalding at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. Bissell had told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed.

That is what General Spalding told you, was it?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Colonel GIBSON. Is it possible that you told that [12430] to Mr. Friedman in one of your conversations?

Colonel SADTLER. It is possible.

Colonel GIBSON. You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many years?

Colonel SADTLER. I have known him for over 25 years.

Colonel GIBSON. This Colonel, now Brigadier J. T. B. Bissell, that you speak of, do you know him personally?

Colonel SADTLER. I do not.

Colonel GIBSON. To your knowledge have you ever met him?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes. I have met him casually but I doubt if I would recognize him today if I saw him.

I will try to cut this down.

Now, you typed this so-called message that you spoke to the gentleman from Wisconsin about, you typed it yourself, didn't you?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not have your stenographer type it?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on December 1st you tried to dissuade General Olmstead from going to Panama because you thought that there would be war there then, did you not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is December 1st?

[12431] Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said:

On December 1, when General Olmstead was making preparations to go to Panama, I attempted to dissuade him from his trip because I felt positive that war would be declared before he returned and I thought that it was his duty to be in Washington.

You did say that before General Clarke?

Colonel SADTLER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Colonel Sadtler, you were asked this question:

Colonel Sadtler, Mr. Friedman has also testified that you told him that you had heard that in addition to the Winds execute message being ordered destroyed by General Marshall, there was a second message that was ordered destroyed by General Marshall. This second message was a message which was the result of a message sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor to the Signal Officer, Colonel Powell, asking him whether the radar installation in the Islands was in operative order at the time of the attack, and the answer came back in the affirmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar installation in the Islands or the answer [12432] thereto had been destroyed?

Your answer was, "I did not."

So that you were not responsible for that part of the gossip?

Colonel SADTLER. Absolutely not; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And the fact is that radar message is down in the files of the War Department now, is it not?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir. That was collected for secrecy at first, as I have explained before.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. That is all, Colonel.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, counsel for General Short requests that I ask a question of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Counsel for General Short would like to have me inquire from the witness as to whether he had seen the reply of General Short to the November 27th message?

Colonel SADTLER. That would be the sabotage?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Where did you see it for the first time?

Colonel SADTLER. In the War Department.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Around the date that it was received?

Colonel SADTLER. I imagine so; yes, sir. I have forgotten exactly when, but I do recall seeing it before Pearl Harbor.

[12433] Mr. KAUFMAN. That is all.

Mr. KEEFE. One question on that, Mr. Chairman. I was going to ask that same question because I thought that you had attempted to say something with respect to the message from General Short to General Marshall of the War Department with respect to his being alerted only against sabotage. It impressed me that you were cut-off by Mr. Murphy and did not get to say it.

Now, as a matter of fact do I understand that at the time you became so apprehensive and felt that a message should go out to Short, was that because you had seen this message which set forth that he was only alerted against sabotage?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I had no reason to single General Short at Hawaii out to get a warning. I thought that they all should be warned because I personally thought that if the Japs attacked it would be the Panama Canal.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then the fact that he had sent in a wire and you knew about it, that he was only alerted against sabotage did not make any particular impression on you?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Colonel SADTLER. Except that I knew he had not—

Mr. KEEFE. I just want to get that clear.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I want to get that clear.

[12434] General Short sent more than one sabotage message. Did you see both of them?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't recall but one.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if he stated—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if he only saw one why go into the second?

Mr. MURPHY. I want to know which one he saw.

Colonel SADTLER. The one I saw was about—I imagine—it was about a hundred words.

Mr. MURPHY. A hundred words?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Colonel SADTLER. It was not a long message.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel, for your cooperation. The committee appreciates your attendance here.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Commander Schulz.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Schulz, come around, please.

[12435] **TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER LESTER ROBERT  
SCHULZ, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state your full name, please?

Commander SCHULZ. Lester Robert Schulz.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy, Commander?

Commander SCHULZ. Since June 1930, beginning as a midshipman.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you in Washington during November and December 1941?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your assignment for duty in Washington during the first week of December?

Commander SCHULZ. I was under instruction in the Office of Naval Communications for communication intelligence. That was my permanent assignment. However, I was on temporary duty under verbal orders at the White House as a communications assistant to the Naval Aide, then Captain Beardall. Also, I had gone to Warm Springs in the same capacity the previous week end. Thus, my return to Washington, I believe, was Tuesday of that week.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were under Admiral Beardall?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who others of the Navy were occupying the same duty, a similar duty there under Beardall?

[12436] Commander SCHULZ. On the 6th of December, I believe the morning of the 6th there was an Ensign Carson who was sent up to assist me. Actually he performed no duties that day and was simply being instructed and informed as to what his duties would be.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is your present assignment now?

Commander SCHULZ. I am under orders at present to be executive officer of the *Indiana*, a battleship.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you on duty at the White House in Admiral Beardall's office there on the night of December 6, 1941?

Commander SCHULZ. I was on duty in the White House. Admiral Beardall had no fixed office in the White House at that time. He conducted his business for the most part in the Navy Department in the Navy Building and I was given a small office in a corner of the mail room, a closed office, but it was not a place used by Admiral Beardall.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was at the White House?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall Captain Kramer coming to the White House on the evening of December 6 to deliver any papers?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. About what time did he come?

[12437] Commander SCHULZ. Between 9 and 10; I should say about 9:30.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In the evening?

Commander SCHULZ. In the evening; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was there besides you?

Commander SCHULZ. No one else of the Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom, if anyone, did Captain Kramer hand his papers?

Commander SCHULZ. He handed them to me. They were in a locked pouch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that the customary way in which dispatches that were being delivered there were delivered?

Commander SCHULZ. Material of that category was so delivered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you do with the locked pouch when it was handed to you?



Commander SCHULZ. I took it from the mail room, which is in the office building, over to the White House proper and obtained permission to go up on the second floor and took it to the President's study.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go alone?

Commander SCHULZ. I was accompanied by someone from the usher's office and announced to the President. However, then I was alone.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But Captain Kramer did not go with you?

[12438] Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long from the time the papers were placed in your hands by Captain Kramer was it before you went to the President's study?

Commander SCHULZ. About 5 minutes, I would say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whom did you find in the study when you arrived there?

Commander SCHULZ. The President was there seated at his desk, and Mr. Hopkins was there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is Mr. Harry Hopkins?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew him?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I had met him the previous day.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you knew the President?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the pouch still locked?

Commander SCHULZ. I had a key to the pouch. I do not recall just when I unlocked it. In all likelihood it was after I was in the study, however.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you do after you entered the study?

Commander SCHULZ. I was announced and I informed the President that I had the material which Captain Kramer had [12439] brought and I took it out of the pouch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any further statement at the time with reference to the material, as to your having been told that it was important or not?

Commander SCHULZ. That I do not recall, sir, but I believe that the President was expecting it. As I recall, he was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why? What makes you believe that? Was there anything said, I mean, that would indicate that?

Commander SCHULZ. When Admiral Beardall instructed me to stay and meet Captain Kramer and receive the material, he told me of its important nature.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, wait just a moment there.

Commander SCHULZ. And my recollection was also that it was of such importance that the President expected to receive it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Before Captain Kramer came did you have a talk with Admiral Beardall with reference to the possibility of papers being delivered in the immediate future?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I did. That is why I stayed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did Admiral Beardall say to you?

Commander SCHULZ. He told me that during the evening Captain Kramer would bring up some magic material and that I was to take it and give it immediately to the President and [12440] he gave me the key to the pouch so that I could take it out and deliver it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the substance of your conversation with Admiral Beardall?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, when you presented the material to the President, was it in the pouch?

Commander SCHULZ. To the best of my recollection I took it out of the pouch and handed it to him. The papers were clipped together. There were perhaps 15 typewritten pages and they were fastened together in a sheaf and I took them out of the pouch and handed them to the President personally.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You know now what we mean when we talk about the first 13 parts of the 14-part message; you know what I am talking about?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you able to state now whether among the papers which were delivered to the President there were this 13 parts of what was eventually the 14-part message?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I cannot. I did not read the message. I have only learned of its substance through information that has been divulged during this inquiry, from [12441] newspapers and so on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now, what happened when you delivered these papers to the President? You remained there?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I remained in the room.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What happened?

Commander SCHULZ. The President read the papers, which took perhaps 10 minutes. Then he handed them to Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far away from the President was Mr. Hopkins sitting?

Commander SCHULZ. He was standing up, pacing back and forth slowly, not more than 10 feet away.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did the President read out loud when he was reading the papers?

Commander SCHULZ. I do not recall that he did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right. Now go ahead and give us in detail just what occurred there, if you please, Commander.

Commander SCHULZ. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance—“This means war.” Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps 5 minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you recall what either of them said?

[12442] Commander SCHULZ. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that—I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first—that since war was imminent, that the Japanese intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for them—

The CHAIRMAN. When all was what?

Commander SCHULZ. When all was most opportune for them. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces

had already landed there and there were implications of where they should move next.

The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their withdrawal.

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record."

The impression that I got was that we would have to stand [12443] on that record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.

During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might begin was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read?

Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined—I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was it from what was said there that you draw the conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?

[12444] Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the National Theater was mentioned in my presence, and the President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the admiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the admiral paged or otherwise when in the theater, where, I believe, the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and that if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused, and the President did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said about telephoning anybody else except Stark?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; there was not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How did he refer to Admiral Stark?

Commander SCHULZ. When he first mentioned calling him, he referred to him as "Betty."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any further discussion there before you left?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir. To the best of my knowledge that is all that was discussed. The President returned the papers to me, and I left the study.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all you know about it?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is all.

[12445] Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. What time would you say you went to the President's study that night?

Commander SCHULZ. It was approximately 9:30.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you there altogether.

Commander SCHULZ. I would say about one-half hour, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One-half hour?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you left there about ten?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then where did you go?

Commander SCHULZ. Then I went back to the office which I mentioned before.

The CHAIRMAN. Back to what you call the situation room?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir. The situation room was a later development, after the war began.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see. You went back to the place from which you departed to deliver the message?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark?

[12446] Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lucas? Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Commander, you just flew in from California, did you?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. You got off the plane within the last hour or so?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir. I arrived at the National Airport at about 9 o'clock this morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever commit any of this material to writing at any time?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. You have no notes whatsoever?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I would like to have you just relax yourself just a little bit; you are tense. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. I will pass at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. Were there any other high ranking Army or Navy officers that called at the White House that night, that you know of?

Commander SCHULZ. Not to my knowledge, sir. However, I was not in that part of the White House, except during this [12447] half hour, where I would have seen them.

Mr. GEARHART. Your office was in the annex near the executive end of the building?

Commander SCHULZ. I believe that is what it is called, sir. It is the annex over toward the State Department.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right. And where is that office to which you have referred? In the basement?

Commander SCHULZ. It is on the basement level; yes, sir. I haven't been in it now for over 4 years but I believe it is on the street level, however, on the side on which you come in on.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Your particular room was off of the mail receiving room?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. How long did you remain on duty that night?

Commander SCHULZ. Until about 10:30.

Mr. GEARHART. And when did you return to duty the next day?

Commander SCHULZ. The next day, after the news of the attack, I called Admiral Beardall after I had heard the news, and then came back to the White House.

Mr. GEARHART. Arriving at the White House at what time?

Commander SCHULZ. About 4 o'clock, I would say, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

[12448] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to take the situation after you left the President's study. You then returned, as I understand it, to the mail room?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And the mail room had these long tables in it?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was Captain Kramer sitting at those tables when you went back, at one of the tables?

Commander SCHULZ. It is my collection that he was.

Senator FERGUSON. And then did you return to Captain Kramer this pouch? Is that your recollection.

Commander SCHULZ. That is my recollection. The happenings during that particular period are somewhat hazy but I know that I did not have the papers the next day. Further, I hadn't too suitable a place to put them during the night because of their high secrecy classification.

Senator FERGUSON. You had worked in the Naval ONI so that you knew how secret these papers were and how valuable they were?

Commander SCHULZ. I was in the Communications Division rather than ONI.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, Communications.

[12449] Commander SCHULZ. However, I knew of their nature and their general source because of their importance.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you wouldn't have cared to keep them at home or where you stayed, and you did not leave them anywhere in the White House?

Commander SCHULZ. I would not have kept them under any circumstances, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that is your reason for saying that you gave them to Commander Kramer, or he was Captain at that time, was he?

Commander SCHULZ. I am not sure of his rank but it is the same Captain Kramer.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your grade at that time?

Commander SCHULZ. I was a Lieutenant at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would say that you were in all about 1 hour or ½ hour, I think you said, in the President's study?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have any other conversation that night later with Commander Beardall?

Commander SCHULZ. I recall having talked on the telephone to then Captain Beardall after I had shown the papers to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us that conversation?

[12450] Commander SCHULZ. I do not remember the exact words. However, the purpose of the call was to inform him that I had received the papers, the President had seen them and I had carried out my instructions; then I would be free to go home.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did get home about what hour that night?

Commander SCHULZ. I left the White House at about 10:30.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Admiral Beardall ask you for the details of the conversation of what the President may have said?

Commander SCHULZ. I don't recall that he did; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not recall telling Admiral Beardall at any time this conversation that you have related here?

Commander SCHULZ. I never told any one during the course of the war of any conversation being held that night in the President's presence.

Senator FERGUSON. And to whom have you repeated this conversation?

Commander SCHULZ. I have repeated it since to you and to Lieutenant Commander Baecher and the gentleman who was with you at the time; I did not know his name.

Mr. MURPHY. By "you" you mean who?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

[12451] Commander SCHULZ. I mean——

Mr. MURPHY. You mean you told Senator Ferguson about this before today?

Senator FERGUSON. This is Mr. Morgan.

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; not before today. Immediately preceding my coming to the chair, within 10 minutes before I came to the chair here.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morgan was present and Commander Baecher was present?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, had you talked it over with anyone else prior to that?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you tell us whether or not that was the first week of your assignment there, so that you had not been with the President prior to his Warm Springs trip and this particular week in the White House?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct. My first association with the White House in any capacity was on the Friday of the week before, when I made the trip to Warm Springs. I did not go to the White House at that time. The first time I was ever in the White House was on the 5th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the 5th of December did any messages come in, to your knowledge?

[12452] Commander SCHULZ. There was one message. I had that in my custody. As I recall, it was given to me by Captain Beardall and had already been shown to the President. At least it was given to me only for custody, and it concerned the reported burning of Japanese consular codes. It came to me on a normal Navy Department secret message form. Its original source, I recall, was from Australia, but I do not know and do not recall who actually originated the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it say anything about the Japanese destroying a code machine in Batavia or sending it back to Tokyo, do you recall?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; no machine was mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. No machine was mentioned in that particular message?

Commander SCHULZ. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, outside of that message, have you any information as to any messages delivered to the President?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; there were no others.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is this the only conversation or the only words that you heard from the President, that you have given us, in relation to the Pacific or the Japanese question?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct, the only words.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing at Warm Springs, any messages [12453] there or any conversations about the Far East?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I had no such material or information there.

Senator FERGUSON. And you heard no conversations by the President there?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is one thing I am not entirely clear on and that is when the President said that he did not want Admiral Stark or "Betty," as he referred to him first, called from the National Theater because it would, in your language, arouse people, or what was the word?

Commander SCHULZ. It might have caused public alarm.

Senator FERGUSON. Public alarm?

Commander SCHULZ. Or at least speculation.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and there was one thing said about that he didn't want that to happen for another hour?

Commander SCHULZ. He made no statement as to when it would be all right that public knowledge might be all right. His statement, his words were, in effect, that he would reach the admiral later. The matter of it being another hour is my own observation based on the fact that the theater eventually was going to close that evening.

Senator FERGUSON. So the President did not use the words "another hour"?

[12454] Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you took that to mean that he would get him after the show?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether the President did reach Admiral Stark that night or not?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. And as I understand it then, you did not work or go to the White House on the morning of the 7th.

Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you tell us who was the President's naval aide on Sunday morning, if you have any knowledge of it?

Commander SCHULZ. Captain Beardall was the naval aide at that time, on that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. To your knowledge, this other gentleman, the other lieutenant—and I did not catch his name.

Commander SCHULZ. The officer who was my assistant was Ensign Carson.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that C-a-r-s-o-n?

Commander SCHULZ. C-a-r-s-o-n- Carson was not there that morning either. He had only reported for work the pre- [12455]  
ceding day and was not yet fully instructed.

Senator FERGUSON. And to your knowledge then he was really not authorized to handle this locked pouch, is that correct?

Commander SCHULZ. He had never been left there alone for such an assignment before.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is only about one other thing, and that is when did Admiral Beardall first tell you to remain there that night to receive this special message for the President?

Commander SCHULZ. It was about 4 o'clock. The time is not exact—

Senator FERGUSON. Near the time.

Commander SCHULZ. It was late in the afternoon, before the admiral left, himself.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did Admiral Beardall leave?

Commander SCHULZ. I do not recall exactly, but about 5:30, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were the only one that remained on duty or did Carson stay with you?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir, Carson left, also, and I remained.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, when did you first learn that you were going to be a witness here?

Commander SCHULZ. I learned definitely only on the 12th [12456] of this month: that is about 3 days ago. I had previous indication about the 1st of December, when I was informed by Lieutenant Commander Baecher that because of my having been on duty at the White House at that time that I might be called. I did not receive definite word.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you then here in Washington?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir. I was in Bremerton, Washington, the Puget Sound Navy Yard at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Baecher there or did he telephone you?

Commander SCHULZ. He telephoned to me.

Senator FERGUSON. And did he ask you to hold yourself in readiness for a call?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; in effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Commander SCHULZ. In effect, to expect to come.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And did you tell him at that time what you knew?



Commander SCHULZ. Not in as great detail as I have today, but I mentioned the fact that I had received the material from Captain Kramer and that I had personally delivered it to the President and stayed there while he read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And have you been called by any other board or anyone else to get your story, to get your [12457] version of what happened?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the first time that you have testified?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did anyone else call you and tell you that you might be a witness?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; no one has.

Senator FERGUSON. You were on the *Indiana* when you got word to come into San Francisco to get off?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; I was. The ship was at sea and we received orders from the Bureau of Personnel that I proceed here for this purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. And your ship pulled into San Francisco?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; the ship came into San Francisco yesterday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You took a plane and landed here at 9 o'clock this morning?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When are you going back?

Commander SCHULZ. Sunday or Monday, I would think, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have two questions.

You say you talked to Mr. Morgan and Senator Ferguson [12458] son. Where was that?

Commander SCHULZ. That was in the hall, just beyond the large door over there.

Mr. MURPHY. With only those two persons present before you came into the presence of the committee?

Commander SCHULZ. And Lieutenant Commander Baecher.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, one other question. Did you know anything about the President dispatching a message to the Emperor on the night of December 6th, the Emperor of Japan?

Commander SCHULZ. I knew that a message had been sent since during the discussion with Mr. Hopkins the President mentioned that he had sent a message to the Emperor and he made a point of the fact that he had sent it to the Emperor as Chief of State and not to Tojo as Premier. He had sent the message to the Emperor and such mention of it as was made in my presence concerned only Indochina.

Mr. MURPHY. But that had been sent, apparently, before the conversation that you heard down there?

Commander SCHULZ. Whether it had actually been sent I do not know, but I know the President had drafted it.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Mr. KEEFE. Just one question.

Commander, you made a statement that you believed that the President was expecting this message. Did I so understand you? [12459]

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir, that is what I said.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Commander SCHULZ. And such was my impression.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like to pursue that just a little bit further.

Commander SCHULZ. My reason for telling that was that Admiral Beardall, knowing its importance and knowing that it was coming out, told the President to expect it during the evening.

Mr. KEEFE. How did Admiral Beardall know that it was coming?

Commander SCHULZ. It had been—it is my understanding that it had been received in the Navy Department and was being worked on. It, of course, takes time, some time to obtain the English text in such a message.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you aware of the fact that there was a so-called pilot message?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to see if we can get that cleared up. You have no knowledge yourself as to the fact that there was a pilot message which came in some time around about noon on the 6th, which indicated that a long message was going to be sent to the Japanese Ambassador?

[12460] There is evidence before the committee that that pilot message was delivered to certain people around about 3 o'clock. Do you know whether it was delivered to the White House by the Navy that afternoon?

Commander SCHULZ. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I did not receive it or see it personally.

Mr. KEEFE. At least Admiral Beardall before he left indicated to you that they were expecting a message in reply from the Japs?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; a message at least. He did not indicate the substance, but a message which was a decode.

Mr. KEEFE. An important message?

Commander SCHULZ. And an important message.

Mr. KEEFE. And did he indicate to you that he had advised the President that there might be such a message?

Commander SCHULZ. I don't recall that he did; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, when the President got through reading it, as I understood your testimony, he showed it to Hopkins and said, "This means war," and Hopkins concurred.

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. The words may not be exact but that is the substance.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the discussion went on between Mr. Hopkins and the President as to possibly where the Japs might strike and you remember discussions of Indochina?

[12461] Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But there was no mention of Pearl Harbor or Hawaii?

Commander SCHULZ. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or any other places that you recall?

Commander SCHULZ. No other places that I recall; none that I recall.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall with any degree of certainty, Commander, just what the conversation was with respect to the transmission of this message direct to the Emperor of Japan and how that came into the conversation?

Commander SCHULZ. It came into the conversation when the disposition of forces in Indochina was mentioned, and the way it came

in was that in this message to the Emperor it is my understanding that the presence of Japanese forces in Indochina was mentioned and that the—I have never read the message, if I may say, Congressman, I would like to have you understand that—but, however, I recall mention being made, the President quoting from this message that he drafted to the effect that he had told Hirohito that he could not see how it could be held that there was any danger to peace in the Far East as far as the United States was concerned if there were no Japanese forces in Indochina.

[12462] In other words, we were not going to attack Indochina, nor was anyone else. Therefore, the presence of Japanese forces in Indochina was for an aggressive purpose or for ulterior purposes on the part of the Japanese. We ourselves held no threat for Indochina.

That also is in substance, but I do remember that point being brought out.

[12463] Mr. KEEFE. Did you get the impression from that conversation that the message to the Emperor had been sent, or was going to be sent?

Commander SCHULZ. I cannot recall that definitely, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now when the President said he wanted to get in touch with "Betty", did he seem to know where "Betty" Stark was that night?

Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; not initially, at least, because I recall that he started to place a telephone call for Admiral Stark.

Mr. KEEFE. Then did word come back that Admiral Stark was at the National Theater? Is that what I understood you to say?

Commander SCHULZ. Word came back that that was where he might be reached. Personally, I have no knowledge that he was there, but the President was informed that that was where the admiral had either left word or else someone who could get in touch with him expected to find him there.

Mr. KEEFE. And then the President indicated that he would not bother calling him to the phone, that he would get him later after the theater was over?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the impression you got?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir.

[12464] Mr. KEEFE. That is because he felt Admiral Stark's leaving his box in the theater might cause some speculation and arouse some public discussion, or alarm.

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that was my impression.

Mr. KEEFE. Now when you got to the President's study the only people who were there were the President and Harry Hopkins?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a graduate of Annapolis?

Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Commander SCHULZ. 1934, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again, Commander.

Commander SCHULZ. You are welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. You are excused.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Admiral Rochefort.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Rochefort, come forward, please.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is Captain Rochefort.

[12465]

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JOSEPH JOHN  
ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I was about to thank you, Senator, for promoting me. I am actually a captain.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. You are not averse to a real promotion if it comes your way, I suppose.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would appreciate it, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, will you state your name?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Joseph John Rochefort.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How old are you, Captain?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Forty-six years, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Since 1918, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When were you first assigned to Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You mean my first trip there, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The first trip was in 1920—1921.

[12466] Mr. RICHARDSON. How long were you there then?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Approximately 2 months.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you next go to Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In 1924.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And how long did you stay that time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Approximately the same length of time, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then when did you return there on regular assignment?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In April 1939, when the Hawaiian Detachment was formed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in what capacity?

Captain ROCHEFORT. At that time on the staff of Commander, Scouting Force, who was also Commander, Hawaiian Detachment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What changes occurred in your assignments thereafter?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In May of 1941 I received dispatch orders to report to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for duty.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would be Admiral Bloch?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That would be Admiral Bloch, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Right.

Captain ROCHEFORT. In personal correspondence [12467] I was informed that my duty there would consist of Officer in Charge of the Communications Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you assume those duties?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In June 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did you remain in that capacity?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Until October 1942.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was there in your unit when you took charge?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Approximately 10 officers and 20 men at Pearl Harbor, and an additional 10 officers and approximately 50 to 60 men in the outlying stations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the name of your unit as it was known at Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. After I arrived there we changed the name slightly and called it the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What were your duties during November and December 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Very briefly, sir, to find out about all of the Japanese naval cryptographic systems.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What experience had you had in connection with cryptographic work?

Captain ROCHEFORT. During the period 1925 to 1927 I [12468] was in charge of all cryptographic work for the Navy Department in Washington. I had had, subsequently, 3 years in Japan as a language officer, and on various staffs during various war problems had carried out cryptographic research.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you speak Japanese?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Proceed, and give us a little detail as to the scope of your duties with your assignment in Hawaii.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The primary duty consisted of intercepting all Japanese naval traffic, and of attacking all the Japanese naval systems contained in that traffic with the exception of one system, which was being worked on in Washington, and in Cavite.

Along with that we had organized a radio intelligence unit whose duties were to obtain all information available from the Japanese naval traffic by means other than cryptanalysis.

We also had in the unit a mid-Pacific direction-finding unit with stations in Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Pearl Harbor, and Midway.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What Japanese codes and ciphers were in use by Japan during November and December that it was [12469] your duty to intercept?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Of the regular systems; that is, the systems used for any considerable period of time, approximately 8 to 10, in addition to which there would be several what we called minor systems, or systems used for specific purposes, such as a fleet problem.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what field was covered by those codes and ciphers that you were intercepting?

Captain ROCHEFORT. All Japanese naval traffic of all descriptions, including personnel matters, engineering matters, operational intelligence, direction finding; in short, all types of naval communication, including ship movements.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Ship locations?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Ship locations would be incidental. That is, they would be contained in the traffic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, were there any Japanese naval codes that you could intercept, but could not translate at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In terms of volume of traffic, perhaps 90 per cent.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me see if I get it accurately. [12470] Out of all the interceptions that you had with reference to Japanese naval operations, you were only able to decode and therefore understand at Hawaii approximately 10 percent of that traffic?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were not able there to handle by deciphering what is known as the purple code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. That was a diplomatic system.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Give me the designations of the other codes there that you could not handle.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Diplomatic or naval, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, both.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I will put it this way: We were not handling any of the diplomatic systems. We were directed to attempt to process all naval systems with the exception of one, which I previously mentioned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the fact as to what section you were expected to handle and decode the result of a working arrangement between you and Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it true that messages might be intercepted by you that you were unable to decode?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Naval; yes, sir.

[12471] Mr. RICHARDSON. And when you intercepted a dispatch or information that you were unable to decode, what was your duty then with respect to that information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If it were other than Navy, we would send it to Washington. But I might point out, sir, that the circuits that we were covering were all naval circuits in which no diplomatic traffic would be passed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. By way of illustration, Captain, let me show you two dispatches here that appear to have been intercepted by the Army at Hawaii—not by the Navy but by the Army, and ask you what codes they came in on? What is the page, please, so it may be identified for the record?

Captain ROCHEFORT. On page 21 of Exhibit 2, I see two dispatches, the first one No. 123, which was translated on 30 December 1941, and it is in the J-19 system.

[12472] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now if the Army had presented that dispatch to you, could you have decoded it in Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not without special equipment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, did you have the equipment in Hawaii that would permit you to decode that message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. On December 2, 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now let me show you the message number 128 on page 26 of Exhibit 2, dated 5 December. Will you tell me what code that came in on? That is also an Army message.

Captain ROCHEFORT. That came in the PA-K2 system.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had been requested by the Army to decode that dispatch would you have been able to do it at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In about how long a time from the time it was presented to you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Probably 6 hours to 6 days. Three days may be a good average.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was in charge of G-2 in Hawaii for the Army?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Colonel Fielder, sir.

[12473] Mr. RICHARDSON. And who was under Fielder as his Chief Assistant?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Colonel Bicknell was at that time, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew both of those gentlemen?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were your relations with them cordial?

Captain ROCHEFORT. My relations, I should say particularly with Colonel Fielder, were most cordial.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How frequently would you see them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Perhaps twice a week, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion between you as to the intelligence that you were handling and the intelligence they were handling?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; but it would be in very general terms, because our jobs were different.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there ever any request by the Army for assistance from you and your outfit?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In my particular work, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the best of my recollection not until after the 7th. After the 7th there was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom was the information that you picked up in Hawaii transmitted by you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the Commander-in-Chief verbally, [12474] and by means of written summaries to the Navy Department and commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, by dispatch or by air mail.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you would turn over what you had to Layton, and Layton had the duty of transmitting it to the commander in chief?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. In addition to that we would send over with the summary a qualified officer to discuss the matter in detail with Layton, if he so wished.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Are you familiar, Captain, with a dispatch that appears in the record here, sent through the Army, requesting G-2 in Hawaii to contact you for information with reference to weather broadcasts?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have heard of such a message, sir, but I did not hear of it up until a short time ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There never at any time was presented any communication to you to contact you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not for that express purpose.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Based upon such a dispatch, as far as you knew? Captain ROCHEFORT. Not for that express purpose, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know how the messages went out from Hawaii, from the Japanese consuls to Tokyo?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have no first-hand information on that, sir. [12475]

Mr. RICHARDSON. I did not understand.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have no first-hand information on that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. With reference to the dispatches from Honolulu to Tokyo during the first week in December, such as is illustrated by the number 247 here, indicating the message went out under PA-K2, would such a message as that go by cable or would it go by some other form of transmission?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It would go either by cable or by radio.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were there any arrangements that you had which would have enabled you to know what was being sent out by cable?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. If we had been asked to do it, or directed to do it, we could have possibly obtained the information.

[12476] Mr. RICHARDSON. What is the basis for that statement, Captain?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The basis for the statement is, sir, I have had considerable experience in attempting to obtain so-called commercial traffic over a period of years, and there are one or two Federal statutes in the matter which made the thing rather delicate to try.

Furthermore, I knew that the authorities in Washington were obtaining the information in sufficient detail, and if they required any assistance, they would ask me to get some information from Honolulu.

In other words, not receiving any requests, or direction from the Navy Department, I assumed they were getting all the information they needed from the diplomatic traffic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, such a dispatch as this shown on page 29 of Exhibit 2, might have gone to Tokyo either by cable or by radio broadcast?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if you had made the effort, would it have been possible for you to have intercepted and decoded that message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If it had gone by radio, we could, of course, have intercepted it. If it had gone by cable, special arrangements would have to have been made in order to obtain copies of the cable traffic.

[12477] Mr. RICHARDSON. Why were not such arrangements made with reference to knowledge of cable transmissions?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Speaking of Honolulu, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Because attempts had been made in previous years to obtain the same information, without success, and I had been led to believe, without making any specific inquiries, that the Navy Department, or the War Department, or both were receiving that information from sources known only to them.

Senator LUCAS. What was your last statement based on? You said you were led to believe.

Captain ROCHEFORT. In personal conversation, sir, with officers from Washington on their way to or from the Far East.



Senator BREWSTER. Will you name any of them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. Of course, I was in communication with Captain Safford. He was in charge of the entire organization. The others I cannot recall their names at this time. They were officers going and coming from the Asiatic Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During the week prior to December 7, were you actively translating for the information of the commander in chief in Hawaii all of the messages coming [12478] in to Honolulu and going out of Honolulu, which it was possible for you to decode?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Could you, by any arrangement with the cable company, have increased the number of messages that you could have translated and reported to the commander in chief?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Mr. Counsel, that had been done on either the 3d or the 4th of December, on which certain messages were made available to me by the District Intelligence Officer. They were being handled in Washington, but I undertook to attempt to handle them myself in Honolulu, as well as send back copies to Washington immediately, and thus we did read some before the 7th, but the important ones after the 7th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And those that you read were transmitted by you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the commander in chief.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To the commander in chief, in due course?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes. Actually, I think what happened, sir, was I told Layton that we had some messages, but they were absolutely of no value then. They involved such things as wages, visas, and that sort of thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, it is very definite, is it not, [12479] that there never was any time prior to Pearl Harbor when your station in Hawaii could handle any of the purple or other high Japanese code transmissions?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we could not handle them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that, of course, would include the code J-19 that you spoke of a moment ago?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But it would not include the PA-K2?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could handle the PA-K2 and lower classifications.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, did you make up, while you were there, a communications intelligence summary covering specific periods?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For transmission from your department to the commander in chief?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The communications intelligence summary was a daily report to the commander in chief, Pacific, of all information obtained, estimates made, and deductions drawn from the previous day's traffic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How often? Daily?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, daily.

[12480] Mr. RICHARDSON. And covering the period of a week or 10 days prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, you furnished, as part

of your duty to the commander in chief, a daily intelligence summary, to acquaint him with everything that had passed through your unit during the preceeding 24 hours?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I show you our Exhibit 115, and ask you whether those are samples of that intelligence summary.

(The document was handed to Captain Rochefort.)

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes; they are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the fact is, Captain, that your activities there, as is indicated by these intelligence summaries, were quite definitely confined to Japanese ship movements, and other matters connected with naval operations which came in codes which you were able to handle and translate?

Captain ROCHEFORT. About 10 percent of which we were able to handle and translate, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, all that did come to you that you were able to handle and translate came from ship movements?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And other similar activities of the Japanese naval forces?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12481] Mr. RICHARDSON. And did not include the diplomatic intercepts, which, it was your understanding, as I understood your testimony, were being handled by Washington, and at Cavite?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any arrangement, so far as you know, between your station in Hawaii and Cavite with respect to the interchange of communications?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There had been an arrangement, which had existed for some years, in which one of the three stations, that is, Cavite, Pearl Harbor, or Washington, if they had information of value to one or more of the other stations, it was immediately passed to that station by radio, or by airmail.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was that stopped?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not think it was ever stopped; not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any cessation of it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. There might have been a possible lowering in the number of messages which were sent to us for information, but that would be because they felt they were more technical in nature and did not interest us.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, if there had been suitable empowering directions from Washington, could there have [12482] been closer and better cooperation between your unit and G-2 in Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. When I say "yes, sir" that may sound as if there were not full cooperation. We did cooperate to the fullest extent possible, bearing in mind the different jobs we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know anything of your own knowledge about the G-2 set-up there?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; from conversations with Colonel Fielder.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what they were able to intercept and decode?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not discuss that matter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were unable, in many instances, to discuss with G-2 the character of the intelligence that you were receiving, were you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; by reason of the fact that, insofar as I knew, Colonel Fielder, as G-2, was not authorized to receive "ultra."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then there was a large field of intelligence that would pass through your unit that you could not communicate to G-2, or any officer in G-2?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I could not communicate [12483] it to G-2 as ultra, but I could communicate the sense of it, which I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you be able to say that that duty was carried out to the extent that you feel G-2 got all of the information from you that would have been useful to them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your assignment now?

Captain ROCHEFORT. On duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Here in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you had that assignment?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Since approximately the middle of December 1945, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And prior to that, where have you been?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have been ordered to sea duty, sir, at my own request, in October.

The CHAIRMAN. How long after the attack on Pearl Harbor before you were assigned to some other place?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In October 1942, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nearly a year?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12484] The CHAIRMAN. You were not in Washington at any time immediately prior to the attack and immediately after?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark isn't here.

Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to pass for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Is it commander or captain?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Captain, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Rochefort, as I understand it, each day at Pearl Harbor you prepared an intelligence summary, which in turn was turned over by you to Layton. That would be Captain Layton?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Captain Layton now, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then Captain Layton himself would make his own estimate of the situation, and present it to Admiral Kimmel, or would he present your intelligence summary?

Captain ROCHEFORT. He would present our intelligence summary, sir, in addition to which he would prepare for [12485] Admiral Kimmel, at infrequent intervals perhaps an over-all general estimate.

Mr. MURPHY. But, at any rate, each of your summaries would, in the ordinary course of events, be presented to Admiral Kimmel daily?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on November 1, the Japanese changed their code signals, did they not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Call sign, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Call sign.

Then sometime towards the end of November you predicted that the Japs were about to change their call sign signals again?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In Navy parlance, that would be pretty extraordinary, wouldn't it, a change within less than 30 days of call sign signals?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It would have been the first time it had happened, to my knowledge, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you conveyed that information to Layton, and he in turn to Kimmel, did he not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, about the first of December there was an actual change of the call signs again, was there not?

[12486] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That too was quite unusual, wasn't it, the fact that they actually changed it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Ordinarily it would be 6 months to a year before they would make such a change; isn't that right?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The periods in which they were being kept in effect were comparatively smaller.

Mr. MURPHY. It is also a fact, is it not, sir, that in your daily intelligence summaries, you stated definitely and positively that the Japanese appeared to be preparing for a major offense in the Pacific?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. About when was it that you stated that in your summary?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We prepared a special dispatch along that line on the 26th of November, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And on that day you felt the Japanese were prepared for a move on a large scale?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also predicted in your daily summaries the fact that the Japanese were moving in the direction of Hawaii with their submarines, did you not?

[12487] Captain ROCHEFORT. We did not say they were moving in the direction of Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. You said they were moving eastward?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And moving eastward was in the direction of Hawaii, so far as our possessions were concerned, Midway, and the United States?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They were moving, at any rate, from the Asiatic coast and from the Japanese coast in the direction generally due east, weren't they?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And due east would be Midway, Johnston, Hawaii, and the west coast of the United States, wouldn't it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you showed that in your summaries, that that progressive move was occurring, did you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Perhaps not in those words, sir, but that was the sense of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, to a naval man, it would mean you predicted the gradual move east of submarine activity of the Japanese, would it not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. As I recall, sir, we [12488] said they were going to the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. They were going to the Marshalls?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. As far as the Marshalls were concerned, there was some controversy over how many carriers were in the Marshalls, wasn't there?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt there were only two carriers there did you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You were right, weren't you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We said one cardiv, or carrier division—at the most, two carriers.

Mr. MURPHY. At the most two carriers?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You were right and the others were wrong?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would hesitate to say.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you were right. There were only two down there.

Captain ROCHEFORT. There would be a maximum of two down there.

Mr. MURPHY. And that was your report on your daily intelligence summary?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That was a special summary.

[12489] Mr. MURPHY. That was a special summary.

On the 26th of November you said there were only two carriers at the Marshalls, and you later learned there were only two carriers at the Marshalls?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There were two carriers actually at Palau, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. There were two carriers at Palau?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, in addition to that, you had located en masse practically the entire Japanese Fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor, had you not? I mean in your daily intelligence summary.

Captain ROCHEFORT. We located them in a negative sense, sir. We had lost them. We did not know where they were.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you made reference in one of your summaries, did you not, to the actual group or block, almost without exception, of the actual ships that had come to Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not recall that, sir. We may have. I do not recall that.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the fact is you did, on your daily intelligence summary, show that the carriers were not accounted for, did you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12490] Mr. MURPHY. You got to the point where you could not account for them, you just left them out of your report, to indicate that nothing was known about them?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

As I recall, we said, "Nothing is known about carriers."

Mr. MURPHY. And the reason for doing that, as a Navy man, as a communications expert, was you did not want to venture an opinion on an unknown quantity; isn't that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes. The idea there was, by means short of cryptanalysis, in other words, radio intelligence, we could obtain a considerable amount of information. That is, without actually reading the messages.

From that information, we found we did not know anything about the carriers.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact you did not know anything about them, and the fact that you did not put in your intelligence summary anything as to their being in home waters meant to indicate, did it not, to those who read it, that there was a danger signal?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would not say that, sir, because that condition had obtained before.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is, you said you knew nothing about them.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

[12491] Mr. MURPHY. And, therefore, when there is an uncertainty you usually look for the worst, don't you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Of course, they could have gone out on a fleet problem, or they could have gone into radio silence, or a variety of other things. That happened before, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it the usual plan, when you have a war warning and you cannot account for carriers, that you prepare for the worst?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the fact is that you did say on your summaries that they could not be accounted for, and then you gave that to Captain Layton, and Captain Layton went to Admiral Kimmel, and presented it to him and Admiral Kimmel said to Captain Layton, "You mean to say they might even be coming around Diamond Head?" Do you remember that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I had heard that later, sir.

[12492] Mr. MURPHY. Captain, did you, as the communications expert at Pearl Harbor, know anything about the war warning of November 27?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; I did see it on or about November 27.

Mr. MURPHY. So that you had knowledge of that and you took that into consideration when you were preparing your intelligence summaries about the location of the carriers; isn't that right?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you alarmed approaching December 2d about those carriers?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You expected trouble was coming, did you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We all knew it was coming, sir. It was a question of where.

Mr. MURPHY. Now then, what facilities did you have for interchanging what you had with your counterpart of the Army?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Personal conversation, sir, with Colonel Fielder in Shafter and Colonel Fielder in Pearl Harbor; meeting Colonel Fielder in Captain Layton's office and perhaps seeing him down town with Captain Mayfield.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, it has come to the committee's attention [12493] that the FBI sent a message to Washington to the effect that the Japanese were destroying most of their important papers as a result of an intercept of a conversation of a cook in the Japanese consulate with Japan; did you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I did not know about the conversation at the time, sir. I had been informed by the district intelligence officer of the fact that the Japanese consulate was destroying certain papers and codes.

Mr. MURPHY. The only difference is that the information that Admiral Kimmel and General Short appeared to have gotten was that the Japanese were reported destroying papers but the FBI reported to Washington that they were destroying most of their important papers. Did you know that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. The information was given to me that they were destroying their codes.

Mr. MURPHY. Codes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, there was a message from Honolulu to Washington on the 6th day of December that the Japanese were destroying their codes. Did you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I originated that message, sir, from Honolulu to Washington.

[12494] Mr. MURPHY. General Short said that he never heard about that. Do you know whether he did or not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, do you know whether your counterpart in the Army knew the Japanese were destroying their codes on December 6 at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; because I received that information from the district intelligence officer. I was fairly sure without asking that he had received it either from the FBI or the Army and in either event the Army would have known about it either from the FBI or themselves.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, General Short said he never heard it. Would you be surprised at that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; it could very well be that it was a matter which was known perhaps to somebody in General Short's staff and was not considered important. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. As a communications expert, Captain, when you heard of the destruction of the codes at the very place where you were located, what did it mean to you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Well, I am trying to keep hindsight out of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; I don't want present-day quarterbacks. What did it mean to you on the 6th with the carriers not [12495] located, with the war warning message before, with the feeling that war was coming, and then the sign that right where you are they are destroying their codes, the expected enemy?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I think that my reaction at that time would have been that Admiral Hart is going to have himself quite a job very shortly.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that at least some of the forces of the United States were going to be in for action?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That Admiral Hart was going to have himself quite a bit of work to do.

Mr. MURPHY. I have just one other question.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, in order to straighten out my own mind I would like to ask you one or two questions.

You originated that message that was sent to Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Wherein you advised the Navy that the Japanese consul was destroying codes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, was that information disseminated after you sent the code or where did the information come from in the first instance?

[12496] Captain ROCHEFORT. The reason for sending the message was twofold. First, we received a message either from Washington or from Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, to the effect that the Japanese were destroying communications equipment in various places throughout the world, and my message to Washington was in amplification of that message in part.

Senator LUCAS. What I am trying to find out, Captain, is what means you had or what liaison did you have with the Army so that everyone of importance in the Army, and in the Navy, would know about the burning of the codes in the consulate at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I don't think I follow you there, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you knew the codes were being burned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You sent a message to Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Who else knew?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Layton.

Senator LUCAS. That codes were being burned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Layton, I was informed.

Senator LUCAS. What was your arrangement between the Army and Navy to get that information to the Army?

[12497] Captain ROCHEFORT. As I said, sir, the information came to me from the District Intelligence Officer.

Senator LUCAS. Who was he?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It was Captain Mayfield, sir. He was a naval officer. Captain Mayfield. He gave me the information. In other words, the District Intelligence Officer then was familiar with the situation. He informed me and I undertook to inform Washington



and the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and, as I said before, I was fairly sure that Captain Mayfield had obtained the information in the first instance either from the FBI or from the Army. In any event, I would not consider it my job to have informed either the FBI or the Army.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. I am trying to ascertain as to whose responsibility it was to disseminate that information between the Army and the Navy, assuming that the Navy got it first?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The District Intelligence Officer, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was Captain Mayfield?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And it was his duty to inform the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet as well as the Army?

[12498] Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. Captain Mayfield actually informed me and I undertook to see that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was informed.

Senator LUCAS. So it was your duty then to see that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was informed?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Whose duty was it in the Navy—I assume they got the message first—whose duty was it in the Navy in Hawaii to advise General Short and his staff of this important message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would say the District Intelligence Officer, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That would be Captain Mayfield?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They must have had an arrangement for the exchange of information, intelligence.

Captain ROCHEFORT. From what I observed they worked in close contact.

Senator LUCAS. Wouldn't you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would not know first-hand.

Senator LUCAS. We would have to rely upon Captain Mayfield for that information as to whether or not he exchanged information with the Army on such vital information as the burning of codes at that particular time?

[12499] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I would have no first-hand information of that.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain, is there any doubt in your mind that Admiral Kimmel knew of this message that you sent to Washington on the 6th? I believe you said that was sent by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to Washington.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That would be the office clearing the message that I had prepared.

Mr. MURPHY. What I mean is, do you know whether or not that message, that information about the destruction of codes on the 6th in Hawaii, got to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I naturally couldn't say positively, sir, but I am quite sure it would have; quite sure.

Mr. MURPHY. How would it get there, who would be the one, Layton?

Captain ROCHEFORT. From Layton; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, one other question. In Exhibit 2 there are a number of messages concerning ship locations in Hawaii. Do you recall whether or not you were translating any of the PA-K2 dispatches?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not until the 3d or 4th of December, sir.

[12500] Mr. MURPHY. And some of these, though, that you did decode had something to do with the number of ships that were actually in Pearl Harbor, did they not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. As I recall, one or two of them did, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder if you would be able to tell which ones—you did refer to them in your previous testimony, not before this committee but before another committee. It may be that you didn't. Somebody at Hawaii did, Captain.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The only message that I would recall, sir, of any importance in the group that we worked on at Pearl subsequent to the night of 3 December was the rather long message pertaining to lights in homes and that sort of thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you succeeded in getting enough out of that to know pretty much what they were doing?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; unfortunately, that was not translated until the evening of the 10th.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you didn't know what was in it on the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you translated any messages before the 7th which indicated an interest on the part of Tokyo in what was going on at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

[12501] Mr. MURPHY. None at all?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know that Tokyo was making inquiry of Honolulu for any purpose up to the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I recall of no messages that indicated that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, my final question: You said you expected there would be a lot of trouble in store for Admiral Hart. How soon after you heard that about the codes being destroyed at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not more than 3 or 4 days, sir, at the outside.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, sir. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster is next.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now.

Captain, are you going to be in the city for awhile?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I don't know that I shall want to further interrogate you, but if you will be here tomorrow I will appreciate it.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, how many kinds of codes are there?

[12502] The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Senator Brewster is next.

Senator BREWSTER. I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. GEARHART. I have heard of the Army, the Navy, and the diplomatic. Are there any other classifications of codes and ciphers?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Most any government agency would have its own system or systems as well as the various commercial systems.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course, when you are monitoring for, picking up these codes, you don't know what they are while you are getting them, it is only after you get them and study them that you can classify them; is that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. Over a period of years we had developed a pretty fair knowledge of the Japanese naval communication system which involved, among other things, a rather detailed knowledge of the radio circuits that were plied, such as between Tokyo and ships at sea, that sort of thing. In Pearl Harbor we merely covered or monitored, if you will, the circuits that we felt the most information was available on.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do we have respected channels when using radio?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Even if there weren't, sir, [12503] we would still find it, because we maintain special watches for searching the whole spectrum.

Mr. GEARHART. You broke some of the Naval codes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. You were able to crack some of the naval codes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Some of the diplomatic codes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you able to crack any of the Army, Japanese Army codes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We didn't try anything with the Army systems at all, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The Army systems would come over the air once in awhile?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, they would, but we were not covering any of those circuits. Our primary concern was with the Navy. When I say that I do not wish to be misunderstood. We were only able to cover a part of the naval communications system through a lack of personnel.

Mr. GEARHART. Because you were way out in the middle of the Pacific, I suppose there weren't many Army messages coming, were there?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could have probably picked up [12504] quite a few had we had the personnel to do it with.

Mr. GEARHART. Once in awhile the Navy could be caught?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could have, sir; but I conceived my first job was to put my own house in order, which was the Japanese Navy. Then when we were able to do that, we could look around and offer whatever help we could.

Mr. GEARHART. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain, there was a message sent from OPNAV, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, for Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, No. 061743.

Mr. Masten, will you show him that message.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. ♦

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that reads:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands, you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

That is the way that reads.

[12505] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that was received by CINCPAC, which is Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you note whether or not it is marked "Urgent" or "Priority"?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I can't see from this copy, sir, what the classification was. This copy that I have is not marked at all as far as the classification.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether in the Navy if it wasn't marked "Priority" or "Urgent" that it would not go "Priority" or "Urgent"?

What hour was it sent out of Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. 1743, which would be 12:43 Washington time. In other words, 43 minutes after noon.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 6th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. 6 December, Saturday.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you receive that prior to the attack?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I did not see this message prior to the attack, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when it did come to your attention?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I recall having seen it, sir, and [12506] it must have been some time after the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you at the time of the attack on Sunday morning at Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. At Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you on duty?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. I got out there about 20 minutes after the attack started.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised at an attack?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you anticipated an attack Sunday morning?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Anywhere?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where?

Mr. MURPHY. May we get the answer as to whether he was surprised at an attack.

(The answer was read by the reporter, as follows:)

Yes, sir, at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate an attack Sunday morning?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I anticipated an attack might occur any morning or any afternoon certainly definitely along the China coast, possibly in the Philippines.

[12507] Senator FERGUSON. Was that because of your Intelligence? What would you draw that conclusion from? I mean, when I say your "Intelligence," I mean the information that you had.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Probably it was due on my part at least to a feeling that the Japanese had more or less committed themselves in southeast Asia, possibly the Philippines, which would not leave very much for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't understand.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Which would not leave them very much in the way of ships and planes for an attack on any other spot.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't the only deterrent to the Japanese movement to the south in Pearl Harbor in the form of ships?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And airplanes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was the deterrent?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Considering the fact that we had a 5-5-3 ratio in the two fleets, Pearl Harbor, some 5,000 miles aloof from Tokyo, and one of the reasons for the 5-5-3 ratio was to give the Japanese a parity in their own waters, it follows that if they were going to the south that the existence or nonexistence of a fleet 5,000 miles [12508] to the eastward was certainly not a major deterrent.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it a deterrent?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In my opinion not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any deterrent at all to them moving?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There would be a deterrent if the entire Japanese Fleet moved to the south thereby risked a hit and run attack on a certain part of their territory, yes, to that extent.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, didn't you know that the entire fleet was not moving south; didn't you know from the British how many ships were moving into the Kra Peninsula?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could count, both from our own sources and other sources, a group of ships going to the south, which comprised, I would say, probably a majority of the Japanese forces available.

Senator FERGUSON. The majority. Would you say over half?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, where did you think the other half was going to strike?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Some, of course, would be in overhaul. Some we just plain lost.

Senator FERGUSON. What about those you lost? Didn't you think there may be danger that they would strike?

[12509] Captain ROCHEFORT. They could; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why weren't you prepared at Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You will pardon me, sir, but I had a rather relatively junior position in Pearl Harbor in connection with preparations.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the head of the Intelligence section?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I was the head of the Combat Intelligence Section, radio intelligence section.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the head of the Radio Combat Intelligence Section?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't it be your duty to appraise as to where Japan was going to attack, when Japan was going to attack and where she was going to attack, and with what force?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Based on radio intelligence only, sir, we would.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then that we had our Intelligence so divided that you only operated on radio intelligence?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then what did you mean by your last [12510] answer?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We gave all the information that we had available or that we had deduced or estimated that had been obtained by means of radio intelligence to the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Senator FERGUSON. That was—

Captain ROCHEFORT. Captain Layton.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you didn't pay any attention after you had given it to him and had drawn the appraisal of it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We gave him our best estimate, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you estimate to him that there was going to be an attack somewhere on Sunday?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; not on Sunday. We did not specify any date, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when did you give him the last estimate?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Saturday, sir, December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you tell him it would happen?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We did not tell them, to the best of my knowledge, on Saturday, 6 December, when it would happen.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them it was going to happen?

[12511] Captain ROCHEFORT. We indicated very strongly there was an offensive movement.

Senator FERGUSON. An offensive movement where?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I think perhaps the best statement on that, sir, would be the November 26 message.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say to him on the 26th? I am trying to find out now—you are the Radio Intelligence man there—why they didn't know about this attack coming, I am trying to find out why the Intelligence System didn't work out there.

Captain ROCHEFORT. As to that I have no answer, Mr. Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no answer as to why it didn't work?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. I cannot explain to you why we did not specify a certain date or a day in the week.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had known under your radio system that there was a message being delivered in Washington Sunday morning and it was to be delivered to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock and that it was even more than an ultimatum, would that have given you the hour?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I believe it would have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get such a message?

[12512] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. No; not now.

Mr. MURPHY. I am wondering the basis for the Senator's statement about it being more than an ultimatum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what I am talking about, the 14th-part message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I did not see that message until 1944-1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you had this, as you call it, the radio intelligence, did you get other intelligence so that you could appraise the entire situation?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12513] Senator FERGUSON. Well then, did you give to Captain Layton an entire appraisal, as far as the Navy was concerned of the situation as to whether or not to expect war and where to expect it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you give it to him?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Daily.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever call it to his attention that there was going to be war as far as the United States was concerned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, I would not say in writing that we made the flat statement that there was or was not going to be war. We gave them indications as we saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were those indications that we were going to have war with Japan, America was?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never gave him such an appraisal?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, not in writing. We may have discussed the matter and undoubtedly did at great length.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had the foundation for such appraisal, why didn't you put it in writing?

The CHAIRMAN. It is 5 o'clock. Obviously we can't finish with the witness. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. MURPHY. May we have available in the morning that 26 summary?

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., February 15, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Saturday, February 16, 1946.)





[12514]

# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.

*Washington, D. C.*

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

[12515] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.  
Senator Ferguson will proceed.

## TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JOSEPH JOHN ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. You have the message now?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you about the message of November 24. Do you have it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. November 26.

Senator FERGUSON. November 26.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read it, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. At the direction of the Commander in Chief, the unit under my command during the month of November had been making various summaries and as a result of Admiral Kimmel's order, as transmitted by Captain Layton, we prepared a summary on the 26th of November which gave our general views as regards the situation which had been developing. I shall read the message.<sup>1</sup> It went to OPNAV for information of Commander in Chief Asiatic and COM16 and Commander in Chief Pacific:

For the past month Commander Second Fleet has been [12516] organizing a task force which comprises following units: Second Fleet, Third Fleet including First and Second Base Forces and First Defense Division, Combined Air Force, Desron Three, Airron Seven, Subron Five and possibly units of Batdiv Three from First Fleet.

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indo China force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako and Takao.

<sup>1</sup> The message referred to is printed in full in Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2814-2815.

Third base force at Palao and RNO Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications with Second Fleet commander.

Combined air force has assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved on to Hainan.

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.

Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and submarine division or squadron.

Crudiv seven and Desron three appear as an advance unit and may be en route South China.

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airron twenty-four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet.

[12517] Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

That, I think, Mr. Senator, gives our views as of the end of November.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, boiling that down, where did that mean an attack, if one?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That meant—we did not refer to it in terms of attack or war. We referred to it constantly as a strong offensive movement with major operations of the Japanese primarily toward Southeastern Asia, while certain parts may operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, where would they go from Palao? What should we be on guard for? Did you see that Australian message that was held up the 17 hours?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not recall having seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you seen it recently?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have seen it in the papers, sir, is all, or some reference to it in the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if the Dutch knew there was going to be an attack on the Dutch possessions from Palao at the time or prior to that message, how do you account for your Intelligence Branch not knowing? Didn't you have [12518] close liaison with the Dutch?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And with the English?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what the arrangement was under the ABCD Bloc?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you plan if you didn't know the arrangement? If there was an attack on British possessions, what did that mean to you as far as America was concerned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You mean whether or not we would be involved, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would not hazard an opinion on that, sir; that decision would be made in Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I didn't understand, Captain.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I said I would not hazard an opinion on that; the decision would be made in Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you will permit the suggestion, I am afraid you keep a little too close to the microphone. It has a tendency of blurring your words. Keep 4 or 5 inches from it.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew there was some arrangement [12519] but the actual arrangement was not known by you and all action, as far as that would be concerned, would come from Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Would come from Washington to the Commander in Chief, sir.

[12520] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But if there was going to be an attack on the Dutch, for instance, as shown by the Melbourne message that was held up by the Australians, where they were going to put Rainbow-2 into effect, which meant the joint plan, as I take it from reading that with the evidence, now did that mean anything to you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That merely—if I had seen the message from the Australians prior to the 7th that would merely have confirmed an opinion that we already had, namely, a movement to NEI, Indochina, and neighboring areas.

Senator FERGUSON. But the fact that they were going to attack there on Sunday—

Captain ROCHEFORT. I did not see the message, sir, prior to the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. No; but if you had known that they were going to attack these possessions on Sunday, would that have meant anything to you under what you knew about the A-B-C-D?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not necessarily, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were more or less of a collector of this material, is that true, and handed it up to Layton?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Of the radio intelligence material?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[12521] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were confined, really to the radio intelligence?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not feel that your responsibility was to determine when war was coming or where it was coming, except as you would get it from radio intelligence?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And as to the policy, you did not have charge of that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did not understand it and did not know it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. That was at a higher level.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, when you got radio intelligence—for instance, you intercepted some of these messages that are in Exhibit 2, which you were shown yesterday, that you saw here. Did you send them to Washington? Do you know what I mean by Exhibit 2? The ship movements.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Oh, yes, sir; they would have been sent to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. How were they sent to Washington?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If they were important enough they would have been sent by radio. Otherwise, if they were very [12522] old, they would have gone by air mail.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, look at page 22. First look at page 12. Do you see the message on page 12?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. September 24, 1941.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That is a diplomatic message, Mr. Senator. I think we are perhaps being confused by diplomatic and naval.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, no.

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is a diplomatic message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the one on page 12 is considered a diplomatic message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That did not go in any naval system.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on page 22.

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is also a diplomatic message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, do I understand then that all these exhibits in Exhibit 2 were the J-19?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; in the various diplomatic systems, sir, J-19 and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. They were all in the diplomatic systems?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12523] Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you were not decoding them in—

Captain ROCHEFORT. Honolulu.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Honolulu or Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you know how to do PA-K2?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But some of these messages are in that code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you tell me whether 12, 22, 25, 26, 27, and 29, in what codes are those?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 12, sir, is in the J-19 system.

Senator FERGUSON. So then you did not translate it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not have facilities for translating that one.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever seen that one before, up to the 7th, up to and including the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, what is 22?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 22 is PA-K2, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not attempt to translate [12524] that and send it on to Washington. Do you know whether you intercepted it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not. We did not intercept it; we did not read it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now go to the one on page 25. These are all in exhibit 2.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 25, sir, is also PA-K2.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you intercept it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you did not have any knowledge of it prior to the 7th.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, on page 26 there are two of them, the first one and the second one.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The first one, No. 252, was also in PA-K2.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you intercept that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The second one on that page?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is also PA-K2.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you intercept that one?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We did not intercept it or read it.

Senator FERGUSON. The one on page 27 and then the one [12525] on 29.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 27, No. 253, likewise was not intercepted or read.

Senator FERGUSON. What code is it in?

Captain ROCHEFORT. PA-K2, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And on 29?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The one on page 29 is also PA-K2. The same condition applies; we did not intercept it or read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you in effect did not know that those existed?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you were before Admiral Hewitt, were you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hewitt said this:

The book of Battle Reports states, "The United States shortly before 7 December 1941 had two task forces at sea and the Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo." What do you know about that?

You answered:

To the best of my knowledge Tokyo was not informed on the presence at sea of the two task forces.

What did you mean by that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. What I was referring to there was, sir, [12526] that at the time I did not know whether or not they had been and I had seen no traffic subsequent to that that indicated that they had; in other words, reading this sort of material here.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, weren't you concerned with the exhibits in number 2 where Japan is trying to ascertain, as they did originally on the 24th of September, laying out a plan of the harbor, not only of the ships that were going out but where they were anchored, so that if they came in for an air attack they would know exactly what ship was at what dock or what buoy?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If I may have your indulgence for just a moment, sir, perhaps I can clear up that point.

My unit in Pearl Harbor was charged by the authorities in Washington with specific duties, which were to intercept and to exploit all Japanese naval communications systems and transmit all the information we could obtain from those interceptions to the fleet and to the Navy Department and other interested parties. We were specifically told to keep away or not to exploit the so-called five-number system, which was a naval system. That was being done elsewhere.

We were not to do any work on the diplomatic systems. That was being handled in Washington and perhaps in Cavite. In other words, the reason that we did not have these diplo- [12527] matic messages, the reason we did not intercept them, the reason we did not

work on them or read them was because it was not our assignment but was being handled by Washington.

On the other hand, Washington was not doing anything on our general naval systems. That was our responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain ROCHEFORT. In other words, there was a division of work, a division of labor.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, your job then was to use the radio finders and locate fleets?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was your specific assignment, on radio?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was your assignment?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Japanese naval messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And not these so-called diplomatic, or from the consuls in Hawaii.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not your assignment.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. That does clear up some of this testimony. [12528]

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. There apparently has been some confusion on that, Mr. Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I correctly understand then that you did not personally inform Fielder, Bicknell, or any other Army officers of the fact that the Japs were destroying most of their codes in the United States in early December 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would hesitate to make a categorical statement to that effect, sir. I may have. If I did, it was probably in the course of conversation. I do not recall informing them at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when you were considering that point did you have in mind that it meant war with America?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not have any recollection of it now?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. I may have, but I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know what conference you had with Bicknell or with—yes, with Bicknell—or Fielder between the 27th of November and the 7th of December?

Captain ROCHEFORT. As to dates or hours or places, no, sir. I saw them fairly frequently, perhaps twice a week, something in that nature, and maybe oftener.

[12529] Senator FERGUSON. Would you generally sit down with your various memorandums and messages and compare them? Is that what you call liaison, or is it just to meet each other and be friendly?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. You see, as of that time, Senator. Colonel Fielder was not what we would say in on the "ultra" picture. In other words, he was not a recipient of that type of information. However, if it affected him or it affected his organization, I would give it to him in a somewhat sanitized form.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by the last answer? In what form?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would give him the sense of the information without disclosing its source.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you are going back. You tell me now, this morning, that you were connected only with the Navy, the naval codes and location of the fleets, and so forth, and I think at one time there was a dispute between your branch and the one in the Sixteenth; was there not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; there was no dispute, because Admiral Hart said what he was going to do and that was sufficient.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; as to where the fleets were.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. There was no dispute there.

[12530] Senator FERGUSON. It was decided here in Washington that in the future they would look for and rely more on Admiral Hart's information than they would upon yours.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that mean to you? Did that remove from you that branch?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Oh, no, sir; not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. And you considered then that the Army was not directly connected with the information on what you were covering, the fleet movements of the Japanese, and that is the reason that you cannot recall giving anything to Bicknell or to Fielder?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would not put it that way, sir. I would say that if anything developed insofar as the Japanese were concerned that indicated a vital interest or a general interest or which affected the Army, I would have given it to either General Fielder or Colonel Bicknell, whoever was concerned, in a sanitized form.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Army was alerted to sabotage from the 27th on?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where you got your information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. Probably in conversations with Army officers.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you ever tell Colonel Bicknell about any magic messages or about the winds message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And if you did, did you place a condition on it that he keep it secret even from Fielder and from General Short?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I would never have done anything like that. On the contrary, it is much more reasonable to assume that I would have given the information to General Fielder rather than to Colonel Bicknell by reason of the fact that General Fielder was Colonel Bicknell's superior.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you do not then recall either Fielder or Bicknell conferring with you about the winds message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you know what I mean, the original set-up on the winds message.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not even on those?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever confer with them [12532] that you were looking for a weather report?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Trying to exclude what those officers have testified, I still cannot recall having discussed the matter with them.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you monitoring for a wind execute message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how did you come to do that? You had not intercepted the original two set-up codes?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We had received from Admiral Hart's organization the basic message. We received further orders from Washington to listen in on the known broadcast frequencies, which we proceeded to do and which we continued to do until after the attack on the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know what I mean by the two set-up messages for the wind code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The directions you mean.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That east wind meant—

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; I am perfectly familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12533] Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that information—by intercepting and decoding?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. That information came to us initially from Admiral Hart and it was followed shortly by a directive from Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Telling us what to do.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. So you had a directive to look out for and monitor for an execution of the wind code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And up until the time of the attack were you continuing that monitoring for the wind code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; with four of my very best language officers on a 24-hour watch. That is, a constant watch on the frequencies that were given to us by Washington as well as at frequencies which we knew existed and which we had uncovered.

Senator FERGUSON. You were following Washington's instructions and even doing more in trying to intercept a wind code message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you at any time get such an intercept?

[12534] Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not get it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, after the attack did you talk to Colonel Bicknell about either the set-up messages or the execute message, or either of them?



Captain ROCHEFORT. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you talked to Fielder after the attack about either the set-up messages for the winds code or the execute message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that you can add here to give us information that would help us in this problem that we have before us?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not. If the duties of my organization are understood now, that is—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you want to say anything on your duties, so that we do understand your duties?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, aside from the fact that we were not working on diplomatic systems, that was not one of our assignments, and we were directed to work on naval systems only, which we were doing. The reason I mention that is there has been some confusion, apparently, about diplomatic systems.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

[12535] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. No questions.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Rochefort, you were considered, and still are considered, one of the most capable and competent communications men in the Navy. I do not want to ask you to put yourself in the position of criticizing your superiors, but in regard to this winds message set-up, here you are with the four best men that you had on a 24-hour watch, and here is the Army and the FCC working on it, and here is the Navy and everybody apparently frantic about the winds message, and all that we get is apparently that the Japanese international communications must be broken up, and then when it comes, all we get is that diplomatic relations are not according to expectations.

I am wondering why the Navy and the Army got so excited about a message of that kind, when the fact is we were still continuing to get all of these interceptions right along, even up to the 7th of December, when international communications were not broken up, and when we already knew the diplomatic relations were not according to expectations; when we even knew that war was coming. Can you understand why all this excitement, and why this 24-hour watch [12536] to get a message that would only confirm what these fellows on the 24-hour watch were going to supplement by getting other valuable information?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I submit the witness, from his position, cannot possibly answer any part of that question.

The CHAIRMAN. That would seem to be an expression of an opinion, and the drawing of a conclusion by the witness and argumentative.

Mr. MURPHY. He is referred to in this record, Mr. Chairman, as the outstanding expert of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. He could not tell why he was ordered from Washington to put a 24-hour watch on the monitoring system. It was his duty to carry it out. I doubt very much whether this witness could give the reasons for that. If he can, the committee would be glad to have it.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me ask you some specific questions, in view of the objection of counsel.

Do you know of any information that the winds intercept would have given and that you did not have?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It would have given perhaps a little advance information as to whether it was the Japanese intention to terminate or to break off the negotiations then in progress.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, is it not, that we had the [12537] dead-line message of the 29th, and we had the messages saying "Just carry out this pretense for a little while," and we had a message saying "You will be sent the code word as to what to do," and we had a message from someone in Tokyo saying the instructions will come very soon.

That is one link in the chain that would add up to what we already had; is that it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. It would, perhaps, have given a little additional or earlier information of Japanese intentions with regard to negotiations only.

Mr. MURPHY. One of the witnesses yesterday was permitted, in the record, to say it was the most important message ever received.

Would you so consider it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You are referring to the winds message, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. What he thought was a winds intercept.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; that would not, in my opinion, be an extremely important message.

Mr. MURPHY. The next thing I would like to have is for you to put in the record your communication summary of the 26th of November.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The 26th of November, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. That was the one where you pointed, [12538] is it not, that the Japs were ready for action? You read that this morning, did you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I read the dispatch, sir, which was based on perhaps a month's summaries.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you refer to the dispatch, if you can, that shows the submarines at Saipan moving eastward?

At any rate, Captain, as I understand it, all of your daily communications summaries are in evidence. I understand between November 26 and December 7 in your communications summaries, you did point out that the Japanese submarines were then at Saipan and moving gradually in an easterly direction.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; toward Jaluit.

Mr. MURPHY. And Jaluit is in the same general location, considering a movement from the Asiatic Coast, as Pearl Harbor, is that right?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

We said that, I might say, on the 30th of November, sir. That might answer your question.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. On the 30th of November. The known progress of the submarine force from the Empire to Chichi Jima and to Saipan makes his destination obviously the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. One other question. You said that General [12539] Fielder was not entitled to magic in this ultra form, so when you say if there was something that you felt was vital, that affected the Army, you gave it to him in a sanitized form.

Now, who would be over you in authority to give an order so that you would give the information you had to your counterpart in the Army? Who had the authority to give you the order to do that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Captain Layton, as a personal representative of Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel had the authority to order you, did he not, to give this ultra material to General Fielder?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And, of course, if you got the order you would promptly obey it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would carry out any order I received.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, allow me to inquire a little for information.

I am not quite clear on one or two points mentioned by you.

[12540] General, then Colonel, I believe, Fielder, was the head of G-2 in Hawaii for the Army, wasn't he?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Colonel Bicknell was G-2 for the Army Air Forces in Hawaii, wasn't he?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That was not my understanding sir. I considered Colonel Bicknell as a subordinate of Colonel Fielder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was an assistant to Colonel Fielder?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; that was my understanding.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that applied to the G-2 of the Army in Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12541] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is it your understanding that the head of G-2 and the assistant G-2 in Hawaii were not entitled to receive this secret information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; he was not on the list of personnel that I had, which indicated those that were entitled to receive ultra.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, who made that list?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That list was maintained in our office and was made up initially by the officer in charge and was passed on to succeeding officers in charge.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the responsible official for determining that question?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The officer in charge, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As to who would receive this secret information.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The officer in charge, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the officer in charge?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I was from June 1941 on, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then while you held this position it was solely within your province to determine who in the Army should or should not receive this secret information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; unless I received contrary orders from either Washington or from Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How is that?

[12542] Captain ROCHEFORT. Unless I had received orders to the contrary from either Washington or Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who fixed that responsibility or that discretion in you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not think I understand that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You said it was within your province to determine who in the Army should receive this secret information.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, who fixed your province as to what you should do in that respect?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Nobody, sir. I would determine that by ascertaining whether or not Colonel Fielder had been receiving ultra from his own people, from the Army, and whether or not he was qualified—I say qualified—to receive ultra either from Washington or from Admiral Kimmel's staff.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you determined the question?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As to what and how the secret information should be transmitted from the Navy to the Army?

Captain ROCHEFORT. A slight correction, sir. I would determine whether or not certain people in the Army received ultra from the Navy. Not secret information, but ultra.

[12543] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Ultra?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you could receive certain ultra information and did?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you determined how much or what part of that was transmitted to the Army?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now if the Army had requested or desired this information, could they have secured it from you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But they would have had to come to you and ask for it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And there was not that free interchange of information of that type and character between you and the Army unless they requested it of you?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I think I have given the wrong impression there, sir. If we received any information at the ultra level, that is, information obtained from ultra sources, which the Army should have had, or it would have been desirable for the Army to have had, I would have certainly given it to the Army, but not in the form of ultra. I would have paraphrased it, or changed it around. [12544] or, as we say, sanitized it and then given it to them in such a way as not to disclose the source. But I would have seen that they had the information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But in the final analysis you determined what they should get?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And if you decided that something was not necessary in your opinion to give to the Army, why, they did not get it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That applies to myself; yes, sir. Of course they could obtain it from Admiral Kimmel, or possibly from Wash-

ington, or any other source. But insofar as I was concerned, that was it; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now were you monitoring for the Morse code, or Morse code information in Honolulu?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Not at any time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You are referring to the winds message now, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I will refer to that, but right now I am talking about the general situation.

Captain ROCHEFORT. All Japanese naval communications—I say all, but perhaps 98 percent of them were in Morse code or Imperial Japanese Kani, which is a variation of Morse— [12545] about 98 percent of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About 98 percent of it was in Morse?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes; of naval communications.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Naval communications?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am trying to find out about the Morse code. You certainly know what that is?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Were you monitoring for that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were you monitoring for the winds message in the Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Never did at any time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So then if any winds message had come in the Morse code you would not have received it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you were monitoring the Morse code messages why did not you also monitor for the winds message in the Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The broadcasts that were furnished us [12546] by Washington, the broadcast schedules giving the various frequencies, were all on voice frequencies; none of them were Morse. The term "broadcast" to me, in referring to weather message and news broadcasts, and all that, means simply voice. As I said before, all of the frequencies that had been assigned us by Washington, giving in their opinion a complete list of all known Japanese broadcast frequencies, were all voice broadcasts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Captain, you stated to Senator Ferguson that you tried to receive information in all of the systems that were designated to you by Washington, and some in addition to that.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You just stated a few moments ago that you were monitoring for Morse code messages.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then if you were monitoring for Morse code messages generally, why did not you monitor for the winds message in Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The monitoring of Morse code messages was for Japanese naval communications system messages which went by well-known circuits, what we would call circuits; that is, established channels of communication. Within the Japanese Navy, perhaps 98 percent of that traffic would [12547] have been in the Japanese version of the Morse code. The listening in for the winds message, for the winds execute message, was a separate and totally distinct assignment for the normal assignment which had been given us.

In other words, it was a little additional duty. All the frequencies that were known in Washington on which that winds execute message could have been sent, and which were furnished us, were all voice frequencies. We listened for those. We also searched for other voice frequencies. We uncovered several of them. We continued monitoring all of the known voice broadcasts from the Japanese Empire.

Does that clear up the thing, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No; I am sorry. I just want to ask the simple question if you were monitoring for Morse code messages why you did not monitor for the winds execute message in Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Because the very setting up of the winds execute, the term itself implies, in my mind, voice. I have never seen it used otherwise.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then with the Japanese message setting up the so-called winds code, it was clear to you that there would not be any message in that code, about the winds execute message, in Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12548] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is clear?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You then knew there was no need for monitoring for the winds execute message in a Morse code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, as I recall Captain Safford's testimony here, I think he stated that the winds execute message, which he says he saw, came in the Morse code.

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is entirely possible, sir, but in order to have that condition exist you must remember that the list of frequencies given us by Washington were all voice. If the message was sent in Morse code, that is, the exact message was sent in Morse code, that would have meant then that every Japanese Embassy in every Japanese location throughout the world for whom the message was intended by the Japanese Government would have had to maintain Morse code operators, people capable of receiving Morse code. I do not think so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not think so?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you do not attach much importance to the winds execute message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Personally, I would not, sir. I would say that it merely would have given a little additional [12549] information, perhaps earlier information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is it your best judgment, Captain, that there was never any genuine winds code execute message received?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would prefer to answer that, sir, by saying that, insofar as my unit was concerned, no winds execute was ever

heard. I would rather not pass on what may or may not have been heard in other parts of the world.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. The Morse code is a technical, mechanical, instrumental method of transmitting information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. It is normally referred to as dot and dash.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in no case voice?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Weather broadcasts, such as that indicated in the winds message, that predicted that under certain circumstances the weather report would be broadcast, that is always in voice, isn't it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you had two entirely different systems?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. One of them mechanical and the other [12550] vocal?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were listening over the vocal system?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. For the winds execute message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It never came through?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we did not hear it.

The CHAIRMAN. According to the two messages predicting that under certain circumstances the broadcast of weather would contain certain words, that in itself indicated it would be a vocal transmission?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator BREWSTER. What is the difference, Captain, between a cipher and a code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Between a cipher and a code, sir?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. In the original understanding, sir, a code has a group of letters and numbers—sometimes the letters are pronounceable and sometimes not—which designate a letter or number, a phrase, perhaps, a whole sentence or a complete thought. That would be termed a code.

[12551] Senator BREWSTER. And you would need a code book of some character in order to interpret it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; you would require the book. That is, the original people would.

Senator BREWSTER. Whoever would get it decoded would have to have a book indicating the significance of these letters and symbols?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. What about a cipher?

Captain ROCHEFORT. A pure cipher would interchange or change each letter of the original text so that rather than having a group of letters meaning a whole thought or sentence or phrase, each letter would be changed, or each numeral.

Senator BREWSTER. You mean the letter "A" might mean "X", for instance?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; and then the following letter "B" might mean "L." Where you interchange your letter by another letter, or a numeral by another numeral, that would be a pure cipher.

Senator BREWSTER. That was the advantage of this so-called cipher machine that you referred to?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The Japanese system, you mean?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. That would mean on this machine [12552] you punch certain letters and certain other letters come out?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. If you know what that combination is, you are able to read it?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Is that peculiar to the Japanese, or do other countries use somewhat similar systems, as far as you know?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Ciphers go back to before the days of Julius Caesar.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not exactly novel?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There is nothing that is novel in them, sir.

[12553] Senator BREWSTER. It is just a question of the possible ways in which they follow the techniques, and so on?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Senator FERGUSON. There is one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. When you said you were getting radio information, did that include RCA? That was cable, was it, or was that considered radio?

Captain ROCHEFORT. You mean the messages we got about the 3d of December?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not know where the District Intelligence Officer got his information, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you do with those messages that you received?

Captain ROCHEFORT. On the night of the 3d or the morning of the 4th, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain ROCHEFORT. We read what we could as quickly as we could. We put our best people on it. Those that we read prior to the 7th were of absolutely no value whatever.

We continued working on them, and on the night of the 10th, we managed to read the remainder.

[12554] Senator FERGUSON. Give it to me up until the time the bombs fell.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Nothing of any value, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you put your best men on those messages as soon as you got them from the so-called cable office; is that right?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Wherever they came from I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean they were on other than your regular channel.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Those were diplomatic messages, Senator.



Senator FERGUSON. Now, on this winds code, you were attempting to evaluate that execution message when you did not have all of the other diplomatic messages.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I think it could have been reasonable to assume the meaning of the thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know we had sent a message on the 26th to Japan?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, not prior to the 7th. I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that prior to the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

[12555] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a deadline set on the 25th to close the negotiations?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Other than what I read in the newspapers, I did not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know it prior to the 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I did not know it prior to the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that was extended to the 29th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; my information came from newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had that kind of knowledge, would the winds code execute have been more significant if you had those diplomatic messages?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think so?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a question, Captain.

The CHAIRMAN. The counsel has a question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If there was to be a winds execute message sent in Morse, it would have had to be initially started in Morse in Tokyo?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[12556] Mr. RICHARDSON. And wherever that message would go, it would go in Morse?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then if it was to be in a weather news communication, it would mean that London and the United States and other places that Morse could go to would be advised in Morse what the news and weather was in Japan?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had had any idea that a winds execute might come in Morse, you could have directed your attention to Morse intercepts for the purpose of getting such an intercept, could you not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, we could have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But it was your understanding, from the information you received from Washington, and the nature of the recitals in the original winds code message, that any intercept was to come by radio broadcast?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all you monitored for?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Captain, it is true, is it not, that early in 1941 arrangements were made for the transmission from Washington

to Cavite the information with respect to purple messages received at Washington from Tokyo?

[12557] Captain ROCHEFORT. I imagine there were a series of messages technical in nature.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when Washington would transmit the information which they got from the purple intercepts to Cavite, would that be transmitted in the Japanese code to Cavite or would it be transmitted in our code, or would it be transmitted in English between Washington and Cavite?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That would have been transmitted in one of the U. S. Naval cryptographic systems.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, would you be able in Hawaii to intercept and read the communications from the United States to Cavite, the information that Washington had received in purple?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, whenever information was given by Washington to Cavite, based upon information which came to Washington under the purple code, did you pick it up in Hawaii?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You could have?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We could have, with considerable difficulty, I would say. In other words, it would have involved picking one message out of perhaps 50,000, which would have required going to the Fleet communications officer.

[12558] Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you paid no attention, in your station at Hawaii, to communications between Washington and Cavite of that nature?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks you, Captain, for your appearance here. You are excused.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Call the next witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to call Admiral Noyes, Mr. Chairman.

## TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. LEIGH NOYES, UNITED STATES NAVY <sup>1</sup>

(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral Noyes, will you please state your full name, your rank, and present assignment for the committee.

Admiral NOYES. Leigh Noyes. Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. President of the Board of Inspection and Survey.

Mr. MASTEN. And what were your rank and duties on the 7th of December, 1941?

Admiral NOYES. I was Rear Admiral, Director of Naval Communications in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MASTEN. When did you become Director of Naval Communications, Admiral? [12559]

Admiral NOYES. About the 1st of August 1939.

Mr. MASTEN. And how long did you then continue as such?

Admiral NOYES. Until the 24th, I think, of February 1942.

<sup>1</sup> See suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Noyes, Hearings, Part II, pp. 5306 et seq.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, would you state briefly to the committee, your experience in the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. I was appointed to the Naval Academy from Vermont; graduated in February 1906; went to the Asiatic station for 3 years; came back in the cruise around the world; was in the *Missouri*, *Mississippi*; aide to Rear Admiral Ward; the *Wyoming*; in 1914 I went to the Office of the then Aide for Operations in the Navy Department, and became the first communications officer of the Navy Department.

I went to sea in 1916 as Fleet Communications Officer, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. I commanded the *Biddle*, a destroyer; came ashore to the Office of Director of Naval Communications, Atlantic Coast Communications Superintendent; went to the Naval War College; battleship *Colorado*; the Naval Mission to Brazil; Director of Training for Navigation on shore; commanded the light cruiser *Richmond* for 2 years; went to Pensacola to qualify as a naval aviator; commanded the *Lexington*; Chief of Staff to commander [12560] aircraft battle force.

In 1939, Director of Naval Communications, which I left in February 1942 to go to sea in the Pacific Fleet.

Commander Task Force 18, 61; came ashore in November of 1942 to the Board of Inspection and Survey, West Coast, and in March 1945 to Washington as President of the Board of Inspection and Survey, which position I now hold.

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral, how many appearances have you made before boards investigating the Pearl Harbor matter?

Admiral NOYES. One. Before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Mr. MASTEN. That was in July 1944, about?

Admiral NOYES. December.

Mr. MASTEN. December 1944?

Admiral NOYES. Yes; in San Francisco.

Mr. MASTEN. In San Francisco?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. Where had you been immediately prior to your appearance before that board?

Admiral NOYES. I was then a senior member of the Board of Inspection and Survey, West Coast—Pacific Coast.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, the office of Naval Communications—

Admiral NOYES. May I add something, sir?

Mr. MASTEN. Excuse me.

Admiral NOYES. I was approached by the Hewitt Board [12561] or, rather, I was given an opportunity to appear before them if I wished to make any changes in any testimony I had given to the Naval Court of Inquiry, but at that time I had nothing to say.

Mr. MASTEN. It is my recollection that all, or part of your testimony in the Navy proceeding was incorporated in the record of the Hewitt proceeding.

Admiral NOYES. I would have made three minor changes if I had known then what I do now.

Mr. MASTEN. What would those have been, Admiral, do you recall?

Admiral NOYES. In regard to the cards for the winds code; in regard to the telephone message from one of the watch officers about a false winds message; and about my knowledge about the first 13 parts.

Mr. MASTEN. We will come to that a little bit later. At the time we mention it, will you state what changes you would have made in any part of what you have previously testified?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, in November and December 1941, the Office of Naval Communications was one of the principal divisions of the Office of Naval Operations, was it not?

[12562] Admiral NOYES. It was one of the coordinate divisions. All divisions are supposed to be coordinate.

Mr. MASTEN. On a par with the War Plans Division and the Division of Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. And you were Admiral Stark's principal adviser on matters relating to naval communications, were you not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Did your work as head of that office bring you into contact more closely with certain of the division heads than others; that is, Admiral Wilkinson or Admiral Turner?

Admiral NOYES. You are speaking of the pre-Pearl Harbor period?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. Yes; more closely with Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner than the other divisions.

Mr. MASTEN. At that time, the principal function of your office was the maintenance of the Navy's communication system, was it not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. In a sense, you were the Navy's Western Union at that time?

[12563] Admiral NOYES. Western Union and A. T. & T.

Mr. MASTEN. In addition to those duties, your office included the unit that was under Captain Safford, known as the Communications Security Unit, or some such name?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. And a part of that unit was the translation section headed by Captain Kramer?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. At whose initiative was Captain Kramer appointed to that work?

Admiral NOYES. I found him there when I reported.

Mr. MASTEN. At the time you became Director of Naval Communications?

Admiral NOYES. That is my recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, who was your Assistant Director of Naval Communications during the period just prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. Then Capt. J. R. Redman.

[12654] Mr. MASTEN. Did he come into the office after you came in, or was he there before?

Admiral NOYES. After.

Mr. MASTEN. What was what might be called the chain of command as regards the Communications Intelligence Unit? Did you issue orders directly to Captain Safford in matters pertaining to his unit, or did you issue orders to Captain Redman and then he passed them on to Captain Safford?

Admiral NOYES. I was the Chief of the Division and Captain Redman was my assistant, second in command, the Executive Officer, Chief of Staff, whatever you might call it. I dealt directly with the heads of sections, who acted in my place. I could give instructions to him, or in handling a certain amount of detail, he could carry it out without referring to me.

Mr. MASTEN. When you were absent, Captain Redman would be in charge of the Office of Naval Communications?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. To what extent were you familiar with the day-to-day operations of Captain Safford's unit?

Admiral NOYES. I tried to be familiar with all that was going on, that was my responsibility. I did not exactly follow you on the question, as to how much detail I could keep track of.

[12565] Mr. MASTEN. Would it be only matters that he would bring to you that you would be informed regarding, or on occasion would you find it necessary to raise questions with him as to the daily operation of his unit?

Admiral NOYES. It was desired to have a considerable amount of decentralization. There was a great deal of detail to Captain Safford's section. In addition to the part in which you are interested, magic, we had a tremendous job in our own codes and ciphers, for which he was responsible.

Mr. MASTEN. Captain Safford was also responsible for that work?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, or his office.

Mr. MASTEN. Turning to the interception and decryption of the Japanese messages, we know from the testimony before the committee that the Navy was maintaining a system of monitoring stations for the interception of those messages. You were familiar, were you not, with that system?

Admiral NOYES. I was, except—

Mr. MASTEN. Except what?

Admiral NOYES. Except the intercept stations were part of the Navy system. They had not been established for this specific purpose.

Mr. MASTEN. And did they take their orders directly from Washington through Captain Safford?

[12566] Admiral NOYES. We had what is called in the Navy operational control of all the systems, somewhat similar to the telephone tie-up. You have to have a net. There must be some over-all control of the entire system. Each station—as Commander Rochefort mentioned, he reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Fourteenth Naval District, but he got over-all directions from Washington.

Mr. MASTEN. Now in addition to the intercepting system of monitoring stations, did the Navy Department also maintain facilities in Washington and at Corregidor and Pearl Harbor for decrypting Japanese messages? Captain Rochefort has been testifying as to how it was done at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. You were familiar with the assignments and facilities available at Pearl Harbor and at Corregidor, were you not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. What was your understanding, prior to December 7, as to what could be decrypted in Pearl Harbor, of the diplomatic traffic?

Admiral NOYES. What Captain Rochefort said.

Mr. MASTEN. That is to say, you understood that there were no facilities at Pearl Harbor for decryption of Japanese messages in the purple code?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

[12567] Mr. MASTEN. And in the code known as J-19, that was your understanding prior to December 7?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral Kimmel has contended before the committee that the Japanese diplomatic intercepts which were decrypted in Washington—some of them—should have been sent to Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Turner has stated before the committee that it was his understanding there were facilities at Pearl Harbor which permitted the people at Pearl Harbor to read the Japanese diplomatic messages. Did Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark ever discuss that matter with you?

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend just a moment.

(Short interruption.)

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral, you were about to say whether or not Admiral Turner or Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Stark had ever had any conversations with you as to the facilities available for the decryption of diplomatic messages in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral NOYES. I know the question. I think it has already been stated by Admiral Turner that he discovered he was mistaken. I think if you look at his testimony, on page 419 of the Navy narrative, you will see that he is speaking of what we call radio intelligence, which is the activity that Captain Rochefort has been discussing. It [12568] does not involve knowing the contents of the messages. It involves direction finding, to find the location of ships, the analysis of the transmissions they monitored, and call signs on messages in code, which, although you cannot read, you can form a good estimate of what the ships are doing from the call signs and the direction alone. That is called a traffic analysis. The ultimate was the question of the carriers, when the traffic became zero.

Mr. MASTEN. Now did you ever make any statements to Admiral Turner that Admiral Kimmel was able to read the translated or decrypted messages in purple code at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief, because I had been the one who had proposed, when we had one machine available—I had to get approval from Admiral Stark to send it to Cavite, and I knew perfectly well that they could decipher the diplomatic traffic and send it to Honolulu.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you now recall that at any time prior to December 7 Admiral Turner made any statements to you which would have indicated at the time that he understood that Admiral Kimmel had the means of decrypting purple traffic?

Admiral NOYES. I do not.

Mr. MASTEN. You account for his apparent misunderstanding—[12569] ing as confusion in his mind between the decrypting and handling of the traffic that you spoke of and the diplomatic, the Jap-

anese diplomatic code? In other words, do you think that he had those two types of information confused in his mind?

Admiral NOYES. That is merely my opinion.

Mr. MASTEN. That is merely your opinion?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. I think it is the only way in which I could see that a misunderstanding could have occurred, plus the fact that his original testimony referred to traffic analyses, which had nothing to do with the reading of the text, of enemy messages.

Mr. MASTEN. Now turning to the exchange of purple information between Manila and Washington and Pearl Harbor, to what extent was the station in Manila expected to forward in to Washington the information which it derived from the interception and decryption of Japanese purple messages at Manila? Will you state in a general way the arrangement between Manila and Washington for any such exchange of information?

[12570] Admiral NOYES. Originally there were no facilities at Cavite for decrypting diplomatic traffic, it all had to be forwarded to Washington. I might say that starting in 1939, when I first came, what little we were doing was not of immediate importance and mail was used almost entirely for forwarding the intercepts.

As Pearl Harbor approached, as December approached and the crisis, that was speeded up more and more.

Mr. MASTEN. May I interrupt you there, Admiral. Are you speaking of forwarding the messages still in the Japanese code or after decryption in English?

Admiral NOYES. Originally they could only be forwarded in the Japanese code.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I think it was early—may I look at this dispatch that you have there.

I should say that about March 1941 one machine became available and it was decided to send it to Cavite.

Mr. MASTEN. And after that anything that came into Washington from Cavite was decrypted and in English?

Admiral NOYES. If they could handle it. All this enemy interception is not an open and shut proposition. Many messages we never could translate. We were very fortunate to get what we did.

[12571] Mr. MASTEN. Was it the practice for Manila to send on to Washington, in the encoded Japanese, what they could not handle in Manila in order that Washington could have an opportunity to decode it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. And did they also send to Washington in English the messages which they did decode in Manila?

Admiral NOYES. The object of putting the machine at Cavite, which was the best listening post we had, was to cut out the transmission between Cavite and Washington, let them decrypt the messages there, throw out the unimportant ones and forward in Navy cipher the important ones, or by ML the important ones, to Washington, depending on the importance.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, to what extent was the reverse true, to what extent did Washington send to Cavite decrypted messages that had been decrypted here in Washington?

Admiral NOYES. I think testimony has been given as to the division of responsibility between Navy Intelligence and Communications in regard to the enemy intercepted messages. The function of Naval Communications was to obtain understandable messages from the original material. That was turned over to Naval Intelligence for distribution. It was their function to evaluate or distribute it to the [12572] proper people, everything in its final form. We only exchanged messages to assist the other station. For example, if Cavite had found that they had gotten started on a message and found a reference which they didn't have, to another message, and they were stuck on continuing their translation, breaking down this message, they would ask Washington for this reference which they had found and that would be sent out to assist them.

Mr. MASTEN. That would be sent out translated in English, would it not?

Admiral NOYES. Probably.

Mr. MASTEN. When it was sent would it be sent for the information of Admiral Kimmel as well as for action to Admiral Hart, or however you would describe it at that time?

Admiral NOYES. It would be sent for the use of the people who were decrypting some message which they had. It wouldn't be sent for information to anybody.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, I will ask you to look at Exhibit 37, pages 6 through 10. Exhibit 37 contains various basic dispatches from the Navy Department in Washington to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, and these dispatches on pages 6 through 10 contain specifically, do they not, material derived from intercepted Japanese diplomatic [12573] messages in the purple code?

The first one is dated 7 July, the one on page 6; the next is also on 7 July; the next is 15 July; the next is 17 July; and the last one, on page 10, is dated 19 July, and they all appear to have been sent from the Navy Department in Washington for action of Admiral Hart and for information of Admiral Kimmel, and they all specifically refer to particular intercepts, do they not?

Admiral NOYES. They do, although they are not exact translations, but apparently just briefs of what appeared.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I would say those are not actual messages that you were referring to.

Mr. MASTEN. These are not messages that were sent to aid Admiral Hart in translating?

Admiral NOYES. This is straight intelligence.

Mr. MASTEN. According to the photostats from which this Exhibit was prepared, the message on page 6 was released by Captain Kramer by direction of Captain Safford; the message on page 7 was released by Captain Kramer also by direction of Captain Safford; the message on page 8 was released by you; the message on page 9 was released by Captain Kramer by your direction, as also in the case of the message on page 10.

[12574] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, for the information of the committee will you explain what is meant by the use of the phrase "released by" on these Navy forms? Does that mean that you decided to send the message



or does that mean that it was final clearance for sending it, that final clearance was given by the people that I have just referred to?

Admiral NOYES. Each office of the Navy Department had officers authorized to release messages and we only insisted that a message be authenticated by the authorized officer. We had one very strict rule. The basis of all our handling of these enemy intercepted messages was the extreme importance of allowing no inkling to reach the Japanese that we could read their messages. That would have ruined everything.

We had a strict rule and endeavored to carry it out that nothing should ever appear in any kind of ordinary Navy traffic which referred to the fact that we could read any Japanese messages. We had a special cipher, a special security cipher, which any reference to magic was supposed to be in, in which it was supposed to be decrypted, and I or some of my subordinates were the only ones that released messages in that system. I would have released in that system, if anyone wished to, I would have been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or requested by [12575] the Director of Naval Intelligence, or by War Plans, to transmit the messages in this form, and any one of those forms. I would have immediately sent them in cipher, provided they wished to refer, as they did, to the fact of their origin.

If they could express it as intelligence without referring in any way where the information was to be obtained, for example, the expression of "reliable source," that doesn't give away the secret, that could have been sent in ordinary naval dispatch.

Mr. MASTEN. This special cipher that you had—when one of these messages was sent which either paraphrased or quoted directly from a Japanese purple message, was there any danger in your opinion that that special Navy code would be broken by someone else?

In other words, did you have any feeling of danger in revealing the secret of magic when you forwarded messages from Washington to Admiral Hart in that special cipher?

Admiral NOYES. We didn't like it particularly. We would have preferred never to cross up any reference to Japanese messages in our own codes, because, particularly in any long message, it is the greatest opening to a crypt analyst to break a cipher or code, the fact that he knows something has been sent; but actually by keeping [12576] the traffic down as we did in this particular cipher, it could not be. The cipher was not used even by my own communication watch officer. We had a special watch who were the only ones that could read the cipher. When messages came in in this cipher, the regular communications watch officers had to send it down to the special watch to be translated. They never saw it.

Mr. MASTEN. If you look at pages 11 and 15 of the same Exhibit 37, those are two messages also in July, the first one on the 19th of July, the second on the 20th, from COM-16, which was the naval district in the Philippines, was it not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. To Washington. And those also refer specifically to intercepts, Japanese intercepts in the purple code, do they not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. So that these are representative of messages that were exchanged during July between Washington and Manila containing information derived from the purple code?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. I had nothing to do with the preparation of this document. I am accepting them as they stand.

[12577] Mr. MASTEN. We understand.

Admiral NOYES. I can't remember now whether those are all the messages. There are no originals there. There is nothing I have to go by.

Mr. MASTEN. Were there any messages comparable to these on pages 6 through 10 which were sent after July and prior to December 1, 1941, and which referred specifically to, or quoted from, Japanese diplomatic intercepts? There are none in this Exhibit 37 but I am asking whether you recall any others?

Admiral NOYES. Let me see.

Mr. MASTEN. It won't be necessary to look through. You will have to accept my assurance that there are none that refer specifically to purple messages in this particular Exhibit.

But do you now recall any, so if we don't have them here we can get them?

Admiral NOYES. No, I do not. I couldn't recall any.

Mr. MASTEN. If you look at pages 40 and 41 of Exhibit 37, the first one on page 40 is the message from Washington for action of CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM14 and COM16. This starts off "Highly reliable information has been——"

Admiral NOYES. Which one is that?

Mr. MASTEN. One page 40, Exhibit 37.

[12578] Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. Starting off:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

That also was based upon information from purple sources, was it not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

[12579] Mr. MASTEN. Similarly in the case of the message on the next page, page 41, that specifically refers to the number designation of the circular from Tokyo, does it not?

Admiral NOYES. It does.

Mr. MASTEN. So that we have a situation where, during July messages were sent in this special code to which you have referred between Washington and Manila for the information of Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii, which specifically referred to magic and quoted from magic, and no other messages after July were sent until December; is that not correct? Which referred to magic?

Admiral NOYES. You are asking me to accept something that I had nothing to do with.

Mr. MASTEN. I am asking whether you recall any during the period from July to December 1.

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection now of individual messages.

Mr. MASTEN. But it is also true that during that same period, as shown by, for example, the warning message of November 27, messages went out which contained information from magic and did not specifically refer to the magic source?

Admiral NOYES. That is true. I would have very much preferred that that be done. We always preferred that [12580] the message be sent out, like the message you referred to, giving the information, but not stating its source, rather than in these direct quotations.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, were there any rules established in your division or was there any rule set up in the Navy Department, which expressly prevented or instructed against the sending of messages after July referring to magic and the source from which the information came?

Admiral NOYES. I know of no specific rule. I would say that—I think there has been testimony before this committee that we had several worries about the fact—the Japanese finding out the fact that we were reading their code, or at least one, and we had others where we were afraid that they were finding out that we were reading their codes, which, of course, caused us to be more careful in what we were doing.

Mr. MASTEN. You say there were no specific rules. Was there any policy established in the Navy Department against that?

Admiral NOYES. The basic policy was that, as I mentioned before, direct reference to the fact of our being able to read Japanese messages should never be referred to in ordinary Navy traffic.

Mr. MASTEN. Was that a rule or a policy that you [12581] established in your division, or was that established elsewhere in the Navy Department.

Admiral NOYES. It is one I inherited when I came to the place.

Mr. MASTEN. So that if messages that were being sent out for the information of those two posts, Manila and Hawaii, included information based upon purple intercepts, you would have sent it if you had been instructed by Admiral Wilkinson or Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark, or Admiral Ingersoll; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. If a message came to me, or if it came to the communications watch officer, released by proper authority, it might very well have gone. All of the messages in the Navy Department didn't pass through me. I couldn't visa all messages before they went out. It was generally understood that the people involved in this sort of thing knew what the rules were.

Mr. MASTEN. Well, did all messages that went by radio from Washington to Hawaii or the Philippines go through your office or did the Navy Department use other radio means?

Admiral NOYES. Every message that went out from the Navy Department, every official dispatch, passed through the [12582] Navy Department's communications office, which was one of my activities, but it was a 24-hour-a-day function; they were handling at that time—I got the data the other day. I think it was 4,100 messages a day.

Mr. MASTEN. By naval communications means?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. From Washington?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, you say there were other means by which this information could be sent. Are you referring to mail dispatches, or courier dispatches, or what else did you have in mind?

Admiral NOYES. Yes; we had a special arrangement with Pan American by which the pilot carried in a locked box, to which he did not have the key, messages for Honolulu.

Mr. MASTEN. How frequently did messages go by that system?

Admiral NOYES. I couldn't say.

Mr. MASTEN. Weekly?

Admiral NOYES. That was not necessarily for the purpose of sending these messages. It was a general means of communication. We would not have used ordinary air mail for any of this sort of thing on account of the danger.

Mr. MASTEN. Was this courier system regarded as safer [12583] than the special radio codes to which you referred a few minutes ago, in connection with these other messages that went from Washington?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you consider there was less likelihood of the knowledge leaking out that we were breaking the Japanese code?

Admiral NOYES. Of course, we would have put anything we sent by the courier into a Navy cipher before we sent it so that we wouldn't have been much worse off if we had lost them than if it had been intercepted on the air.

Mr. MASTEN. And if anything went by this naval courier, which involved magic, you would have presumably used this special cipher which you referred to a few minutes ago?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. One of the greatest dangers of the communications business is the security side of it; we were responsible for both things. We had to protect our own codes and ciphers, and we were endeavoring to break the enemy codes and ciphers, and we had certain rules that we went by. We knew what we could do, and we avoided giving them the same opening. A large amount of traffic is one of the worst things that can be done, one of the worst offenses that can be committed against the security of any means of communication.

[12584] Mr. MASTEN. At page 11157 of our transcript appears this message, which I will ask you to look at. It is dated December 1, and it is an additional message conveying purple information from Washington to the Philippines for the information of Admiral Kimmel.

Down at the bottom of the message there is a certification that that is a true copy of an encrypted message in the files of the Navy Department. I would like to ask you this:

Was it customary when a message was sent from Washington to Manila which contained purple information, or information derived from Japanese purple messages, was it customary to leave in the files of the Navy Department the outgoing message only in the Navy code, or were copies of the message left in other files of your division?

In other words, I am interested in finding this: Would we be able to find other messages which went from Washington to the Philippines by making a further search through the encrypted messages in the files of the Navy Department, or was it also the practice to leave the translated versions in some of the files of your division?

Admiral NOYES. I couldn't say what the details of the filing were; I couldn't say at this date what the details of the filing system were

then. I notice this is not the [12585] original of the message, but has been translated by someone from the coded copy, so I don't know who originated it.

Mr. MASTEN. You know of no practice whereby when a message containing purple was sent from Washington, the only file copy of that was kept in the Navy code as a matter of precaution?

Admiral NOYES. Anything that referred to the purple code should not have appeared in the ordinary Navy filing system. It should have gone in a special channel which was kept entirely separate from this sort of stuff.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by "this sort of stuff"?

Admiral NOYES. It is an ordinary naval dispatch which went in, it is a secret dispatch that went in a Navy cipher.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, I have here, Admiral, a message, No. 281500 dated March 25, 1941, from Opnav to Com 16 for the information of Cincaf, and Chief of Staff, United States Army, which reads as follows:

Following plan of coordination between Asiatic communication intelligence units of Army and Navy proposed X Army intercept unit furnish Navy decrypting unit copies of all intercepts in orange diplomatic systems forwarding same [12586] by land wire or other rapid and secure means X Com 16 furnish Commanding General Philippine Department translations of above messages—

There are some words stricken out here. Do you know what they are?

These two words?

Admiral NOYES. The original draft said "of interest to the Army," and it is corrected to say, "the translations of above messages be delivered."

Mr. MASTEN. Will you continue and read the balance of the message?

Admiral NOYES (reading):

Details to be worked out locally X Foregoing is additional to forwarding of intercepts to Washington by both services X Deliver Commanding General exact translation this message.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, would you also read into the record, Admiral, this second message of the same date?

Admiral NOYES. It is addressed from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Philippine Department and Commandant Sixteenth Naval District.

Chief of Naval Operations and Army Chief of Staff authorize Commanding General Philippine Department and [12587] Commandant 16 Naval District to confer on subject matter of Opnav 281500.

Mr. MASTEN. Will you explain the purpose of the arrangement that is set up there, which applies only, as I understand it, to the Philippines and to the Com. 16 situation?

Admiral NOYES. Originally, the Army and Navy had worked independently in regard to magic. The Army had their intercept stations and the Navy had theirs, and we each had a unit which was only for the purpose of training cryptographers, cryptanalysts.

Early in 1941, General Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, who was my opposite number in the War Department, and I, had a conference in regard to avoiding duplication and pooling our interests in this matter.

At about this time we had been able to send a machine to Cavite and this arrangement was set up in order to cut down the amount of transmission to Washington and speed up the entire operation.

Mr. MASTEN. So this was, in effect, an arrangement to keep the Army and the Navy in the Philippines informed as to what each was doing in regard to the interception and decryption of Japanese diplomatic messages; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. As far as the diplomatic traffic was [12588] concerned, the object was to improve the system of getting the diplomatic information to Washington, rather than for the local value. They were given the benefit of it by giving them the authority to exchange locally. They were able to cut out the transmission back and forth, or at least back from Washington, of matters that were of interest to them.

[12589] Mr. MASTEN. Now, did this proposal and this method originate in your division, or was this a suggestion which originated elsewhere in the Navy Department and which you simply passed on as the man who was charged with communicating messages to the Philippines?

Admiral NOYES. Well, on our level there were four of us involved: The G-2 in the Army, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, Director of Naval Intelligence, and I. We four agreed on this plan as an improvement over the independent work we had been doing.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, was any similar plan to this set-up with respect to Hawaii that you recall?

Admiral NOYES. This plan could not have worked for Hawaii, because there was no machine available for Hawaii and, as I learned from listening to Commander Rochefort's testimony, they could not read another code, which was necessary.

Mr. MASTEN. But if there were advantages in making the information available in the Philippines with regard to the purple traffic, might there not have been similar advantages in Hawaii in arranging for exchange of information in connection with the messages that were being intercepted and handled and decrypted by the Army and the Navy in Hawaii?

Admiral NOYES. In the first place, we did not have another machine. [12590] Mr. MASTEN. I realize that.

Admiral NOYES. And in the second place, as Commander Rochefort explained in his testimony, our plan was to have Hawaii concentrate on the naval codes, which was a large part of the business and what we were most behind on.

Mr. MASTEN. I was thinking of this: There is testimony before the committee that the Army station, which I believe was No. 5, intercepted certain messages which Captain Rochefort could have handled had they been made available to him by the Army. Now, do you recall whether or not any attempt was made, or any instructions sent from Washington, which would have permitted that interchange of information or intercepts, or which specifically directed it?

Admiral NOYES. No; I cannot recall. I should think that—in listening to Commander Rochefort's testimony I was surprised that there would have been anything intercepted in Hawaii that the Navy could translate that was not immediately passed to the Navy. I do not understand why that should not have been done.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You mean immediately passed to the Army?

Admiral NOYES. No. These are messages intercepted by the Army, as I understand it, which were forwarded to Washington, although there was one message that I don't think [12591] Commander Rochefort said they could have translated. They might have.

Mr. MASTEN. That was in this code J-19 about which he testified this morning.

Admiral NOYES. I would like to add to one thing Commander Rochefort said, which I am sure he would approve. You did not allow him to finish when he was describing the ciphers. He described a pure cipher to you, and then something came up and he did not go on.

I am sure he intended to add that we also speak of a cipher where there is a code book there. A key is applied to the code words or groups of figures in that book, and the key must be found out before you can get down to looking things up in a book. I am sure he would have said that if he had not been interrupted, and one of the big troubles was to recover the keys day by day, and that would require a certain amount of traffic before that could be done. It is very seldom that an individual message in anything can be translated. It requires, generally, a large number.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, turning to the handling of magic in the Navy Department. We have been discussing the exchange of information, and the method, back and forth between Washington and the Philippines and Hawaii. Turning now to the question of how the magic was handled in the Navy Department, the tes- [12592] timony shows that in the customary procedure a decrypted purple message would be taken to Captain Kramer's unit for translation and preparation of smooth copies for dissemination among those in the Navy Department who were entitled to receive them.

When was it customary for you to see the magic messages? That is, did Captain Kramer bring them to you before his dissemination or did you just learn of them afterward, or what was the practice in that regard?

Admiral NOYES. Maybe this is repetition but to make it quite clear, Captain Kramer was primarily a subordinate of the Director of Naval Intelligence and his primary duty was to act for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the distribution of the messages when they had been finished, when they were in readable form. He had an additional duty, somewhat, in getting them into readable form, the idea being to have one officer who carried right through horizontally through our two divisions.

Originally—that is, when I say originally—when I first came to the division in 1939 as Director of Naval Communications, there was only one copy made of any distributed messages. They were about 3 weeks old before we got any of them and the Director of Naval Intelligence took the book and carried it himself to the few persons that saw them.

[12593] Mr. MASTEN. Well, now, would he show that book to you before starting out on his distribution, or at what point did you come into the picture, if I may interrupt you?

Admiral NOYES. I was going to put that in.

Mr. MASTEN. All right, sir.

Admiral NOYES. That was the original plan and, therefore, the book was brought to me to O. K. before it went to him. I saw the book before he got in.

Mr. MASTEN. And that practice continued after the one-book method was abandoned and the several folders were prepared?

Admiral NOYES. No; it did not. One of our first efforts after September 1939 was to concentrate on speeding up the recovery of these intercepted messages, and between 1939 and December 1941 we got them down to where we were getting some messages in hours or a day or 2 days, and the volume had greatly increased. That is one of the points that I wish to change in my testimony. I said that after Pearl Harbor we changed to separate books. I am convinced from the testimony of Kramer, who delivered the books, and others that the change had already been made.

Mr. MASTEN. That is the testimony which you gave before the Navy court.

Admiral NOYES. The change had been made and I think it [12594] was made between October and November, when I was on temporary duty and absent, and that is the reason I did not remember the change.

Mr. MASTEN. Well, now, when Captain Kramer brought these messages to you and they were ready for distribution or dissemination, did you make any deletions from messages that he brought to you or did you pass on and give him to distribute all of the messages that he had translated? In other words, did you exercise any censorship over the messages that were distributed?

Admiral NOYES. I exercised no censorship. I scanned the messages for the purpose of seeing that they appeared to be in good—appeared to be authentic—in the first place. Second, for any indication that the Japanese had broken any of our codes. Several times I found indications that they referred to information, secret naval information, United States naval information. I always ran those cases down and every time it developed that they got the information somewhere else rather than by breaking one of our codes.

I also criticized my subordinates; required an explanation in regard to delays in messages. There was usually no criticism involved but I asked for an explanation as to why we had not gotten things sooner. Generally, it was because we could not read it.

[12595] Mr. MASTEN. So that your participation in the dissemination of the magic was simply the participation of one who was charged with the responsibility for getting it out to those others? In other words, you made no attempt to evaluate the messages or censor them in any way. Everything went out that your people decrypted and translated; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. There is only one other point that bears on it. There was an understanding between the Director of Naval Intelligence and myself that if at any time the other was involved when an important, when something important came up, that the other would act for him because we were closer than anyone else to it. We both understood each other's duties, and if, for example, some important message had come up and the Director of Naval Intelligence was involved, instead of going to his subordinate Kramer would have come direct to me and I would have taken it up immediately to the Chief of Naval Opera-



tions. However, that had no bearing on this particular period because at that time it had been decentralized among the several bureaus, and the Chief of Naval Communications went direct to him, and at the same time the Director of Naval Intelligence went to him direct.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, you mentioned a few minutes ago the question of delays in translations. What specific steps do you recall that were taken prior to December 7 which were directed [12596] toward speeding up the decryptions and translations, or increasing your staff to that end?

Admiral NOYES. The first thing we did was to—we conferred on this matter in September 1939. As I say, it was taking us about 3 weeks to get anything out—and made an analysis, an office analysis. Our bottleneck really was the translators, so we made every effort to acquire more translators, but they were very difficult to find because, in addition to being reasonable Japanese students, it was necessary to have them of unquestioned loyalty to the United States, and we could not afford to take a chance on anyone whose record was not entirely clear.

We found that with the competition of the Army and the State Department and some other Government departments the supply of Japanese translators in the United States was very small.

Mr. MASTEN. By December 7, do you recall how many translators you had in your Division?

Admiral NOYES. I heard Captain Kramer say the other day six. I do not know of my own knowledge that that is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Did that represent an increase during the immediately preceding period?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. In how many you had had on January 1, 1941?

[12597] Admiral NOYES. Well, I don't think we had found more than a couple. I should say we probably added two in the whole period.

Mr. MASTEN. Now I would like to turn to this question of the winds message, Admiral Noyes. I would like to have you look at page 154 of Exhibit 1, pages 154 and 155, which contain the messages establishing the winds codes. You were familiar with those, were you not, at the time they were intercepted and translated?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, following the receipt of those two messages, what steps were taken in your division to make sure that an implementing message, if it was sent, would be picked up?

Admiral NOYES. At my direction Captain Safford made certain assignments of frequencies to be covered by our intercepting stations—the same was done by the Army and through the Army by FCC—in order to intercept any message which might include this winds code.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall whether there were any written orders issued in that respect?

Admiral NOYES. I do not.

Mr. MASTEN. Probably it was done orally?

Admiral NOYES. I think so. Everything about the enemy intercepts was kept out of writing as much as possible. [12598] That is one reason it is difficult to find records.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall the question of these cards that Captain Kramer was instructed to prepare, on which were to be written the English translation of the code words and what they would mean?

Admiral NOYES. I do now.

Mr. MASTEN. You mentioned it a few minutes ago, earlier in your testimony.

Admiral NOYES. I testified previously I did not recall them, the reason I should think being that, as I understood the question, I was asked if we had cards in the office and I could not see any reason why we should have done that.

Captain Safford explained to me this summer that we had these cards so that we could telephone to people at home and just mention "weather." Of course, we never used the telephone for anything which had to do with intercepted messages and by having the cards with the English expression "East wind, rain," we could call up Admiral Stark and say that a message had come in—we had a weather report of "rain with an east wind" and he would have understood what it meant.

Mr. MASTEN. So that this card system was a special code in the Navy Department to enable you to discuss this matter over the telephone, was that the original purpose of it?

Admiral NOYES. It was a code to enable the watch officer [12599] in the Navy Department or me to talk over the telephone—to transmit that information at night or at odd hours to leading people at home.

Mr. MASTEN. If the information for which the Department was looking had come in during the daytime or at a time when you were at your office, there would have been no occasion to use these cards; it would simply have come direct to you?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you issue any instructions that any winds execute message, if received, should be brought directly to you?

Admiral NOYES. Reasonably direct. There was no reason that it should not pass through Captain Safford. It did not need to pass through anybody else, because the watch officers understood it and it was just a case of an expression appearing and it did not require any translation. I knew the words, I knew the Japanese words. The English meaning did not make any difference to us.

Mr. MASTEN. You say it was just a case of an expression appearing. Wasn't it also necessary to see the entire context of the message in which the words appeared?

Admiral NOYES. That is true. It had to appear in a certain way. It had to appear, this one to which you refer—

Mr. MASTEN. Page 154.

[12600] Admiral NOYES. It had to be repeated twice in the middle of a short-wave broadcast.

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather broadcast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers—

and so forth.

At the beginning it said:

The following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast—

which is the same thing that you will hear over WINX hourly in this city.

Mr. MASTEN. In the case of the code established by the message on page 154, which is circular 2353, did you expect that that would come in in voice or in Morse?

Admiral NOYES. In voice. In voice because that is what the message said:

The daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

As I say, a good example of that is given in WINX on an hourly broadcast by voice which people would listen to. The other message—do you know what page the other one is on?

Mr. MASTEN. The next following, on page 155.

Admiral NOYES. Oh, yes. In that, they only use the first words, the words that mean "East, North and West," which [12601] were at the end of the general intelligence broadcast, and I believe those could have come in the Morse broadcast, which is the dot-dash. You can hear it on the same receiver, but we knew in general what the schedule was.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, while it is perfectly true that under circular 2353 it was to be in a short-wave news broadcast, was there not a possibility that that short-wave news broadcast might be sent out from Tokyo in the Morse code?

Admiral NOYES. I don't see how. You can only have a broadcast when people know when it is coming, just the same as, to use the analogy here, you would have to listen all day long if you did not know when the news was being sent. Now, if you say that you are going to put something in a news broadcast on a certain schedule and then you send it at some other time, then you certainly cannot depend on anybody hearing it who is familiar with the schedule.

Mr. MASTEN. So that as far as your opinion at the time is concerned, you wish the committee to understand that you expected any implementing message under 2353 to be a voice broadcast?

Admiral NOYES. I did and, furthermore, I expected it to be a voice broadcast in accordance with this.

Mr. MASTEN. With the other conditions.

Admiral NOYES. "Daily Japanese language short wave news [12602] broadcast." If they changed their short wave news broadcast to a Morse transmission, that would have changed the code along with it, but at the time it was being sent by voice. The guiding point was what they said, that it would appear in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast, and the Japanese are most meticulous in carrying out their own instructions.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, under this arrangement that you set up, would it have been necessary for a winds execute message, if received, to have passed through Captain Kramer's hands?

Admiral NOYES. No.

Mr. MASTEN. It would have been brought directly to you, or to Captain Safford and then to you?

Admiral NOYES. I should think so. There is no reason that Captain Kramer should not have been consulted, but if a correct message had ever come in nobody would have needed to be consulted. If

there had not been a question about it, I could have told just by being shown it.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, under the system which was set up who was to be the final judge of whether or not a message was a genuine winds execute message under either of these two circulars that we have mentioned?

Admiral NOYES. Well, I was the Director of Naval Communications. I was supposed to be the deciding factor over my [12603] subordinates if there was any question.

Mr. MASTEN. And in deciding whether or not an alleged winds execute message was genuine would you have taken into account these various points you have mentioned that appear in circular 2353, is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. That is what I did do.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, did anybody—

Admiral NOYES. If you do not mind, if you will refer to that FFC, it is on page —

Mr. MASTEN. It is item 3d right at the top, in the right-hand corner.

Admiral NOYES. That is what I expected to come as an executed winds message, assuming that it is repeated at the end.

Mr. MASTEN. You are referring now to item 3-D of Exhibit No. 142?

Admiral NOYES. Item No. 3-d, document No. 4.

Mr. MASTEN. Document No. 4, yes.

Admiral NOYES. Sent as in the right-hand column, which is in Japanese, expressed in "Kana".

Mr. MASTEN. With the phrase repeated twice?

Admiral NOYES. The English translation is, "This is in the middle of the news." He went out of his way to state that it was in the middle of the news, to comply with those [12604] instructions and that here it should be in the middle of the news, so that somebody would not say that it was too far and miss it—

but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast: West Wind, clear—West Wind, Clear.

The other station did the same thing in almost the same words, just changed the point of the wording, of the word "specially." Now, I would say that, assuming that that was repeated again at the end, that that was an authentic broadcast in this cipher, in this code.

Mr. MASTEN. This document that you are looking at is the one which is described as a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Federal Communication Commission monitors from Tokyo stations between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. eastern standard time, December 7, 1941.

I am reading from the certification of Mr. Slowie, item 3 of this Exhibit.

Now, before we discuss anything further, I would like to ask you this. At any time prior to December 7, 1941, did anyone bring to you, or call your attention to, a message which they said was or appeared to be a genuine winds execute message and which, [12605] after consideration by you, was so regarded? In other words, did you see, prior to December 7, 1941, a genuine winds execute message under either of these two circulars, 2353 and 2354?

Admiral NOYES. You asked me about two things. You asked did I receive a false one and did I receive a correct one.

Mr. MASTEN. Let us confine it just to the latter part. Did you receive a genuine one?

Admiral NOYES. I did see messages that were brought to me because they were supposed to be, but I never saw one which checked out as being an authentic message.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. We will recess until 1:30. Admiral, be back at that time.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[12606]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order, please. Counsel may proceed.

# TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. LEIGH NOYES, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral, just before the recess I asked you whether prior to December 7 any genuine winds execute message was brought to you, or to your attention, by anyone in the Navy Department.

Admiral NOYES. There was not.

Mr. MASTEN. Your answer to that question is, there was not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. If there had been, would that have been a matter of importance so that you would now remember it?

Admiral NOYES. Up to December 3 it would have been a matter of importance. On December 3 we received an intercepted message, which is in the exhibit—

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 1.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, which informed us that the Japanese were destroying their codes. Sent out on December 2, No. 867.

Mr. MASTEN. Will you identify the page, Admiral?

Admiral NOYES. Page 215. I think that is the one.

Mr. MASTEN. That is message No. 867?

[12607] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. And what effect did that have on how you regarded the question of intercepting a winds execute message?

Admiral NOYES. We sent that message out to all people concerned, and thereafter there was no particular importance to an execute of the winds message except in a cumulative way.

Mr. MASTEN. So that you regard the sending from Tokyo of the instructions to burn the codes of the Japanese representatives as for all practical purposes nullifying the importance of the search for a winds execute message; is that what the committee is to understand?

Admiral NOYES. No, I don't think that that way, I am quite sure, from what I heard testified to, for instance, in Honolulu, I don't think the orders were immediately countermanded, I don't think they would have been, because this coverage was, at any time something else might have come up, and we had a system which covered pretty well Japanese transmissions.

Mr. MASTEN. But the receipt of this message instructing the Japanese representatives to burn their codes did lessen the importance in your mind, at any rate, of the interception of a winds execute message?

Admiral NOYES. Of this particular east wind rain message, [12608] yes.

Mr. KEEFE. What message are you referring to, east wind rain? Are you referring to that code set-up when you make that statement?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You are not referring to the message that is alleged to have been delivered by Captain Safford?

Admiral NOYES. That is what is alleged to have been delivered to me.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to know whether that answer relates to the message which Safford delivered. We haven't gotten to the point where it is shown one was delivered.

Mr. MASTEN. We haven't come to that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, counsel is doing a good job.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not critical of counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. He will do a better one if he is not interrupted.

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral, the question was whether or not after December 3 and the receipt of this message from Tokyo instructing the Japanese representatives to burn their codes, you regarded the interception of a winds execute message of as great importance as you had before you received the message regarding the code burning, and I take it your answer to that is, that it was not of as great importance [12609] after December 3?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, before the recess we referred to document 4, item 3 (d) of Exhibit 142, and you stated that you regarded that as a genuine winds execute message under circular 2353; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. Assuming it was repeated again at the end of the message.

Mr. MASTEN. Yes. This document does not show whether or not it was repeated at the end of the message.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. But did you check at the time, or was this communicated to you at the time so that you could check as to whether or not it had been repeated at the end of the message, do you remember?

Admiral NOYES. I do not remember the receipt of this specific message in detail. It occurred after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, then, prior to December 7, do you recall any instances when messages that were first thought to be winds execute messages were brought to you and were determined by you not to be genuine winds execute messages?

Admiral NOYES. I recall the fact that there were several but I do not recall the details.

[12610] Mr. MASTEN. How many occasions were there on which alleged winds execute messages were brought to you and it was left for you to determine whether or not they were genuine winds execute messages?

Admiral NOYES. I could not say. Few.

Mr. MASTEN. As many as half a dozen or a dozen?

Admiral NOYES. Not a dozen. Less than a half-dozen. Two or three, perhaps.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, Captain Safford has testified before this committee that a winds execute message was received on the morning of December 4. I am going to read you his testimony from his prepared statement in that regard. At page 9641 of our transcript Captain Safford testified as follows:

The winds message broadcast was about 200 words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo circular 2353 appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. All three "code words" were used, but the expression meaning "North Wind Cloudy" was in the negative form.

When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communications [12611] Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting, the following three translations:

War with England (including NEI, etc.)

War with the U. S.

Peace with Russia.

I am not sure of the order; but it was the same as in the broadcast and I think England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U. S." rather than "United States". It is possible that the words "no war", instead of "peace", were used to describe Japan's intentions with regard to Russia.

Then dropping down to the bottom of page 9642 he continued:

I immediately sent the original of the winds message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take "no" for an answer, and if he could not find him in a reasonable time to let me know. I did not explain the nature or significance of the winds message to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report to the effect that the message had been delivered.

[12612] Now, going back to the description which I have just read you, given by Captain Safford before this committee, do you have any recollection of ever seeing such a message as he describes?

Admiral NOYES. I don't believe that his description is good enough for me to answer that question. I will say, however, that the message which he describes is not an authentic execute of a winds message.

Mr. MASTEN. Why do you say it is not an authentic winds execute message?

Admiral NOYES. In the first place, for the reason, in my opinion, that it was not transmitted as the Japanese said it would be, which he passes over.

Mr. MASTEN. What do you mean by that?

Admiral NOYES. It was sent in Morse code and not by voice. Not on the schedule and not in the broadcast which they had said they would send it. Furthermore, his description of the meaning of the phrases, of course, is not correct. I think that has been discussed. About whether it meant war or not. But actually this one had nothing to do with "including the Netherlands East Indies," the circular that was set up—the one he says did—east wind rain.

Mr. MASTEN. 2353?

Admiral NOYES. Had no reference to Netherlands East Indies.

[12613] Mr. MASTEN. Now, what other reasons?

Admiral NOYES. That would have been the Morse one, which merely said north, east, and south. There is no such thing in Japanese, any more than there is in English, as negative nouns. We don't say, the Japanese don't say, "no north wind," they say what the wind is. It

wasn't provided in the code for any negative expression. The only thing in connection with that I have a recollection of, which is not very distinct, is that this question did come up of someone trying to make out of a translation that it meant "Peace with Russia," which is in common with what he said here.

Mr. MASTEN. Was that in connection with a message that you recall having been brought to you on December 4?

Admiral NOYES. I don't recall the date.

Mr. MASTEN. But you do remember some incident prior to December 7 having to do with whether "Peace with Russia" was a proper expression under the winds code?

Admiral NOYES. If I may take up another matter, it was, in another place, in a previous investigation, it was said that one of the watch officers telephoned to me at my home a possible winds execute message and I replied that that was a peculiar direction from which to have the wind blowing. I didn't remember that at the first investigation.

[12614] Captain Safford recalled to my recollection that that is what I had agreed I would say, that if I didn't agree over the telephone that the message was authentic. So if that is the message, that part fits together.

I believe that a message was presented to me which in some way mentioned Russia, which I was unwilling to accept.

Mr. MASTEN. Let's come back to the reasons why the particular message described by Captain Safford would not, in your opinion, have met the requirements of the winds code?

In the first place, you say you have no specific collection of this incident?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Then you say that if a message such as this had been brought to you, you would not have regarded it as an authentic winds execute for the reasons, first, that it was a Morse broadcast whereas you expected it to be a voice broadcast?

Admiral NOYES. Because it had been stated in the set-up that it would be, when these expressions were used it would be in a voice broadcast. In Circular 2354 there was not another set-up that could have been used in the Morse broadcast.

Mr. MASTEN. Your second reason was that the message [12615] as written, the interpretation as said to have been written by Captain Kramer at the bottom, "including N. E. I. etc." does not appear in Circular 2353; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, and also the fact—

Mr. MASTEN. Or in 2354, for that matter?

Admiral NOYES. This did not agree with 2353, which Captain Safford said it was intended to be. Captain Kramer also I believe stated that he would never have written "war" because he didn't consider, and so testified before the committee, that that was the correct Japanese translation of the set-up.

Mr. MASTEN. And your fourth reason is that the expression used in regard to Russia was in the negative form; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Which was not provided for under the circular establishing the code?



Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir; and there is nothing positive to show that it did appear in the middle of a broadcast so that it was repeated twice.

Mr. MASTEN. But the phrase "including N. E. I." might have been derived, might it not, from the dispatch you had received from Admiral Hart, [12616] which also appears in Exhibit 142, and in which he says he translates the intercept received from Singapore, the phrase "Nishi," as meaning England, including the occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya or N. E. I.

Admiral NOYES. That is right; that is 2354.

I will tell you, I think they did a poor job of a second-hand translation out there. I think they got it rather mixed up.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall whether by the morning of December 4, this message from Admiral Hart had been received? That is on page 1 (c) of Exhibit 142.

Admiral NOYES. Please repeat that.

Mr. MASTEN. I just wanted to get your recollection as to whether or not this message had been received in the Navy Department before the morning of December 4.

Admiral NOYES. It had. It should have been. It was transmitted on the 28th of November.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, Colonel Sadtler testified yesterday before the committee that on the morning of December 5 you telephoned him and said to him, "The message is in," or words to that effect, regarding a winds execute message.

Do you have any present recollection of having said that?

Admiral NOYES. No, I have not. We had a private tele- [12617] phone, secret telephone, from my desk to the desk of the Chief Signal Officer in the Army and we talked together a number of times a day. As to any particular conversation, I do not identify a conversation such as he testified to, although I wouldn't say it didn't occur.

Mr. KEEFE. What was the last part?

Admiral NOYES. I would not say that it didn't occur, because I talked to him several times a day.

Mr. MASTEN. At any rate you were in communication with him on matters such as this from time to time during the period prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct. I cannot see why I should have said "The" message, because, to my mind this was not "the" message. We had large numbers of messages to discuss. If anything the note which we were waiting for was more important on the date he says, the 5th, than this. Incidentally, his day is not the same as the date given by Captain Safford or Captain Kramer, which makes it difficult for me to identify a date in answering.

Mr. MASTEN. Well, now, would it have been your practice in deciding whether an alleged winds execute message was authentic or not, to have discussed the matter with Admiral Ingersoll, or Admiral Wilkinson, or Admiral Turner before making up your mind on the subject?

[12618] Admiral NOYES. Yes, particularly if I, if it met some requirement, and if it was approaching the borderline, I certainly would have discussed it with them.

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral Turner testified before this committee that on December 5 in the afternoon you telephoned him and told him

that a winds execute message translated "North wind clear," or perhaps "North wind cloudy" had been received in the Navy Department. Do you have any recollection of that incident?

Admiral NOYES. He says the afternoon of the 5th?

Mr. MASTEN. He said the afternoon of the 5th.

Admiral NOYES. Of course, Captain Safford says the morning of the 4th. I would say there was only one message that had a Russian slant. They are probably both talking about the same false message.

Mr. MASTEN. But you have no specific recollection of that particular incident?

Admiral NOYES. I have not, except that I have an indistinct recollection of a message—of going over this thing once before, that there is no such thing in Japanese as a negative noun.

Mr. MASTEN. Then would it be fair to summarize your testimony on this question of a winds execute message as follows, that prior to December 7 in your best recollection [12619] no authentic winds execute message was received in the Navy Department?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. That prior to December 7, a number, perhaps as many as a half dozen, alleged winds execute messages were brought to you and you decided, perhaps after consultation with Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner or Admiral Wilkinson, that the messages were not authentic winds messages?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, except I would say that some of the ones brought to me were brought with a subordinate saying himself that he was sure it couldn't be correct.

In other words, already questioned by one of the watch officers, or Captain Safford.

[12620] Mr. MASTEN. Were the watch officers supposed to bring them directly to you, or to take them to Captain Safford, if an alleged message came in?

Admiral NOYES. They took them to him if he was there.

Mr. MASTEN. If he was there.

Admiral NOYES. I imagine.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall having had anything to do after December the 7th with the preparation of a folder of intercepted Japanese messages to be submitted to the Roberts Commission?

Admiral NOYES. I received orders from the Secretary of the Navy, probably via the Chief of Naval Operations, to prepare such a folder for the Roberts Commission and I passed that order on to my subordinates and checked the folder after it was presented to me.

Mr. MASTEN. Did that folder include an execute message under either of the codes establishing the winds code?

Admiral NOYES. It did not. It was supposed to contain no magic or any reference to it.

Mr. KEEFE. What was that answer?

Admiral NOYES. The folder for the Roberts Commission was not supposed to contain magic.

Mr. KEEFE. And did not?

Admiral NOYES. It did not to the best of my recollection. [12621] If it did, it got by me.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, there is one other point at which this winds message comes up and that is in connection with the warning dispatch

which Captain McCollum prepared during the week prior to Pearl Harbor and which was never sent.

Captain Safford has testified before this committee in connection with that message (and he also testified before the Navy Court) that the message ended with a reference to the receipt in the Navy Department of a winds execute message. Do you recall having been shown this message proposed by Captain McCollum on or about December the 5th?

Admiral NOYES. I recall having been shown a message prepared by Captain McCollum. I am not sure of the date. Incidentally, Captain McCollum's own testimony was that it did not contain any reference to the winds message; that is my own recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall whether or not the proposed message contained a reference to a winds execute?

Admiral NOYES. I will say it did not.

Mr. MASTEN. It is your present recollection that there was no reference in this message prepared by Captain McCollum to any winds execute message; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, referring again to these dispatches [12,622] in Exhibit 37, on pages 42 to 44, which were the messages regarding the destruction of codes by the United States representatives in our outlying islands, will you state again—I think you touched on it briefly earlier—will you state again why those messages were prepared at that particular time?

Admiral NOYES. To the best of my recollection, based on an intercepted Japanese message, we had on the 3d of December notified our outlying representatives of the fact that the Japanese had destroyed their codes and papers in general.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, those are the dispatches on pages 40 and 41, are they not?

Admiral NOYES. The dispatches on pages 40 and 41. On the morning of the 4th of December I asked Admirals Turner and Wilkinson to come to my office and proposed to them that we had better destroy our own codes and ciphers in our most outlying positions. They agreed and I gave instructions to Captain Safford over the inter-office phone to prepare these messages which you have in the Exhibit.

Mr. MASTEN. And the reason, the immediate cause of sending those out was the receipt and decryption in Washington of the Japanese messages instructing their representatives to destroy their codes; is that correct?

[12623] Admiral NOYES. It was a natural sequence to the fact that they had destroyed theirs at the places named, Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai. Of course, when we did it we limited ourselves to any—we cut ourselves off from any further information. That is the reason it was desirable from our point of view and from the operational people's point of view that it had to be agreed to.

Mr. MASTEN. And the sending of those messages was not caused, are we to understand, by the receipt in Washington of a winds execute message prior to that time?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. You say that is correct?

Admiral NOYES. These messages were not caused by the receipt of any winds code execute.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, Admiral, turning to the events of December the 6th and 7th, will you state briefly where you were, and what you did, on the late afternoon and evening of December the 6th, if you can now recall?

Admiral NOYES. On the 6th, Saturday the 6th, around noontime we had another conference, to the best of my recollection, to discuss authorizing the commander in chief, Pacific, to destroy more codes, which was a rather serious matter because that still further out down our communications, incoming communications. The message was prepared and sent up to be [12624] considered by the Chief of Naval Operations and eventually released by him, or by Admiral Ingersoll, it was.

Mr. MASTEN. Could I interrupt you and ask you if that is the message on page 44 of Exhibit 37?

Admiral NOYES. No; that is about Guam. It is the message on page 45.

Mr. MASTEN. The message on page 45 is the one that was discussed at this conference to which you referred?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Mr. MASTEN. And that was in the late afternoon of December, the 6th?

Admiral NOYES. You see, we had Com 16, who was the shore representative of the commander in chief. Asiatic, he had been covered by the dispatch on page 42 and this covered the rest of the islands.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, about what time did this conference take place?

Admiral NOYES. I would not remember except for the reference number on the dispatch, which is my best guide.

Mr. MASTEN. And what time does that indicate?

Admiral NOYES. That is around noontime.

Mr. MASTEN. Around noontime.

Admiral NOYES. The middle of the day.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, during the afternoon of December the 6th, [12625] did you know that the 13-part message, so-called—you are familiar with what I mean when I refer to that?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you know that that had been received and was being decrypted in the Navy Department?

Admiral NOYES. I now believe that I did. I was either informed or saw the rough originals of the parts and knew they were coming in, and I particularly instructed Kramer to be sure that the Secretary of State got his copies promptly, although it was the Army responsibility for the delivery, because I felt it very important that he should be able to study the note before the Japanese representatives presented it to him.

Mr. MASTEN. And when did you first see the 13 parts as translated?

Admiral NOYES. As I say, I think I saw the rough. When these messages come in originally they are quite full of holes and they were—I think you will notice in that message, I believe, reference to 46 words that we never did get. I saw enough to get the sense of it before I left.

Mr. MASTEN. Can you be more specific as to what time it was?

Admiral NOYES. No.

Mr. MASTEN. It would have been along in the late afternoon, before 6 o'clock?

[12626] Admiral NOYES. I left between 7 and 8, nearer 8, from my office. It could have been any time. It wasn't after 8 o'clock.

Mr. MASTEN. And did you return home at that time?

Admiral NOYES. I did.

Mr. MASTEN. And you were at home all during the evening of December the 6th?

Admiral NOYES. I was. As I mentioned before, I might have come back then to the office but nobody seems to have seen me, so I guess I did not.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you have any recollection of having seen on the evening of December the 6th the so-called pilot message? That is the message on page 238 of Exhibit 1.

Admiral NOYES. No, I am rather definite that I did not.

Mr. MASTEN. You did not see that in the late afternoon or evening of the 6th?

Admiral NOYES. I don't think the Navy received it on the 6th.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, what time did you come to your office on Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. Around 9.

Mr. MASTEN. Around 9 o'clock?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MASTEN. And what time on Sunday morning, or when, did [12627] you first learn of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 14-part message?

Admiral NOYES. Actually I was reading my copy of the note when I got the intercept of the warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor—I mean of the notice of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Just when the book was brought to me I could not say.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you recall specifically what time it was on Sunday when you say you first heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. Oh, the broadcast—we intercepted the broadcast from Pearl Harbor. I do not remember the exact number of minutes after 1, but as soon as it was intercepted by my people—I was sitting at my desk reading the booklet when on my interoffice phone they gave me the message, "Air raid on Pearl Harbor; this is not drill."

Mr. MASTEN. Now, by "booklet" you mean the volume of translated intercepts which contained the full 14 parts of the 14-part message; is that what you mean?

Admiral NOYES. I think the fourteenth part was in it.

Mr. MASTEN. Was the 1 p. m. message in the booklet at that time? Do you recall seeing it?

Admiral NOYES. I am sure it was not.

Mr. MASTEN. Prior to that time had you seen any of the other admirals in OPNAV during the morning of December the 7th?

[12628] Admiral NOYES. I had been busy from nine until one. We were quite involved with a Japanese convoy, which over our regular systems of communication had been reported by Admiral Hart.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you have any discussion with any of the other admirals that morning regarding the 14 part and 1 p. m. message? Are we to understand that you had not seen it up until just prior to

the time when the radio message was intercepted saying, "Air raid on Pearl Harbor; this is not drill"?

Admiral NOYES. That is my best recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. You had not read it prior to that time and had not discussed it with anyone or heard anyone else talking about it or its receipt?

Admiral NOYES. I might explain by saying that Kramer in being caught between the White House and State Department and Secretary of the Navy did not get around to cover my copies of those messages, which was quite proper because I knew my job was to see that the things got delivered to the ultimate addressees and I would not expect him to hold up in getting the copies through. I gathered from his testimony that when he returned from one trip he found another and had to go right back. I think that is the reason I did not have my booklet sooner.

[12629] Mr. MASTEN. Now, you said that on the afternoon of December the 6th you had seen the 13-part message in the rough.

Admiral NOYES. I said I think so. I had either seen them or had been told about them by Kramer.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you receive any—or, rather, did you leave any instructions with Captain Safford about it, or with Captain Kramer about it, when you left the Navy Department on the evening of December 6th—regarding that message or any other intercepts?

Admiral NOYES. The only specific instructions that I remember were to be sure that the Secretary of State got the completed copy as soon as possible. At the time it was coming, and we did not know how long it was going to take for the note to be completed.

Mr. MASTEN. Did anyone get in touch with you during the late evening or night of December 6th regarding those messages?

Admiral NOYES. Not to the best of my recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. Is there anything else in connection with the events of those two days that you now recall that would be helpful to the committee? For example, as to whether or not during the morning of December the 7th you heard any discussion of Pearl Harbor.

[12630] Admiral NOYES. Well, I can be very definite that I heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MASTEN. You heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral NOYES. I heard no discussion of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MASTEN. Until the time of the attack?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct. There is only one thing. A British officer came to my office shortly after 9 o'clock in connection with this actual sighting that we had made of this Japanese convoy heading either for Thailand, Malay Peninsula or the Philippines. It was around abreast the Philippines at that time. He had some information and I gave him ours, which we were doing, and he wanted an appointment with the Secretary of State. I called up the Secretary of State's office and they told me that the Japanese, I believe, had conflicted; that the Japanese representatives had asked for an appointment at 1 o'clock. That is the best of my recollection.

Mr. MASTEN. Other than that incident you have no other information which you think would be helpful regarding the events on the morning of December the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. No.

Mr. MASTEN. Now, Admiral what steps were taken in the Navy Department, in your division of the Navy Department, immediately after December the 7th to make certain that there, [12631] were no leaks of information from the Navy Department? I suppose there were such steps taken.

Admiral NOYES. Well, I read in the paper Captain Safford's testimony that I directed all personal memoranda to be destroyed, war having been declared. I have no recollection of that particular meeting.

We had a conference every Tuesday morning of division heads, but I certainly would be perfectly willing to stand by that order. I would not have allowed officers to keep personal memoranda on secret matters and it is now, it is at the present time a standing instruction in the Navy.

Mr. MASTEN. Did you attend a particular meeting, or call together a particular meeting of your subordinates to issue such instructions, during the week after the Pearl Harbor attack?

Admiral NOYES. I have no such recollection, but as I say, I may very well have done that. That would have been a logical thing to do.

Mr. MASTEN. Captain Safford also testified that at that meeting to which he referred there was reference to stopping the attack on, or the rumors about, Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Do you have any recollection of that?

Admiral NOYES. I have not, but the same thing applies. According to what he said, I said that the Roberts commission [12632] was going to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor and that I did not want any gossiping from any of my people. If they had anything to say they were to say it when they were witnesses on the stand, which is also standard Navy procedure, that witnesses are not to discuss matters aside from court.

Mr. MASTEN. Did any instructions of that character which you issued at that time call for the destruction of any official papers of any kind?

Admiral NOYES. Absolutely not.

Mr. MASTEN. I think we have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Junior counsel has covered the ground so thoroughly that the chairman has no questions to ask.

Mr. Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I do not believe I have any at the present time. I may want to ask some later on.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark? Mr. Lucas? Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Noyes, there has been testimony before this committee that you made a call to the Army and you gave them to believe that there had been some kind of a winds intercept and that the Army, in their desire to find out what the truth was, called you on the phone and you said you were too busy, you had to go to a meeting. Is that true or not true?

[12633] Admiral NOYES. I have no such recollection. Mr. Murphy. I don't believe that I would have ever handled it in that way.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, this committee for the last 2 weeks have been working night and day on this matter, I think largely on what

your subordinate, Captain Safford said, that he took it to you and he said when he brought it to you that ended his responsibility and I think this committee is entitled to a definite, positive statement from you, to pick up from what your subordinate stated with reference to it.

Captain Safford said:

There was a winds message. It meant war—and we knew it meant war.

What do you have to say about that?

Admiral NOYES. I say that that is not a correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Also Captain Safford said:

I saw the Winds message typed in page form on yellow teletype paper, with the translation written below. I immediately forwarded this message to my commanding officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter.

Is that so?

Admiral NOYES. I cannot say that Captain Safford did not send to me a message. I will say that he sent me no message which was a correct execute of the winds message or, rather, [12634] that I did not receive it.

I will again read you what Captain Safford said:

I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter.

He said that he forwarded this message to your personally. Do you know whether he did or did not? Is that question clear?

Admiral NOYES. I cannot say that Captain Safford did not on the 4th of December forward some form of message on yellow teletype paper to me. If it was such message as he describes, it was not a correct execute of the winds message.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, he says on page 2:

CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral intercept information apparently made an impression upon the Director of Naval Intelligence, for he immediately sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Communications, that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with the Winds codes.

Was it usual for Admiral Wilkinson to send messages to Captain Safford through you or would he confer with you directly?

Admiral NOYES. He would confer with me directly and in [12635] my own opinion this is not correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, he says:

It would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our sister service didn't.

Were your services trying to get feathers in their caps in competition with the other service that you know of?

Admiral NOYES. They were not, and I disapproved very much of his making any such statement. We were making every effort to cooperate with the Army. As I told you, we had the closest cooperation between General Maughborne and myself and he was later succeeded by General Olmstead and Colonel Sadtler was Acting at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to ask at this point, Mr. Chairman, that counsel prepare for the record Tokyo-to-Washington serial 843, dated November 27, 1941, prescribing the schedule of Tokyo news broadcasts, as well as OPNAV 282301 and the three other messages which Captain Safford referred to at the bottom of page 3 of his



statement, so that all five of them can be in the record. Are they in the record?

Mr. MASTEN. They are not all in the record, Mr. Murphy. Commander Baecher has furnished us with a number of the messages referred to in Captain Safford's statement and they are still looking for some others and we had intended to put them all in at the same time.

[12636] Mr. MURPHY. We will get them all in at the same time.

Mr. MASTEN. I think this 28143, that is one of the documents we have here. If you wish me to do so, I will read it into the record now.

Mr. MURPHY. No; I will wait. I want them all to go in at the same time in the record so that we can refer to them at one place.<sup>1</sup>

Captain Safford said that his superiors were heckling him. You did not indulge in any heckling of Captain Safford, did you?

Admiral NOYES. I never did.

Mr. MURPHY. That is on page 8 of his statement.

Now, he says on page 10:

We used to "sample" these broadcasts periodically until the F. C. C.'s Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service came into existence and relieved the U. S. Navy of this duty.

And he is speaking there of general information broadcasts, as well as Domei News to its diplomatic and consular officials in foreign lands.

Is it true, Admiral, that FCC did take over that function from the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. The Navy never had that function, Mr. Murphy. Mr. Berle, who was Assistant Secretary of State— [12637] one of his representatives came to see me at one time and asked if we would not expand our copying of Japanese broadcasts. I told him that we did not want to go into that business; we had all we could handle with official traffic and I suggested that we much preferred that the FCC should do it. Eventually the FCC got some funds or found some funds and took that on. It was more a taking on than a taking over.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Captain Safford then in connection with that on page 10 said:

There is no basis for assuming that the Winds message had to be sent on a voice broadcast—

and then he leaves the inference, to me, at least, on page 10 that the Navy then started, after December 1, to listen in on these broadcasts which FCC was covering generally. Do you know whether or not that is true?

Admiral NOYES. I do not agree with him about its not being necessary to send the broadcast by voice. It had to be sent in accordance with the instructions that they had sent out, on certain broadcasts, which was at a definite time, and in voice. We only covered such broadcasts as were specifically covered by those two circulars.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is true, is it not, that FCC was covering the general information broadcasts and the Domei News broadcasts to diplomatic and consular officials?

[12638] Admiral NOYES. I think so, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And do you of your own knowledge know whether or not Cheltenham then decided to go into that field as a result of this dispatch on page 155 in Exhibit 1?

<sup>1</sup> See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5500 et seq.

Admiral NOYES. Whether Cheltenham started to cover this Circular 2354 on page 155?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Admiral NOYES. The one we were talking about is page 154.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right, but Safford talks about page 155 instead of 154.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; I think he has got them mixed up.

Mr. MURPHY. He says:

We expected that the Winds message would be sent in Morse code—and it was.

Admiral NOYES. Well, I think——

Mr. MURPHY. Were you expecting it to come in Morse code?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. I think Commander Rochefort testified to the same effect on that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Commander Rochefort was listening only for voice and he certainly would not get code if he was listening for voice.

Admiral NOYES. I think that the 24-hour-a-day [12639] coverage that he mentioned was—it is, and I may be repeating—just like WINX in their news broadcasts. They do not send it out 24 hours a day, all day, but during the 24 hours of the day they had certain schedules on which they broadcast that news and people listen for it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Captain Safford said on page 11:

The original documents giving details of the interception of the Winds message are not available.

What is your answer to that?

Admiral NOYES. He was in charge of the files at the time. I will say further I left Washington in February 1942, and I have no knowledge of what has occurred since then.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he also stated that after he went to your office, that there was a smooth copy placed in the dispatch case and that that was delivered to each of the recipients in the Army and the Navy. Of course, he had only an impression on that.

Did you ever approve any winds intercept as being authentic so that it would get over to Captain Kramer and then be placed as a communication for each of the recipients of magic in the Navy and the Army?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, Mr. Murphy.

I would like to say about the files, I was talking to the commanding officer of the radio station at Cheltenham. [12640] This broadcast business, when you intercept it is not addressed to us. It is things like weather reports and press and things like that that build up to a terrible amount of paper in a short time and it is customary in any naval radio station to keep files of any message addressed to a station for which they are responsible or which comes for information, in other words, all Navy business, but intercept stuff is never kept more than 3 or 4 months.

Now, this question not having been raised, as I understand it, until almost a year later whatever station might have intercepted would have by that time destroyed intercepts that far back. The commanding officer at Cheltenham told me it was customary to keep it for 3 or 4 months.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did receive then after that monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, did you not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And those reports for 1941 are still down in the Navy Department, aren't they?

Admiral NOYES. I left there. I have no information on that matter.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, I am going to ask the Navy liaison to make a statement in the record as to whether they are or not. I understand they are and have been since [12641] 1941, but I would like to have it definitely by the Navy Department.

Now, then, he says at page 12—is he in a position to indicate it now?

The CHAIRMAN. Not at the moment.

Mr. MURPHY. My question is whether or not the reports from Cheltenham, Bainbridge Island, and Winter Harbor are available at the Navy Department presently for the month of December 1941.

Commander BAECHE. They are, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And they have been since 1941, have they, the monthly reports?

Commander BAECHE. Yes; that is the way I understand it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Now, then, at page 12. Admiral Noyes, Captain Safford said:

The Winds broadcast message was about two hundred words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo circular 2353—

so that would be voice broadcast—

appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast.

Now, then, if you will just go back to 154 and 155 a [12642] while, in 154 it was to appear in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave broadcast and at the end and the sentence was to be repeated twice. In the one on page 155 it was to be repeated five times and both at the beginning and at the end. On 154 it was to be in voice. On 155 it was to be in code. So that Captain Safford describes one that is part of 154 and one that is part of 155. Do the Japanese do things like that?

Admiral NOYES. They did not, sir. I think the Japanese are much more meticulous than any people I know of in carrying out exactly instructions that they send out. That is supposed to be one of their faults.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, as I understand it you have no recollection whatever of a call from Captain Sadtler to inquire as to what word was used, do you? Do you have any such recollection?

Admiral NOYES. As I understand it from listening to Colonel Sadtler's testimony, he talks about the 5th of December and Captain Safford's is the 4th of December.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, do you have any recollection of having, either on the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th or 7th of December, had a call from Colonel Sadtler asking you what word was used in the alleged winds intercept?

Admiral NOYES. I have no such recollection, sir. [12643] I could not say that he did not ask me such a question because we handled many messages together and the only thing that I am sur-

prised at is that he would make a point of someone, that, I would say, that he would say that I would speak of the message when we handled so many things together.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, when did you first have a talk with Captain Safford as to whether or not there were any missing papers or did you ever have a talk with him? He has been talking to a lot of people for a long time. Did he talk to you about it?

Admiral NOYES. The only time I have talked to Captain Safford—I had been away from Washington from February 1942 until March 1945 and it was some time after I got back. I had not heard any more about Pearl Harbor since I had appeared before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

[12644] Mr. MURPHY. Now at this point I would like it if counsel would produce the page in the record referring to the Rochefort message that Colonel Bratton said he forwarded to Hawaii, and I would like to offer that in the record at this point for the reason that the record shows it was mailed instead of dispatched, and I would like to ask the witness about it.

Do you have that? It is in the B, C, or D of the Army board.

Mr. MASTEN. We do not have it in our record.

Mr. MURPHY. While you are getting that, I will move on.

Admiral NOYES. I did not finish, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Excuse me. Go ahead, if you will. I am sorry.

Admiral NOYES. I do not know whether you want to go ahead with my talk with Captain Safford.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I did not see Captain Safford from the time I left Washington or hear from him until I got back in March 1945.

Mr. MURPHY. So you did not talk to him in the meantime?

Admiral NOYES. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he try to communicate with you?

Admiral NOYES. Did he try to communicate with me?

[12645] Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; he did not, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. MURPHY. When you came to Washington—you say it was what month of 1945?

Admiral NOYES. March, 1945.

Mr. MURPHY. Now then, Captain Safford did talk to you on your return to Washington?

Admiral NOYES. He came to see me on my initiative.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you tell us what that conversation was? First tell us when it was, and then what it was.

Admiral NOYES. I gathered from the questions that were asked me in the Naval Court of Inquiry that somebody had had a different recollection on certain matters from mine. So I called up Safford and asked him to have lunch with me. He said he was very busy and could not, but he would come down to the office. I told him I wanted to see him about things in connection with our past, with the Office of Naval Communications.

So when he came down I told him I gathered from the questions that were asked me that there was some difference of opinion, and asked him why he and Kramer and I could not get together and get hold of the files, now that we were here in Washington, and remove

any of these discrepancies [12646] and decide them one way or another.

Well, he said there were not many discrepancies, and he said he was sure there was a winds message and that everybody else agreed with me. I said, "Can't you find some evidence that you are right, that you can show me what this is based on?" He said no, that he had not been able to find anything. So he said he was going to write a statement and when he got it together he would show it to me and we would talk it over.

Well, I did not hear from him. In about, I think it was in August, there was something in the newspaper about Pear Harbor. So I called him up. There were some things that I had not ever heard of. I called him up and I asked him what he was doing about his statement in conference with me. He said that he was still working on it. Within a few days it was proposed that this congressional inquiry occur. So he called me up and said he thought it would be better if we did not have any conference, that we might be criticised for talking together, and I agreed with him, and so we dropped it.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know of any trouble that Captain Safford had, or any differences between him and anyone down there at the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. I do not.

[12647] Mr. MURPHY. Was there any difference between him and Captain Redman, or anyone else there that you know of?

Admiral NOYES. I left Washington in February 1942.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Mr. Chairman, I have just one other thing that I want to cover, that I will pass for the time being. When I find that one thing I want to show a reference in the Army board to the Rochefort message.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will pass you temporarily.

Senator Brewster is absent.

Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, did I understand you correctly to say that you testified first in the Navy Court of Inquiry investigation?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You have not testified in any other investigations other than that one, and this one?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. And the Navy Court of Inquiry investigation was carried on during the summer months of 1944?

Admiral NOYES. Well, they did not get out to San Francisco until December 1944, as I remember it.

Mr. GEARHART. It started in the summer and continued [12648] through the balance of the year?

Admiral NOYES. I believe they went out to Pearl Harbor and on the way back, they stopped at San Francisco, and I was called as a witness there.

Mr. GEARHART. That, you say, was in December?

Admiral NOYES. I thought it was December. I may be wrong about the month.

Mr. GEARHART. The Secretary of the Navy's statement is the next to the last notation that appears in the succession of events, and that was the 28th of August 1944.

Admiral NOYES. I must be wrong about the date, then. It ought to show the date that I appeared in the transcript. I did not appear in Washington. I appeared in San Francisco.

Mr. GEARHART. The thing that makes me inquire about that is the fact that the Secretary of the Navy himself prepared a statement in reference to the court of inquiry's decision, which is the fourth endorsement, and that is dated the 28th day of August, unless I am mistaken.

No, I see another one here now. That was the third endorsement, which preceded the one I have reference to. The date of the fourth one is December 1944. So it extended from the summer to the end of the year.

Admiral NOYES. That is my recollection.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; I think you are right. The dates [12649] are so confusing, but they are here, nevertheless.

Now, what did you have to do, if anything, with or in the investigations that preceded the Navy Court of Inquiry?

Were you consulted in reference to your knowledge about these matters or did you have anything to do with it at all?

Admiral NOYES. When the Roberts Commission was held, I was directed to prepare the dispatches to and from the Navy Department bearing on the incident, for the use of the committee, or the commission, whatever it was called.

Mr. GEARHART. Did that involve the making out of any memorandum, or any evaluations, or any statement as to your own participation in or with relation to the events?

Admiral NOYES. It involved nothing but a file of dispatches, with a list and index.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, did you prepare a memorandum between December 7, 1941, and December of 1944, as an aid to your memory?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, sir. I did not particularly, because I was at sea, in the Pacific, and I think in general the naval officers at that time did not know about magic.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, when you testified in December 1944, you testified from your memory at that moment, unaided [12650] by any memorandum that you may have made between December 7, 1941, and the time you testified?

Admiral NOYES. I was not only testifying from memory, but I did not know until I got into the room what I was going to be asked, or what the questions would be, or the subject.

Mr. GEARHART. Between Pearl Harbor and the giving of your testimony, many earth-shaking events had occurred, events of tremendous importance, hadn't there? That is correct, isn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Matters of tremendous importance, which, in your mind, as in other persons' minds, overshadowed the earlier events; isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you have heard the testimony of Captain Kramer with reference to the so-called winds execute. He said that a watch officer came by and handed you a teletype paper on which there was an evaluation—or a translation, rather—of a message, what he constructed to be a winds execute message. He was so impressed

with it that he went to Captain Safford and said, "This is it." You have heard that testimony, haven't you?

Admiral NOYES. I thought that was Captain Safford's [12651] testimony.

Mr. GEARHART. No; Captain Kramer's testimony, and also Captain Safford's testimony. They—you heard the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll to the effect that they brought him the message and he read it, and tossed it aside, because he considered it unimportant; that there were many other events, many other messages which preceded it, which convinced him that war was very imminent.

You heard his testimony to that effect, didn't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes; I heard Admiral Ingersoll's testimony.

Mr. GEARHART. There we have three naval officers who say it was a winds execute; all three of them said they saw it, and Admiral Ingersoll said it was unimportant.

Admiral NOYES. I did not gather that from Captain Kramer's testimony, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. What?

Admiral NOYES. I did not gather that from Captain Kramer's testimony.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I think you will find that that is a correct statement.

Admiral NOYES. I certainly did not gather that he agreed with Captain Safford at all.

Mr. GEARHART. He agreed definitely that he took it from [12652] the hands of the watch officer, hastily read it, and took it to Captain Safford and said "This is it." No question about that. He does not pretend to remember clearly what was in that message, but he has stated in his testimony over and over and over again, "When I handed it to Captain Safford, I said 'This is it'." He also testified definitely that he, Captain Kramer, considered it the winds execute message. So Captain Kramer absolutely corroborates Captain Safford, as far as he goes, and that was as far as he did go.

Then Admiral Ingersoll steps into the picture and tells us:

Yes; they brought it to me. I read it, but I did not consider it important. There were so many other things of greater importance that indicated to me that war was imminent and I tossed it aside.

But the substance of that testimony is that there was a winds execute. Now, I say those things preliminarily to asking you this question: In all fairness, isn't it possible that you read it too, but considered it so unimportant, for the same reason that Admiral Ingersoll considered it unimportant, and you not being interrogated on the subject from December 7, 1941, until December 1944, that it might have gone from your mind? Isn't that possible?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; not in my opinion.

[12653] Mr. GEARHART. You knew about the message of November 29, after which things were automatically going to happen? You knew about that, didn't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now that was a very, very important intercept, that was telling us of the hostile attitude of Japan, wasn't it, "things were going automatically to begin to happen"?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That was a very direct warning, wasn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It was of overshadowing importance, wasn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Progressive importance, I would say, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you knew all about the Japanese message directing their Ambassadors, their consuls, and all the other Japanese agents of different degrees, the Japanese nationals, directing them to destroy their codes, didn't you? The fact that consuls were included indicated more than anything else the suspension of diplomatic negotiations, didn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Those messages collectively were of [12654] tremendous importance, were they not?

Admiral NOYES. As I say, each one carried matters a step further.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then if you should get another message which would merely tell you that relations between the United States and Japan were becoming dangerous, you would regard that message as of overshadowing importance, would you not, after you had already received these other messages?

Admiral NOYES. I would not consider it as of overshadowing importance, but it would be of sufficient importance so it would be taken up, under my standard system, and handled as a message.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. There would have been at least 50 copies around Washington before we got through—not 50, but 30 I should say. If somebody had brought to me in November, 1943, a paper with my initials on it I would have had to admit that my recollection was wrong. If anybody could have brought me other documentary evidence I would have to admit my recollection had failed me. I am only testifying to the best of my recollection, except in this case I have studied other people's testimony and I can find no testimony that will hang together against my own recollection. [12655] There is nothing that in any way tends to make me feel that my recollection as to the fact that there was no execute message is not correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, supposing you had gotten the execute message conveying that thought to you, that relations with Japan were growing dangerous—that is a literal interpretation of the words, isn't it?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. What it was primarily is an instruction to destroy the codes.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral NOYES. We would have written it up as an instruction to destroy the codes.

Mr. GEARHART. The message on the destruction of codes was an important message?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. That was the tell-tale to us of what Japan was up to?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now if you got this other message, the winds execute message, after you had read all these other messages about the destruction of codes, would you be called upon to do anything about it?

Admiral NOYES. There was nothing to do about it, except it would be written up, distributed and handled as [12656] an enemy intercept, just like all these messages that are in the book.



Mr. GEARHART. Did you send every message that came over your desk to all these distributees, whether it was important or unimportant?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You decided whether or not it was important enough to be distributed, did you not? That was one of your jobs?

Admiral NOYES. But it was gaged not on whether action was to be taken, but the subject matter of the message. There were lots of messages about typewriters, personnel, promoting clerks, and that sort of thing, which we just threw out, which we did not finish translating. But anything of that character would have been carried through as a matter of record.

Mr. GEARHART. But in view of this importance of the message would you not have distributed it? You had already distributed the very, very ultra important ones, and here you had the most important one, in the light of events, and yet you might have tossed that aside as unimportant, just like Ingersoll said he did when he read it?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Ingersoll was not in my position, sir. I was responsible for all this business, whereas [12657] Admiral Ingersoll had it as only one of his activities. To him it was very far down the list, and to me it was down the list, too, but it still had to be taken care of.

If it had been an authentic execute, we had all these people copying and intercepting messages, the War Department, the FCC, we would have had to distribute it as a message.

I cannot imagine, from Colonel Sadtler's testimony, how the War Department, if they thought it was authentic at all, could have thought of dropping it, why they would not have followed it through, unless it was a false message.

Mr. GEARHART. That was just the point I had in mind. Here you have several people saying they are very positive as to the existence of the winds execute, and you seem to be equally positive what they testified to is not the fact. So I was trying to harmonize the testimony they have given with the testimony that you have given on the ground that you simply don't remember, because you regarded it, as Admiral Ingersoll did, as being only in part important.

Admiral NOYES. May I ask you a question, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. Did you hear my testimony in answer to the counsel this morning?

Mr. GEARHART. I have listened, but if you wish to repeat what you have said, that I may have overlooked, I [12658] would be glad to hear it again.

Admiral NOYES. I testified that there were several false messages that came in. It is very difficult for me to answer when these different witnesses all differ in their description of the circumstances. The dates are different, the conditions are different.

I am perfectly willing to admit that Captain Safford may have sent me such a message and on the face of it, from a documentary point of view, I would never have accepted that message as an execute of the winds message, and I gave the reasons to the counsel for my believing as I do.

Mr. GEARHART. How can so many testify to the same thing and it not have a semblance of truth? These other things that these other

officers have said must be true, because you don't remember whether it was true or not true.

Then when you come up to the winds execute message you positively say there was none, in the face of these other men testifying there was a winds execute. How can you be so positive about that and at the same time you are willing to accept what Captain Safford says, or Colonel Sadtler?

Admiral NOYES. Colonel Sadtler?

Mr. GEARHART. You said many things he said may have been true because he said so. You have no memory on it.

Admiral NOYES. I am perfectly willing to admit that [12659-12669] every one of the witnesses that have testified to a so-called winds execute has some message in mind of which I had knowledge, but I do not think that any one of their stories, their recollection, their description will stand up as a description of a true winds execute, nor do they fit together.

Captain Kramer's and Captain Safford's descriptions were entirely different. It is very difficult for me to answer if you ask me if I got a message on the 4th or the 5th. Captain Safford goes into great detail about his reasons for thinking it was the 4th, although his original testimony was it was the 5th.

I do not want to question the fact that their recollection is the best they have, but that does not convince me that there is anything wrong with my recollection. That is all I can say about that, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, as I understand it now, in your Department you were the head and it was your duty, in effect, to determine what messages were to be distributed to certain persons, which included the President, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans Division, the Intelligence Department—and what other departments of the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. I think that is all.

[12670] Senator FERGUSON. That is all?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. But I had nothing to do with them.

Senator FERGUSON. No, but you determined what messages were to be distributed.

Admiral NOYES. No, Senator Ferguson, I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now let us get down then to this: If a message came to your desk, or your department, about hiring a clerk in the Embassy and one came in relation to a reply to the message of the 26th, who determined what message would be delivered to the President? What department?

Admiral NOYES. The Director of Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, who determined how that message would get to the Naval Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. In the mechanics of deciphering, Captain Kramer, who was primarily the subordinate to the Director of Naval Intelligence, had the additional duty with me, so that one officer could carry through the whole process from the interception, from the receipt in Washington of an enemy message in cipher until it was actually delivered, as far as he was concerned. On account of the load we had, and the peak loads we had, we could not possibly decipher every message

of the ones we received. Therefore, having started the message, as soon as it turned out to be of no apparent value, it was laid aside and the next one was [12671] gone ahead with. We had to do that.

We found at first that the Army and ourselves, working independently, were wasting a lot of time by translating the same messages. We might work 3 days on a message and find we had the same thing. At a conference we decided the best solution was to take the Tokyo date of origin, and it was agreed that the Navy would take all messages originated in Tokyo on the odd day and the Army would take all messages originated in Tokyo on an even day.

In order to determine when it originated in Tokyo it was necessary to start to break the message. So each service took the message coming from its own intercept stations and the message was given a number, and as soon as they had reached the date of origin they kept it or sent it over at it might be.

Now from there on the other service went on until they discovered it seemed to be something that was not of diplomatic, or military, or political value and they laid it aside.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he have before him the cipher to break the date?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you had to know what key in the cipher or the machine was necessary by breaking the [12672] date?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you sent the key over to the other department, or would you let them work it out for themselves?

Admiral NOYES. Well, we had a constant interchange. If there was any recovery of keys, we had a direct telephone from our code room to theirs, a secret phone.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as soon as the date was ascertained you had the cipher and you knew what key it was in?

Admiral NOYES. We did not necessarily. We might get that far and still not be able to go all the way through, but we had a start then.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we come back to the question, and you say it was Kramer's duty to ascertain and determine what messages were distributed to the list that I gave you just in my former question.

Admiral NOYES. The question of what messages were finished was primarily determined below, by Kramer, who supervised—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). I am trying to get an answer to this particular question, because I think it is very important.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. I understand, Senator Ferguson, [12673] and I am trying to explain it to you, sir. Some messages were never finished. Other messages that were finished, I doubt if they were all sent to the White House. I did not censor them myself. The Director of Naval Intelligence was the one who did that function, in regard to the finished messages. He probably did not want to bother the President with a lot of messages, or the Secretary of State.

In other words, there were certain messages that he probably had culled out of certain books, but, as far as I know, there was nothing culled out of the finished stuff from the Navy books.

Senator FERGUSON. Who, in your department, or in anyone's department, determined what messages would be decoded? You say some

were decoded just part way and you determined they were not of any value. Now who had that determination?

Admiral NOYES. Well, I should say Kramer was the one who was directly responsible for that. If he had a question he could bring it to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, if he was in doubt he could bring it to you. Then it was your responsibility to determine what was decoded, is that right?

Admiral NOYES. I was responsible for it, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, then, who determined what messages were sent in to the Intelligence when they were [12674] intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. They were all sent to Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. They were all sent to Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. Everything that was decoded was sent to Intelligence, whether it was important or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether it was hiring a clerk or doing something else?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was sent to Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. Incidentally, some of those things that we did not bother with ourselves, all personnel matters, were sent to FBI, as a matter of fact. That was done by Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you did not have to determine what messages went in to Intelligence because all that was translated, that Kramer determined should be determined, unless he needed your help, went immediately in to Intelligence?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now with that in mind, how can you reconcile this fact, that you were to get the winds code message?

Admiral NOYES. Because that was a special thing. It required no translation. They had set up those Japanese expressions which actually were plain Japanese. What they [12675] said in Japanese was "East Wind Rain," in the Japanese language, with no cipher, no code. They were not the ordinary run of diplomatic messages.

[12676] Senator FERGUSON. You just told me that after it was completely translated, it, by necessity, went to the Intelligence Branch, and this was in Japanese and, therefore, needed translation.

Admiral NOYES. It did not need translation, Senator Ferguson. They had given certain expressions a fixed meaning. Anyone of us could have told what the message was.

Those words did not mean destroy codes and ciphers; they just had an arbitrary meaning.

Senator FERGUSON. They mean what was in the message you had previously received?

Admiral NOYES. They appeared to be a weather report, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you draw up cards on that particular code message?

Admiral NOYES. Cards were drawn up to give the meaning of this in English, so that by telephone, in case we ever got an authentic execute of the winds code, Admiral Stark and the people concerned could be called over the telephone, and without any give-away we would say, "We received a weather report 'east wind rain'" and he would know what it meant.

Senator FERGUSON. Who ordered the cards drawn up?

Admiral NOYES. Well, I ordered it. It was my responsibility. [12677]

Senator FERGUSON. Did you send one to the White House?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. I think the naval aide had one.

Senator FERGUSON. The naval aide had one?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. We did not deal directly with the President. I think the naval aide dealt with the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Then one went to the White House, to Admiral Beardall?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. I am not certain that he was one of them, but I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever set up a similar system of cards?

Admiral NOYES. Never, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This was an outstandingly important message?

Admiral NOYES. At the time it was received, we thought it was the first—at the 28th of November—we thought it was very important and might give us our first tip as to what was to occur.

Senator FERGUSON. But a little later you say it had become a little doubtful.

Admiral NOYES. Become what, sir?

[12678] Senator FERGUSON. A little doubtful as to its value, because you got similar messages about destruction of codes.

Admiral NOYES. Having gotten the message from the Japanese in their own cipher, with detailed instructions about destroying the codes, it went very far down in importance.

Senator FERGUSON. But you still kept the cards?

Admiral NOYES. I do not remember whether the cards were destroyed at that time or not. The cards only said "East wind rain; U. S." We made them with the idea if anybody lost them, nothing would be given away.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in English?

Admiral NOYES. In English.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

If Colonel Sadtler is correct, that you called him and told him that was it—do you remember that testimony?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir. I remember the testimony, but I do not remember the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. He called you back and you told him you could not get the translation for him because you were going to a meeting. How could you reconcile your testimony with that, that you did not see any winds code message, any winds code execute message?

[12679] Admiral NOYES. Senator FERGUSON, that is not the way I interpreted his testimony.

As I interpreted it, what he said was he called back to ask for the exact words that were in the intercept.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

And you were too busy to give it to him.

Admiral NOYES. That I do not admit, but that is what he said.

[12680] Senator FERGUSON. You have no memory of it?

Admiral NOYES. I have no memory of it.

Senator FERGUSON. If there wasn't any winds code execute message how do you account for Admiral Ingersoll testifying here in this room that he saw one and never knew that there was any question

about it being a genuine or a phoney until sometime just recently when he landed back in this country?

Admiral NOYES. I do not account for it, sir. I think he is very busy and had many things to do at the time. I think he stated in his testimony that it very likely did turn out to be a false message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to ask you this: Could it have been that you called Sadtler when you received this message from the watch officer that Kramer and Safford talked about going to your office with your message? Could that be a true statement?

Admiral NOYES. Could I have called Sadtler?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. When I first got this message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now will you tell me——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). I did not understand his answer. [12681]

Admiral NOYES. I said I could have called Sadtler when someone came to my office with a message. I had a private phone to his office.

Senator FERGUSON. So at that particular time you believed that this was a genuine message on this winds execute code, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. I would think it was a possible message.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral NOYES. That is the impression he got, as I take it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now I will ask you whether or not you ever made an examination to determine that the message that the watch officer delivered to you, that Kramer and Safford were talking about, and that you telephoned to Sadtler about, whether you ever determined that that was a phoney and not a genuine message?

Admiral NOYES. I will give you a reconstruction that could be possible, if you would like to have me do it.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to know whether you ever made a determination that this message that you telephoned about, that the watch officer gave you, whether you ever made a determination that that particular message was a phoney and was not the genuine message in compliance with the code.

[12682] Admiral NOYES. The message has been testified to, that it was received on two different days.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not my question. My question is whether or not you ever made a determination at that time. I am not asking you what you determine now as you try to reconstruct, but I want to know whether or not you ever made a determination that that message that was sent to you was a phoney.

Admiral NOYES. If the message that Captain Safford describes in his statement was presented to me, and I think very likely it was, I would have determined it to be a phoney message.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you that: Did you determine that that message was a phoney?

Admiral NOYES. I have no direct recollection from his description, but from his own description I would not have accepted it. That is the best I can say, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not have accepted it. How could you then have called Sadtler about that message?

Admiral NOYES. Sadtler says it was a different day; it is not the same day.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about the reconstruction now, I mean as to what you heard testified here. Could you have kept it over a day and then called him? That [12683] even makes his testimony stronger, that it was a genuine message.

Admiral NOYES. I would not think of doing such a thing.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to do is to get the facts as to whether or not you ever made a determination that the message brought to you by the watch officer was not a genuine message.

Admiral NOYES. I am certain, sir, that I did not seem to make myself clear. I am perfectly willing to admit that several messages, which in the end turned out to be false, were brought to me by various watch officers. I also think one watch officer telephoned me at my home about one of the messages, which was afterwards delivered to me. I think every one was determined by me to be not correct, and, so far as I knew, everyone was in concurrence, no one raising a question, no one questioning my decision, to the best of my knowledge and belief at the time.

The first time any question was raised was much later on.

Senator FERGUSON. After the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. No; after I had left Washington. Nobody ever questioned me while I was here.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you this question: Did you ever notify Kramer that the message that he saw and said "Here it is," or whatever his expression was at the time, [12684] and showed it to Safford and they sent a watch officer to you, did you ever notify Kramer that that message was a phoney or a bad message?

Admiral NOYES. I was not supposed to be present. Senator Ferguson, when Kramer said "Here it is." That identifies nothing to me.

Senator FERGUSON. You admit here that Safford could have sent you a message. Did you ever send word back to Kramer, or to Safford, that the message was not a genuine message?

Admiral NOYES. I undoubtedly did, if this message as described by Safford, which I am not at all sure is correct—it is not what he told me this summer at all, and I am not sure that it is at all correct—but if it is correct, I would have determined it to be not a proper winds execute, and I would have informed him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you inform him?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of the message being received as described nor of having determined it as being wrong, and therefore not informing him.

Senator FERGUSON. My question is a short one. Did you so inform him, that it was not a genuine message?

Admiral NOYES. I cannot admit that this message, as now described by Captain Safford, was ever delivered to me, sir. [12685] It does not comply with the description that he gave me as long ago as 4 months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not what I am talking about. He has testified that he had delivered to you a message that he believed was a genuine one. My question to you now is: Did you ever notify him that that message was not a genuine message?

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman—

Admiral NOYES. I do not agree with his testimony, Mr. Ferguson.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever notify Safford personally then that any message on the winds was not a genuine one?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasion?

Admiral NOYES. I could not tell you.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield for a correction?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever notify Sadtler—keeping in mind his testimony—that you had two conversations with him, that it was not a genuine message?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other people in [12686] the Department there that you notified that there had come in some messages that were not genuine as far as the winds execute code was concerned?

Admiral NOYES. I have no specific recollection of the details regarding any of the false messages at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have done what you did not do if you had received a winds code execute on either the 4th or the 5th?

Admiral NOYES. I would have approved the message as a winds code execute, and it would have been written up and distributed to the regular recipients. It is very difficult for me to say now everything I would have done. I think I would have put a note on it saying:

This confirms the previous information from the Naval Attachés and Commander in Chief.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood that only the messages that Kramer was in doubt about went to you. Why were you wanting this particular message? What were you going to do with it?

Admiral NOYES. This was the only instance that occurred, this was the only message of that sort which came up during my experience, that is this and the others that go with it. There is a series of them, I mean the ones that are shown in this book.

[12687] Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to the conclusion that war between Japan and the United States was imminent?

Admiral NOYES. Imminent?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I first held a conference in my Division in September 1939, shortly after I took the Division over. I told them at that time that I thought that the chances of our being involved in the war which had started in Europe were considerable, and that we in 20 years had gotten very much on a peacetime basis and I wanted everything done to get us on a war basis, and I had a report for everything that was necessary to put us on a war basis in Naval Communications. That brought in the question of this time lapse, the intercepted enemy messages, but I imagine you would not be interested in all of the details.

However, in May 1941, on my recommendations, the Communications were mobilized, which meant that we had gone on a war status, as far as Communications were concerned. From then on we were on a war basis. I was cognizant, through my position, of these var-



ious messages as we went along. I considered that things practically continuously got worse.

At the time that when I came into the Department, which I think was June——

[12688] The CHAIRMAN. 1940?

Admiral NOYES. Of 1940—there was one time when I thought we might likely go to war with Japan. In June 1941 was another time. Each time we got by, but it became worse.

I think that the last chance that I thought of a peaceful settlement was when we turned down the Japanese proposition and submitted our last note, to which the 13 parts was the reply.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, when we turned down the modus vivendi and sent the message of the 26th, you then considered that we would have war?

Admiral NOYES. That is nothing but my personal opinion, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How is that?

Admiral NOYES. This is my personal opinion, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean.

Admiral NOYES. In my own opinion, Japan would not accept those terms, and therefore she would go ahead with her invasion of Siam, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the question was what the result would be of that; were we or were we not going to stand for it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now did you know about the message that the President gave on the 17th of August [12689] 1941?

Admiral NOYES. I do not identify it that way, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what we were going to do in case of an attack, or a further move into the Southwest Pacific?

Admiral NOYES. I knew that we had tried to impress the Japanese with the idea that we would take definite action if they proceeded with their invasion.

Senator FERGUSON. If they proceeded with an invasion of the British or the Dutch, or both on them, we had undertaken, as you say now——

Admiral NOYES (interposing). No, sir; I beg your pardon. I did not say we had undertaken.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read his answer?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Now we tried to impress the Japanese with what we would do if they proceeded? What would we do if they proceeded?

Admiral NOYES. One thing we did was cut off the oil and scrap-iron shipments.

Senator FERGUSON. What else did we do to impress them if they moved down there that we would take action? You understand your answer, don't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

[12690] Senator FERGUSON. What else did we do to impress them that we would take action?

Admiral NOYES. Other than arguments and notes, we had done nothing.

Senator FERGUSON. What did we say in notes to impress them?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, will not those notes speak for themselves? They are in the record, they are a part of the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't any idea as to whether all of the notes are in evidence yet.

Admiral NOYES. I must say I am not familiar offhand with the contents of those notes individually, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. But you just told me that we tried to impress them that if they made further moves we would take action. That is the substance of what you said.

Admiral NOYES. That is what I gathered from what I had been reading in the papers, and what I also knew of officially. I had no direct knowledge of what was going on through the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you evaluate the evidence if you had not any knowledge of our policy?

Admiral NOYES. I said I had no direct knowledge of what [12691] was going on through the State Department, sir. I think you will find most of it appeared in the press. I had some access to other information through this book.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that book is Exhibit 1. Those are the messages that we had been given.

Admiral NOYES. I had a general familiarity with the messages that are in this book. That is where I got my picture partly.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to object. They are not the messages that we were given that were sent out. They are the Jap version of certain dispatches.

Senator FERGUSON. The record is clear as to what Exhibit 1 is.

Were we intercepting messages to Rome?

Admiral NOYES. To whom in Rome?

Senator FERGUSON. The Japanese. To anyone in Rome.

Admiral NOYES. From time to time we got messages that were from the Japanese Ambassadors abroad.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not quite the question. The question is, were we intercepting Japanese messages to Rome?

Admiral NOYES. From time to time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. From Tokyo to Rome?

[12692] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir, or Rome to Tokyo. I do not remember seeing any from Tokyo to Rome. It is more difficult for us to intercept from Tokyo to Rome. Rome to Tokyo was a different proposition.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think I have been able to find any messages in Exhibit 1 that we intercepted from Rome to Tokyo or Tokyo to Rome.

Admiral NOYES. I think there is one in there that I saw.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would point them out.

Mr. MURPHY. The one of December 3d.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, there is one on page 228, the 3d of December. Are you familiar with that message?

Admiral NOYES. What page, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. On page 228.

Admiral NOYES. I would like to say I had never seen this book until 2 weeks ago when it was given me by the counsel of the committee.

I have read the message now, sir. I do not recall it specifically. It was not translated until the 6th of December, according to the note.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when it was delivered to the people who were supposed to receive these messages?

Admiral NOYES. I have no idea, sir.

[12693] Senator FERGUSON. Now one paragraph there on page 229:

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain I asked would it be due almost immediately and Mussolini replied of course she is obligated to do so under the terms of the tripartite pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point.

That would indicate that the message that they are talking about was that they were trying to get a commitment from Italy as to whether or not, if the war started, they would join in it. Would you not say that is a fair construction of that paragraph?

Admiral NOYES. I should think so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that indicate to you that they were going into a war with America?

Admiral NOYES. I do not imagine I saw this message before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know as you saw it?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, I have no definite recollection of it, and I would not be surprised at that sort of conversation. I think it was a natural thing for the Ambassador to discuss matters like that. In my own opinion, some of the Japanese were afraid that we were going to war with them if they went ahead with their invasion. It was not [12694] that they wanted to go to war with us, it was that they wanted to occupy southwest Asia. If we let them do it they would not go to war with us.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you think the reason for the attack, as you give in this last answer, would be that they expected that we would interfere with their occupation of other countries?

Admiral NOYES. That would be my personal opinion, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your personal opinion. And you were of that opinion back in December of 1941?

Admiral NOYES. As I stated, that if we had been willing to accept their point and allow them to occupy Siam, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, they would probably not have gone to war with us, if they could avoid it.

[12695] Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised on December 7 that there had been an attack by the Japanese on an American possession?

Admiral NOYES. I was surprised that the attack got in. I was surprised that an air raid was made on Pearl Harbor at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait. You said first that you were surprised that the attack got in. You mean that it was successful?

Admiral NOYES. I will put it in the reverse. I was surprised that an air attack was made on Pearl Harbor at that time, and if it was made, I was surprised it got in.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you expect an attack on the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. I did not expect an attack on the 7th, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Anywhere?

Admiral NOYES. Beg pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. Any where?

Admiral NOYES. When, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I mean anywhere on the 7th, any country by the Japanese.

Admiral NOYES. I do not understand. At what time did I expect an attack on the 7th? I didn't expect an attack on [12696] the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not expect the Japanese to attack any country on the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. I did not expect it; no, sir.

I knew that 30 warships, a large convoy was heading south, and they were going to attack somewhere within a short time. The convoy would not probably have landed on the 7th. They could go to the Philippines, but they were pretty far away to get in on the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. They were over in the north of Siam?

Admiral NOYES. That is right.

I had considerable to do with traffic on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will ask you about that traffic. Were you not in contact with Admiral Hart, about that move?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the movement was to the Kra Peninsula, did you not?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not America know from the message that our Ambassador Winant sent here at 10:40 on the morning of the 6th, which was Saturday, that the movement was on the Kra Peninsula, and that we could expect an attack within 14 hours?

[12697] Admiral NOYES. I never saw that message, sir. That was not a Navy message. It was a State Department message.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you understand the movement was going?

Admiral NOYES. Probably somewhere in that vicinity. Whether they were going first into Indochina, or Thailand, or direct to the Kra Peninsula, I could not say, but there was always a possibility that they could turn toward the Philippines. It was in that order of possibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. They would have had to reverse their course and sail almost 1,000 miles, would they not, to the Philippines from where they were?

Admiral NOYES. I do not think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How far?

Admiral NOYES. I do not remember exactly the position, but Camranh Bay is a little less distant to Manila Bay than it is to the Kra Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. Had not the ships gone further than that on Saturday?

Admiral NOYES. I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Had not the ships gone further than Camranh Bay on Saturday?

Admiral NOYES. I do not think so, sir. I have no definite recollection of the exact position, but as I remember, [12698] it was somewhere near Camranh Bay.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would not have been surprised at an attack on the Philippines on Sunday?

Admiral NOYES. I am getting a little out of my depth, Senator Ferguson. I was not concerned with the war plans or with this from a strategic point of view. That was not my business at the time. I was merely handling the traffic.

I got involved in an expression of my personal views. I had no responsibility in this respect in the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what I mean when I say the pilot message?

Admiral NOYES. The what message, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The pilot message.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that is? It is in Exhibit 1.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at it and just tell me when you first knew that there was such a message, if you knew at all, prior to the attack?

Admiral NOYES. My recollection is not clear as to exactly when I saw that message. I think it was in the afternoon. I do not think I saw the message prior to the at- [12699] tack.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say your best judgment then was that you saw it after the attack?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you when you first saw the message that tells them not to use typists or any other person, which is on page 245.

Admiral NOYES. I should imagine during the afternoon of the 7th, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. After the attack?

Admiral NOYES. I have no direct recollection of the time when I first saw that particular message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what were you working on in relation to Admiral Hart's position in the Southwest Pacific?

Admiral NOYES. We had received a considerable amount of traffic, which I do not remember exactly now, the overnight traffic from both the Atlantic and Pacific. I do not remember any of the traffic specifically, except a report from Admiral Hart in regard to the convoy. That is the thing that sticks in my mind in regard to that warning.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that report came in from Admiral Hart about convoys?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; I do not recollect at the moment.

[12700] Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it the 6th?

Admiral NOYES. I thought you were speaking of the morning of the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. That is when you saw it. Do you know when it came in?

Admiral NOYES. A message came in during the night of the 6th, that is during our night of the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether it was this message from Admiral Hart.

To OPNAV.

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; that is not the message to which I was referring.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that there was such a message?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir; I think I knew at the time. I have heard it discussed here.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of it before the attack?

Admiral NOYES. I should say I did. I think that I knew of it before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what interpretation did you give that?

[12701] Admiral NOYES. That it was some misinformation in regard to the ABC agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. You say it was some misinformation?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say that?

Admiral NOYES. Because the ABC agreement was purely a military conversation, starting with an assumption that the United States would be associated with certain other countries in a war with Japan, and from there on the plans would be put into effect if that assumption should come through.

Senator FERGUSON. What does this mean:

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or four eventualities.

Admiral NOYES. I think it was somebody misinterpreting the ABC agreement. That is my personal opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand in case of war we were to give them armed support?

Admiral NOYES. What war, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. With Japan.

Admiral NOYES. I do not understand.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you interpret this to mean?

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities.

[12702] Admiral NOYES. I was familiar with the ABC agreement because I had certain duties under it, and I knew whoever said that misinterpreted what the whole agreement was.

I suppose it is a case of some young liaison officer getting off the track.

[12703] Senator FERGUSON. If this was Admiral Phillips of the Royal British Navy, you wouldn't expect that he would be very far off the track, would you?

Admiral NOYES. I don't believe it was Admiral Phillips of the British Navy. I think it was some young man in our Navy talking to some man in the British Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you ever get that idea? Where did you ever hear that?

Admiral NOYES. You asked me what I thought of the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I suppose I should have said I don't know anything about it.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you do know, now.

Admiral NOYES. I said I supposed that that was discussed. You asked me what I thought at the time. The truth was I thought somebody misinterpreted the agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Admiral Phillips told Admiral Hart this at Manila on December 6, and that is why Admiral Hart cabled to Washington to find out why he didn't have the information that the British had, and there was about to be an attack upon the British?

Admiral NOYES. I did not know that information, sir, and I knew I had read and was involved in the duties in the [12704] ABCD agreement, and it is purely a military agreement, starting out with an assumption.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Did you know that Phillips was in command of the British in Singapore?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. I don't, I don't know; I wouldn't be positive about that now. I thought he was a captain on one of the British ships, but my recollection may be wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you really think at the time that Admiral Hart would wire Washington if some young officer told him this, that the British were assured armed support under three or four eventualities?

Admiral NOYES. You are asking me what I think now, and what I thought then, sir. I do not remember having any particular thoughts on it. The best answer I can give is that that is what seems to me would have been my reaction then, seeing that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true that you were working on this? I didn't bring it up. You brought it up, about working, you were busily engaged on this Hart proposition in the South Pacific.

Admiral NOYES. You asked me what I was doing.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, I show you this message.

[12705] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not you saw that message that morning and were working on that proposition?

Admiral NOYES. May I ask the date of the message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It came in Saturday night.

(A paper was handed to Admiral Noyes.)

Admiral NOYES. I did not have this message in mind at all. I had thought that this message came in before the 7th.

Mr. FERGUSON. Yes, it did. It came in Saturday night.

Admiral NOYES. I hadn't thought it was a message that was in it.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you working on? What message were you replying to? Didn't Admiral Hart then send a much longer message and a wire also, cable, from the British, about this proposition, that very day? Is that what you were working on?

Admiral NOYES. The recollection I have is the strategic and tactical implications of a convoy. I do not remember any other messages specifically.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain just what it was [12706] you were working on and what you had worked out, whether you had sent a message?

Admiral NOYES. We had been following the—trying to follow the course of this convoy, because we—you are again asking me something I had nothing to do with except from seeing messages.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated, as I understood you, that you were working on this proposition of Admiral Hart in the South Pacific. Now, this was one of the propositions that he had and he sent a long message which was replied to before the attack, but not actually sent until after the attack, and that is in the record—on this very point. Did you know about that?

Admiral NOYES. I don't recollect such a message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what were you working on about the convoy? What were you doing that morning?

Admiral NOYES. This message had come in in regard to the scouting, reports on the convoy entirely aside from this other enemy intercept. This was a straight naval message from Admiral Hart.

A British officer came to see me with some information that he had on the same, in regard to what information the British received about the movements of the big convoy. I gave him the information we had. He went up to see the [12707] Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, I believe, and later on he asked me if I would arrange for him, ask for an appointment for him with the Secretary of State.

I called up the Secretary of State's office, and asked for an appointment. That is the one message that sticks in my mind on Sunday morning other than the note business.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that you did this all Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. I can't—no, sir. I had all the Atlantic traffic—

Senator FERGUSON. Do. Did you call the Secretary of State? Did you see the British officer on Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

[12708] Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that the British had an officer talking with you about this convoy going to the Kra Peninsula, or going somewhere, and you and he were working it out as to where it was going?

Admiral NOYES. We weren't working out where it was going. He came to me with his information.

Senator FERGUSON. What for, what information did he have?

Admiral NOYES. I don't remember the specific information now.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall what you gave him?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What information did you have on that convoy?

Admiral NOYES. I think I have seen it in some of these dispatches, but I don't remember the text of it now.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to point out is why he would come to the communications officer, the head of the Communications, this British officer, and not come to our Intelligence Branch, if he wanted to get this information. You were not an evaluator of this information, were you?

Admiral NOYES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was this British officer that came to you Sunday morning and what time did he come?

Admiral NOYES. I could not give you the exact hour, sir.

[12709] Senator FERGUSON. About what time?

Admiral NOYES. I would say about 9:30 or 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say that they expected an attack that morning?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say that they did not expect an attack that day?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection in regard to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, wouldn't that be a thing that a man would be likely to remember?



Admiral NOYES. I am sure I would remember if they had expected an attack. I might not remember if they didn't. There would be many days when you would not expect an attack but only one day when you did expect one.

Senator FERGUSON. Can't you help the committee here on what this conversation between you and the British officer was about this transport on Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. I have—you asked me what I was doing, sir. I had a 24-hour day job. The only thing I remember specifically about that morning was this British officer coming in. In addition I had enough business to do going over my traffic with the Atlantic where we were in a very serious situation to take me the morning without doing anything [12710] else. I have no recollection of the British officer except the part that I have explained to you, sir. I had no conversation about Singapore. I had no conversation about political matters. It was purely in regard to the strategic and tactical implications of this convoy movement. Why he came to me, probably was because it was Sunday morning and there probably weren't so many people down there.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your office alerted this morning to war?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir, it was, 24 hours a day, since May 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. What was said, why did you send him to the Secretary of State and not to the Intelligence Department of the Navy?

Admiral NOYES. That I said to the Secretary of State?

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't I understand that you called the Secretary of State for an appointment?

Admiral NOYES. I called his office.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. Some subordinate.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make an appointment with the Secretary of State?

Admiral NOYES. I did, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the point that he wanted [12711] you to get him in touch with the Secretary of State to discuss?

Admiral NOYES. He didn't tell me, sir. He merely said everybody was busy and would I ring up the State Department and ask if they could see him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say who he wanted to see in the State Department?

Admiral NOYES. I am not sure whom he wanted to see. I thought it was the Secretary of State. It might have been the Under Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the rank of this officer?

Admiral NOYES. I think he was a rear admiral.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that at 10 o'clock that morning there was a meeting between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and Secretary of Navy?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know why that had been called?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us why?

Admiral NOYES. It was called on the Japanese note.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you received word that the Secretary of State had told the Secretary of the Navy that it was up to the Army and Navy as early as the 27th of November?

[12712] Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew that?

Admiral NOYES. I know it now.

Senator FERGUSON. Before the 7th you didn't know it?

Admiral NOYES. I think not. I don't remember having it brought to my attention.

[12713] Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get the information about the meeting between the three secretaries?

Admiral NOYES. I don't remember. I imagine Kramer told me. Kramer, or one of his people.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Admiral NOYES. Kramer, or one of his assistants.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any meeting in Admiral Stark's office that morning?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Stark's office was more or less full of meetings in those days, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't understand.

Admiral NOYES. There were meetings going on all the time in Admiral Stark's office. I remember nothing specific about it that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall anything about that morning?

Admiral NOYES. I did not see Admiral Stark that morning. I saw Admiral Ingersoll, but not Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was Admiral Ingersoll when you saw him?

Admiral NOYES. I think in his office.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasion was it that you saw him Sunday morning?

Admiral NOYES. I don't remember, sir.

[12714] Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall that at all.

Admiral NOYES. No. I saw him very often. He was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and I dealt a great deal with him?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any discussion about the 14 parts message or the pilot message or any of these other messages?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir; I remember nothing. I believe, as I remember it, that I felt they were having this meeting and they had the note and would decide what they were going to do about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that was a normal morning in your office and in Admiral Ingersoll's office?

Admiral NOYES. Normal for the last week. There had been gradually increasing tension.

Senator FERGUSON. Normal for the last week. Will you explain that a little more? Things were getting rather tense were they not?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. I think from the 28th of November on, some important dispatch had been sent out almost every day in regard to the situation. There was hardly a day that there wasn't some approach to the crisis.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was gradually getting worse.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

[12715] Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever see the message, the answer to General Marshall's note sent by General Short?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not.

Admiral NOYES. I say I didn't. I didn't see it before Pearl Harbor. I have seen it since.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't know then what was going on between General Marshall and General Short, or Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark?

Admiral NOYES. Oh, yes; I handled the war-warning message that was sent by the Navy. I didn't see the Army's incoming message. The message from General Short to the War Department. We exchanged this intercepted enemy traffic with the War Department. Our ordinary business was not exchanged through me. We didn't send a copy to the War Department of every message we sent to the field.

The important messages were in general discussed between Admiral Stark and General Marshall. And at one time I was sent over to see General Marshall about a message and clear it with him. Whenever it involved the Army, we endeavored to clear with the Army.

But it didn't happen that General Short's message to the War Department ever came to my attention until after Pearl Harbor. [12716]

Senator FERGUSON. Now Captain Safford has testified that he drafted a message to CINCPAC for information of Wake:

In view of the imminence of war destroy all registered publications on Wake except this system and current editions of aircraft code and direction finding code.

This message was not sent.

Admiral Noyes asked:

What do you mean by using such language as that?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral, the war is just a matter of days if not hours.

Admiral NOYES. You may think there is going to be war, but I think they are bluffing.

Captain SAFFORD. Well, Admiral, if all these publications on Wake are captured, we will never be able to explain.

Now, do you remember such a conversation?

Admiral NOYES. What date was this, may I ask? Was this message under discussion?

Senator FERGUSON. I may refresh your memory further on it:

Admiral Noyes rewrote 061743.

That is the number of the message which was sent deferred on December 6, and received after the attack. It was [12717] that message about the destruction of codes on Wake.

Admiral NOYES. I recollect no such conversation as you have read me, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Admiral NOYES. I recollect no such conversation with Captain Safford. As a matter of fact, I took the initiative in the sending of these previous—the only argument that I recollect having with Captain Safford in regard to the destruction of codes, which we both agreed as being responsible for the security of our own codes, we were both in agreement that we would like to get all of the dangerous ones out of the way, but we recognize the fact that it had a very direct influence on the operations people, intelligence and war plans, and I think he

recognized, as well as I did that we had to get their concurrence, and that is the reason we had to consider quite a bit before it was sent.

The one argument we had about it was that he wanted to specify to the commander in chief what codes, exactly what codes should be kept, and I, since you bring it up, sir, it comes back to me, that argument that I had with him that he shouldn't tell Admiral Kimmel which codes to keep with the outlying islands; let him decide that for himself.

That is the only difference of opinion that I remember, except I think he stuck in some rather brusque language to [12718] the commander in chief, which was contrary to the policy of the Chief of Naval Operations, and I scratched it out.

Senator FERGUSON. What kind of language?

Admiral NOYES. Brusque.

Senator FERGUSON. There could have been such a conversation then: "What do you mean by using such language as that?"

Admiral NOYES. Well, that might have been—I will modify what I said to that extent, if that is what he refers to. You didn't say what the language was.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Admiral NOYES. I think he made the direct order to Admiral Kimmel that he should destroy certain codes in the outlying islands, something to that effect. Nobody was willing to go along with that because they felt Admiral Kimmel should have more discretion in the matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you believe that you and Captain Safford would know more about what codes to destroy than Admiral Kimmel would because you were the men who knew your codes, knew how you would have to communicate? Wouldn't you say you had more experience along that line and should have told him what to destroy?

Admiral NOYES. We can't run the Navy that way, sir. We have to let the man in the field use his judgment in [12719] regard to things within his province. That is what the discussion was between Captain Safford and me. He wanted to specify.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell the Admiral what to do?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you thought that that was not the way the Navy did business?

Admiral NOYES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, did you at that time think Japan was bluffing as far as the United States was concerned?

Admiral NOYES. On what date?

Senator FERGUSON. On the 6th.

Admiral NOYES. No; I don't think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that did you think they were bluffing?

Admiral NOYES. Sometimes I would see a message, these intercepted messages, which would have a little bit of a favorable tendency in that direction, but on the whole not.

I never had any feeling that way that lasted over one message.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you came to the conclusion [12720] that this was really business and that Japan was not bluffing in these messages?

Admiral NOYES. I have made a list of messages that you could read that would lead you to believe that they weren't going to war.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not going to war?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They would indicate that they were bluffing. Will you give us those?

Admiral NOYES. 1180, page 181; 842, page 186; 1204, page 192; 844, page 199; 857, page 199; 1393, page 200; 985, page 204; 865, page 208; 1226, page 212; 1243, page 227; 1256, page 227.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the occasion for making up that list.

Admiral NOYES. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion of making up that list?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you finish your answer to the former question? Did you complete your answer to the former question after you read that list? The Chair thought you started to say something else.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. I think Senator Ferguson asked me if I ever thought there wasn't going to be war. As [12721] I say, I didn't get this book until 2 weeks ago. I just did it as a matter of interest, to pick out certain messages from these messages. In most of these messages Nomura and Kurusu and even the Prime Minister, the Japanese Prime Minister, give the impression that they are sincere. And the other thing that I said, that the Japanese would be glad to—in other words, if we would leave them alone, they would occupy southeast Asia and not necessarily attack us.

But, of course, I didn't think that would ever be.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back, I had been asking you whether or not you thought that they were bluffing, and you said at times you did, and at times you did not.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you made up this list to demonstrate that they didn't mean to go to war.

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. That is not my thesis, sir. I said among those messages, you will find times when the Prime Minister seemed to be optimistic, says we are trying one more thing. There are several messages in there where the Japanese seem to be endeavoring to patch things up.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look on page 204, the message to Berlin. The last part of that message:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon [12722] nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Admiral NOYES. If you go back, I think you will find that the preceding one to that shows that the Japanese told Hitler that they were afraid if they went ahead with Thailand that we would intervene.

Also at this time Hitler was trying to get Japan to go to war with Russia. My general conclusion was—I merely meant to say, Senator Ferguson, that in going over all of them there are times when you see some evidence of Japan trying to do something to smooth things over, but the net result was certainly all to the bad.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, look at the one on page 195. They are referring there to the message of the 26th:

Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. That is one of the worst ones.

Senator FERGUSON. That didn't leave much doubt, did it?

Admiral NOYES. Well, look at the one, if you will, sir, on page 197, that follows that.

[12723] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, what are we after with this examination?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair doesn't know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't think the witness knows anything about these dispatches, and I don't think his opinion amounts to anything, therefore.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can't pass on that question, but the Chair has been unable to see just where this meticulous inquiry about these particular messages leads.

It may be that the Senator from Michigan can explain it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not going to comment upon the evidence, but the witness gave me a list of messages and I was inquiring about some other messages that seem to contradict the ones he had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I know, but my suggestion is that the list of messages is just as far out of relevance in this proceeding. I want to get through with it and get through with this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to cooperate, and I am sure the member at the far end of the table to the left would also be glad if we could do that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no witness to follow this witness this afternoon, so perhaps I shouldn't have interrupted.

[12724] Senator FERGUSON. The witness has been on the stand all day, and I have only had him for a short time.

The CHAIRMAN. It has perhaps only been a short time, but it probably just seems long.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No; I don't even make that criticism; I just wondered whether we couldn't get along.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, I am not accustomed to ask the other members of the committee what questions I should ask; neither do I ask counsel.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think if the committee is able to endure it, counsel ought to be able to do so, and I think that the propriety of counsel raising these issues is somewhat open to question.

Members of the committee have repeatedly raised that question but I hadn't supposed that we secured counsel in order for him to tell us how to cross-examine witnesses.

I regret that the issue has been raised in just this way.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to say that counsel were secured, not only present counsel, but all counsel, to assist and guide the committee in the interrogation of witnesses and the elucidation of facts, and the Chair sees no impropriety in counsel suggesting that the witness' testimony might be terminated. The whole thing started by counsel [12725] asking the Chair a question that he couldn't answer. From there on, it went.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I just want to say that I agree with Senator Brewster. I have been waiting for some kick in the shins when I made one of these objections, but this is the first time I have received it.

I won't do it any more.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair hopes that counsel will feel free to kick any shins that need to be kicked. Maybe we ought to have done more of that.

Will you proceed so that we can finish with the Admiral today if possible?

Senator FERGUSON. I might say that I haven't questioned the Chairman's questions to the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. You haven't had much chance, because the Chair has asked very few questions of any witness.

Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. I could say many things right now but for the purpose of getting through with the witness I will not say them.

I just want to find out why you prepared this list of messages that you just read.

Admiral NOYES. Senator, I have been waiting to testify, present in this committee room, since last Monday. For 2 [12726] weeks before last Monday I have been standing by, away from the committee room.

I made it purely for my own information: while studying it over I made notes, as I read through this Exhibit 1, which was given to me by counsel for the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any list that would indicate that they were going to war?

Admiral NOYES. That is a combination of both, sir. It is a list of both. It has to do with the probability of war. Negative or positive.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, then, the list is on both sides?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir, and I am very sorry that I brought this up. I tried to tell you this is my personal opinion and I recognize the fact that I didn't have any business to express my personal opinion on this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked if you stated to Captain Safford that you thought the Japanese were bluffing and in answer to that question, I think you went into this.

Admiral NOYES. That is where I got into it, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You were led into it. You didn't just go into it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is the Chair through?

The CHAIRMAN. For the moment.

[12727] Senator FERGUSON. Of course, other people have tried to take me off the track, but I will ask more questions anyway.

Admiral, it is your understanding that the Navy sent direct communications, that is, the direct intercepts to Admiral Kimmel prior to July 1941, or up until sometime in July 1941?

Admiral NOYES. I tried to explain that in my answer this morning by saying we had a strict rule not to send exact translations or direct reference to enemy intercepted messages mixed up with any other Navy business. There was no objection to sending from time to time an exact translation of any message under my cognizance for the purpose of helping people who had had it as a reference in other messages.

In other words, for the mechanics of decrypting.

Senator FERGUSON. If you look back on the question, we will get through quicker. If you will try to keep to the question.

Admiral NOYES. I know of no reason why there were less after July than before July unless it was on account of the international situation.

Senator FERGUSON. On May 26, 1941, did you know that Admiral Kimmel had written a letter to Admiral Stark asking [12728] him specifically for this kind of information?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a circular sent out through the various departments along that line?

Admiral NOYES. A circular, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, to the various departments.

Admiral NOYES. In regard to magic?

Senator FERGUSON. No, about sending information direct to Kimmel.

Admiral NOYES. I had nothing to do with that, sir. That was the Director of Naval Intelligence, who sent out information.

The messages I sent were at the request of someone else.

Senator FERGUSON. You say there may have been a change from July until November because of the international situation. Will you explain what you mean by that answer?

Admiral NOYES. I understood your question, Senator Ferguson, to be on the assumption that the number of messages sent out decreased after July.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any doubt about that. That is what I was asking about, and that is a fact, as I take it from this record.

Admiral NOYES. I had nothing to do with the preparation [12729] of the record, and I supposed the record was supposed to bear on subsequent events.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get an order from Admiral Stark on that?

Admiral NOYES. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Ingersoll?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Anyone, to your knowledge?

Admiral NOYES. All of the orders in regard to the handling of magic came from the Chief of Naval Operations. I could make no change in the orders or the general policy without his approval.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as far as you were concerned, there was no change in policy, as far as you personally were concerned, you knew of no change in the policy of sending messages to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral Turner has indicated on this record—I want you to be specific on this—that he obtained some information from you that Admiral Kimmel was getting all of the magic, and Admiral Stark to the same effect.

What have you got to say about that?

Did you believe that Admiral Kimmel was getting all [12730] of the magic?

Admiral NOYES. I knew that he was not, sir. It would not have been a possibility to do it. There was no way to get the messages to him.

Senator FERGUSON. And there was no way for him to decode it?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.



Senator FERGUSON. You knew specifically that Admiral Kimmel or his source there did not have any machinery or equipment to decipher or decode magic, that is purple?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. Magic includes all.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I changed it to purple.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your answer?

Admiral NOYES. Purple.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that?

Admiral NOYES. I knew that, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of anyone ever asking you that question as to whether or not they were able to get purple or not?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, except when it was discussed when the machine was sent to Cavite, when the purple machine was sent to Cavite the decision had to be made between Cavite and Honolulu. It was sent by the approval of [12731] Naval Operations because it was the best listening post for us. It wasn't sent for the benefit of Admiral Hart. That was a secondary consideration.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us when it was sent to Cavite?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, I cannot.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Admiral NOYES. 1941, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what part of 1941?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom did you discuss the question?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Ingersoll certainly, and I think with Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time did the British have theirs, their machine?

Admiral NOYES. I think so, sir.

[12732] Senator FERGUSON. We had already sent one to the British, is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. The Navy did not do that, so I am not sure of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who did furnish the British with the deciphering machine?

Admiral NOYES. I am not familiar with the—I cannot give you a specific answer to the question. I imagine it was the Army, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you don't know who did it?

Admiral NOYES. I don't recollect. I didn't have anything to do with it. I did not do it personally.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did have a discussion with Admiral Stark that you only had the one machine and it could be sent to Cavite and not sent to Hawaii?

Admiral NOYES. I recommended that it be sent to Cavite because that was the best place to intercept Japanese traffic and receive information during that time and that was—I will say that that was about the time of the message that the counsel put in the record this morning, when we sent a joint message to the Philippines, the commanding general in the Philippines and the commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, to make a full exchange at their end of the line.

Admiral NOYES. I think that was March 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. You say this is in March 1941?

Admiral NOYES. I think the message was sent in March 1941 and it would have had to be—the machine would have had to be there before the message was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether you discussed that matter with Admiral Turner?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And would your answers be the same on Admiral Turner about a conversation of purple being translated at Hawaii, as it was with Admiral Stark, that you do not recall any such statement to Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark on that question, that Kimmel was getting the purple?

Admiral NOYES. In regard to Admiral Turner, his testimony indicates that he was referring to traffic analyses and I think that he got confused between the business that Commander Rochefort was describing this morning in his testimony, the analysis of traffic, radio direction finder bearings, and that kind of strictly naval work, as contrasted with diplomatic dispatches, which was what was the primary use of the purple code.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you at the time breaking the Japanese navy code?

[12734] Admiral NOYES. We were working on them. Actually we—it is a relative matter with all codes. There is no code ever read—there is no one code ever read 100 percent. We speak of it in percentage. Some codes can be read 10 percent, some 90 percent, and I never heard of any one that could be read for any length of time 100 percent.

Senator FERGUSON. How much of the Navy code were you in 1941 able to read?

Admiral NOYES. I would have to refer you to Commander Rochefort's testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know?

Admiral NOYES. Not of my own knowledge. I heard him this morning but I do not recollect his exact statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether we were able to read all of it, whether there was a top and a lower code?

Admiral NOYES. Whether we could read all Japanese naval codes?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. The naval codes had given us much more trouble than the other codes in general, that is the reason that we had—since it was directly naval traffic, before I took over the job—we had that set-up, with the people in Hawaii concentrated on the naval systems and they were the hardest [12735] and they had not got as far as we had with the diplomatic through more or less luck.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is one message that is mentioned in Safford's testimony; that is No. 843, on November 27, 1941, prescribing a schedule of Tokyo news broadcasts. That is just a short time after—it is not in a book. That is just a short time after the setting up of the wind code. I will send it to you so that you can see it. It is from Tokyo to Washington, 27th of November 1941, purple 843 is the number [handing document to witness].

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see that before?

Admiral NOYES. I could not say, sir. I probably did. I am familiar with what it means. It was used in connection with the—

Captain Safford though it had a connection with the winds execute. It is a list of Japanese stations and their frequencies.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. When did Captain Safford discuss that with you, or was that what you took from his testimony?

Admiral NOYES. Oh, we discussed, as soon as the—

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, when it came in?

Admiral NOYES. When the winds set-up came in. This came in actually prior to the—well, it came in the—they were translated the same day, apparently. This was the day before [12736] this schedule message came in a day before the set-up for the winds code was sent out from Tokyo or, rather, it was sent out a day before, as I remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Admiral NOYES. No, I am wrong on that.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 19th.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was sent out on the 19th.

Admiral NOYES. It was not translated until the 28th.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral NOYES. We got them both translated on the same day.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall a discussion with Safford that the message that he has now referred to in his testimony, that is not in the book, Number 843, which I have shown you, had something to do with setting up a program for this winds code?

Admiral NOYES. Well, for the reason, I should say, that does not check, because the winds code had been sent out on the 19th and this schedule was not set up until the 27th, so it could not—

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to know whether you had a discussion with him?

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, didn't you tell us that you did [12737] have a discussion with him at some time?

Admiral NOYES. I did have a discussion—

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Admiral NOYES (continuing).—In regard to the implementing winds code.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Admiral NOYES. At about the time that it came in.

Senator FERGUSON. And was it on that schedule that I have shown you, 843?

Admiral NOYES. I have no specific recollection of any discussion of this particular schedule. I am perfectly willing to accept his statement that he thought that this schedule was received—that this schedule was likely to be one on which the winds execute might be received. He may have said that; I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. In view of the fact, Admiral, that there was a little discrepancy as to the time you testified before the Navy Court I have checked that record and find that it was in September 1944 and not December.

Admiral NOYES. Thank you, sir. My recollection was at fault.

Mr. KEEFE. The Navy Court had concluded its hearings on [12738] the 19th of October 1944.

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. The Hewitt examination followed and took place in December.

Now, I am very much mystified by certain portions of your testimony and some time or other in the course of trying to work out some sort of a report to come to some determination on this testimony we will have to judge the witnesses that testified and we have got to believe some.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir, I realize that.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is going to be a pretty difficult task in view of the testimony that has been given here, as I see it.

Admiral NOYES. I have been here this past week, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like to refer you to the testimony which you gave before the Navy Court of Inquiry and I want to ask you whether or not this question was asked you, or these questions were asked you, and did you make these answers? This is question 82:

Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office for the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the execution signal was received?

A. We had a special twenty-four hour watch for all [12739] Communication Intelligence matters.

Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that were expected and these cards, sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal?

A. I could not say.

Now, I want to stop right there.

Admiral NOYES. Did you say question 82, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that is the way it appears in our record, questions 82 and 83. I read you the questions and read you the answers.

Now the question is, were those questions asked you and did you make those answers before the Naval Board of Inquiry?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Now you come before us in this matter and you say that after hearing the testimony of Captain Kramer you think that you did direct the preparation of some cards. Now, did you or didn't you?

Admiral NOYES. I stated that I had a discussion with Captain Safford after my return to Washington this summer which—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, the question is—pardon me. I don't want to interrupt you but I would like to have this as [12740] short and as succinct and as clear as possible without a lot of roaming around the bush. Did you or did you not direct the preparation of these cards?

Admiral NOYES. I authorized the preparation of them, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is there a distinction to be made between authorization and direction?

Admiral NOYES. I think that the suggestion probably came from Captain Safford or Captain Kramer and I approved of its being done. They were in my division.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, can't you answer that specific question? Did you yourself direct the preparation of those cards?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you answer that yes or no?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, than the answer is "Yes, sir." We have got that much settled then. Now; the next question is were those cards prepared?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And who prepared them?

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were they delivered to you?

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect, sir. They were delivered to me or to the ones who were to use them but I do not know that I made the delivery or Kramer. I should think that [12741] Kramer would have been probably the one to deliver it.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't care for argumentation that is not an answer. I am asking you simple questions and they can have simple and direct answers. That has been the trouble with this whole hearing, every answer is an argument; instead of being an answer to the question we go off around the bush and saying all around about what this one said and that one said and everything else instead of getting a direct answer to the question.

Now, I am going to have difficulty, in passing on the character of the witnesses that testified here, to determine who is telling the truth. They cannot all be telling the truth, as I have listened to this testimony and I want to see if we cannot pin some of these things down. We have now reached the point where you have testified here that you did direct the preparation of these cards.

Admiral NOYES. And that the cards were distributed.

Mr. KEEFE. Distributed to whom?

Admiral NOYES. I should say, to the best of my recollection—

Mr. RICHARDSON. He is asking for your personal knowledge now.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking you to testify not about what somebody else told you or somebody told him or what you heard [12742] here in this room. I am asking you to test your recollection and your knowledge of the things that you are testifying about, trying to apply what are ordinary rules of evidence and the construction of evidence.

To whom were those cards distributed?

Admiral NOYES. If you ask me to whom I personally delivered the cards, I do not recollect.

Mr. KEEFE. To whom were they delivered by your direction?

Admiral NOYES. I believe that they were delivered to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Wilkinson, the Naval Aide, probably Admiral Turner.

Mr. KEEFE. The Naval Aide to whom?

Admiral NOYES. The Naval Aide to the President.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, it is perfectly sensible, is it not, Admiral Noyes, that that procedure would have been indulged in due to the importance that had been previously attached to this winds code that had been set up?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the evidence is before this committee that as to no other message other than this proposed winds execute was any such arrangement made. That is true, isn't it?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

[12743] Mr. KEEFE. Yes. It is also true, is it not, that due to the fact of secrecy of magic these cards would not have been delivered to any persons other than those entitled to receive ultra-magic, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is true, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the very purpose of delivering these cards was so that when and if this winds code execute message came in it would be possible to immediately contact the recipients of those cards and advise them of the receipt of that message, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. At night, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, at night, yes. They could have those cards at home with them, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That was the idea of the cards.

Mr. KEEFE. So you had a plan set up by which a telephone message could be sent to the Chief of Naval Operations or to the President or to this one or that one of the six that you have named and they could be given language that would indicate to them what the winds execute message was and by turning to the card they could interpret it and understand it, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you devised that plan yourself, didn't you?

[12744] Admiral NOYES. I am not sure whether I devised it or whether it was suggested to me. It may have been a joint affair. It came—Kramer and Safford and myself—

Mr. KEEFE. I am trying to give you the credit.

Admiral NOYES. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. I am trying to give you the credit in this case.

Admiral NOYES. Well, Safford, I see, took credit for it already.

Mr. KEEFE. Safford does not take credit for that. The testimony of both Captain Kramer and Captain Safford is that this whole card system was your production.

Admiral NOYES. Well, it was undoubtedly my direction.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral NOYES. I thought you asked me if I initiated the idea, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, we have got this far, that the cards were made out, they were distributed and in the hands of those entitled to receive ultra-magic. You are sure about that, aren't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Before this committee now, that much you are sure of?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. There can be no mistake about that?

[12745] Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that subsequent refreshment won't change your opinion later, is that right?

Admiral NOYES. My opinion has only been changed once, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am not so certain about that if I go through your testimony, as I will before we get through.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean today?

Admiral NOYES. I mean this particular incident.

Mr. KEEFE. What is that?

Admiral NOYES. I did not mean that there was only one discrepancy. I mean that I changed my opinion on this after talking to Captain Safford upon my return to Washington.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what I want to be sure—is what you are testifying to now a fact?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking for facts.

Admiral NOYES. To the best of my recollection it is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. Not rumors, suspicions, and not conjectures, and not composite ideas resulting from conversations where you worked out something to say, but I am asking for simple facts. You realize that, do you not?

Admiral NOYES. I understand that, Mr. Keefe.

[12746] Mr. KEEFE. And the reason I am asking it is because this question was asked you. Question 84:

As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and each had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall if any such system was established?

No, I could not say.

That is what you told the Court of Inquiry?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But since that time, after talking with other individuals you now are prepared to come here under oath and tell this committee as a fact what you have stated to us this afternoon in respect to those cards, is that right?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. One other individual, not individuals.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, was this question asked you before the Naval Court of Inquiry at that time:

Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone the execution of the winds message in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form of [12747] the winds message, is that the way you want to leave your testimony on this subject?

A. That is right; yes.

Now, you want that changed before this committee, do you not?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir. I have stated before this committee that there was no authentic execute on the winds message.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral, I don't want to split hairs.

Admiral NOYES. I am not trying to split hairs, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I think you are.

Admiral NOYES. I am sorry.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, listen to this question that was asked you:

Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds message in any form.

Admiral NOYES. I did not take that question to be an execute, a false execute at the time. That is the reason I answered as I did.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Question 136. Was this question asked you and did you make this answer:

Q. Referring to this winds message and the execute of the winds message, have you any recollection whether Lieut. [12748] tenant Commander Kramer came in with an execute of the winds message and said, "Here it is"?

A. As I remember it we received some outside information which afterwards turned out not to be correct.

What information was taken to mean that an execute of this winds message had been received which turned out not to be correct? Did you make that answer?

Admiral NOYES. That it turned out not to be correct?

Mr. KEEFE. No, I am not asking you that. I am asking you the simple question——

Admiral NOYES. Well, I haven't been able to find it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I assumed that you made it because I am reading it from the record.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral Noyes, Captain Kramer has testified that the watch officer on duty, as he says, on the 5th of December came to his door and handed him a message that had just been taken off the teletype. Captain Kramer looked at it and told this committee that he believed at that time that it was an authentic winds execute message; that he walked down with the watch officer to Captain Safford's office and said to Captain Safford, "Here it is."

Kramer says that Safford then carried the ball from there on and indicated that he had gone to your office. Captain [12749] Safford said that he sent one of his subordinates to your office with that message.

Now, my question is, Did a message, true or false, good or bad, of the character described by Captain Safford and Captain Kramer reach your office either on the 4th or 5th of December?

Admiral NOYES. I could not give you a specific answer to that question, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Why not?

Admiral NOYES. Because to say that a false message written on yellow teletype paper—I cannot say that a message written on yellow teletype paper was not delivered to me in my office on the 4th or the 5th.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was it ever delivered to you?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then we are to understand that your memory fails on that subject, is that right? You have no recollection of receiving this message, regardless of whether you considered it to be a true winds execute or a false winds execute, you cannot tell this committee whether you received such a message?

Admiral NOYES. With the exception that I have a partial recollection of receiving a message with a Russian slant, which caused a dispute and that would fit in with a winds [12750] message, except for some parts of Captain Safford's testimony. I testified to that this morning, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the difficulty that I have with this testimony of yours is that Colonel Sadtler, who has apparently told the same story all through all these hearings, comes before this committee and says that he received a telephone message from you on the 5th, in which you told him that the winds execute message was in.

Now, he testified meticulously that he talked to Colonel Bratton; that Colonel Bratton took a piece of paper out of his pocket with some words on it, looked at them and said to Colonel Sadtler, "What were the words on this?" And Sadtler did not get them. They then talked to General Miles and General Miles told him to call you on



the telephone and ascertain the exact words on the message and Colonel Sadtler says he did call you on the telephone and that you told him that you were busy, that you were just going to a meeting and did not have time to talk to him.

Now, your testimony is, if I understand it, that your mind is a blank as to all of that; you have no recollection of anything of that kind taking place. Is that right?

Admiral NOYES. I testified that I had talked to Colonel Sadtler numerous times during that week. I have no recollection of a conversation such as he describes. I believe from [12751] listening to his testimony yesterday that he said it was a message, regarding only severance of relations with the British that he referred to.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, my dear sir, Colonel Sadtler never saw the message. The only thing that Colonel Sadtler knows about it is what you told him and he told us that you told him that over the telephone.

Admiral NOYES. He said in his testimony yesterday I told him there was a message in that looked like severance of relations with the British.

Mr. KEEFE. Exactly; that is what Colonel Sadtler said that you told him over the phone.

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And when he reported that to Colonel Bratton, Colonel Bratton wanted him to tell him what was the Japanese word upon it and Sadtler could not tell Bratton that and General Miles directed him to call you back and get the exact words that were in the message and you said you were busy and going to attend a meeting.

Now, you wouldn't think Colonel Sadtler could possibly be mistaken and make up a story that was not absolutely true in that respect, do you?

Admiral NOYES. I should be very sorry to think that any of these witnesses were intentionally mistaken, sir.

[12752] Mr. KEEFE. Well, do you think that took place exactly as Colonel Sadtler stated?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then do you deny that it did take place?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir. I deny that it took place exactly as he said.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then you tell us what did take place?

Admiral NOYES. I do not know, sir. I would not have said that the message is in just the way I have been quoted. I might very well have called him and told him that we had a questionable message that we were considering and that is the most that I would have done, or that could have resulted in the train of circumstances that occurred.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, that is an argument. That is not a statement of facts, Admiral.

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect that I made any such remarks over the telephone as Colonel Sadtler states that I made.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you do not want to testify under oath that you did not, do you?

Admiral NOYES. I do not, sir. I stated that I hadn't a recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the nature of your story is you do not remember what was said?

[12753] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or you don't remember that there was even a telephone conversation?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, why then build up something and argue and say that if I had a telephone conversation I may have said so and so when your recollection is a perfect blank and you don't know whether you telephoned him at all or not, and you certainly don't remember what you did say if you did telephone. Now, that is a fair assumption, isn't it?

Admiral NOYES. You are right, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Then let us get down to some facts. Now, did you talk to anyone else about this winds code execute that you do remember about?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of specific conversations with anyone else in regard to false executes on the wind message.

Mr. KEEFE. I did not ask you for your recollection as to specific conversations. I asked you the simple question did you talk to anyone else? We will go to the question as to what the conversation was in a minute.

Admiral NOYES. I do not recollect, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark?

[12754] Admiral NOYES. In regard to the execute you mean?

Mr. KEEFE. In regard to this message that had been brought to your office.

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of discussing it with him personally. You mean in regard to the set-up, I assume, and not the execution?

Mr. KEEFE. I am talking about the execute message.

Admiral NOYES. The execution I did not ever discuss with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to ask you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers before the naval court of inquiry? Question No. 141.

In my previous examination I asked you—

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask whether there is a chance to finish with the admiral today?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; in just a few minutes I can get through.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go ahead then.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

In my previous examination I asked you, at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution on the winds message in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form? I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just testi- [12755] fied that you did receive some information. From where did this information come?

A. I beg your pardon. I said to the best of my recollection there was a false alarm about it.

Q. But that was information about the winds message, was it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from that subject, did it?

A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.

Q. Then you did hear from some source about the execution of the winds message, is that right?

A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the so-called winds message was finally received.

Q. Did you ever discuss this winds message—and they are referring to the winds execute message, the one you have just been talking about—did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were strained.

[12756] Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Did you give him any information?

A. He got a copy of it.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers? You can answer that “yes” or “no” if you remember.

Admiral NOYES. I don’t think the record is correct, but I have no objection to accepting those. It does not sound—it sounds as if something is misplaced in the record to me. I never had a chance to go over my testimony, but I see nothing that is contrary to what might have been said, with the exception of—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I haven’t time—

Senator BREWSTER. What exception?

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness finish.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought he had finished.

The CHAIRMAN. He started to say, “With the exception of” something.

Admiral NOYES. I noticed in reading this over that it looks as if the question did not belong with the—the answer did not belong with the question, but I don’t know that it makes any particular difference so far as the facts go.

[12757] Mr. KEEFE. I will read it to you again.

Admiral NOYES. I am perfectly willing to accept the facts as stated, having in mind what you just read.

Mr. KEEFE. Question 145:

I asked you whether you discussed it?

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Did you give him any information?

A. He got a copy of it.

That is perfectly clear and logical, isn’t it, and follows in sequence, doesn’t it?

Admiral NOYES. All right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you made those answers, didn’t you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was that answer true that the Chief of Naval Operations did get a copy of this message?

Admiral NOYES. He got a copy of the message setting up the winds code; that is what I said. I don’t think it is correctly written up from the notes. He did not get a copy of the execute. They said they wanted to know if he had any information on the set-up or the execute, as I followed you in your reading, and he did get a copy—

Mr. KEEFE. Evidently you did not follow me in the reading [12758] because I will read it to you again and demonstrate to

you that your interpretation could not possibly be a fact. This is what I said:

Did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

Without going back, the previous questions were referring to the winds execute message, and then the question is:

Did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember at that time we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated.

Now, get this:

The message only said that relations were strained.

There wasn't anything in the original code that talked about the relations being strained, was there? That was what was alleged to have been in the winds execute message.

Admiral NOYES. Oh, I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral NOYES. The winds execute message contained nothing but a weather report, an apparent weather report. The description as to what it meant finally you will find on page 154.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; I am very familiar with it. I have got [12759] it right in front of me.

Admiral NOYES. That is the only place where any words in regard to severing diplomatic relations occurs. When the execute came it was merely to have the words in Japanese, "East wind, rain; north wind, cloudy; or west wind, clear." That was all the Japanese would mean.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I understand your present statement to be that you did not discuss this winds code execute message with the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral NOYES. I did not discuss an execute message with the Chief of Naval Operations; that is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss it with anyone else, the message which was delivered to you either by Captain Safford or one of his assistants?

Admiral NOYES. I think I very probably did.

Mr. KEEFE. With whom did you discuss it?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll would have been the most probable ones, outside of my own division.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not dealing in probabilities. I cannot arrive at a decision in this matter based upon probability. Did you talk to Admiral Wilkinson or didn't you?

Admiral NOYES. I have no recollection of a conversation in regard to any specific false execute message with any [12760] individuals.

Mr. KEEFE. Where are the cards now that were made out by Captain Kramer?

Admiral NOYES. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have one of them in your office?

Admiral NOYES. I had one in my possession; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Where is it now?

Admiral NOYES. I do not know, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you made any search among any of those other people who had those cards to determine what has become of them?

Admiral NOYES. I have not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you had one of these cards in your possession?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall what was stated on the card?

Admiral NOYES. "East wind, rain—U. S.; north wind, cloudy—USSR; west wind, clear—British."

Expressions to that effect. I wouldn't be sure of the exact way of expressing it but to that sense.

Mr. KEEFE. Were the Japanese words on there?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir. The Japanese words would have been of no value because nobody could—the code was intended purely for telephoning to people at their home and [12761] the idea was that over the telephone there would merely be said that a weather report had been received "East wind, rain" which to the recipient of this card would remind him which country was involved.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to get this one thing straight, Admiral. You had this pick-up station or intercept station over here at Cheltenham?

Admiral NOYES. Cheltenham was the receiving station for the Navy Department. It was not a pick-up station. It was the main traffic station of the Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the testimony here up to date is quite undisputed, it seems to me, that a message was taken off the teletype. We haven't heard yet from the lieutenant who took it off, Lieutenant Murray. Some of them were identified by Lieutenant Murray. Now, if a message came over the teletype, that message would have to be written down at the station that received it; isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir. It had to be typed at the station.

Mr. KEEFE. It had to be typed at the station that received it; isn't that right?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And typing it at the station sends it over the teletype here to the Navy Department where it is teletyped on the teletype machine?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the way it is received?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

[12762] Mr. KEEFE. Now the only way you could identify the winds execute message was by finding the words that were set up in the original code set-up, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So when the testimony is, as testified by Captain Safford before the Naval Court of Inquiry, that the watch officer saw the identification words on this teletype and tore off this page, the Japanese word must have been there to identify it, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Without that nobody would have even thought of it being a winds execute, isn't that true?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the Japanese word that was there would indicate with whom relations were strained or broken off?

Admiral NOYES. It may, after the other requirements of the code were met.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, I understand that. Now you found a message taken off the teletype which Kramer—with all the other inconsistencies in his testimony, but I think he was clear finally before this committee that he then believed that that was an original, authentic winds code execute message, and Safford believed it to be such, two of the high men handling that sort of traffic in this division, and [12763] that message found its way into your office and from there on the matter becomes blank. Now with all this refreshing of your mind you are still unable to tell us what became of the message that was actually delivered to you from Captain Safford? I do not care whether it was on the 4th or the 5th. That is immaterial. Dates do not make any difference.

Admiral NOYES. It is quite material to me, sir. When you ask me to identify a specific piece of paper and to line it up with the testimony of three different people, it puts me in a very difficult position.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Noyes, I am not asking you to do any such thing. Here is a message that the testimony is clear and convincing on that both the Army and Navy had gone to great lengths to receive it, and the evidence is clear on that score, and you have gone to the extent of setting up an absolutely clear system that would apply only to this one message when it came in, so that this message could be identified out of all the other messages, it was the only one that was to be handled and brought directly to your office and the only one for which these cards were made out.

Now that takes it completely out of the ordinary traffic, doesn't it?

Admiral NOYES. It was out of the ordinary traffic; there is no question of that, sir.

[12764] Mr. KEEFE. Still you do not remember this message, or anything about it?

Admiral NOYES. You ask me to bring together a 200-word message, which is a message that long [indicating], at least, on the 4th, which Safford testified to, a small strip of paper on the 5th, which Kramer testified to, and a different message on the 5th, about an entirely different set-up, where the British and Russia were both brought in, and they are not the same thing.

I am not able to identify the disposition of any one of those three supposed messages.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would think, Admiral, there might be some justification for this last statement of yours were it not for the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that you actually telephoned him. He did not telephone you; you telephoned him and told him the message was in, clearly demonstrating the extreme interest that was applied to this one particular message, and you do not deny that you telephoned that to Colonel Sadtler. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I want to ask you a question or two.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood in regard to this telephone message that your testimony here before us is to the effect [12765] you may have telephoned him but you do not recall.

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. If you did telephone him.

Admiral NOYES. That is correct. I telephoned many times a day. We had a secret telephone between my office and the office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army for the purpose of discussing these matters.

The CHAIRMAN. You were all down there in offices that were closely associated, weren't you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In and out all during the day?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not, any of you, quarantined against the other so you were afraid to go back and forth, and you did go back and forth and held many conversations about things that were then of interest to your Department and to the Navy and the Government with respect to this Japanese situation, is that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Now about these cards that we have been talking about here. As I understand it, whether you initiated that or whether Kramer or Safford initiated it, it was a matter of convenience, so you could distribute those cards—which were identical, as I understand it.

[12766] Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir; they were identical.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). To four or five people.

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So if they happened to be at home at night and what you were looking for, that is the execute message came in, you could call these people and say, "The weather report is here." Nobody could understand that except the two people at each end of the telephone, is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The general public would not understand it?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They would not know what you were talking about. They would not know you were talking about a Japanese secret code message, would they?

Admiral NOYES. That was the purpose of the cards.

The CHAIRMAN. You would call up and say, "The weather report is in", and the other man would say, "Well, what is it?" You would say, "It is East Wind Rain", and he knew what that meant. You did not have to go into details, or to give a blueprint. That card was for that purpose, is that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So it does not make a lot of difference [12767] who initiated it, or who actually wrote that out, if there was such a card system and it was distributed to these four or five top-notchers who were entitled to this secret information.

Admiral NOYES. I might say the original question which I was asked before the Navy court of inquiry indicated they were cards for use in the office, and having been away for a year in the Pacific, away from Washington, I did not recall them in that sense.

The CHAIRMAN. The first impression I got in reference to these cards was that they were cards that were distributed among the high officers in the offices and kept there. I evidently was mistaken. They were supposed to take them home with them?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They could keep them in the office if anybody called them there, and they would understand the meaning?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This teletype business, you had both white and yellow teletype paper, didn't you, or pink and yellow?

Admiral NOYES. I could not say, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have more than one color?

[12768] Admiral NOYES. I do not know, sir. I thought the general run of teletype rolls was yellow.

The CHAIRMAN. A lot of it is white. I have seen white teletype paper, although I do not know what the Navy uses.

Admiral NOYES. I think we would use white, if we did not have yellow. In other words, I do not know of any color code distinction in a teletype message.

The CHAIRMAN. If you were using both yellow and pink, or white and pink, or any other color, would you be able now to identify which color any particular message was in that was handed to you?

Admiral NOYES. The only way I could identify a message now, unless it recalls something to my memory, would be my initials on the message.

The CHAIRMAN. Now about the execute message which has been referred to here. When you referred to the message shown to you on either the 4th or 5th you were talking about the message that you call the false execute message?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now in the code set-up, the weather set-up, the Japanese from Tokyo sent a message to their Ambassador here that in the event of a breaking off of relations or interfering with communications, if they heard a weather report containing these words this is what [12769] it meant: "East Wind Rain: Trouble with the United States," or a break in relations?

Admiral NOYES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. "North Wind Cloudy: With Russian; West Wind Clear: With England."

Admiral NOYES. It would indicate on account of the probable severance of relations with the country indicated, upon receipt of the message codes and papers were to be destroyed.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if other means of communication became impossible and they heard a weather broadcast of that sort and heard these words they would know what they meant?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir. I believe the reason the Japanese sent the British message on the 7th was that some one of their stations had not checked in with the word "Haruna," indicating that the papers had been destroyed, and they may have found out, or have suspected that they never had gotten the message, and they sent that out to try to get that set destroyed.

The CHAIRMAN. Now prior to the 7th the conditions under which this weather report were to be broadcast had not taken place, that is, there had been no break in diplomatic relations nor communications, had there?

[12770] Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the message that was received here on the 7th, is that a message that you regarded and interpreted as a true execute message, according to the weather set-up?



Admiral NOYES. The one in the FCC?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the one that you referred to earlier as having gotten here on the 7th. I think it is on the last page of the exhibit.

Admiral NOYES. Page 3 (d) of Exhibit 142?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. It says in English, and this is in the middle of the news:

but today especially at this point I will give the weather broadcast West Wind Clear, West Wind Clear—

twice.

The CHAIRMAN. That meant there was no trouble with Russia?

Admiral NOYES. That meant diplomatic relations severed with England.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course neither of those signals or symbols were to be interpreted as meaning war, necessarily.

Admiral NOYES. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It meant there might be severance of diplomatic relations between the respective countries. Well, [12771] now, if that was to be regarded as an execute message based upon the weather signals that had been previously given to the Japanese diplomatic representatives, would there have been any need or any occasion for sending an execute message either on the 4th or 5th, and if they sent one on the 4th or 5th would they necessarily have repeated it on the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. I should think it is very unlikely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So if the message that was received here was really an execute message and was so intended to be regarded by the Japanese to their representatives, would there have been any need to send another one on the 7th?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, except I think this one on the 7th was just intended to clean up some things in some British point.

The CHAIRMAN. That related to the British?

Admiral NOYES. They had not got an answer back from some British station and they were afraid they were going to lose their codes at that place, or for some reason the British had held them up.

The CHAIRMAN. Now with reference to Admiral Phillips, he was an acquaintance of yours?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir, I did not know him personally. I knew who he was.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether he came there [12772] specifically to see you that Sunday morning, or just came to see somebody?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Phillips was at an Asiatic station, I think sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the man who came in to see you on Sunday morning, the 7th.

Admiral NOYES. I think that was Admiral Little, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was referred to here as Phillips.

Admiral NOYES. I beg your pardon, sir. He was talking about Manila.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the man who came into your office on Sunday morning and wanted you to make an appointment with Secretary Hull.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Admiral NOYES. I think it was Admiral Little. I do not know whether Admiral Phillips was in Washington at that time or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anything unusual about that?

Admiral NOYES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say he gave you some information that he had from British sources and then you gave him some idea about this fleet going down through the South China Sea.

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

[12773] The CHAIRMAN. Then you called up to see if you could make an appointment with Secretary Hull, and you talked to one of his subordinates.

Admiral NOYES. Normally a foreigner is supposed to go through the Office of Naval Intelligence, and he wanted to cut a corner and asked me if I would be willing to call the Secretary of State's office. I knew one of the Secretary of State's people and I just called him up.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this man an acquaintance of yours?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So he knew you and you knew him?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It being Sunday and most of the officers probably not being there, he chose you as a sort of agent through whom he could seek an appointment with the Secretary of State?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You performed that function and he left?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

[12774] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you stated that you had a conversation with Captain Safford, I believe, about 4 months ago.

Admiral NOYES. During the summer. I could not give you the exact month, sir.

[12775] The VICE CHAIRMAN. During this last summer?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was the description that Captain Safford gave you about the winds message at that time?

Admiral NOYES. To the best of my recollection, Captain Safford said—he said that he still thought there had been an execute of the winds message. I said, well, I don't think so. Why can't you show me something, if it is true; some record that we can get together on. I said, when did it come in. He said that it came in at Winter Harbor, I think, and they have destroyed their records. I didn't want to put any pressure on Captain Safford to change his opinion.

I just told him that I had no recollection of it, and that he would have to show me something to indicate that there was an authentic execute.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to state that the description that Captain Safford gave here in his prepared statement of a winds

execute message was different from the description that he gave you last summer; is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. It is correct in that he didn't give me any description like that.

[12776] He said, in the first place, that it came in at Winter Harbor, he thought, and he didn't tell me anything about this business about the Russian slant, the negative Russian business. That wasn't mentioned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When he talked to you that summer, he said the message came in at Winter Harbor, Maine?

Admiral NOYES. Yes. I don't think he was positive.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When he testified here, I think he said it came in over the Cheltenham station, didn't he?

Admiral NOYES. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is, two different places?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now then, whatever description he gave you last summer about a winds execute message, your impression of that is that it was different from the description he gave here. Is that correct?

Admiral NOYES. Specifically to the extent of the station and in the fact he did not mention any—he mentioned very little—of what was contained in his present statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he told you that he was going to prepare a statement, and would show it to you?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he never did do that?

[12777] Admiral NOYES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral NOYES. But he stated that he didn't think it was proper after this inquiry was ordered by Congress; that was his reason, and I agreed with him on that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I would like to ask you this question: You were present during the appearance of Admiral Ingersoll here?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Before this committee?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You heard his testimony about the so-called winds execute message?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In which he said, in substance, that he thought it had been magnified beyond all reasonable proportion of importance?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you agree in that statement?

Admiral NOYES. I do, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is your opinion then that if such a message had been received as Captain Safford contends, it would have been of very little importance in the light of [12778] other information you had?

Admiral NOYES. I should have recommended no action whatever in regard to such a message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Even if a correct winds execute message, just as Captain Safford contends, had been received on either the 4th or

the 5th of December and brought to you, you would not have recommended that any action be taken on it?

Admiral NOYES. I would not have recommended that any action be taken, Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Because you didn't consider it of any importance then?

Admiral NOYES. We had already informed our people in the field everything that the message would have told.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I overlooked one question.

In regard to these cards, in your former testimony, I believe, before the naval inquiry, you either said that you did not know about the cards, or didn't remember them?

Admiral NOYES. I said I didn't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. After you came back here, you testified, I believe, on the Pacific coast, after having been in the Pacific since 1942, you testified from memory and after you [12779] got back to Washington, you talked it over with Captain Safford, and you concluded that he was correct, and that you were mistaken in the first instance, and that there was a system of cards, is that true?

Admiral NOYES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, on the 6-7 of December, were you in civilian clothes?

Admiral NOYES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Admiral Hart in civilian clothes?

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Hart?

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark.

Admiral NOYES. Admiral Stark?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral NOYES. I said right away, "yes." I may be wrong. I didn't think we put on uniforms until after the attack at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. You were all in civilian clothes?

Admiral NOYES. All the same way.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll. Now, Admiral Little, was he in civilian clothes or in British uniform?

[12780] Admiral NOYES. Well, I think if we were, he was. I think the attaché people in foreign stations wear the same rig we do.

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as Britain was at war, he might well have been in uniform, and our naval officers in civilian clothes?

Admiral NOYES. That is true. Yes, you are probably correct, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, thank you very much for your presence here. You are excused.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 p. m., February 16, 1946, the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., on Monday morning, February 18, 1946.)

[12781]

## PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[12782] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel desire to call his next witness? Who does counsel desire to call as his next witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The first thing I wish to call the committee's attention to, Mr. Chairman, is a letter I have just received from Mr. Farrington, the Representative from Hawaii, in which he states:

I have received from Fred Ohrt, manager and chief engineer of the Board of Water Supply of Honolulu the accompanying map and memorandum showing the bombs which dropped in the city of Honolulu on December 7, 1941.

I am calling this to your attention to ascertain whether or not you care to incorporate this information in the record of the Pearl Harbor proceedings I will, of course, be happy to have you do so if it is your wish, but in the event you feel it is not pertinent to this inquiry I trust you will return it to me for my records.

He accompanies it with a statement with reference to the bomb damage done in Oahu at the time of the attack, together with a map of the area, showing on that map the points of bomb damage and content. I present it in respect to the Delegate for the committee to determine whether it thinks that matter would be of any importance in our record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I at the moment, not having [12783] heard of it before, I rather doubt whether that would have any particular place here. I would assume from what you say that it might be a question of damages sustained there that they might want some future consideration on, but that would not have anything to do with this inquiry.

Senator BREWSTER. I think perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that it would have a bearing, of course, on the nature of the attack which we have, of course, gone into in some detail as to the attack on the ships and

the fields. I have never realized, as that indicated, that so many bombs hit on the city. I don't think anyone we have had before us has indicated it and I think it would be very valuable for historical purposes to have it in the record if it is not too extended.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The statement which is attached to it, Mr. Chairman, is not controversial in any way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I did not assume there was any controversy about it, Mr. Richardson. It was just a question whether the committee feels that that type of material ought to be included in this inquiry, in this record.

Senator BREWSTER. The bearing that it has is on the hazards which the Navy and other installations present. I had not realized that the bombs were scattered around that way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, I know Mr. Farrington very pleasantly and any requests that he might present would certainly be worthy of the utmost consideration. I did not [12784] get the impression from what he said that he was insistent on it one way or the other.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, no. I am presenting it only because Mr. Farrington asked me to present it to the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did he specially emphasize that he thought it ought to be in the record here?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. He said:

I am calling this to your attention to ascertain whether or not you care to incorporate this information in the record of the Pearl Harbor proceedings.

Senator FERGUSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it ought to be made part of the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it would be a good idea.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, without objection then it will be included in the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, may it be given an exhibit number?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, it will be given the proper exhibit number and received as an exhibit.

(The document above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 152.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything further from counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now I would like to ask you to call Admiral, Mr., Senator Hart, whichever is correct.

[12785] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, Senator, Mr. Hart, please come forward.

# **TESTIMONY OF SENATOR THOMAS CHARLES HART, FORMERLY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ASIATIC FLEET, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, will you state your full name for the reporter?

Senator HART. Thomas Charles Hart.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are now one of the Senators from the State of Connecticut?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did you serve in the Navy?

Senator HART. Nearly 52 years.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what was your rank and assignment at the time you were retired?

Senator HART. I was a full admiral on the active list, was switched over to the retired list on the 1st of July 1942, but continued on active duty until the day before I came to the Senate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During what period were you the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet?

Senator HART. From the latter part of July 1939 until the date of my transfer to the retired list; that was 3 years afterward.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are the same Admiral Hart who conducted an examination of witnesses under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, commencing in February 1944?

Senator HART. Yes, I am that man but I do not know that the word "examination" is quite correct. I was really recording testimony for the purposes of preservation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in your work in that connection witnesses did appear before you?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were sworn and their sworn testimony taken down and recorded?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And among those witnesses, Admiral, was Captain Safford?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, in Captain Safford's testimony which appears at page 10428, under examination by Senator Brewster, the following record was made which I will read to you:

Senator BREWSTER. Captain, I want to speak about this Hart incident, which has come to my attention, and in that connection will read the testimony which you gave before the Army Board at pages 172, 173, and 174:

"Captain SAFFORD. There is a possibility that [12787] the original distribution copy of that message is in existence in the Navy Department in the hands or in the safe of some high official, probably the Vice Chief of Naval Operations if it is in existence, possibly the Secretary of the Navy. Admiral Hart made a statement to me which implied that he had sighted it and that I was not justified in the statement that all copies of the 'winds' message had been destroyed.

"Major CLAUSEN. In connection with the answer that you just gave to General Russell you stated that Admiral Hart informed you he had cited a distribution list. Do you recall that?

"Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. That he had sighted the actual "winds" message.

"Major CLAUSEN. That he had cited the message in a written report that he rendered?

"Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. He said to me, 'I have just come from the front office, and I have seen your "winds" message. Now, don't make statements that you can't verify.' This is of the time I came in to verify my testimony, so I withdrew from my testimony any statement to the effect relative then to other copies having been destroyed, because I didn't know where I stood then."

[12788] That is the end of the quotation of the testimony.

Now, do you recall the statement of Admiral Hart to you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That is substantially correct, as you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. It is substantially correct.

Senator BREWSTER. And that was at the time you were going to verify your testimony before Admiral Hart when he cautioned you to be careful about any

statement that the winds message had been destroyed because you understood him to say he had seen a copy just before that?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, immediately before that.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

Now, Admiral, do you recall having a conversation with Captain Safford that has any relation to the incident detailed in that testimony?

Senator HART. Yes.

[12789] Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you tell the committee all you know about the incident?

Senator HART. In every case witnesses were allowed to verify testimony as a check on the correctness of the recording. Due to the lapse of time between the events that they were testifying to, and the dates that they were testifying, I was in the habit of allowing considerable latitude in that verification, and instructed them that I would before they began.

It is a very severe tax on memory at best, and my object was to get the most accurate testimony I could obtain.

Therefore all witness were told that after thinking over what they had given, if they noted errors of commission or omission that were of moment, and talked to me about it when they returned their testimony, I would make my decision as to what alterations could be made.

Captain Safford came in as a part of the process. I found that he had made very extensive alterations, not so much in the way of changes in what he did state, but in additions to it.

Now, as I recall, I pointed out quite a number of places where he was not stating simply what he knew, but what he had been told, and in certain places where he was, as of that date, making deductions and drawing conclusions.

[12790] May I have the testimony?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You mean your own record, or the testimony I just read?

Senator HART. No; my record.

(The document was handed to Senator Hart.)

Senator HART. Captain Safford had very extensively expanded his answer to my question No. 18 that contained certain deductions and certain analyses on his part, which my conversation with him brought out were not made at the time, but were made subsequently.

I think in the end I permitted him to leave his amended answer about as he had brought it in in this case, although I did think that he was taking considerably more latitude than the situation justified.

Now, as I recall, in response to my invitation, or instruction, which was usual under Navy customs, to add additional facts which he might remember subsequent to his testimony and which would seem to be particularly pertinent. Captain Safford wrote a long reply, and I told him that so much of that reply was not a matter of stating facts, but was deductions on his part, and somewhat hearsay, that I did not think it was a correct answer and that it would be necessary for him to revise it in the other direction.

Now, it was in connection with that that Captain Safford's [12791] testimony before the Army Court which you have just read, must have been given.

To the best of my recollection he stated as a fact that one or all of the dispatches referring to the winds message had been removed from the files.



I pointed out that that was a very serious thing to say and that he ought not to say it unless he knew it to be a fact.

[12792] I think I told him that in my entire naval career I had never known of any one instance where files had been falsified, and that he needed to be very sure before he made such a statement as that.

I think I prefaced what I said about having seen something myself with the statement to him that when I first began this job of taking testimony, while I was planning the work, I spent some time in looking through the Navy's files to see how the pertinent material was stored—and incidentally, decided that I would simplify my own task by not doing other than referring to pertinent documents.

So I told Captain Safford that I thought that I myself had sighted something in the files about the winds message, and the conversation on that point stopped right there.

Now to complete the story, that same thing turned up during the Navy's Court of Inquiry on the subject and what had always seemed to me to be a matter of very little importance, as I still regard the entire winds code affair, was a point of issue in some respects, so I returned to that office to reconstruct what it was that I had seen, and found that I had not seen the file at all, because that particular file was not at that time even stored in the Navy Department Building. What I had seen was a compilation, rather a history, gotten out by some entirely nontechnical officer, [12793] to somewhat indicate to a layman's point of view what the work of that unit had been. I ran over that rather hastily, and there was some reference to the winds code in it, and that was what I had seen.<sup>1</sup>

Now I did not, and I could not have made the definite statement to Captain Safford that I had seen in the official files any of those messages, because I had not examined the files at the time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Does that complete your statement, Admiral? Senator HART. Well, that is all I have now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions of the Admiral. I called him on this one point of Senator Brewster's testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. Just a minute.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean Senator Brewster's investigation.

Senator BREWSTER. You mean inquiry.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Inquiry. I do not believe I have any questions at this time of the Admiral.

Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No, I have no questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark is next. He not being here, Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Hart, or Senator Hart, as I [12794] understood you to say in your statement to the committee, in the beginning this was more or less of a procedure for the purpose of preservation of testimony. Am I correct in that, or was it an actual investigation, or do you make a distinction between the two?

Senator HART. As you state, Senator, it was a matter of recording testimony. My precept read:

Certain members of the Naval forces who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matters are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments at great distances from the United States, and it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain

<sup>1</sup> See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5477, for a letter from the Navy Department in this connection.

members of the Naval forces, that their testimony pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack be recorded and preserved.

[12795] That was the gist of my instruction.

Senator LUCAS. Is that all of the original directive that you had?

Senator HART. No.

Senator LUCAS. I think perhaps at this point it probably all should go into the record.

Senator HART. That is not all. The rest of it contains various preliminary "whereas's" and instructions about what would be available to me.

Senator LUCAS. All right. I will withdraw that last request.

Now, Senator Hart, with whom did you have a conversation before you started to gather this testimony in connection with the disaster at Pearl Harbor?

Senator HART. Will you repeat the first part of that question?

Senator LUCAS. With whom did you confer before you started the gathering of this testimony in relation to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Senator HART. No one, except the Navy Judge Advocate General. That had all to do with ways and means. No instructions about how I should do it from him.

Senator LUCAS. Now, an I understood your direct statement to the committee, after you interrogated a witness [12796] you would permit that witness to review his testimony before it was actually recorded, in order to give him an opportunity to correct any statements that he might have made, or also you might give him the opportunity to add to anything that he had said previous to that time.

Senator HART. Yes, within the limitations which I stated in my answer to the counsel.

Senator LUCAS. I understand, and this examination of witnesses took place at what time? What year?

Senator HART. The date of the precept was February 12, 1944, and the date of my submitting it to the Secretary as completed was approximately June 30. The date of the last testimony taken was June 15, 1944.

Senator LUCAS. And all the witnesses whom you examined at that time were members of the Navy, or members of the armed forces of this country?

Senator HART. They were all Navy.

Senator LUCAS. They were all engaged at that time in the prosecution of the war?

Senator HART. There may be an exception or two, but in general that is correct.

Senator LUCAS. You stated to the committee that it was a rather severe memory test of these men whom you examined in 1944, as to what actually happened at Pearl Harbor [12797] in early December 1941.

Senator HART. I considered it so at the time, and I still do.

Senator LUCAS. What was true of the witnesses whom you examined would be true of all the witnesses who were examined in 1944, whether it was this inquiry or any other inquiry, I take it.

As far as their memory is concerned, as far as the memory test is concerned, it would be difficult for any witness—if you found that to be true in the course of your inquiry, it would also be true in the

naval court of inquiry and it would be very difficult for any witness to remember exactly what transpired in those hectic days around December 1941, isn't that true?

Senator HART. I do not wish to agree or disagree with you, Senator. You know that as well as I do.

[12798] Senator LUCAS. Now, you stated to the committee that Captain Safford made extensive alterations in his testimony.

Will you explain to the committee just a little more in detail what you mean by that?

Senator HART. I don't think I am able to go into great detail. My statement was that his changes were largely additions rather than corrections.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in the first statement that he made to you, do you recall whether he went extensively into the winds message?

Senator HART. I don't recall, but I have an impression that there was nothing about it in his original testimony. I certainly didn't ask him anything about it.

Senator LUCAS. It is your recollection now, that in the original testimony submitted to you, he said nothing to you about the winds message at all?

Senator HART. That is my recollection, but I am most uncertain on the point. He might have.

Senator LUCAS. I think it is rather important to ascertain whether Captain Safford did say anything to you in his original testimony about this winds message.

Counsel has suggested that this is the only compilation of testimony and that maybe you do not have any memorandum of what he first originally submitted to you.

[12799] Mr. RICHARDSON. Senator Hart, would you be able to tell from your official record there what was or what was not in the original reporter's statement of the testimony prior to his amendment or addition to it?

Admiral HART. No. That original, I am quite sure, was destroyed.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand you, Senator, it is your best recollection now that in the first memorandum submitted to you by Captain Safford, there was nothing in it about the winds message?

Senator HART. By "memorandum" do you mean his first testimony?

Senator LUCAS. That is correct, sir.

Senator HART. That is what I said.

Senator LUCAS. Later on, when he made additional statements, when Captain Safford gave you additional testimony, then is when the winds message was discussed between you and Captain Safford?

Senator HART. That isn't what I said, Senator.

I didn't say that he was giving additional testimony. I said that in the process of the verification of his testimony, he was allowed to correct errors of omission and commission.

Senator LUCAS. I stand corrected on that, sir.

[12800] Now, as I understand it, you took some exceptions to Captain Safford's lengthy statement, because it included a lot of hearsay testimony, and he drew his own conclusions and deductions about a number of things.

Senator HART. I think I said "a certain amount." I didn't say "a lot."

Senator LUCAS. I said a number of things, or a certain amount. Whatever you said. Anyhow, he did have certain deductions and conclusions to which you took some exception?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in the conversation that you had with him about the winds message, as I recall, you stated that you told him that you thought you had probably seen some sort of a winds message when you made an examination of the files?

Senator HART. Well, I suggest that you have the recorder read what I said.

Senator LUCAS. I don't want to misquote you. I am just trying to get exact information on that question.

Senator HART. I tried to give you a correct statement of the situation.

Senator LUCAS. I think you did.

Senator HART. I would rather rest on that rather than have you interpret what I did say.

[12801] Senator LUCAS. I am not trying to interpret what you said, Senator. I am trying to get additional light on this winds message because of its tremendous importance.

The newspapers of the country have told the people that you saw a message and that because of the conversation that you had with Captain Safford as brought out here in the examination by Senator Brewster the other day.

Senator HART. You say it is of tremendous importance. I think I said in my testimony that I considered it of very little importance.

Senator LUCAS. I agree, Senator, but certain people have made much ado about this so-called execute message.

In the opinion of the Senator from Illinois, and I think you agree, there isn't very much to it, but certain people on this committee, and certain newspapers of the country have made much to-do about this winds message.

Senator HART. All right, Senator, I will try to go along with it.

Senator LUCAS. That is the reason the Senator from Illinois is interrogating you further on it.

In the final analysis, when you went back to the Navy Department, and you examined the files again to refresh your memory to see whether or not there was a so-called execute winds message, you found none?

[12802] Senator HART. I didn't look at the files. I simply returned, as I stated in my testimony, in order to see what it was that I had seen which caused me to carry on that conversation with Captain Safford.

I did not say that I had gone back and examined the files.

Senator LUCAS. You went back to examine the original file where you thought, at least you had discovered a so-called winds message of some kind?

Senator HART. Well, it wasn't a file, I didn't say it was a file.

Senator LUCAS. Whatever it was. You went back to see whether or not your memory was correct?

Senator HART. Right.

[12803] Senator LUCAS. And when you got there you found that it was not what you thought it was?

Senator HART. I found that I had not seen the official file.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I am talking about a winds message. As I understand it, at least Captain Safford indicated in his testimony you had said, Senator, or he thought you said, at least, that you saw a winds message of some kind; later on you went back to look at the place where you thought you had seen the so-called winds message, or whatever it was, and you discovered that it was, as I recall your testimony, a history that had been compiled by a nontechnical officer of some kind?

Senator HART. That is what I said.

Senator LUCAS. And it didn't have any relation at all to the winds execute message or the original so-called pilot winds message?

Senator HART. That is what I said.

Senator LUCAS. Did it have?

Senator HART. Did it have what?

Senator LUCAS. Did what you saw when you returned, what was in this nontechnical officer's file, did it have any relation to the so-called winds message and the winds execute message?

[12804] Senator HART. I didn't differentiate between the two parts at all. I simply saw that there was something about the winds code subject and I think that at the time, I am fairly sure that at the time, I didn't go any further than simply to note that there was something about it in there.

Senator LUCAS. You say there was something about it in there?

Senator HART. That is what I said.

Senator LUCAS. What was there about it?

Senator HART. I don't remember. I don't remember any more than I have already told you.

Senator LUCAS. All right. I think that is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy would be next. Senator Brewster would be next. Mr. Gearhart, of California.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hart, as I understand it, the purpose of your inquiry was to perpetuate the testimony. Had you been given the names of witnesses that you were to interview?

Senator HART. The purpose was to record and not to inquire. I was not given any names or any instructions whatever as to whom to include or exclude. It was all left [12805] to my discretion.

Senator FERGUSON. And I suppose the subject of the inquiry had been fully discussed with the Secretary of the Navy; is that correct?

Senator HART. No. I discussed it with no one, as I stated before, except the Judge Advocate General.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that Admiral Gatch?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is this: Did it include Washington as well as what took place in Hawaii? What took place in both places?

Senator HART. That was a subject, of course, of my own judgment and interpretation. And I carried out the instructions. I think, I am sure, that my first idea was to get on paper the evidence of those

people whom we might lose, and after a few days of taking testimony of men in Washington I went out into the field, out into the Pacific, to get that testimony, and the general sequence was that I first examined those who were outside of Washington when the war began rather than those who were here.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any inquiry in the Secretary of State's office to obtain facts?

Senator HART. Certainly not. I was not authorized to.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume the same answer applies [12806] to the Executive Office, the White House?

Senator HART. Yes; and also to the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. The War Department. Did you interview Admiral Stark?

Senator HART. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Ingersoll?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time that you were in command of the Asiatic Fleet, commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, on about the 6th you sent a message to Washington. It is Exhibit 40. It says:

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

This is from CINCAF to OPNAV, which would be from you to Admiral Stark.

Do you recall the sending of that message or having it sent?

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, Senator Ferguson now throws back 2 years further, over 4 years, and during this intervening time I have had no time for any thoughts on the events of those days at all. I wish to be helpful to the committee but in order to give what I myself would consider the best testimony I need some time to throw everything out [12807] of my mind and think over those days. My memory is cold. By putting my thoughts back to those days, as would be assisted by what documents there are, I could warm my memory up. But if the committee wishes to go into my own participation in those days I would like a certain amount of time to prepare.

Now, possibly I can answer this question of Senator Ferguson's forthwith.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have quite a number along the same line. If you do want to use the documents to refresh your memory I would ask the committee to give you some time and to have you return as a later witness.

The CHAIRMAN. We might see how many of them he can answer now and determine that later. The committee would want the admiral to be given every opportunity to refresh his recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. It would take considerable time. I think we would get along faster if the admiral had some time to refresh his memory on it, not only this but a longer message that was sent and the reply that was sent back.

Senator HART. I can give a fair answer to this specific question, Mr. Chairman, but if it does go much further I think I would like to have some time, and I would [12808] also like to have with me one or two members of my staff during those days, whom I think are available and who could help me in remembering, and I might be more specific with their aid.

Now, as regards this one, the copy seems rather incomplete, but I gather from the reference number that it was on the 7th of December. On that supposition I can answer.

At about that time, the early days of December, I did receive a dispatch from Capt. John Creighton, who was stationed in Singapore subject directly to the direct orders of the Navy Department, but over whom I had a certain amount of authority, and the substance of the message was as follows: That he, Creighton, had learned from Air Marshal Brooke Popham that the latter had been advised from London that in certain eventualities, which I cannot recall, they, the British, had been assured of our armed support. I think this dispatch of mine was entirely founded upon that one from Captain Creighton. At about that same time I was in conference with the new British commander in chief, Admiral Tom Phillips, who had just arrived on the station, but I do not recall that he said anything to me whatever on that subject, but he may have.

Senator FERGUSON. The 7th would be your 6th, which was the 7th in the Philippines?

[12809] Senator HART. No. The 7th would be our 8th.

Senator FERGUSON. Eighth.

Senator HART. Yes. But, of course, this is—

Senator FERGUSON. This was sent on your 7th, which was our 6th?

Senator HART. Your 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. But this is Greenwich time and the date on the face of this, I don't think it is too reliable. In stating the date and hour I would rather see the original.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it was prior to the attack at Hawaii?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you recall what the eventualities were, that we were to give armed support?

Senator HART. I said I did not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have officers here that are familiar with that conversation so that you could refresh your memory on that?

Senator HART. I didn't say it was a conversation. I said it was a dispatch from Captain Creighton at Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know where we might locate that dispatch? Would it come later to the office here in the Navy?

[12810] Senator HART. You mean the dispatch from Captain Creighton?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Senator HART. No. My files were lost and the only source that you would have would be Captain Creighton himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised at an attack on Hawaii on Sunday?

Senator HART. You have two parts to your question, Senator. I was in no way surprised at the date. I was surprised at the attack, a part of the attack fell on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been alerted in the Philippines, had you not?

Senator HART. Well, I had alerted myself for a good many months and weeks.

[12811] Senator FERGUSON. You had access to magic in the Philippines?

Senator HART. I had a unit there which spent a certain amount of its time on the Japanese diplomatic code, if that is what you mean by "magic."

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I have in mind. And you were familiar, I assume, with the 13 parts of the message—did you receive that?

Senator HART. No; I don't recall receiving it. I may have, but I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Japanese were sending reconnaissance planes over the Philippines prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Senator HART. I don't recall having heard that that was the case.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your fleet attacked at the same time as the airports, Clark Field, in the Philippines?

Senator HART. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the attack before or after the airfields had been attacked?

Senator HART. The first attack in the Philippines occurred at daybreak on Monday morning. That would be about 2 hours after the exact hour of the beginning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. That attack was made on a small [12812] air reconnaissance unit which was stationed in the Gulf of Davao in the southeast portion of the Philippines. The attack was by air, but there was an attempted attack on the part of four Japanese destroyers which was evaded.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was your fleet located at the time of the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Senator HART. Well, it was located in its deployment positions.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that position?

Senator HART. There wasn't any one position.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have instructions or any information as to what the United States would do, as far as your fleet was concerned, or any other fleet in case of an attack upon the British and/or the Dutch, and not upon American possessions?

Senator HART. Throwing back to this dispatch which you brought in, Senator, I said, "Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

Senator FERGUSON. You sent a longer dispatch, did you not, signed by you and by Phillips—page 5125 of our record?

I will ask for the original, if it can be produced, to refresh the Senator's memory. Page 5125 of our record, up to page 5127.

I would like to have you see the record.

[12813] (The record was handed to Senator Hart.)

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I haven't seen or thought of this message since the day it was sent, and I have a very scant recollection of what is in it. I can read it, and perhaps go on, but possibly not.

The CHAIRMAN. You might read it now, and see what you think of it. If you don't feel you are qualified to answer specifically without further research, the committee will be glad to give you that time.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, this pertains to a subject in which my chief of staff, Rear Admiral Parnell, was always the negotiator on my part, except on this one particular occasion. He was present



through this entire interview with Admiral Phillips, and I think that his testimony on this, and all the rest of that series of the so-called A. D. B. agreements, if the committee wishes to go into it, would be much better than mine.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that message?

Senator FERGUSON. It is prior to the attack. It is on the 7th. Our reply was drawn up prior to the attack, but not sent out until after.

Senator HART. This dispatch which Senator Ferguson has brought up was drafted on Saturday afternoon, the attack on the Philippines beginning on Monday morning, Philippine [12814] time Monday morning, and it was the culmination of about a day and a half of conference, the British and our Navy with General MacArthur's representation part of the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, I noticed, in the second paragraph you say this:

In the early stages of a war with Japan occurring at the present time, the initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese.

Now, the bombs did not start to drop until Monday morning, and this language was used Saturday. Was that because you knew of the fleet going to the Kra Peninsula, and you knew it meant war?

Senator HART. No; we did not know that when that was drawn up that the Japanese expedition had left Camranh Bay.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn of that, that it had left Camranh Bay for the Kra Peninsula?

Senator HART. About 5 or 6 hours after this dispatch was sent.

[12815] Senator FERGUSON. How is it that you used this language then, "War with Japan occurring at the present time"?

Senator HART. I don't know; that may be paraphrased. It doesn't look like very good language, but that whole paragraph simply says what everybody knew, that we were not going to start the war and if it was started that the Japanese would start it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have such instructions about overt acts from Washington?

Senator HART. I don't know whether the word "overt" ever appeared in any of my instructions, but I certainly didn't need any instructions to keep me from starting a war.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the war-warning message personally?

Senator HART. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were alerted to war prior to that time, that was the 27th, I think you said, for months you were alerted?

Senator HART. Well, Senator, there is always a degree of alert. Yes. We were close to the enemy. The Japanese forces were in Formosa, Hainan, over in Indochina, a few hundred miles away. So naturally we were alerted in various degrees for some time before that. But the actual, there was no actual time when we said, "Well, today we don't have [12816] to worry," and "Now we do." It was a shading all the way along there and I don't think that I could give you a date as to when we were alerted. I suppose it might be made out that when the war began I was not fully alerted because I had a fuel ship or two in Manila Bay.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, would this be a fair statement, that you, because of the tenseness of the situation, you were in effect waiting for the attack which you anticipated from Japan?

Senator HART. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And when you learned that the fleet left Camranh Bay about 6 hours after you sent this message you knew then there was going to be an attack or you anticipated an attack upon the Kra Peninsula?

Senator HART. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you anticipate that attack?

Senator HART. That force might have gone up into Thailand.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So you didn't know exactly where that one was going?

Senator HART. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Admiral Phillips in Manila when that was drawn up? I notice his name is purported to be signed to it.

[12817] Senator HART. That was drawn up in conference between Admiral Phillips and me.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that a British admiral—your conference was in Manila, was it not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And how do you account for the fact, can you explain the fact, that the British admiral also sent this message to us here in Washington?

Senator HART. That was a joint message that went to the Navy Department and to the Admiralty in London.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice there is used in the fourth paragraph this language:

We are agreed that it is of great importance to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay Barrier.

What did you have in mind there; will you explain that on the record?

Senator HART. I take it that you wish me to define the Malay Barrier?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Why it was important to America to prevent any Japanese movement through there. I would like to have the record show what you had in mind on that.

Senator HART. The Malay Barrier is a name that was given to a land from Singapore through the southernmost islands [12818] of the N. E. I. to the northwest coast of Australia, say Darwin. It has passages through, the most of which are rather narrow, and from the naval strategic standpoint it is a defense land, and the best defense land that there was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it include the Malay Peninsula?

Senator HART. No. I said it came from Singapore, which is the island south of the Malay Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. So it didn't include a part where the fleet could have gone, the fleet that left Camranh Bay?

Senator HART. The fleet couldn't go across the Malay Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. That is sure. That is certain. But it didn't include that territory, did it? I am trying to analyze this message, because the fleet was not moving in this direction toward the Malay Barrier as you defined it.

Now, did you have another movement in mind?

Senator HART. I don't agree that it wasn't moving toward the Malay Barrier. Any movement that it made to the southward was toward the Malay Barrier. Any movement that it made to the southward was toward that barrier.

Senator FERGUSON. Did our airplanes make reconnaissance so that you knew from the time the fleet left about 6 hours after you had sent this message—so we kept track of where that fleet was going?

Senator HART. No; my planes didn't see them leave Camranh [12819] Bay and did not follow them at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get information from the British as to the movement of that fleet?

Senator HART. That was where the information came from, which was the first we knew that they left Camranh Bay, was the dispatch originated by a British plane. It was the northeast monsoon season. That whole area is filled with rain squalls. And on the occasion of the last reconnaissance made by my own planes, everything seemed to have been shut in so they saw nothing and I do not know to this day whether the Japanese expedition was still there on that occasion or whether it had departed.

Senator FERGUSON. The information that you received from the British, did you send that on to Washington?

Senator HART. The best evidence for that would lie in the files. I feel that I must have, but I don't recall having written the dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall a message dated the 2d of December 1941, page 39 of Exhibit 37:

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt of this dispatch. Charter three small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol".

Then you were to equip three small vessels to make them [12820] men-of-war. I wish you would look at that message.

Senator HART. Yes; I recall the dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it carried out?

Senator HART. No. Time did not serve. One ship was—the *Isabel* was dispatched in consequence of this instruction and was nearing her station when the Japanese attack occurred. The second one to be made ready was on the point of sailing and the third was not yet ready.

Senator FERGUSON. So the *Isabel* had been equipped, or was equipped at the time, and you sent her on the mission, the other one was just about ready to sail, and the third not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us where the *Isabel* was to be stationed?

Senator HART. She was the one that was to be off Camranh Bay.

Senator FERGUSON. She had not taken her station or had not obtained information that she could send about this fleet movement, is that correct, until after the attack?

Senator HART. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the purpose, if you know, that was to be served by these three small men-of-war? That was more for patrol of what was going on in the Gulf of Siam, was it not, than what would be going on in the [12821] Philippines?

Senator HART. I know nothing, Senator, that is not contained in the dispatch. I wouldn't say that your analysis was quite correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would correct me.

Senator HART. The Gulf of Siam is quite a distance around the corner; it is south and west, and the coast of the Philippines is 600 miles east.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you give instructions to the *Isabel* as to what they were to do, what they were to patrol?

Senator HART. Yes; based on this dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what that was?

Senator HART. I don't remember the wording of the dispatch and I can't give you anything better than that, that whatever instructions she had were in conformity with this dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going back to a question that I had asked you previously on Exhibit 40, I am trying to get information on the question of if you had received any instructions as to what would or should be done in case of an attack upon the British and not upon any of our possessions. This message says:

Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed [12822] support under three or four eventualities.

Now, you have told us that you didn't remember those eventualities, but your message, signed by you and Admiral Phillips, as I read it, indicates that we were to do certain things, and I find nowhere in it that they were based upon the fact that first an attack had to be made upon the American possessions.

I am trying to find out if you had any information either from the British or from America as to what we were supposed to do if there was an attack upon the British and not upon the American possessions.

Senator HART. You mean did I have? You said "We." Did you mean "me"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. No. Again the same answer that I gave the Department. "I have received no instructions."

[12823] Senator FERGUSON. So you were at that time seeking information as to what we intended to do because you had the information from the British; is that correct?

Senator HART. No, no; I don't think so. Will you repeat the question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. When I use the word "we" I mean the country here, the Government here in Washington. The British had told you, as I understand it, that there were eventualities that we were to give them armed support.

Senator HART. Well, you don't understand it correctly. I had not been told that by the British.

Senator FERGUSON. You learned from Singapore. Was that an American that gave you that information?

Senator HART. I have told you two or three times, Senator, it came from Capt. J. Creighton, United States Navy——

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you where he——

Senator HART. Who said that Brooke-Popham had told him.

Senator FERGUSON. So the information from Brooke-Popham was the British, was it not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Or the Dutch?

Senator HART. British.

Senator FERGUSON. British. So the information did come [12824] from the British, isn't that correct, even though it was hearsay?

Senator HART. The information to whom?

Senator FERGUSON. To the captain that gave you the message.

Senator HART. Yes, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did this armed support include an attack upon the British or the Dutch, that one of the eventualities was an attack upon the British or the Dutch?

Senator HART. I have told you that I do not remember what those eventualities were.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that by some study with other officers you can get those eventualities?

Senator HART. I think the best man to remember it would be what I said before, Captain Creighton himself. He did not have as many things on his mind as the rest of us had and he perhaps would remember it quite accurately.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Creighton place in his message to you what the eventualities were or did he use the same kind of an expression, the conclusion being three or four eventualities, or did he describe them so that when we call him we can find out what the eventualities were?

Senator HART. I don't remember well enough to say.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't remember that?

[12825] Senator HART. No. I think Captain Creighton would be your best source of information.

Senator FERGUSON. He would be the best source of information on that.

Now, on December 4th—it shows from the Army Top Secret, from Captain Safford, that on the 4th of December, from OPNAV to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, under serial No. 042018:

Communications room should now be stripped of all secret and confidential books and papers which in the hands of an enemy would be a disadvantage to the United States, retaining for essential purposes the minimum number of cryptographic channels at your discretion. Report those retained.

General Frank asked the question:

Did this go to the Asiatic?

Captain SAFFORD. Those went.

General FRANK. Did information copies of that go to the Pacific Fleet?

Captain SAFFORD. No, that also did not go to the Pacific Fleet.

I read that, indicating that it went to you, as far as Safford was concerned, and I would like to show you that and ask you if you remember that message?

[12826] Senator HART. No; I don't remember that dispatch, and from its nature I think it is most unlikely that I would have been shown it. It was a matter of rather a small detail to come to me about.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would the officer be that would receive that kind of a message to the Communications?

Senator HART. My intelligence officer would have had the most direct cognizance of it. He is Capt. Redfield Mason. Also the

officer who was in charge of that unit on Corregidor, and his name is Leitwiler; L-e-i-t-w-i-l-e-r, I think it is.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that kind of a message, Admiral, would indicate that at Washington they thought war was near as far as your fleet was concerned, would it not?

Senator HART. No; I think that is a message which deals with activities on a rather minor scale, on lower levels in the Navy Department and in my own command, and that no particular inference was to be drawn from it. It was rather a follow-up of the higher level instructions that had already been sent out, a matter of carrying out of certain detail.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any discussion with the High Commissioner in the Philippines in relation to the coming attack or coming war?

Senator HART. Oh, yes; we used to talk about it all [12827] through the last 3 or 4 months preceding the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he indicate that he had received a message from the President and that he was to take a matter up with you in relation to the attack or the war?

Senator HART. There was a dispatch which was transmitted over Navy radio from the President to the High Commissioner, and it was approximately current with the war warning. Is that the one you mean, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Your name was not mentioned in it. General MacArthur—as I recall the message—was mentioned in it, but I wondered whether or not he had taken it up with you also.

Senator HART. Oh, I no doubt saw it before the High Commissioner did himself, because it came over my radio, my system. I think I sent it over to him with my own aide.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that mean in your opinion that war was imminent?

Senator HART. Nothing additional to what we already had.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you another exhibit and ask you about it—or it is in the transcript—a penciled memo which had nothing to do with that.

Senator HART. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that message?

Senator HART. Well, I hadn't thought of it for four and [12828] a half years. I had forgotten all about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, does it refresh your memory?

Senator HART. Somewhat.

Senator FERGUSON. You were asked to do some scouting with air-planes; and you, as I recall the instructions, were to avoid the appearance of attacking. Will you explain how that could be done and what you did in relation to that order?

Senator HART. Well, we began doing it rather before we got the order, Senator, and Admiral Hart stuck his neck out considerably in doing it, too. We felt that we had to—that the time had arrived when we had to take a certain number of chances, which in air scouting would be a minimum, because we were concerned in order to find out what was going on along the Indochina coast and as far as Hainan, to say nothing about Formosa.

I started it myself personally and personally instructed the pilots who were going in on the coast that they were not to get into combat;

and even if they returned having seen nothing, that would be a whole lot better than if they brought on a collision in the air. Being aviators, I know how they would interpret most anything that I told them and that I was taking chances. However, it would not have been an overt act. The air is free, and we had just as much right to be using it along the Indochina coast as the Japanese had. Still, [12829] they were to be as careful about it as possible.

It happened that conditions were such that the very first morning they went out they did see the Japanese expedition in Camranh Bay, and I think we had been flying for about 2 days before I had any instruction from the Navy Department, and in the meantime one of our planes and a Jap plane or two had been looking each other over at short range in the air, so I was decidedly relieved when I got—

Senator FERGUSON. The message from Washington?

Senator HART (continuing). The message from Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Washington notify you that the Japs were complaining that one of your planes had gone over Formosa?

Senator HART. I don't recall any incident of that sort. It most likely would have been an Army B-17.

Senator FERGUSON. Rather than one of your own?

Senator HART. Rather than Navy, because the Army B-17's had finally volunteered to take one rather narrow sector which covered Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, we have some evidence here of a message—or not a message—indicating that in the morning previous, 3 mornings or 4 mornings previous to the attack, there had been a scouting plane or a Japanese [12830] plane flying over the Philippines or Clark Field. Did you have that information?

Senator HART. I don't recall it now, and I don't think I was told that.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any doubt that you were fully alerted to war, and that was true even prior to the warning message?

Senator HART. I tried to express a little while ago, Senator, that it would not be possible, even in the future I don't think, and it is not possible now, to say that at this time we became fully alerted and before that we were not. Our degree of alertness had been growing for several weeks before the war warning dispatch was received.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, there wasn't any doubt as far as the Philippines were concerned that you anticipated for a considerable time that there would be war between the United States and Japan and it was only a question as to when it would start?

Senator HART. Well, if I had been getting up a bet on the subject, Senator, I would have given tremendous odds, but I would have felt that I would have liked to have a chance on earning a dollar or two in risking my one thousand. We were never absolutely certain, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you think it was a thousand [12831] to two?

Senator HART. I never got up a bet.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not. Well, it was very certain, was it not, in your mind?

Senator HART. Well, again, Senator, in the effort to warm up a cold memory and go back 4 years, I think the simplest way to state my estimate of the situation as of those days would be this:

The Japanese, of course, sought to attain their ends without getting into any more extended war, and no doubt we were the last nation that they wished to take on in case they did extend. They had to go to the NEI to get oil. That was a "must" in their situation. The question then resolved to this: Did they dare go into the NEI in force, running into British opposition perhaps as well as Dutch, certainly Dutch, and leave the Philippines on their flank while they stuck their necks out fifteen hundred miles farther south? My own estimate was that they would not leave us on their flank and make the venture. Consequently, that they would attack.

Senator FERGUSON. That answers my question. Now, did you know Admiral Helfrich?

Senator HART. I became acquainted with him after the war began.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you communicate with him at any [12832] time after the war began or have someone communicate with him in relation to your fleet getting in?

Senator HART. There, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that you bring in Admiral Purnell, who, as I stated before, was the conferee in all of that and who can give us much better testimony. I had no communications with Admiral Helfrich, no direct communication, and the only business that went on between the two commands were either of a minor nature or, if on a higher plane, were a subject of conference with Admiral Purnell.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Senator, we have had considerable testimony on the meaning of "deploy" as far as the fleet was concerned. I wish that you would give us your opinion of what it meant by deploying your fleet, which you have indicated that you did this morning. You have stated that you had your fleet deployed at the time.

Senator HART. Senator, are you bringing in the language of the war warning dispatch?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. Then I think you should say a "defensive deployment."

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Senator HART. Is that what you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; if you will tell us about that. [12833] I wanted first the word "deployed," but the words used were "defensive deployment."

Senator HART. I think the easiest way is to indicate what the Asiatic Fleet did in carrying out that directive.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I would like to know, what you understood it to mean and what you did in compliance with it.

Senator HART. The Asiatic Fleet had to await attack. It could not attack. So, manifestly, the measure was to so dispose ourselves that when the attack came it would inflict as little damage as was possible; and under the circumstances that obtained out there, the only way to do that was following the principle of dispersal and concealment. That is what we did.

The submarines, in which lay the main power of the Asiatic Fleet—their concealment is inherent in the type. The surface ships were dispersed and disposed in a southerly direction, where they were farthest away from what would have to be the points from which the Japanese would jump off, and that was about all there was to it.



Well, I could go on and say that following that we sent all the cruisers, including the *Boise*, which arrived on the 4th of December and which I did not permit to return, and three-fourths of the destroyers well south, and a part [12834] of them even in down to the Borneo oil ports.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, did that defensive deployment—was it done in any way to protect the base—your base?

Senator HART. You mean Manila Bay?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or the base where your fleet had been stationed?

Senator HART. Certainly not, as regards the surface ships.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would not so construe the words “defensive deployment”—that they were to be used for the purpose of defending the base?

Senator HART. I do not think—I think your question is theoretical rather than practical, if you can permit me that observation, Senator. From the theoretical standpoint, I think you are quite correct—that bases are for the purpose of fleets, and it is always a wrong conception to tie a fleet to a base in order to protect it: but, at the same time, since no one ever knows enough, if there is anything hat the Navy can do while not violating theoretical conceptions to assist the other force, particularly the Army, in defending bases, why, that is the thing to do; and insofar as the Philippines were concerned, that was what we did. We so disposed the submarines as to be in good defensive positions, and the main power of defense that lay in the Asiatic [12835] Fleet was confined to the submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. Those submarines were a defense from surface ships, were they not, of the enemy?

Senator HART. You mean warships?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; as far as protection of the bases is concerned.

Senator HART. That, or invading expeditions with transports and supply ships.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you at any time anticipate that the Japanese Fleet or ships that were in Camranh Bay were intended for an attack upon the Philippines?

Senator HART. Repeat that question.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator HART. I am not sure what you mean by “anticipate,” Senator. I think I can only answer you to the effect that I saw the possibility that they would.

Senator FERGUSON. It had never reached the stage, though, of probability?

Senator HART. I don't think that I can warm up to the point of differentiating between probability and possibility back in those days.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, your Asiatic Fleet, as you have explained, was certainly not intended as an offensive fleet, and had you had trouble getting ships for your fleet or [12836] equipment for your fleet that you did have?

Senator HART. You mean had I been having trouble in getting reinforcements?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. Or ships and equipment for the fleet I had? Details and equipment for the fleet I had?

Senator FERGUSON. Both reinforcements and details of equipment.

Senator HART. Oh, yes, yes; plenty of trouble.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you very anxious to obtain more vessels, more ships, I will say?

Senator HART. Yes; I think I had the common failing of all commanders in chief. You always want more.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was that just because you felt, and sincerely felt, that you needed them for the purpose of defending even those that you did have, helping with the defense?

Senator HART. Well, as you express it, Senator, it would not be my conception of the way to do, get some ships to defend some others, but perhaps I can answer you this way; I think I know what you mean.

I don't think that at any time during the months leading up to the war I felt like persistently urging upon the Navy Department that I be reinforced with surface ships. The reason was that unless that reinforcement was great I would not be in a markedly stronger position. Shall I go on?

[12837] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. The only urging of that sort that I did was to give me more modern ships, because the cruisers and destroyers that I had were the weakest and the slowest that we had in the Navy.

A small, fast force of very high quality could have been used under those conditions, whereas my cruisers and destroyers, which were both weaker and slower than the Japanese, did not give us much to work with.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us just how many hours after the attack at Pearl Harbor the first attack on our Navy was made, as far as your fleet was concerned.

Senator HART. I have already testified to that in the instance of Davao Bay, Davao Gulf.

Senator FERGUSON. It was then 2 hours—I will let you tell that.

Senator HART. I said it was at daybreak that morning. It was about, in point of time, an hour or two after the attack began on Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, in time, how long that attack was, either before or after in relation to the attack upon the airfield in the Philippines? I am trying to get this time down. We have had some difficulty with this time.

Senator HART. Well, the attack at Balalak on my [12838] unit in the Gulf of Davao was a little before 6 a. m.

The first Japanese air attack on Luzon was on Bagio, as I recall, about 10:30, and the heavy, very damaging, attack upon the Army's airfields, as I recall, was at about 12:30.

Now, those hours are as I pull them out of memory, and there is much better evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I assume—and do I assume correctly—that as soon as the attack came upon your part of the fleet, which was the first attack, that there was notice given both to the Navy headquarters at Manila and also notice given to the Army, so that everyone was warned there had been an attack upon the Philippines?

Senator HART. That would be a natural assumption, Senator, but I fear that was not right, because the only unit that took that attack,

that could transmit the news of it, was the destroyer, and she was so exceedingly busy the next 2 hours in evading the four Japanese destroyers that, as I recall, she did not get the message in, and we did not hear about that until, oh, I would guess 9 o'clock.

After that, no doubt, it was immediately sent to the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were in Manila at that time?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

[12839] Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Admiral, do you want to go and answer that roll call? We do not pay very much attention to roll calls here in the committee.

Senator HART. I would like to do anything to get me out of this seat, but I will continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I shall be very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral, the entire Hart report is in evidence before this committee.

Senator HART. What report?

Mr. KEEFE. The evidence taken by you.

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Under the direction or precept of February 12, 1944.

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in accordance with the directions which were given to you by the Secretary of the Navy, Knox, you did, in fact, examine the witnesses, did you not?

Senator HART. Well, as it appears on the record, subject to the modifications in the testimony concerning which I have already testified, all questions and answers [12840] appear in the testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. Exactly. But I gained the impression from your testimony today that this was an effort on the part of the Navy to preserve the testimony, and that it was in the nature of taking statements rather than the examination of witnesses.

Senator HART. Well, the witnesses were under oath.

Mr. KEEFE. They were, in fact, questioned, were they not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Questions were submitted to them to answer?

Senator HART. Questions were asked them.

Mr. KEEFE. Questions were asked them, we will put it that way.

I note also in this directive, it specifically set forth:

In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, was on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Admiral, U. S. Navy, and therefore has an interest in the matter into which this examination is being made, you will notify him of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross [12841] examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request.

That right was extended to Admiral Kimmel, was it not, during the course of your examination?

Senator HART. Of course, I carried out the directive of the precept.

Mr. KEEFE. Was Admiral Kimmel represented at any of these hearings?

Senator HART. None of them.

Mr. KEEFE. He did not appear at any of these hearings?

Senator HART. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he notified of the hearings?

Senator HART. You will find attached to the record, which you say is before the committee, certain letters on the subject which I think fully explain it, although he did not appear, we continued to send him notices of the meetings for, oh, I would guess, the first seven or eight sessions, and after that I believe my assistant told me that he had heard indirectly from Admiral Kimmel that we need not inform him any longer.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I note according to this record, that you did examine Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Turner, Director of [12842] War Plans. That is right; is it not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Schuirmann, Director of Central Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And Admiral Ingersoll, as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And Captain McRea, aide to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Wellborn, assistant aide to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. But you did not examine Admiral Stark. That is the thing that impressed me, and I wondered if there was any reason for it.

Senator HART. Well, for one reason he was very busy in London carrying on the war. I decided not to make a trip to London.

After I had examined Admiral Ingersoll, I felt perhaps I should have gone to London and examined Admiral Stark, but I decided not to.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, as a member of this committee, it [12843] rather impressed me when all of the high ranking officers in connection with the Office of Chief of Naval Operations had their testimony preserved through your interrogation, that the Chief of Naval Operations, who was the responsible head of that department, was not examined, and the only reason for it was because, as you state, he was then in London, and busy, as commander in chief of the European Fleet, and you did not see fit to go there to preserve his testimony for that reason.

Senator HART. Yes, Mr. Keefe. I think you may well be quite right in criticizing me for not having done it. I felt that I had met the requirements of my precept, with the exception of the two witnesses whom I mentioned in the end.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, Senator, I am not asking you questions with any desire to be critical.

Senator HART. That is all right.

Mr. KEEFE. I want this record to be clear.

Senator HART. That is all right.

Mr. KEEFE. It impressed me that the most important testimony that should be preserved, that there was any reason for preserving, should be the testimony of the Chief of Naval Operations, and his testimony was not preserved as the result of the precept which was issued to you by the [12844] Secretary of the Navy, and I would like to have that explained, as to why it was not.

Now, the Court of Inquiry set up by the Navy Department followed your examination; did it not?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. So as to get the chronological record, so that we will have it in this record at this point, my record indicates that your investigation began on February 12, 1944, and ended on June 14, 1944.

Are those dates correct?

Senator HART. Whatever is shown in the report which I submitted.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would like to have the dates established in our record here now, if it is not too difficult to ascertain it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He has already testified to it specifically.

Senator HART. I think I have given that a couple of times. The first testimony was under date of February 22 and the last date is June 15. It states the examination is then finished.

Mr. KEEFE. My record indicates that the first hearing of the Naval Court of Inquiry was on July 31, 1944, which is about a month after you had concluded your investigation, [12845] and that the first witness called, a month after you had concluded your investigation, the first witness called by the Naval Court of Inquiry was Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.

Did you know that?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

I might also add that I was not authorized to call Admiral Stark to testify, but, of course, the Court of Inquiry was. That was a much higher level instrument than I was.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when Admiral Stark first appeared before the Naval Court of Inquiry, did you appear before that court as his counsel?

Senator HART. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Or one of his counsel?

Senator HART. No. Admiral Stark was called back, and was made an interested party, and at the same time it was entirely apparent that he could not be present throughout the proceedings and would have to return to London to carry on the war.

He called me by long distance phone in Chicago, and set forth the dilemma, that he, of course, would like to stand on his rights and insist on being present throughout the proceedings of the court of inquiry, but the exigencies [12846] of the war and his duties in connection therewith were such that he could not conscientiously do that, and he thought if I would consent that some arrangement might be made under which I could act as his counsel, and do my best toward representing him.

I tried to get him to do much better than that, to get a lawyer, but he could not get one whom he wished to turn it over to.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you attend the naval court of inquiry proceedings?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. You appeared before the naval court of inquiry as his counsel?

Senator HART. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have an assistant counsel in the person of Admiral Ingersoll?

Senator HART. I think Admiral Ingersoll was in there as counsel before the court before I got back to town, just filling in, and was there for one or two sessions of the court, when he returned to his duties as commander of all the forces in the Atlantic.

Mr. KEEFE. Then at least after you got back to Washington you assumed the responsibility of representing Admiral Stark as his counsel before the naval court of inquiry?

[12847] Senator HART. That is putting it rather extremely, but I will go along with that; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if there is anything extreme about it—all I want is the facts, Senator, that is all.

Senator HART. I do not know what you are leading up to, so possibly I will come back to that.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not leading up to anything.

Senator HART. I set forth the situation under which I was before the court.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. I am very frank to state to you the reason for my asking these questions is because my attention was challenged by the fact that you, in your investigation, had failed to examine Admiral Stark. A month after you had completed your examination, the naval court of inquiry is set up, Admiral Stark is brought here from London and is the first witness, and that in the proceedings before the naval court of inquiry you then appeared as counsel for Admiral Stark.

Senator HART. And what is the inference?

Mr. KEEFE. I just wondered whether there is any question that ought to be explained in reference to that situation.

Senator HART. I think you have an inference there, do you not? You may as well state it.

[12848] Mr. KEEFE. I am not the witness on the stand.

I am asking you if there isn't any or if there is. I would be glad to have you state it.

Senator HART. No; I have stated my position, and expressed my reluctance to assume the position of representing Admiral Stark.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Senator HART. There happened to be a war on at the time, otherwise I certainly would not have done it.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

[12849] The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I would like to ask you one or two questions. I was absent when you began your testimony.

I would like to ask you with reference to this dispatch you received from Captain Creighton from Singapore, in which he told you that he had been informed by this British naval officer—whether he named him or not is not material—that he had received information from London that in certain eventualities, maybe three or four, assistance would be given. Do you know whether that had any relationship to

the conference that took place, I think in Singapore, previous to that between American, British, and Dutch military and naval officers in which a plan was worked out and agreed to there to do certain things under certain eventualities, but which was never approved by the President?

You are familiar with that, aren't you?

Senator HART. Dimly so, Senator. I think not. I think the last conference at Singapore had terminated some weeks before. I do not think there was any connection.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the evidence here is that these representatives of these different Governments did meet there and they worked out there a tentative plan based upon certain assumptions, that that plan was never agreed to, never was approved by the President and never went into effect. I wondered if it could have any relationship to [12850] this information that Captain Creighton had received from the British officer who said he had gotten it from London.

You do not think it had any relationship?

Senator HART. I would not think so, Senator, because all that planning was staff planning, with the idea, "Well if we do become allies in a war this is what we will do," but with no commitments whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know from what sources the British officer in Singapore received that information, or how reliable it was, I presume, or what it was based on?

Senator HART. No.

The CHAIRMAN. When you received it you sent a dispatch here in which you said you had gotten this information, but that you had received no—what did you call it?—no corresponding instructions from the Navy Department or from Washington, and you never did after that receive any in reply to that message.

Senator HART. I do not think I ever had any reply. No; I am sure I never had any reply to that message.

The CHAIRMAN. So you had no instructions or no information from Washington with reference to any naval assistance?

Senator HART. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That anybody had promised?

[12851] Senator HART. I had nothing at the time, as I stated in my dispatch, and I got no reply.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, you got the dispatch from the Navy that was sent out on the 24th of November in which they said that the Japanese attack from any direction, or in any direction, might be expected.

Senator HART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the one on the 27th also which started out by saying this was a war warning?

Senator HART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You got that?

Senator HART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You also got a dispatch from the Navy that the Japanese were burning their codes, which was sent out, I believe, December 3 or 4. You got that?

Senator HART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you this question, and if you do not feel you can properly answer it, why, I will leave that up to you.

You described awhile ago your method of deployment. It is a sort of scatterment of your ships, if I can use such a word, so they would not be subject to a concentrated attack; in the first place, to conceal them, or to get them as far away from the jumping-off place of an attack as possible. [12852] In the case of submarines it is easier to conceal them because concealment is inherent in their construction largely.

Now, assuming that the same information you got went to Pearl Harbor with respect to the attack from any direction, with respect to the war warning, with respect to the burning of the codes, and with instructions to execute an appropriate defensive deployment of the ships preparatory for such possible attack, do you think that the concentration of a fleet, any fleet, such as the one that was concentrated in Pearl Harbor, would be interpreted or regarded as an appropriate defensive deployment of those ships?

Senator HART. Senator, you, I think, should have included in your question also what was expected of the Pacific Fleet in case a war broke out, in a way of offensive movements and readiness to carry them out.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably so.

Senator HART. Now, even so, I doubt, despite all the information that I have read and heard concerning the Pearl Harbor incident, that I can properly put myself in the position of the commander in chief who was there and give a useful opinion on what was the best thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I will not press you on that. I will ask you this: Whether, from the information that you have about what was done there with the ships that were in Pearl [12853] Harbor, and from the testimony that has been adduced in all of these hearings as to where they were located, was it the sort of deployment that you executed in the control of your fleet?

Senator HART. No; it was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I will ask you this: You spoke awhile ago about no naval commander ever having all that he wanted. At that time we were engaged in a two-ocean war and we did not at that time have a two-ocean fleet or Navy, did we?

Senator HART. No.

The CHAIRMAN. So that those who were in control on the war strategy had to decide the relative importance of shifting ships from one ocean to another, and not having enough ships for the two oceans simultaneously to match the Japanese Navy and German submarine menace and Italian, and others, that were being carried on in the Atlantic. You, I suppose, recognized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the countries at war had to determine how much of the Navy in the Pacific might be needed in the Atlantic, or how much of the Navy in the Atlantic could be shifted into the Pacific without weakening either one out of proportion to its importance; that is true, isn't it?

Senator HART. I do not know whether you are correct [12854] in mentioning the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am not sure that it was set up at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us limit it to our own Naval Department.

Senator HART. They naturally were the ones who were carrying the responsibility.



The CHAIRMAN. Yes. What I understood you to say awhile ago was that while no naval commander ever had all he wanted, you do not mean by that to convey the impression to the committee that those who were charged with the primary responsibility of deciding where the Navy should be, or what proportion should be at any one place, were acting without due judgment in deciding that matter as they did?

Senator HART. That is correct. The question of the correctness of the judgment is another matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Of course, that is always a question that enters into every human act and all human conduct, is the question of judgment, and when we get into that realm we get into a difficult field. I do not think I want to ask any other questions.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask one question.

Senator HART. I might say, Senator, while I never particularly pressed the Department for additional forces, I think I did make known, in an unofficial way, my total [12855] disagreement in not keeping almost all of our force in the Pacific waters during those times, but at the same time I know I did not have very good knowledge of what the requirements and responsibilities were in the Atlantic.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Senator Hart, do you recall from whom you first learned about the attack on Clark Field at 12:30 on the afternoon of December 7, or whenever it was?

Senator HART. Someone of my staff officers came in and told me.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have a talk with General MacArthur about the destruction of those planes on Clark Field thereafter?

Senator HART. Only on that afternoon, when he told me what had happened.

Senator LUCAS. Will you give to the committee the substance of that conversation, please?

Senator HART. The substance was that the Japanese had made a highly efficient attack, displayed excellent ability in the air, and told me about what he had lost and about what he had left. The respective figures I no longer remember.

Senator LUCAS. Did he give you at that time any [12856] information as to why the planes were on the ground?

Senator HART. No.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall how many he said he lost at that time?

Senator HART. No. I said I did not remember.

Senator LUCAS. There are no records that I can find here in the War Department as to the number of planes that were lost at Clark Field, and that is one of the reasons I am asking you about it.

Senator HART. I would not know.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You have indicated to one of the chairman's questions—

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have some questions that I would like to ask him, so you might adjourn to the afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. We might as well go over.

Admiral, you will be back at 1:30, please.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I repeat what I told you a little while ago, that I have been doing my best to be helpful here to the committee, but if there is going to be much more questioning I suggest that I be given some [12857] time to get better prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. I imagine there will not be but a few more questions, Senator. I hate to bring you back, but we do have to recess. The time has arrived.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[12858]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Senator, will you please come forward and take the stand? Senator Ferguson will inquire.

### TESTIMONY OF SENATOR THOMAS CHARLES HART (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hart, I show you the memorandum which you wrote at the time that you learned that there had been an attack upon America and ask you to read it into the record. I think that should be read into the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You might give the circumstances at the time when you wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; if you will just relate under what circumstances you wrote it.

Senator HART. This is a photostat copy of a scrap of paper in my hand which was written at 4 a. m. sitting on my bed in Manila just after we had received the dispatch which was sent out from Pearl Harbor to the effect that there was an air raid on Pearl Harbor and that it was no drill.

I made sure from the staff officer who brought it over to me from my command post about 200 yards away that it was authentic and did emanate from someone who was on the official key in Pearl Harbor and then wrote this dispatch to send to all my forces:

Priority dispatch: Japan started hostilities. [12859] Govern yourselves accordingly.

That was all they had to go on until they got official word from Washington that the war was on.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I show you another exhibit, which is the one, as I understand it, you received from Washington. Is that correct?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you read that into the record and, if you can, tell us when as commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet you received that one.

Senator HART. This also is photostat copy of the working copy of the dispatch. I might say that these two scraps of paper were picked up by one of my men when we were abandoning that command post and were carried by him throughout his 3½ years of captivity and finally got to me. I returned them to him to keep for his own purposes. The dispatch says:

Execute WPL-46 against Japan.

That was the war plan which was in effect. It was issued by the Secretary of the Navy and went to the entire Navy. The hour at which it was sent seems to be 1930 Greenwich time on December 7. It was received in my communication office 15 minutes afterward.

Senator FERGUSON. That is 5 hours earlier in Washington? [12860]

Senator HART. In Washington time this would mean 2:30 p. m., on the 7th of December when it was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And 15 minutes later it was received?

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you a few questions about the fact that you have now stated that your fleet was not deployed as the one at Pearl Harbor. I notice in this dispatch of the 27th it is this way:

Execute a preparatory defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Now, your task and the commander in chief at Pearl Harbor's task under WPL-46 were different, were they not?

Senator HART. In detail; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He had certain tasks to carry out against the Marshalls, did he not, under WPL-46? I have a copy if you want to look at it. I have turned up the page on one of your tasks if you will just look at that.

Senator HART. That is correct, Senator. His first task, either given to him in the Navy Department's war plan or following that written into his own contributory plan was a raid on the Japanese mandate islands.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that account for the fact that [12861] one man, if he had one plan to carry out, would deploy his ships in one way, whereas if he had another plan to carry out he might deploy them in another way?

Senator HART. Well, the war plan was not in effect until the dispatch was sent which I have just read into the record. Up to that time it was simply a plan, but it did require something to put it into effect.

Now, the dispatch that you mentioned of November 27 said, "preparatory to carrying out the plan."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. In the meantime, as I read that dispatch, from anybody's standpoint, deployment should be defensive.

Senator FERGUSON. Defensive alone or preparatory to carrying out this task?

Senator HART. It is pretty difficult to figure just where you are going to draw the line and that is the difficulty that any commander in chief is always under such circumstances.

Senator FERGUSON. In reading the language that is sent to him.

Senator HART. In knowing how to act.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, in knowing how to act and understanding it.

Senator HART. There is no fault with the language at [12862] all but on the conditions that face you.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand then from this language you are not attempting to say how Admiral Kimmel should have deployed his fleet preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Senator HART. No. I told Senator Barkley in the preceding session that as to what it might mean that it was difficult to give an opinion on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. And the fact that you carried this out in a way different than Admiral Kimmel carried his task out is not to be considered a criticism of his method of doing it under this message?

Senator HART. Not at all. There was a vast difference of geography between the two commands. Japan was over 3,000 miles away from Pearl Harbor and very much less than that from where the Asiatic Fleet was.

Senator FERGUSON. There is one thing, and this is only for the purpose of trying to locate the instrument that you were speaking of, will you describe a little more on the record the so-called historical paper or historical instrument that you looked at in relation to the winds message, that we may be able to locate that if possible?

Senator HART. I think that Admiral Redman probably knows what that is better than I and will know what it means [12863] if he reads my testimony. It obviously was produced primarily with a view to at some later date being able to show the rest of the Navy what that unit had been engaged in, what it had been trained for, and what it had accomplished.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume, then, it had been made out after the attack, that paper?

Senator HART. Oh, yes. I do not recall, but I rather think it was probably produced about January or February 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you just tell us what office it was in when you saw it, which may help us locate it?

Senator HART. Office of Naval Communications, and it was given me by Admiral Redman.<sup>1</sup>

Senator FERGUSON. And, Admiral, you made no report and was not supposed to make a report on your work that you did in getting this testimony in the, as we call it in this hearing, the Hart report or the Hart hearing?

Senator HART. No; no findings of fact or opinion were required of me, and it would have been going way out of my field to have volunteered any. It was simply what the precept says it is. It was recording testimony that was being forgotten, and worse yet, was being lost on account of men dying.

I might further say that I did not turn it in as by any means a complete job. A complete job, of course, would have required me to put Admiral Kimmel on the stand as well as [12864] Admiral Stark, who was mentioned this morning by Mr. Keefe, and various other subordinates who were important.

At the end of the report I advised the Secretary only as regards two witnesses, the names were McCollum and Kramer, whom I had not examined but pointed out that I thought they did have very pertinent testimony and I probably might well have gone back to the Pacific, chased them to Australia and then to the Solomons, in order to get the testimony, but I decided to close it down at that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you started this in 1944. Did the Secretary of the Navy state to you why he was doing this that many years after the happening of the event, as to what his purpose in getting his testimony was?

<sup>1</sup> See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5477 et seq. for a letter from the Navy Department.

Senator HART. No; I don't think Secretary Knox ever said anything whatever to me about that. All of my dealings were with Admiral Gatch; quite a little of it is persuading me that I ought to be willing to take on the task, and while that was going on I think Admiral Gatch said that Admiral Kimmel himself had pointed out that situation, that testimony was being forgotten and lost and that something ought to be done.

Senator FERGUSON. So as I understand it, then, the Navy did not close the matter just because the President had appointed a commission and that commission had made a report: [12865] that Admiral Gatch desired that the Navy itself perpetuate this testimony?

Senator HART. You refer to the Roberts Commission, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator HART. I doubt if there was any relationship there. If there was, I did not know of it and it is my impression that I was put on this job because there was a feeling on the part of—a considerable feeling that better records ought to be made and that Admiral Kimmel was one of the leaders in setting that forth.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes; I have a question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will inquire.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, might I ask you to turn your attention to the dispatch of November 24? Would you care to offer any statement, Admiral, as to what meaning the words, "aggressive movement in any direction," meant to you? In other words, is the language as broad as it seems or did the words "aggressive movement in any direction" confine itself to any particular theater in your mind?

Senator HART. Well, there are six addressees to this dispatch.

[12866] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Senator HART. The two commanders in chief afloat and the commanders of four different naval districts, including the one in the Canal Zone, and in specific answer to your question I would read it now as I read it then: They may strike in any direction and particularly watch out in the Philippines and at Guam.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But there can be no place where you have indicated the dispatch went that would not have to bear the burden of interpreting that language as it applied to them?

Senator HART. Oh, I think that is always the case when a dispatch is written to multiple addressees scattered over as large a portion of the world as this one was scattered.

[12867] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, if you will turn to the dispatch of the 27th, would you care to indicate, Admiral, what meaning you gave to the phrase, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

Did that differentiate this dispatch from other dispatches, or was there anything in your mind that was significant in the use of those terms?

Senator HART. Well, absolutely. Insofar as I was concerned, the dispatch might have ended right there. "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you regard the subsequent matters in that dispatch in any extent qualifying or minimizing the language in the first nine words?

Senator HART. Well, it certainly did not from where I sat.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, at the end of the dispatch, what significance would the phrase "Spenavo inform British" have? What would that mean to you?

Senator HART. I am not sure that I knew at the time who Spenavo was. I think he was a liaison man, a naval officer in London. It meant nothing to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The inference you got was that the nature of this dispatch and the purport would come to the knowledge of the British in that way?

[12868] Senator HART. Yes, but not through me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. I realize that.

"Spenavo" would identify someone in London who would advise the British?

Senator HART. Yes. It is addressed to him for information.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Now, Admiral, did you observe, following the attack at Pearl Harbor, that there was any change in the amount of ships, and military supplies that were brought into the Pacific area?

Senator HART. Did you say after the attack?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will repeat that.

You testified this morning that you asked for and desired additional ships and additional military supplies. You spoke of the fact that commanders are always doing that.

I am asking you whether there was any change in the getting of supplies and equipment and ships into the Pacific after Pearl Harbor.

Senator HART. Certainly not in my area, because it could not be done, and I do not know anything about the rest of the area.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, one question further.

You spoke about the Japanese having to take into con- [12869]  
sideration the presence of your fleet on their flank, if they proceeded to go down to the Malay barrier.

Would you, as a skilled naval commander have regarded the Pacific Fleet which was based on Pearl Harbor as also presenting any flank threat to a Japanese aggressive move?

Senator HART. Eventually, when they were able to get there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

Senator HART. From Pearl Harbor, the radius over which they could deliver their power did not reach to the Philippines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will ask you one other thing further.

Would the duty, imposed by a desire for readiness to move under a proper order, under War Plan 46, have required a commander to make the preparation and conditioning of his fleet his first objective, to get it ready to execute such an order when it should come at the sacrifice of defensive deployment in the meantime?

Senator HART. Well, it is a matter of being between the devil and the deep blue sea. It is an occasion where you have to use your judgment and make the right guess, and it does take a certain amount of guessing. A commander could easily make the mistake of taking himself so far afield that the offensive which the Government has a right to expect of its forces, would be too slow in being brought to [12870]  
play.

On the other hand, if he does not guard himself against an attack sufficiently, he is making another mistake.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recognize, as a skilled naval expert, any difference in the priority status between a future aggressive movement of the fleet and the protection or the safety of the fleet before that movement?

Is one prior to the other in importance?

Senator HART. Any general statement either way, would be no good. Some men err, some commanders err on the side of caution and others err on the other side.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster will inquire.

Senator BREWSTER. I apologize for not having been here this morning, and what I have in mind may have been covered, so I shall not try to duplicate.

As I think I have said to you privately, I did hear from Admiral Helfrich of a message which, as I understood it, you sent to him prior to Pearl Harbor dealing with the possibility of moving some parts of your fleet down there.

I am not clear as to what the state of the record is regarding that.

Senator HART. No, I was not asked that.

[12871] I communicated with Admiral Helfrich only informally.

Under peacetime regulations naval ships cannot be sent into foreign ports without a process of getting permission and authority via the State Department.

Well, of course, I was not going to do that, so I sent the ships down to these oil ports ostensibly to get fuel—and, incidentally, they did get some—and had word conveyed over to Admiral Helfrich informally what I was doing, and I apprehended that those ships would have a great deal of difficulty in getting any fuel and might be there some days, and please not to raise any row about it.

[12872] Senator BREWSTER. That was some time prior to December 7?

Senator HART. About 10 days.

Senator BREWSTER. That indicated some concern you felt at that time regarding the security of your ships?

Senator HART. Well, that was the primary reason for sending them down there.

Senator BREWSTER. Those ships did remain down there?

Senator HART. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. It was thought it would not have been helpful to bring them back to the Philippines to join you?

Senator HART. You mean after the war broke?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator HART. Well, their first task was guarding the escape of about 200,000 tons of allied merchant craft which fled into Manila Harbor and which we got out and to safety. As I stated this morning, Senator, those destroyers and cruisers were both weaker and slower than the Jap opposite numbers, and that, coupled with the superiority in the air which the Japanese obtained within 2 or 3 days,

meant that they did not have much chance to accomplish anything if they had returned, so I never did bring them back.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the last answer has [12873] brought up a question that was not fully covered, as I recall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hart, you made the statement this morning, as I recall it, in relation to the transfer of the ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, in relation to your private opinion, or at least your opinion possibly not through direct navy channels that you had an opinion on the matter.

Would you explain what you did, or what your opinion was?

Senator HART. I answered to this effect in reply to a question by Senator Barkley, that I, sitting out where I was, rather naturally perhaps, could not see any good reason for having much of our naval power in the Atlantic because of our situation in the Pacific, but that I acknowledged freely that I was not faced with the over-all responsibility and did not know the situation which confronted our highest levels of command as well as they knew it themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you of the opinion that the Pacific Fleet was sufficient, as it was constituted on the 7th of December, to carry out the war plan against Japan?

Senator HART. Yes; I thought that they had power [12874] enough to make a raid into the Japanese Mandated Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not sufficient to go further than the Mandated Islands, as constituted?

Senator HART. No. The logistic considerations would have prevented their reaching much further than the eastern edge of the Mandated Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. That, of course, would not have been true if we had had our entire fleet in the Pacific?

Senator HART. Well, the entire fleet, including all of the logistic power that we had, would have been another thing. But just the combat ships—

Senator FERGUSON. No; I mean all of the trains, and all.

Senator HART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That we would have been able to secure.

Senator HART. I do not know how far we would be able to go.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator, the raid you spoke of into the mandated islands, is that what was provided under the war plans?

Senator HART. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your appearance [12875] and the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in every way. You are now excused.

Senator HART. Thank you, sir.

(Senator Hart was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will counsel please call the next witness?

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask counsel if they can locate the report and history that has been talked about so the committee might see it?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.



Mr. RICHARDSON. We will call Captain Layton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is Captain Layton the next witness, Counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will Captain Layton please come forward.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you please state your full name to the committee?

Captain LAYTON. Edwin Thomas Layton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are a captain in the United States [12876] Navy?

Captain LAYTON. Captain, United States Navy; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain LAYTON. I entered the Naval Academy in 1920. I graduated therefrom in 1924. I have served continuously ever since.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is your present assignment?

Captain LAYTON. Fleet intelligence officer and combat intelligence officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your assignment at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. Fleet intelligence officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you give to the committee in some detail as to what your duties were at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, what duties you were performing in Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. I will read from the staff instructions to the staff of the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, issued July 14, 1941, and in effect the day of the attack. The instructions I will read are those laid out for the duty of the fleet intelligence officer and his assistants [reading]:

Paragraph 214. Intelligence Officer.

[12877] A. Directs assembly of enemy information and evaluate the same; disseminating to the various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

B. Provides operation officer and war plans officer information essential for current estimates; monograph material.

C. Maintain section 2 sub-paragraph A, B, C, D, E, F and G of the estimate of situation, enemy forces; maintains location plot of Fleets of possibly enemy or Allies.

D. Directs counter-espionage and counter-information.

E. Maintains intelligence records. (See the Naval Intelligence Manual.)

F. Prepares Fleet intelligence bulletins.

G. Evaluates intelligence information received of procedures or processes of other navies, and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within our own Fleet.

H. In charge of censorship.

I. Internal security of ships.

J. Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

215. Assistant Intelligence Officer,

who was my subordinate and for whom I am responsible.

In addition to assisting 25—

that was my number—

In all duties of the Intelligence Section, performs the [12878] following additional assignments:

- A. Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analyses.
- B. Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to the Fleet.
- C. Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of enemy information.
- D. Maintenance of current estimates of situation enemy forces and location of plots of fleets of possible enemies or Allies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your assistant?

Captain LAYTON. Commander Robert E. Hudson, U. S. Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. From whom or through whom did you get your basic intelligence on which you made your reports?

Captain LAYTON. In accordance with the set-up, the Chief of Naval Operations subdivision of Naval Intelligence was charged with the furnishing of information of all kinds from all sources to the fleet intelligence officer via official channels.

I also received what we then called combat intelligence, which is now called communications intelligence, and derived via the Fourteenth Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit. This was the unit commanded by the then commander, now Capt. J. J. Rochefort.

[12879] In addition, from time to time and infrequently, we would receive telegraphic information from other communication intelligence organizations, for instance, Cavite and OPNAV.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you secured this intelligence did you put it in shape for delivery?

Captain LAYTON. In some cases the actual material was in shape. For instance, reports from OPNAV, various observations. In most cases the communication intelligence as delivered or as received by me was not always in shape desirable for presentation to the commander in chief, and therefore I would work on that, make an evaluation of it and submit it to the commander in chief.

When I speak of it not being in shape, I refer to some of the station logs received from the intercept station at Guam, and the station at Cavite, which was recorded and indexed in accordance with their procedure, but was not in suitable shape for intelligence material requiring a considerable digesting, collating, and the putting together of basic elements of intelligence information for the commander in chief.

[12880] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did most of your basic material come through Captain Rochefort?

Captain LAYTON. Most of the basic material received concerning the Japanese ship locations came from Captain Rochefort, although I must say the unit at Cavite was of great assistance, both as a check and because they were nearer and could provide probably more accurate information on certain details.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How would information from Cavite come to you?

Captain LAYTON. Both by mail and by dispatch. In the latter part of October and November most of their information came by dispatch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom did you directly convey your intelligence?

Captain LAYTON. Directly to Admiral Kimmel, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In person.

Captain LAYTON. In person.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in what form?

Captain LAYTON. At 8:15 each morning I would appear at the admiral's office with my intelligence material. It invariably consisted of the communications intelligence summary for that day, plus notations of dispatches received in the recent 24 hours that I thought pertinent materials, that [12881] might bear upon the subject.

This would then be discussed, sometimes briefly, and other times at length, depending upon the state of the material or the nature of the information contained therein.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, were those intelligence reports made directly to Admiral Kimmel during the week prior to the attack on December 7?

Captain LAYTON. They were made daily to Admiral Kimmel during the week prior to the attack on December 7, and for several months theretofore.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in each of those intelligence reports that you made, did you endeavor to collate all of the intelligence that was available to you for that day?

Captain LAYTON. The written communications intelligence report contained all information noted from observation of enemy naval circuits. Additionally, through conversational explanation, additional enemy reports received during the past 24 hours were discussed, and an attempt made to make them fit, or to key them into materials contained in the radio intelligence report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you the agency through whom dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, would pass?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. The dispatches to the commander [12882] in chief, Pacific Fleet, were of generally two categories; regular Navy dispatches, that is, secret, confidential, plain language, which would come through the communications office, and there were the magic dispatches, or dispatches carried in the special channel which has been referred to before, a special radio cryptographic system coming over the same radio channels.

When this went to the communications office, they could not identify the cipher except to know it was a special cipher and held by the fleet security officer, the then Lieutenant Coleman, now deceased, who would bring out the special machinery wheels and would then decrypt this dispatch, would deliver it to me in person, after having shown it to Admiral Kimmel, or the chief of staff, then Captain Smith, the war plans officer, then Captain McMorris, and the fleet communications officer, Commander Curtis.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would they get that information before it came to you or afterward?

Captain LAYTON. There were occasions when I saw it first because I would be in the office when it was being deciphered, and would read it, but the admiral and chief of staff had priority on the receipt of this material, naturally.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then in the transmission of intelligence to the chief of staff, part of it would be in your communication [12883]

intelligence summary, and part of it would be oral, and part of it would consist of dispatches?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That had been sent in, where it was your duty to convey that to the commander in chief?

Captain LAYTON. Plus other normal dispatches, such as sightings, or reports from naval attachés, or naval observers from State Department sources, and others that came in ordinary dispatch form, and was delivered to the admiral as well as the chief of staff and other officers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. After this information had gone to the commander in chief, would it reach other members of his staff?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, it would. May I explain why and how this was done?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. The radio intelligence organization at that time was a secret. Regulations had been issued as to how it would be handled, who would have access to it, and by whose authority.

When I first assumed this job on December 7, 1940, 1 year before the big day, I made a liaison contact with the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is Admiral Bloch?

[12884] Captain LAYTON. Directly under Admiral Bloch, for administration.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain LAYTON. I showed them my credentials, and they showed me these regulations, and had me read one page, and this page is more or less in substance as follows:

This is very secret. No one shall know about it except the following named officers and offices:

The Commandant of Operations, in which office is placed the Commander in Chief, his Chief of Staff, his Intelligence Officer, and such other officers as designated by him or by the Chief of Naval Operations.

This page was signed by the then Chief of Naval Operations.

I was then administered an oath to maintain secrecy and carry out these regulations.

Now, in order that other members of the staff who were not by the admiral's direction on this list who would receive this secret intelligence, or supersecret intelligence might be aware of these facts, I would make up a special intelligence folder in which I would not say where it came from but would give it a rating of A-1 in case it was communication intelligence, and would lay out the facts as I saw them, as contained in these dispatches. This was shown to the [12885] members of the staff, and their initials appear in blocks at the bottom of the page.

I would like to say parenthetically, by Admiral Kimmel's direction, the war plans officer was added to this list and I received a written directive to that effect.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I think you told us that it was your custom to include in your communication intelligence summary which you made daily the information which had come to you with reference to fleet and enemy vessel locations.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I call your attention to your intelligence summary as of November 30, 1941.

Captain LAYTON. I have the original before me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That appears in our record, Captain as Exhibit 115.

Now, will you explain to the committee what the significance would be of your report of November 30, as you explained it to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. It was my practice to take the communications intelligence summary to Admiral Kimmel at 8:15. He would accept it from my hand and sit and read it. Thereafter he would ask me questions regarding specific points and then a brief discussion would take place regarding its contents.

Thereafter, he would initial it, and in this case it has initials also of the War Plans Officer, then Captain McMorris. I cannot now recall specific words or discussions regarding this specific summary.

[12886] I would like to say, however, that since the middle of November the tenor of these discussions had been about the apparent change in the Japanese naval tactical organization as reflected by radio intercepts of their own circuits.

It was apparent that the normal volumes of traffic were increasing, that the commanders of certain fleets had decreasing importance. One, for example, the c. in c., Combined Fleet, the big boss, and the c. in c. of the Second Fleet, who correspond roughly to our commander, Scouting Forces, who commanded normally cruisers and destroyers, had taken a position high and above what he had been in the previous 6 to 8 or 10 months.

Also a fairly newly organized force, the Third Fleet that they sent out, and that we assumed to be an amphibious force, also was far more important in the traffic than he would have been under normal circumstances.

From receiving these from day to day there was no doubt in our minds that a task force was being formed.

This same phenomenon had been noted, only not so strongly, first in February 1941, when the Japanese decided to mediate the French Indochina-Thailand dispute over a border, and with a show of force went down and mediated.

The task force organization at that time was fairly well reflected in the traffic. The task force organization [12887] at that time was well proven in traffic. When the mediation was over the security measures were reduced and they returned to Tokyo.

This same sort of phenomenon had been noted in about July, 1941, when the Japanese, by ultimatum to Vichy and French Indochina authorities, decided to move in and take over certain Japanese naval bases and air bases in French Indochina.

Then we also received information from magic, from Washington, by the special channel, and were able to fill the picture very nicely.

To return to November 1941, I have spoken of the prominence of two fleet commanders. We had also the commander of the combined air forces, a shore-based air organization, which also contained air tenders with seaplanes aboard, and so forth.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Speaking now of the Japanese forces?

Captain LAYTON. Yes. The Japanese combined air force. They were also quite prominent.

Another point of interest at this time that had been noted and talked about was the fact that fleet units belonging to certain fleets apparently no longer had the same mother. For instance, some first fleet destroyers definitely were working for the second fleet.

[12888] Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, let me caution you right there, in relating this information as you saw it about the middle of November and from then on, I should like to have you confine yourself to information which was communicated to Admiral Kimmel and to his staff generally.

Captain LAYTON. This information was communicated to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Captain LAYTON. And was written up in the summary, which I will produce later, if you wish.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead. You said something about the ships not having the same mother.

Captain LAYTON. Various units no longer had their normal mothers. In other words, each fleet commander, that we call mother, had certain chickens, and some of these chickens no longer belonged to the mother, but belonged to other mothers of other fleets. This was an unusual procedure, because normally all naval traffic followed an administrative routing, and to have new commanders traced directly as subordinates of another commander was an unusual procedure and indicated he had a tactical interest as opposed to an administrative interest.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

Captain LAYTON. The associations of these commanders [12889] were entirely with southern addresses, Formosa, Hainan, and French Indochina. Their direction of movement clearly indicated they were bypassing Formosa, and they were going in that general direction.

It was noted also that certain Cardivs, carrier divisions, were apparently interested or concerned with this movement.

To be specific, the one we called Carrier Division 3, the one we called Carrier Division 4, apparently were concerned somewhat with this movement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many carriers in a division?

Captain LAYTON. Two, sir. As a result of this radio phenomenon, Admiral Kimmel became more interested day by day, and on the 24th told me to contact Rochefort and to see if he was receiving from other units any such phenomena. Rochefort's answer was to the effect that no one had reported this on the circuits. Admiral Kimmel then directed me to order a dispatch, to send a dispatch in a special system to the unit at Cavite and OpNav, making his observations and drawing the conclusions that had been drawn in the summaries which Admiral Kimmel had been reading.

The dispatch that Commander Rochefort originated and was sent to COM14 was the one read here in the testimony the other day. This was replied to by the fleet commander of the Sixteenth Naval Operation at Cavite, in which he agreed [12890] in part and elaborated in part and disagreed to a minor degree.

I have always believed, and I do to this day, that it was the result of these two dispatches to some degree that the war warning came on the 27th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Captain LAYTON. Speaking now from December 6, 1941, we had this information and no more, we saw this movement growing; we had reports from shore observers in China, assistant naval attachés, merchant skippers, consular authorities, that they had seen these ships loading and going out, that they had been sighted going south, the merchant marine ships stating that they were going south in a convoy, and the entire movement was noted as going south.

That was the radio picture. The visual picture, of course, was not as complete as to detail, or as to destination.

[12891] When the 27th of November war warning message came, as more than one officer on the staff has explained, that fits the picture, as we see it, and that was what I thought myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Coming up to the 30th of November, let me ask you, in the designation of that Intelligence summary under the styling of the Third Fleet you make the recital:

No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is under way.

Will you explain that statement?

Captain LAYTON. I did not write this summary and I cannot explain that statement other than to say that the operators and the supervisors who sat on these circuits week in, month in, and year in, had the impression, from the type of traffic they were seeing, that he was under way.

I can explain it a little further by this, by going back there in these summaries you will see where the commander in chief, Third Fleet, is a very busy originator of traffic. He is talking to the commander of the Second Fleet, he is talking to the commander of the Air Force, he is talking to the resident naval officer of Hainan, he is talking to the resident naval officer in Taihoku, to the present naval officer in Indochina, to the officer in charge at Palao in [12892] the Caroline Islands, he is entirely associated with them and with other high commands, C in C, Second Fleet, indicating he is getting ready to go in those directions. He then shows no longer in the traffic. He is still being addressed in the traffic. He is the addressee of other messages. But no messages originate from him that day. The operator gets the impression he is under way. I think that is what is meant in here.

Like all things, radio intelligence, however, has its limitations. I won't go into the technical details but when you identify one whom you don't know you do it by association, by his activities in the radio circuits, and by his known friends.

In this one, however, is an example of the misleading character of the radio intelligence information. In the general paragraph it states:

The only tactical circuit heard today was one with *Akagi* and several *Marus*.

A tactical circuit is one in which one unit calls another unit on strong enough power for us to hear at Pearl Harbor or Cavite. Normally, units do not communicate that way. Administrative traffic and command traffic is usually handled up a chain of command to its nearest shore station who broadcasts it, and it is then rebroadcast so that [12893] all addresses receive it on an umbrella.

The fact that *Akagi* was that day exercising with several marus was brought to my attention and the admiral noted it also. He asked me what I thought, as I recall it, and I said the *Akagi* was probably talking to some tanker marus, marus being merchant ships and probably going to get oil.

As a matter of fact we now know the *Akagi* was at sea under radio silence and was not talking to the marus because this same *Akagi* identified here was identified by Cavite on this day as moving southward from the Empire.

This, of course, is not to find fault with the time of information. It just has its limitations. It certainly is an inexact science and while the averages are good you cannot follow it on to the last detail and depend upon it without looking it over.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, referring to this language in the fourth paragraph:

Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

What is there in the presence of destroyers which gives an indication of the presence of carriers?

Captain LAYTON. There again is the technique of reading [12894] the enemy's radio signals without reading his messages and taking who does things as a rule and how he does it as a rule and using that as a thumb rule to find out what he is doing now.

The Japanese naval organization was so set up that originally the carriers or carrier divisions had been assigned to both First and Second Fleets. Sometime in the middle of 1941 this organization was apparently dissolved. It took us some time to find it out for sure. The carriers were lumped under one organization. But one of the Japanese tendencies had been to keep plane guard destroyers with the same carrier division and when they moved over from the First and Second Fleet into the Carrier Fleet they took their plane guard destroyers with them.

The presence of a plane guard destroyer in the Mandates would be the first and probably the only tip-off under normal circumstances if they were under radio silence that a carrier might be there, too. It wouldn't prove that the carrier was there, but under normal circumstances it would be logical to assume it. This, unfortunately, was not the case. This plane guard destroyer division, it later turned out, had been detached from the carriers and had gone to the Mandates to reinforce the Mandate Fleet. The deduction was right at the time but incorrect in fact.

[12895] Mr. RICHARDSON. Turning to the Intelligence summary of December 1 I note the statement:

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.

Will you explain that statement?

Captain LAYTON. Japanese radio call signs normally lasted about 6 months. It was anticipated on November 1 from the type of traffic before that that the call signs would change about November 1. They did so do. To find the radio call signs changing in only 1 month, and when I speak of radio call signs I am speaking of fleet and command call signs, not shore stations, this change was significant and was



considered an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations because, first, we saw tactical task forces being formed. We heard of them being formed from eye witnesses who had sighted them on the China coast.

Call signs changing then on December 1 along with the formation of task forces was a logical thought and that they were preparing for operation was also a logical sequence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, turning to the second page of the Communication Intelligence Summary of December 2, I note there in reference to carriers the statement:

[12896] Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today.

Now, when did this carrier silence, approximately, begin?

Captain LAYTON. There had been very little information on the carrier divisions and commander carriers who was their technical commander with the exception of Carrier Division 3 and sometimes Carrier Division 4 since early in November. There was no definite information throughout November as to their exact location or activity although from time to time a carrier call or carrier activity would be associated with shore stations, air bases.

On November 14 a statement was made:

The carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

The subject of carrier information thereafter was generally fragmentary but it was noted that BatDivThree, the carrier divisions, and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic and addressed letters to the Chief of Naval General Staff, which generally indicated impending operations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, for how many days prior to December 7 had there been general carrier silence?

Captain LAYTON. I would have to check the record to be exact. Carrier silence was not commented on as such at any [12897] time. The lack of information on the carriers was commented on after November 27. The November 27 summary indicated the carriers were still located in home waters.

It is to be remarked here, and I believe it to be of extreme importance in judging all these facts, that in this build-up that I mentioned, since the middle of November the association of forces, the tying together of your task forces, the commander of carriers, or carrier division commander, with the exception of Carrier Division 3, were not addressed, were not associated, and apparently were entirely aloof from the whole proceedings.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I called your attention a moment ago to your Intelligence summary of December 1 and to the language therein quoted:

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.

Now, it is a fact, is it not, that that opinion was directly presented to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that is the opinion which in your testimony before the Hewitt investigation you referred to as being, that sentence, being underlined in red pencil by Admiral Kimmel at the time?

[12898] Captain LAYTON. I have the original copy here and it is not underlined in red pencil. It was underlined in lead pencil. L-e-a-d.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the reference "in red pencil", was a mistake?

Captain LAYTON. That was a typographical error on the part of the recorder, I believe.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the underlining, however, was done by Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. At that time; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, is the—

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Counsel—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is the absence of information over a considerable period of time of the carriers any evidence of whether those carriers are at sea or in port?

Captain LAYTON. Not necessarily, sir. There have been many times during the course of 1941 and previously when not only carriers but battleships, cruisers and other types were not located by Radio Intelligence traffic. This is because when carriers or other types of vessels go into home waters, home ports, home exercise areas, they use low power radio direct with shore stations. This is then handled normally on telegraphic land lines to prevent our direction finder stations and intercept stations from hearing [12899] their traffic. During such periods as that we have always carried those units as "home waters."

Also when one of these vessels go into a navy yard for overhaul he suspends communications and it is handled by the nearest naval station for him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in reporting the fact that these carriers were lost, did you have in your mind at that time any apprehension as to what that might mean with respect to what the carriers were doing, speaking of your own apprehensions now?

Captain LAYTON. My apprehensions as of that time were briefly these: We have all of these units, all these commands, very well lined up for an operational, an offensive operation. We haven't seen the carriers except Cardiv 3 and sometimes Cardiv 4. Since it was my duty to keep track of the Japanese naval forces, I felt apprehensive as to where they were and therefore conferred with my opposite number daily regarding any evidence that might be able to be pieced out.

[12900] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you called Admiral Kimmel's attention to the fact that you didn't know where Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 were?

Captain LAYTON. That was at the time following the December 1, 1941, Communication Intelligence Summary which I have been referring to.

Admiral Kimmel told me to make out for him a location sheet on the Japanese Navy. I proceeded to do so from my current files, derived principally from Radio Intelligence.

I did it at December 1, 1941, that is, it was so typed, but I am positive in my mind that it was actually delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 2, 1941.

This location sheet showed the location, to the best of our knowledge, of the major portion of the Japanese Fleet and which, with the

exception of the Pearl Harbor Task Force was very active. In this location sheet I did not list Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division 2 because neither one of those commands had appeared in traffic for fully 15 and possibly 25 days. That is, identifiable traffic as an addressee, or as an originator.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, Admiral Kimmel at that time called your attention to the fact that you didn't know where those carriers were?

Captain LAYTON. He did, sir.

[12901] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was the occasion of his remark to you, to which you testified, Admiral Kimmel speaking:

Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it? My reply was I hoped they would be sighted before now.

Captain LAYTON. Words said to that effect. I believe that Admiral Kimmel said, "What, you do not know where the carriers are?" And my reply was as you read it, or words to that effect.

I must say that his saying "You mean they could be rounding Diamond Head," was to emphasize the fact that I didn't know where they were. I don't believe the admiral meant to say they were off Diamond Head, and I didn't know it, and I answered saying I hoped they would be sighted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any significance attached to lack of information concerning the whereabouts of the carriers that could be construed by you from your experience as indicating a possibility that they were at sea on a mission?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that everyone who has worked with enemy radio intelligence has always been aware that any force given sealed orders can get under way, go to sea, and as long as they don't use their radio, as long as they are not sighted, can move almost anywhere in the world, provided they are not sighted before they arrive where they [12902] are going.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then radio silence would, in itself, be one of the evidences from which it might be possible to deduce that certain warships were under sealed orders proceeding at sea and not using their radio?

Captain LAYTON. That would be a very difficult deduction to make, but one could make such a deduction, and I might say, in hindsight now, not foresight, that there was no evidence in this of considerations of radio silence.

I would like to point out that had these carriers or carrier-division commanders or the carrier commander in chief been addressed in any messages of the thousands and thousands that came out from the naval General Staff, regardless of the silence of carriers, then the thought of radio silence would have been paramount, but the fact that they were never addressed, not even once, led to the belief that they were in the same situation as the carrier divisions were in July 1941, when the Japanese had a task force go down with their ultimatum into French Indochina.

At that time the carriers remained in home waters, and not known as to where they were in a covering position, doubtlessly, in case we took counteraction, but where they continued training, returning to the Empire after the conclusion of the French Indochina matter.

[12903] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral Kimmel in his testimony asserted that there had been quite a number of occasions prior

to this period during early 1941 and 1940 when there was a similar absence of call signs from groups of ships and carriers, quite the same in intimation and extent of this absence of signs to which you have just testified.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any difference in your mind between the earlier lack of information and the present lack of information you are referring to here?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I believe it to be identical.

In the previous cases they were not addressed, nor did they address messages. In this case they followed the same pattern. I submitted a memorandum to the Roberts commission to that effect prepared by the Intelligence Unit under Commander Rochefort to give a general analysis of periods in which various types of ships were unlocated. Some types of ships were never located by radio intelligence because they didn't appear.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If it were felt that war was imminent and a war warning had been received, the fact that the carrier divisions 1 and 2 were lost, would have some significance in the evaluation of that warning, would it not, from an intelligence standpoint?

[12904] Captain LAYTON. The valuation of the enemy information was my job. I evaluated it to the best of my ability.

The formulation of the estimate of the enemy situation and its possible courses of action was not a function of Intelligence, and was laid down in the staff instructions as under Operations and War Plans.

I furnished those sections with my material. I furnished it to Admiral Kimmel. I did not at any time suggest that the Japanese carriers were under radio silence approaching Oahu. I wish I had. I did not so consider at that time.

My own personal opinion, and that is what we work on, when making estimates to ourselves, was that the carriers were remaining in home waters preparing for operations so that they would be in a covering position in case we moved against Japan after she attacked, if she did, in southeast Asia.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This information that you were giving, the method that you were following in assembling this information, continued every day up to the attack, did it?

Captain LAYTON. It continued every day up until I left Pearl Harbor on November 29, 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in conveying that information, you did your very best to acquaint Admiral Kimmel with all of the information at your disposal?

[12905] Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel had all of the information at my disposal.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you are not now conscious of having omitted any method of conveying information to him that you did not use?

Captain LAYTON. I feel confident of that. I also feel confident that Admiral Kimmel feels confident of that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't believe I have any questions now. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Just one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.

Captain, you say that you transmitted everything that you received to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. That is, in general, true. Certain things came in to the staff that I received that he received also in the course of routine routing of mail, dispatches, et cetera, which I did not have the responsibility for delivering.

Senator GEORGE. So far as you know, did the information which you gave Admiral Kimmel pass on to General Short?

Captain LAYTON. I was rarely present when Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. However, from time to time in late 1941, whenever naval task-force commanders came in to [12606] port, there was a conference in Admiral Kimmel's cabin wherein I outlined the recent strategic and tactical disposition of the Japanese Navy, their rearmament in the Marshall Islands, in the Carolines, and in general went over the entire picture as against Japan. On at least one and possibly more of these occasions, General Short was present and was so briefed by me.

However, when General Short and Admiral Kimmel had conferences between themselves, I was not a party to the conference.

Senator GEORGE. Do you recall any conference in which General Short participated late in November or in the first 6 days of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I have no definite recollection of what days they were, but I saw General Short in the admiral's outer office. I saw General Short's aide in the admiral's outer office waiting for General Short, who was inside with the admiral, and I believe it was the middle of November 1941, or around the 20th, perhaps, when I last saw General Short in at a general task-force briefing where I went over the Japanese situation as to the mandated islands, and the general disposition and tactical deployment of the Japanese Fleet.

Senator GEORGE. You say that was about the middle of November? [12907]

Captain LAYTON. About that time, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, did you continue to tell Admiral Kimmel, or submit your reports to Admiral Kimmel, indicating the loss of the carriers, or the lack of contact with the carriers, through the means available to you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. May I read those to you?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Captain LAYTON. December 1, 1941—

Senator GEORGE. Is that the original paper?

Captain LAYTON. This is the original paper made out at that time, and bears Admiral Kimmel's initials.

Carriers, no change.

December 2, 1941:

Carriers, almost a complete blank of information on the carriers, today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information.

I would like to say that the call-sign change had taken place the day before and with some twelve or fifteen thousand call signs being changed the lack of identification would naturally show little information on carriers.

However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change to the first of December, and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

[12908] About 200 calls is about 6 percent of the total.

Senator GEORGE. That was the 2d of December?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That was the 2d of December.  
December 3:

No information on submarines or carriers.

The 4th of December:

Carriers were not mentioned.

Fifth of December:

Carriers were not mentioned.

I beg your pardon. Correction.

No traffic from the commander carriers or submarine force has been seen.

Sixth of December, the summary was not delivered until after the attack.

Senator GEORGE. Do you have anything on the 6th of December relating to carriers? It wasn't delivered?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. It was not delivered until after the attack, and contained no information on the carriers.

Senator GEORGE. Captain, did the message of December 3 relating to the destruction reach you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That came through you?

[12909] Captain LAYTON. No, sir. That came through a special security officer who signed it, delivered to the admiral, Chief of Staff, head of war plans, Chief of Operations, and to myself, and the communications officer.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral Kimmel had that message, did he?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did he also have as information the message of December 4, 5, or 6—4 or 5—I believe, relating to the code destruction?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I am not clear on which message you refer to. The message I was referring to was a message stating that purple machines were being destroyed at certain places. Admiral Kimmel sent for me and asked me what a purple machine was.

Senator GEORGE. That was the December 3 message?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That was the information that was sent direct to him, was it?

Captain LAYTON. That was information sent—information to him; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Sent as information to him?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; and he sent for me, wanted to know what the purple machine was, and I told him I did not [12910] know but would find out.

I went to the fleet security officer, late Lieutenant Coleman, and asked him, and he said it was an electric diplomatic coding machine of the Japs, and I so reported it to Admiral Kimmel.

[12911] Senator GEORGE. Now, subsequent to that there were two other messages that referred to codes. I don't know whether you have them there or not. Did they go to Admiral Kimmel also as information?

Captain LAYTON. One on December 3 saying:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

That is the one you refer to?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that was received.

Senator GEORGE. That was received also?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That was believed to be another version of the one I previously mentioned, Circular 2444, from Tokyo, speaking of purple machines.

Senator GEORGE. I believe I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart, of California, will inquire.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, the answers to these questions of mine may be obvious. They are put for the purpose of the [12912] record.

Is there any absolutely sure method of preventing a surprise attack?

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Gearhart, I am glad you asked me that question. I was a little curious myself at the end of the war to see what the results had been during the war. If I may have your indulgence for a minute, I will try and find my paper.

To avoid having any personal interest I asked CincPac Analytical Section. They analyzed all reports from all sources and put them together in what they thought was the best narrative of what happened. I told them that I wanted to have a study made of all our carrier task force raids throughout the course of the war, and that I would like to know what degree of surprise they were able to have against the Japs who were supposed to be looking for them.

I told them to go on the cautious side, if anything. And this is what was handed to me by the chief of that section:

There were 72 major raids by carrier-based planes in the Pacific during World War II in which it might have been expected that the element of surprise would be present. Of these, 21, or 29% percent achieved complete surprise; 32 or 44% percent achieved partial surprise; 15 or 20% percent achieved no element of surprise; and 4 or [12913] 5.5 percent achieved an unknown element of surprise.

In this tabulation raids on the same area within a week's time or on areas under amphibious attack or under bombardment were not included.

Mr. GEARHART. That is very interesting. I don't think I got the third one. Will you repeat it?

Captain LAYTON. There were 21, which is 29% percent; 32, which is 44% percent; 15, which is 20% percent; and 4 or 5% percent.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, that was surprise to the Japs?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When they were at war with us, when they were on the lookout for us, using all of their methods to prevent surprise?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then anything that is done to prevent surprise is merely to reduce the probability of surprise; is that not correct?

Captain LAYTON. In general I think that is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you were to say anything else you would say there would be a method of preventing surprise absolutely.

Captain LAYTON. There is, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. There is?

[12914] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. If you have all the information from the enemy's intercepts and you are reading enough of his systems you can prevent a surprise, and we did it at Midway.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, what you are saying is that if you achieve perfection then you approach the absolute.

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. But that isn't to be expected in human affairs on very, very many occasions, is it?

Captain LAYTON. Perfection is a very rare thing, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, one of the best methods that could have been pursued to have prevented the surprise at Pearl Harbor would have been to have placed in operation adequate and efficient long-distance patrol; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is one of the ways, sir. I think the Japanese in the early part of the war had an efficient method. The raid that Halsey conducted to take General Doolittle and his brave fliers into Tokyo in April 1942 was prevented not by aerial reconnaissance but by picket boats or fishing boats, thousands of them, spread out there 800 miles to the east of Japan, wherein no task force could penetrate without being seen.

They sank the picket boats but they got their radio message off.

[12915] Mr. GEARHART. Then if they had sufficient equipment to have carried on an adequate long-distance aerial reconnaissance for 360° around Hawaii the opportunity of a surprise would have been greatly reduced?

Captain LAYTON. Greatly reduced subject to weather conditions which would allow the search to be effective. Weather conditions prevented a plane from seeing forces, at that time, before the installation of radar.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you any idea how many airplanes of the long-distance reconnaissance type would have been required to keep up a long-distance reconnaissance around that island that was adequate?

Captain LAYTON. That is a little out of my field. I would rather let the operations people and the aviation people answer those technical questions.

Mr. GEARHART. I think the figures you have given here are very helpful. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire, Captain.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Layton, apparently from your answer about this purple machine you were not familiar with the fact that Washington was intercepting the diplomatic messages that the Japanese were using the machine to decipher?

Captain LAYTON. I was not personally familiar with the [12916] machine. I knew that Washington had been, in July 1941, intercepting and decrypting Japanese high diplomatic traffic because they told us what the Japanese were going to demand of Vichy and what they were going to do if Vichy didn't give in, and they also laid out the



bases they were going to take and which they did take. So I was aware that our unit in Washington was working and having success as of July with the Japanese, as you call it now, high-level diplomatic system.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know the name "purple"?

Captain LAYTON. The name "purple" was new to me. I had never heard it.

Senator FERGUSON. So when the word "purple" came in on the message you were not familiar with what they were talking about?

Captain LAYTON. I didn't know what "purple machine" meant. I thought it probably was one of our code names to cover some device or means of decrypting messages, perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now,, you mentioned these messages came to you in July and you knew we were intercepting them here in Washington.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any specific notice that they were not going to give you any more of that kind [12917] of information?

Captain LAYTON. I had noticed, sir. I had written to my opposite number in Washington, Captain McCollum, and had urged him to send us diplomatic traffic of the very nature of which you speak. He replied in a personal letter and said it was determined that we should not have this sent to us because in fact Washington was the place best qualified both by personnel in number and in experience to evaluate it and to disseminate this information to the fleet and assured me that we would get what we needed at the time we needed it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you have that personal letter?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have it with you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. Shall I read it, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON (reading):

APRIL 22, 1941.

DEAR EDDIE: Sorry to be so late in replying to your letter of 11 March but I have just gotten out of the hospital after having them trim me down a trifle. I have taken up the [12918] matter of getting you the Fortnightly Summary by air mail and hope that this matter will be adjusted in the very near future but I cannot be certain as another division handles the mailing and distribution of this report.

I would like to add parenthetically that we got it.

I thoroughly appreciate that you would probably be much helped in your daily estimates if you had at your disposal the DIP.

That is what I asked for, "DIP", standing for diplomatic traffic.

This, however, brings up matters of security, et cetera, which would be very difficult to solve. While I appreciate your position fully in the matter, still I cannot agree that this material should be forwarded to you in the way you suggest. It seems reasonable to suppose that the Department should be the origin for evaluated political situations as its availability of information is greater than that of any command afloat, however large, its staff is larger and it should be in a position to evaluate the political consequences. Therefore it would seem that the forces afloat must rely on the Department for evaluated views of political situations.

I should think that the forces afloat should, in general, confine themselves to the estimates of the strategic [12919] and tactical situations with which they will be confronted when the time of action arrives. The material you mentioned can necessarily have but passing and transient interest as action in the political sphere is determined by the Government as a whole and not by the forces afloat.

It does not seem to me to be very practical to build up an organization afloat which will merely duplicate the efforts of the Intelligence Division in the Department. I appreciate that all this leaves you in rather a spot as naturally people are interested in current developments. I believe, however, that a sharp line should be drawn and a distinction continuously emphasized between information that is of interest and information that is desirable to have on which to base action.

In other words, while you and the Fleet may be highly interested in politics, there is nothing that you can do about it. Therefore, information of political significance, except as it affects immediate action by the Fleet, is merely a matter of interest to you and not a matter of utility.

Senator FERGUSON. Signed?

Captain LAYTON. I have another paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON (reading):

I think your remarks concerning the slate are very [12920] apt and pertinent.

The word "slate" means the slate for language officers in case of war.

I would, however, ask you to look at this other aspect of the situation. If the officers concerned are to continue to be of use to the Navy in their specialty they must be given a reasonable opportunity for promotion. Certain of the promotion laws are matters of law and are not within the province of the Bureau of Navigation or of any Selection Board to modify.

I don't believe reading this letter any further will have any influence on the Pearl Harbor investigation, Senator. It is a long talk about why the officers have to go to sea and cannot remain at their posts.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is of interest to the committee.

Captain LAYTON [reading]:

A case in point—I am advised by the Bureau of Navigation that Birtley—

Commander Birtley was then the officer in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit and who was relieved as officer in charge by Commander Rochefort later on. I was trying to get him kept on in view of his experience. [Reading further:]

A case in point—I am advised by the Bureau of [12921] Navigation that Birtley is barely over the line in sea duty in rank for the promotion to the grade of Commander, and they were not quite sure of their computation. In other words, it is desirable from the Bureau's viewpoint and from the point of view of law for Birtley to get to sea for about a year so that there will be no question as to his qualifications for promotion.

Fullinwider, of course, has no sea duty in rank and as he must have two years sea duty in rank before his next grade he cannot afford to stay ashore much more than about another year and we are leaving him there for just that.

I had asked for Fullinwider. He had been there for 2 years. Birtley had been there for 2 years. I wanted Commander Rochefort to come there as the most experienced and talented officer in the line. I felt that the Pacific Fleet needed the best talent on the spot.

Senator FERGUSON. You conveyed that to McCollum?

Captain LAYTON. In a personal letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He is telling you why you can't have these valuable men?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

This whole subject is tied up with matters of the progress of the work as a whole. I appreciate that the local view frequently looms very big but in assigning personnel [12922] to stations and providing for shifts in personnel I must consider future requirements as well as present needs.

In this connection, we ran on a present need basis for several years with the result that our talent all of a sudden disappeared from certain important billets and I have had a great deal of difficulty in getting all of our stations on a functioning basis again. All of them are just now functioning with some degree of satisfaction and continuity and in order to provide for this desirable continuity, I might even say essential continuity, a definite plan for shifting personnel is essential.

I appreciate that the two boys in Honolulu are doing exceptionally good work and for that reason I would like to see them stay there, but for their own good and more important for the good of the specialized service as a whole, some shift is going to have to be made and Honolulu is the place that a general study of the situation indicates to be the logical place to make the change.

I hope to have the new silhouettes in the mail within the next two weeks. I am ashamed that they have not been sent out before now but I have been forced to accept a reduction in priority of this work as the powers that be have considered other work more urgent. The instruction models I will have to check up on for you although I had [12923] understood that they were already being sent out.

I hope that you will keep in touch with me from time to time as I value your comments very highly.

With best regards,

MAC.

Over the signature of A. H. McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you any other letters or memoranda?

Captain LAYTON. No other pertaining to Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that would indicate, that letter, that you were told at that time that you would not be getting diplomatic matter except that which the Department here wanted you to know for action?

Captain LAYTON. That affected action on the part of the fleet; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you believe up until the time of the attack that you were getting all diplomatic intercepted messages that would in any way relate to the action of the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. I thought that the Department had sent us everything they had and when I learned a couple of years later that we had been short-changed I was outraged and astonished.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we have in evidence three intercepts of so-called diplomatic messages, the one of the [12924] intrigue in Thailand and the two in relation to the codes. Do you know of any others? One is on the 1st of December and the other two are on the 3d of December. Do you know of any other for action? Those show on their face that they were the so-called magic or purple, or at least intercepts. You didn't know them by the name of magic. Are those the only three messages that showed on their face that they were intercepted Japanese messages?

Captain LAYTON. Those are the only ones I recall at present. I am sure there weren't many others, if there was even one.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't understand.

Captain LAYTON. Those are the only ones I recall at present, although the setting up on the winds code may be included in that same category.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now how can we find out how many other messages there are that on their face indicate that they were intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages?

Captain LAYTON. I have my file here. If the Senator will give me a little time I will go through it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will be glad to give you time. I think that is important.

Captain LAYTON. I have one dated December 1, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your file?

[12925] Captain LAYTON. That is the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, intelligence file, sir. I have kept it since December 1940, when I first reported for duty.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that message?

Captain LAYTON. It is a duplication of the one you just handed me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That I gave you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON. It started out "Ambassador in Bangkok."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I have one here dated November 28, 1941, from Cincaf to Opnav, Cincpac, Com14, and Com16, which I am sure you have in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the winds?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that is the five times winds and the two times winds.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson has to go to the floor, and in the meantime Mr. Richardson has a question or two.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, are you the author of this map of Pearl Harbor that has been set up on this side of the room?

Captain LAYTON. I am not the artist; no, sir. The [12926] map of Pearl Harbor made from existing records in the office of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, was constructed by the direction of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to show this committee if they wished where the ships were at the time of the attack; also where a couple of them moved during the time of the attack, and to show what has been referred to as Japanese submarine track around Ford Island.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Suppose you take the pointer, Captain, and give us a demonstration on that map of the information it is intended to convey.

Captain LAYTON. This map, with its color for sounding, does not lend itself to being seen, but I will show with this pointer the course laid down on a captured map from the Japanese midget submarine the course he intended to follow. His course has been projected on the map which is a United States naval confidence chart of Pearl Harbor corrected and brought up to date as of December 7, 1941. It is to be remarked when you see me put this submarine on the ground that I am following his track as he laid it down in his chart, which was not a correct chart.

He comes up the channel here to this point; then he starts almost due north.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Does this arrow indicate due north?

[12927] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Here he arrives in the vicinity of Hickam Field; this is Hickam Field here; this area here is a naval section base at Bishop Point; this point is Bishop Point.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you indicate where the entrance net is?

Captain LAYTON. The entrance net was here, sir.

And the course of this midget submarine as he projected it in his chart places him almost aground on the corner of Bishop Point; he then was going to proceed on this course to this position and then around Ford Island to this position and then to cut across; and notice that he cuts across these ships that were anchored there at the time, across these ships to this position and down here and down here; and he goes then under a position which the *Nevada* has moved to after she was under way during the attack and ground herself; and then he proceeds on out.

Actually I can prove, and any naval officer will believe me, that he was never inside of Pearl Harbor. That was his intended course.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it is your opinion that the chart which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating that he actually entered the harbor and made a circuit of the harbor was not correct, and it was simply a projection of the course?

[12928] Captain LAYTON. It was a projected course and not an accomplished course. And, furthermore, the prisoner in interrogation never said that he went inside of Pearl Harbor.

As a matter of fact, he still had his torpedoes aboard when picked up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where was he picked up?

Captain LAYTON. At Bellows Field, over at Kaneohe Bay.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Show where the different vessels were. What is this channel to the left?

Captain LAYTON. This is West Loch. It is not used, as a rule, by naval vessels, except ammunition vessels, to unload at the ammunition depot over here.

At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is U. S. S. *California*.

At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is the oiler *Neosho*. She got under way and moved about the harbor. She was full of high-test gasoline and was not touched.

Alongside this mooring is the *Maryland* and *Oklahoma*. I beg pardon. *Oklahoma*.

Alongside of this mooring is the *Tennessee* and *West Virginia*.

Alongside of this mooring was the *Arizona* and the repair [12929] ship *Vista*. The *Vista* got under way and moved over here.

The *Nevada* had been in this position, got under way at the time of the attack and moved down here.

These were destroyers.

This was a hospital ship, *Solace*.

This was a destroyer.

This was the cruiser *Phoenix*.

Later two destroyers.

Tender and destroyers.

Four destroyers.

There were four destroyers.

Here was a cruiser, *Detroit*.

Light cruiser *Raleigh*.

The old training ship *Utah*.

And there was the *Tangier*.

Seaplane tender *Curtiss* was here.

*Medusa*, a repair ship, was here.

Mine sweeping destroyers were here.

The ships that moved, the principal ships that moved were the vessels from alongside the *Arizona*, which grounded itself.

The *Nevada* moved down here.

The cruiser *Detroit*, these four destroyers, part of these destroyers, the *Phoenix*, these two destroyers, one [12930] destroyer. The *Solace* moved over here. And the *Nevada*, which I mentioned before.

I think that covers the high lights.

MR. RICHARDSON. Where are the oil supplies?

Captain LAYTON. These are the oil supply tanks of Pearl Harbor, and here. There.

MR. RICHARDSON. Where are the beaches where the patrol planes were maintained?

Captain LAYTON. The patrol planes, sir?

MR. RICHARDSON. Patrol planes.

Captain LAYTON. The patrol planes were operating from this section of Ford Island here.

MR. RICHARDSON. Where is the airport where the carrier planes were?

Captain LAYTON. They were in this field here.

MR. RICHARDSON. That is Ford Island?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

MR. RICHARDSON. Nothing further.

MR. KEEFE. Captain, I understand your testimony to be that you communicated the available intelligence to Admiral Kimmel and his staff each morning?

Captain LAYTON. To Admiral Kimmel each morning; to other members of his staff on every two or three mornings, sometimes every other day, depending on their availability and the amount of material available for them to see. The [12931] Communication Intelligence summaries that I have referred to were mostly always shown to the Chief of Staff and frequently to the Chief of Plans, War Plans, and the operations officer. These officers all saw the evaluated intelligence summaries that I also wrote up for the entire staff.

[12932] MR. KEEFE. In your answers to questions before the Hart investigation you stated in substance facts which I assume is what you mean to tell us today:

Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available, concerning the Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Daily, at about eight-fifteen in the morning. If subsequent thereto an important dispatch was received, generally from Cavite, or if important developments took place and reported from local communications intelligence unit, I would take it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity he was free.

Q. Did those daily visits to Commander-in-Chief usually bring forth discussions concerning the intelligence?

A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted and as to the Japanese dispositions, intentions, and future operations of the forces concerned, and a general discussion of the situation in general.

That is correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading) :

Q. Was it usual for any other members of the [12933] Staff or any of the Commanders of the Fleet's task forces to be present during those discussions?

A. The Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions, the senior War Plans Officer and the senior Operations Officer was called in and a discussion then held. Often during these discussions I was no longer required and was permitted to retire. When Task Force Commanders, who were then operating out two weeks and in one week, approximately, would return to port, the Admiral would send for me and have me review for the benefit of the Task Force Commanders, then in port the situation and developments that had taken place during their absence and a general discussion of Japanese potentialities, capabilities, strength would ensue.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is generally the manner that you operated?

Captain LAYTON. That is a better general picture than I have told orally here because I had a chance to put question marks, punctuation, and periods in that testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. And during these discussions you were in the habit of expressing your own opinion and estimate as to the situation that confronted the commander in chief?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel encouraged officers to [12934] express themselves and I took advantage of that opportunity to express my own opinions on several occasions.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when messages came in which were considered important, there was a general staff discussion as to the meaning and intent of that particular message, was there not?

Captain LAYTON. There were staff discussions almost every day. My participation in the staff discussions was generally of an intelligence nature, such as briefing the staff on the situation as developed and giving them the picture so they would not have to read a lot of material. Then I would be allowed to retire while they discussed specific phases, particularly regarding the war plans.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, did you have a liaison with the Army through the person of Col. Edwin Raley?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He was appointed by the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Captain LAYTON. I understood that at the time, Mr. Keefe. He came to me in the middle of 1941 and said he wanted to establish a liaison with the fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I told him that I was delighted and thereafter I saw Colonel Raley from time to time. Shortly [12935] thereafter the B-17's were to be flown to Australia and the Philippines and I furnished him all the information I had available of weather or bases, including some secret information from the Dutch that we had received regarding the air bases in Dutch territory that could be used.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event there was complete, direct, friendly and intimate and almost daily liaison with the Army through the officers that had been appointed by the G-2 in the presence of Colonel Raley?

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Raley and I saw one another on an average of maybe twice a week in late October and I am sure at least

three times a week or more often in late November of 1941. Our liaison was so good—I mean by good, I could get together with his liaison officer. His assistant reported to me, to my desk the morning of the attack and remained there for some 18 hours so that liaison would be intimate and correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to get this one fact clear, that so far as the relations in matters of intelligence between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor you had an intimate and a direct and a constant relationship.

Captain LAYTON. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you transferred, as I understand it, to the Army through their liaison officer Colonel Raley the im- [12936] portant information that you thought the Army should have?

Captain LAYTON. I had to dress it down from some of its very secret action. I could not tell him the sources and because I was under oath I went a little further than my oath allowed.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Captain LAYTON. But Admiral Kimmel knew I was doing it. I had his permission to make and give Colonel Raley a little more than you could under the oath that I was under obligation to. I would not tell him how it came about we knew these things, but I would inform him of the general details. He knew of this December 1 message—he did not know it was a message—regarding the plot by the Japanese to force the British to invade Thailand so that the Thais could call the British the aggressor and then call on the Japanese to come and help them out. He knew that.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not have this message which has been introduced in evidence here, or discuss that one, the so-called plotting message, by which the Japs sought to plot Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. Unfortunately, Mr. Keefe, it was not transmitted to the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. And some other things were not communicated [12937] to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. I think Exhibit 1—

Mr. KEEFE. Which were considered important.

Captain LAYTON. I think Exhibit 1 covers most of those, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you made a statement a few moments ago in response to Senator Ferguson's question, that about 2 years after Pearl Harbor, when you learned that you had been short-changed, you were very much upset and disturbed.

Captain LAYTON. I was outraged, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You said you were outraged?

Captain LAYTON. I still am, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, will you explain that just a little more, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Perhaps my outrage, being 2 years after Pearl Harbor, is hindsight, but throughout this war I have been the fleet intelligence officer and the combat intelligence officer and directly charged with informing our forces at sea with all pertinent information of the Japanese dispositions or intentions or anything else that had to do with our forces and for their own safety, had I been negligent for 1 minute and not informed our forces of things which should be known, I would have been court-martialed and possibly shot and deserved it. That, of course, was during the war.



[12938] Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, I have before me an affidavit of Col. Edward W. Raley, who at the time of making this affidavit was at Langley Field, Va., and who was allegedly sworn by Henry C. Clausen, and in this affidavit Colonel Raley says this:

On 7 December 1941 and for about one year preceding I was G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Commander Layton, U. S. N.

I close the quote there and I want to inquire: From this affidavit it would appear that Colonel Raley is drawing a distinction between G-2 of the Army and G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force.

Captain LAYTON. There is a distinction, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you understand that that was his capacity when he contacted you?

Captain LAYTON. I knew that he was the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force. When he came to establish his liaison I understood that he was coming as Army liaison, without distinguishing in my mind G-2, Hawaiian Department, or G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. He did, however, say, and I agreed with him, to the effect that this liaison was an ideal one insofar as the Navy and the Air Force were offensive weapons while the Hawaiian Department [12939] ment was a defense garrison, and, therefore, our liaison should be good and intimate, and we thereafter carried on that liaison.

Mr. KEEFE. I am quoting again from his affidavit:

I told Commander Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year I had not more than six conversations with Commander Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Commander Layton before 7 December 1941 was about October 1941.

The information given me by Commander Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan coming to his knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 December 1941.

Any information I received from Commander Layton I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin.

On 1 October 1941 I conferred with Commander Lay- [12940] ton and Colonel Bicknell, who was the Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this to General Martin. Attached are portions of a letter, written by me to my daughter on 2 October 1941, concerning this conference.

Now I want to get this straightened out because the colonel's affidavit is here in the record for what it is worth: I have had no chance, or no one on the committee has had any chance to examine Col. Edward Raley, but I would like to get the exact liaison that existed between you and the Army out there at Hawaii and if I am to read his affidavit correctly, he states that he was merely representing the Hawaiian Air Force and that he reported to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin.

Now, to a layman this is difficult to understand. It perhaps explains some of the reasons why Pearl Harbor occurred.

Now, I understand your story to be that there was complete friendly relations and almost daily liaison with the Army officer.

He says he did not have over six conversations in a year and the last one was in October 1941, before Pearl Harbor. Now, that raises a question of fact. If I am to consider Colonel Raley's affidavit at all, I have got to [12941] appraise it in connection with the testimony that you have given to the committee. Do you understand the purpose of my questions?

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Keefe, my testimony that I gave you here is the facts and I am sure in my heart that if Col. Edward Raley—I think I called him Edwin before—were to testify here he would say exactly what I have said or words to that effect. Now, I would like to point out one thing. His affidavit was made—

Mr. KEEFE. I will give you the date. It was made the 11th of March 1945.

Captain LAYTON. Perhaps his memory has slipped him on that but he referred to a Japanese attack on Malay, didn't he?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. And may I point out that Ambassador Subokimo's dispatch received by CINCPAC on December 1 was the thing that I testified to as having told him and which he in turn refers to as having been told him here.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. That would indicate that I saw him some time after November 30, wouldn't it?

Mr. KEEFE. It would indicate that you saw him after October at least, Captain.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[12942] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to say to you and I am glad to say so for the purposes of the record—

Captain LAYTON. I would like to continue if I may, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes. Pardon me.

Captain LAYTON. I am sure that Colonel Raley in making this affidavit had a bad memory or his recollection was not too good. He has always been a personal friend of mine and I know that if he were to stand here I could recollect things to him.

For example, as I recall the Army-Navy game was played on Saturday, the 29th of November 1941. He invited myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, to join him at the Officers' Club at Hickam Field the evening before that game. We had a little conversation and I took him outside the club, out onto the veranda away from ears, to tell him what was the latest developments at that time in my office and again impressed him with what I considered the seriousness of the situation. I am sure that Colonel Raley will remember that and I believe that his attitude at that time was one of not considering the importance of this matter as you have brought it up, or of the recollection of the matters that I have brought up.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I do not want to be prejudging anyone, but the testimony that you have given here so far as I am [12943] concerned has a ring of complete sincerity and truth in it and it has impressed me just exactly that way. But, of course, this committee has got to try to understand this testimony and reconcile the differences that exist as best we can. That is what I am trying to do.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It is going to be a difficult job as we go along and see these differences that crop out in this testimony.

Well, now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you stated:

I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. However, I was not given a lot of pieces of this jig-saw puzzle. All the pieces I had made a pretty good picture and when you work as I have in Intelligence I can say it is nothing more than piecing up pieces that do not belong to a jigsaw and pieces that do belong to jigsaw until you form a framework. Then you try to complete the framework of a puzzle until you get [12944] enough to show you what your complete picture is. Unfortunately, there were other sets of jigsaw puzzles that went with this one that were not given us, so all I could do was use what I had and I was surprised.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, Captain, am I correct in saying this, that to me your testimony means that you had a pretty good mosaic or a jigsaw worked out and put together from what information was available to you and that information indicated that there was going to be war but that it would take place in its initial phases, at least, way off to the southwest, is that right?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir, backed additionally by the past experience of the previous Japanese task force movement to French Indochina, which took place and which was backed up by diplomatic intercept dispatches to us to inform us as to the nature of these ultimatums as to what the Japanese were going to do, which they did.

Here again we have the same build-up, we have a possibility, we get everything that Washington gives us with that and so our jigsaw puzzle as we make it looked pretty good at that time. As a matter of fact, it looked good in Washington.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you had in that jigsaw puzzle this war warning message of the 27th—

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

[12945] Mr. KEEFE (continuing). Did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me ask you this: Not having ever been an intelligence officer and not too intelligent in any respect connected with this whole business, I would like to have you tell me this because you are one witness that we have had here who talks plainly and frankly and you know what you are talking about, you know your business:

Is it possible in interpreting the actions of men in the armed services charged with responsibility to judge their conduct by any one particular message such as this war warning message of the 27th of November, or must you judge that message in connection with all the other intelligence and all the other information that is available to the commander in the field?

Captain LAYTON. It has been my experience, limited as it may be, that certain commanders write certain messages in certain ways. I believe that certain commanders under them know what their commander means by the way he writes his message. I do not think—other than that, I do not believe I can comment.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I might say to you that a very high-ranking officer in the intelligence field and who has not yet been a witness here

but whose affidavit appears in this [12946] so-called Clausen file, I have had a chance to talk with at some length and the conclusion that I have gotten from that man was that you cannot pick out of intelligence any one single message and say that is the message which determines the responsibility of a commander in the field.

Take a man situated exactly as Kimmel was or as Short was: Kimmel gets this so-called war warning message and the implications have been that that ought to be sufficient to warn anybody to go out and do certain things, execute a suitable defensive deployment of his ships when he also has an order before him, war plan 46, which required him to attack, spearhead an attack into the Marshalls.

Now, the point is, can I, as one attempting to evaluate this picture look at that one war warning message of the twenty-seventh and disregard all the other information and all of the other wires and all the other orders that might affect his decision as to what to do? That is what I am struggling with in my mind, trying to get it straightened out.

Captain LAYTON. Any commander who took only one message and based his course of action on one message would most likely be relieved of his command because his guess most likely would be wrong.

I have a file here and here of probably 50 messages from Chinese sources and diplomatic sources. I mean consuls [12947] and assistant naval attachés, Chiang Kai-shek's representative, and so forth, saying that the Japanese are positively going to invade Russia next week. I did not take any of this to be factual until something else backs it up. You have to have all these things and intelligence must be backed up by something else. That is what makes the jig-saw puzzle.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Having all these messages and finally here is a message comes through which I believe in your statement before the Hart committee, before Admiral Hart, you said was the first message of its kind you had ever seen?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. A war warning message?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It would be striking, it would be called to the attention of anybody, wouldn't it?

Captain LAYTON. It would, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, that message must have been discussed out there, and I believe the evidence here shows that it was discussed in the staff meetings of Admiral Kimmel.

Captain LAYTON. There was a staff meeting that afternoon and evening, yes. I was drafting a paraphrase for delivery to General Short. As a matter of fact, I had a draft—I had to draft three paraphrases before I found one that carried the picture right without destroying it.

[12948] When I took it to Admiral Kimmel's cabin there were discussions going on at the time. There were about half a dozen of our higher echelon staff in there. At that time the chief of staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought General Short's message from the War Department over there and gave it to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, you found difficulty, as far as the staff was concerned, in determining what to do, all discussing the message that

came from Marshall to Short and here is a message from their Chief of Naval Operations to Kimmel.

Now, we are sitting here on this committee judging by hindsight what men should have done. They were faced out there with the situation as it was on the 7th of December and I am trying to put myself in that position.

Now, there were a lot of distinguished men on that staff, were there not?

Captain LAYTON. I thought so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Very able men?

Captain LAYTON. I am sure of that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you participate in any of those discussions with respect to this war warning message?

Captain LAYTON. No, I did not, sir. I was busy making this paraphrase and thereafter I was told to get it to General Short. I was not in on the discussions of the war warning [12949] message.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event, Captain Layton, so far as you were concerned, with available to you all of the information that had come out there to Admiral Kimmel—you knew of all of it, didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were the one that supplied him with the information?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were utterly and completely surprised at this attack the moment that it came?

Captain LAYTON. I was, sir, very.

Mr. KEEFE. But I understand your testimony to be that had you had the information that Washington had, which they did not send out there, then a situation might well have arisen in your mind?

Captain LAYTON. That is hindsight, sir, but I feel confident that had we had all that material, particularly those main intercepts from the consul and from Foreign Minister Togo to the consul telling him to make reports even when there wasn't anything to report, I think there would have been an entirely different situation there, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you people out there knew that the Japs were destroying their codes and orders went out from [12950] Washington here to go to our outlying possessions for them to destroy their codes; you knew that, didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That simply confirmed the fact that war was going to start; isn't that true?

Captain LAYTON. It did to me, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But so far as the information which you had of the places where the war was going to start it led you all to believe that it was going to start out in the Far East; is that right?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is why everybody was surprised when it started with an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you made the statement that you did a little while ago, if I understand you correctly, you felt outraged and still feel outraged because of the fact that you were not supplied with the information which you now feel had you had it at that time would

have given you people out there an entirely different picture of the situation?

Captain LAYTON. I feel very confident of that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the funny part of it is, Captain, from all the witnesses that have been here before this committee in the higher echelons in Washington, everyone of them [12951] were surprised, from the Commander in Chief on down apparently, that there was any attack on Pearl Harbor. Nobody expected an attack on Pearl Harbor apparently, those in Washington here who had all this information. You have read the testimony, I assume, or heard it?

Captain LAYTON. I have heard a good part of it, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. You got that impression, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There are only two witnesses who differ in that respect and I think I am right in that, I have been trying to follow this thing carefully. One is Admiral Turner and the other is Captain Zacharias; they were the only two witnesses, and Zacharias' testimony was in the form of a sort of prophecy. Admiral Turner seemed to be the only one that had any idea that there might be any possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, was there anybody out there that you knew out at Pearl Harbor that had any idea that there was a likelihood of an attack at that point?

Captain LAYTON. I feel very positive that there was no one there that was not as surprised as I was. I feel confident also that had anyone predicted this attack coming that something would have been done.

[12952] Mr. KEEFE. Well, Captain, you say that in view of the fact that this book that has been referred to here several times by some Jap, that some Jap wrote predicting the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor—you were all familiar with that, were you not?

Captain LAYTON. I translated it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You translated it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That had all been presented to Kimmel and his staff and evaluated, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. That was a book dealing with the movements or possible actions of the Japanese Fleet after the outbreak of war. It did not predict a surprise attack before war and it was one of many of their courses of action.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Captain LAYTON. I do not mean to say for a minute that the Japanese did not have the Pearl Harbor raid as a potentiality, but it was not by itself, in my own mental estimate, made as a capability, capability being differentiated in the military sense as something that they can and will do under the proper circumstances. The Japanese proved that it was a capability.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you made this comment, Captain:

[12953] I have one matter which I think should be properly included in the record. Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned before, always consulted with his Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warning for instance, and had with them, many times in my hearing, a complete, free, and frank dis-

cussion of the situation, and asked and received their opinions regarding it. I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the *California*, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down.

That meant the Philippines and Guam, did it not?

[12954] Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversations in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank.

Now, is that a fair statement of the situation, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. That is a very fair statement of the situation as I saw it then and as I see it now.

Mr. KEEFE. You further said:

It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you made that statement before Admiral Hart in the face of the fact that you were the fleet intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

[12955] Mr. KEEFE. And had all of the available information that came to Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And were the individual who discussed it with the commander in chief, Admiral Kimmel, and with the commanders of his task forces?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Who were Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, I believe.

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Brown and Admiral Halsey and Admiral Pye were the three task force commanders.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes.

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Newton was a subordinate of Admiral Brown, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. I think perhaps that is right. My recollection is that Admiral Newton was in command of this task force in which the carrier—

Captain LAYTON. That is correct. On the movement just before December 7 Admiral Newton was put in command of that task unit or group because part of the force went to Johnston Island for landing-force exercises, so the reference to that as a task force as I have there would be a misnomer.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you further made this statement. I would like to have this in the record and have you confirm it [12956] to this committee and in this record. This question was asked you:

Q. Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase concerning war warning in the Department's dispatch of 27 November?

A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever seen saying "This is a war warning", I took particular note of it. I thought it over considerably. Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping, meanwhile, to mollify us through a compromise deal with Kurusu-Nomura negotiations. It made me feel that the picture we had was a good picture, and perhaps complete, and that the times were very critical and perhaps the Department hoped for a last minute compromise in view of their statement that nothing should be done to aggravate an already serious situation. I saw the Army that evening take their condition of readiness, trucks moving, troops moving, and I thought I saw weapons moving in the street and I presumed that they were going into full condition of readiness, including the emplacement of anti-aircraft and other mobile weapons around Pearl Harbor and other im- [12957] portant points on Oahu.

Is that a fair statement?

Captain LAYTON. That is a correct statement except one typographical error or else you may have misread it there where it was leaving the Philippines on the flank. I think it would be more properly not leaving the Philippines on the flank. In other words, as it was stated there, as I understood it, if it was leaving them on their flank they wouldn't bother us and go in there but I was apprehensive that if there was they would not leave us on our flank and proceed southward from the Philippines in their southward movement, and that they would attack the Philippines along with the Malay barrier.

Mr. KEEFE. You think that the word "not" should be in there?

Captain LAYTON. I think so. It would make better sense.

Mr. KEEFE. I had better read it again as it does make sense to me:

Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations.

You think it should read, "If Japan would decide not [12958] to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward"?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. "Hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations."

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that would read better.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the way that that ought to be corrected?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is quite important.

Captain, where are you stationed now?

Captain LAYTON. I am still attached to the staff of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. Upon the conclusion of this testimony and return to the west coast I hope to be detached for new duty.

Mr. KEEFE. Detached what?

Captain LAYTON. For a reassignment, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Captain LAYTON. I have been on one job too long, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, that is another thing, Captain, that bothers me. I don't know whether other members of the committee have



been bothered or not but I want to ask you because I value your opinion.

There seems to be an attitude that a man who is attached to Intelligence, which is to me a highly specialized field of [12959] activity, does not have very much to look forward to in the line of promotion; that in order to meet the attitudes of the examining boards he must leave the field of intelligence and go to sea and get sea duty and all that sort of thing and thus we have the situation where you are writing to McCollum here at Washington asking him to leave out at Honolulu two men who are experts in their field and whom you wanted there for the purpose of building up and maintaining the highest state of efficiency in intelligence and the answer comes back that, "Well, sorry, but they have got other plans. They have got to go to sea in order to meet the tests of sea duty," and all that sort of thing.

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, is that a situation that persists in the Navy?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the law.

Mr. KEEFE. What?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the law.

Captain LAYTON. The law is that you must go to sea and you must perform your duties in an outstanding and highly able manner because, you see, there is selection to promotion.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. If you do not have a record that shows what you have been doing and have commanded ships at sea and [12960] have been a sailor you cannot be promoted to higher grade. That is the law. McCollum was only trying to protect his officers because if he had left Birtley, for example, over at Pearl Harbor he wouldn't show the sea service on his record. When he came up for selection he would be passed over and he would not get his promotion.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, Captain, I will betray my ignorance some but I want to know about it. You say it is the law, that is a congressional act. Do you understand it to be a law of Congress?

Captain LAYTON. Maybe I overstepped—

Mr. KEEFE. Or a rule or regulation of the Navy?

Captain LAYTON. I think that is, you might say, a law by doctrine. I can say only that I am not prepared to give testimony of that sort.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, this committee is bound to make some recommendations to the Congress and if that is the law I would like to know about it. If it is a law passed by the Congress governing the Army and Navy, that is one thing, but if it is a rule and regulation and practice and tradition of the service, that is another thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you yield there?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

[12961] The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is Admiral Stark testified here that it is a law passed by Congress.

Captain LAYTON. He is in a much better position to know than I, sir. I have been doing nothing but intelligence work for a long time and I haven't paid any attention to the regulations other than that pertain to intelligence and I must confess my ignorance on that subject.

Mr. KEEFE. On the other side of the picture we are confronted with a situation where you take a man off a ship who is an outstanding line officer and drag him into Washington to head up the Naval Intelligence Service 1 month before Pearl Harbor.

Captain LAYTON. It is true that——

Mr. KEEFE. A man that never had any previous experience in the field of intelligence. That is the other side of the picture.

Captain LAYTON. I believe it is true, sir, that intelligence as a line of endeavor with the Navy has not been in the past thoroughly appreciated. I believe as a result of this war, however, there is a very high appreciation among many of the high-ranking officers and certainly those who were at sea in commanding task forces would value that intelligence during this war, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

[12962] Mr. KEEFE. Well, the reason for my asking those questions is in line with some that have been asked heretofore, that it is quite difficult for me to understand, when we spent the money that has been spent by the United States Government in training people as Japanese language experts—you have been trained as a Japanese language expert; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. I trained as Japanese-language expert and was also assistant naval attaché.

Mr. KEEFE. So you would be competent in the field of intelligence, isn't that true, in the Pacific area?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the evidence here is that they had such limited numbers of people in the Navy to do this sort of work, and yet it is the most outstanding type of work and most necessary work, perhaps, that has to be done, and I came to the impression that the men would sort of shy away from it because when their name comes up for selection they know when they are in intelligence they get passed up.

I don't know whether this committee will do anything about it or not, but it may desire to make some recommendation to the Congress, or to the Navy with reference to that.

That is why I asked these questions, because I have been impressed with the fact that there is a lot of work that could [12963] have been better coordinated in this field of intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor.

That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, let me ask you a question or two, if I may, please, sir.

You were the fleet intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor on the 1st of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And had been or a year or more?

Captain LAYTON. I reported on December 7, 1940, 1 year to a day before the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And as I understood you to say, you were not present at the staff meetings that were held about the war-warning message.

Captain LAYTON. I was not an active member. I walked into the admiral's cabin during the process of these meetings to show him the paraphrase of the war-warning message that I had drawn up to deliver to General Short and to receive his approval of this paraphrase.

I was in there while the chief of staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought in General Short's warning message that he received from the War Department, and I remained there while there was a discussion among other staff members of this.

[12964] I was not directly asked to and I did not venture an opinion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not give any opinion?

Captain LAYTON. At that time, I did not feel it was proper, sir.

I do not think I could have added anything to the opinions already being given, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you did not attend and participate?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir, I did not attend and participate. I was an intruder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not participate in the staff meeting with respect to the war-warning message?

Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what messages were in Washington that you did not have at Pearl Harbor that would have caused you to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I did not want to give the impression that by afterthought and hindsight I could look at a book of these messages and pick out some and show them to you, and state what they would have meant to me. Offhand, I think the bomb plot would have been important. I am sure the messages that were passed in the latter part of November from Kita, the consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo, plus the [12965] request from Togo to Kita for information on our fleet moving in and out, plus a message I have seen about, I believe, balloon barrages were not being used, I think were all important.

I have not gone over Exhibit 1, sir. I have not read it in detail. I merely have heard these things here in this room and have been impressed. I did read some of the messages that are now in Exhibit 1, 2 years after Pearl Harbor, when I first learned that they had them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the list of messages listed in Admiral Kimmel's statement to this committee?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I read that statement, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You read his statement?

Captain LAYTON. I have read his statement; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Before he presented it here?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; I read the statement about, oh, about a month ago, I think, sir, and again 3 or 4 days ago.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Now, of those messages listed by him as being important, that he should have had in Hawaii, do you agree with him in his conclusion in that respect?

Captain LAYTON. I agree with the statements that he made there regarding these messages, yes, sir. I think it [12966] would have assisted considerably. I think probably, as I recall it, the one from Berlin outlining the conversations that had been held with Ribbentrop and Hitler, and the one from Rome in which the Japanese Ambassador outlined his conversation with Mussolini, they clearly indicated that the Axis were talking to one another regarding a war with the Anglo-Saxons, which was then very imminent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would any of those messages listed by Admiral Kimmel indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe any of them would have indicated definitely an attack on Pearl Harbor, unless you take them all

together, and discover that Pearl Harbor is the only geographical location in all the magic intercepts wherein there was increasing interest along toward the latter part of November, keeping in mind the information we had from intercepts of their traffic, which indicated also a naval interest.

It is another one of these things. I cannot say now that I would have been able to say, "Admiral they are going to take Pearl Harbor." I did not mean to give that impression.

I mean to say it was a sort of jigsaw puzzle, that, when fitted together, fell into a common pattern.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is a fact, Captain, that none of [12967] the messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, except the so-called bomb-plot message refers to Pearl Harbor. Is that true?

Captain LAYTON. I would have to review the statement very carefully to make a definite answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not recall now?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall now, but I thought there were a couple that referred to the movement of ships in and out, or the anchorage of ships, that referred to area C, and area A, Malama Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is my recollection of all the list of messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, none of them referred to Pearl Harbor, except the so-called bomb-plot message.

Mr. GEARHART. Will the gentleman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. There were five or six messages that had to do with the ships' movements to which the witness just referred. There was one message dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the so-called bomb-plot message.

Mr. GEARHART. And other messages calling for reports on ship movements, and calling upon Honolulu for reports [12968] even when there were no ship-movement messages.

Captain LAYTON. Those are the ones I referred to, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The so-called bomb-plot message is the one dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas. You are familiar with that?

Captain LAYTON. I recall having seen that here; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that is the only one that directly refers to Pearl Harbor, and I believe you substantially agree with me in that respect.

Captain LAYTON. Except those that refer to the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain you say you kept the Army officials in Pearl Harbor completely advised as to all the intelligence you had?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe I said that, Senator. I said that I kept Colonel Raley of the Hawaiian Air Force, who established Army liaison with me rather fully informed as to the general situation and as to some of the details of the Japanese task force, its movements, and its implications. I did not for a minute intend to say that I had contacts with General Fielder, then Colonel Fielder. I stated in my affidavit to Colonel Clausen that inasmuch as [12969] Colonel Raley was an Army liaison, I saw no reason to establish a liaison with

Fielder, and if Fielder for 1 minute was not satisfied with what he was getting from Washington—and I did not know that he was getting anything, or nothing—then, he could certainly establish liaison with me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was your opposite number in the Army in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. May I take a minute to explain what the intelligence functions were? I think I can rather straighten out a little doubt in the minds of the committee.

When I joined there, we were afloat. It had been the habitual practice and doctrine in the Navy that when the fleet desires liaison with shore-based authorities, whether they be public or private services, or the Army or the FBI, we made this liaison through the naval district intelligence officer in the place where we were.

My liaison through the Army official was, therefore, through Captain Mayfield, the district intelligence officer at Honolulu who was attached to Admiral Bloch's organization.

There were meetings between the Army and FBI and himself every week or more. I attended one of them shortly after I reported, just to let them know I was there, and to say [12970] that I was willing to cooperate in all matters. But for anyone to imply that I had to search out and find an opposite number, or that the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department should be dependent upon me for sources of information, is rather unusual, for the simple reason the Army and Navy in Washington have close agreement, and have worked in close liaison for years in intelligence, that the Navy passed it down and disclosed it to the Army and the Army disclosed it to the Navy, and in case there was an occasion in which we wanted to consult one another in the field, we consulted then with each other in the field.

Now, it is doctrine in the Army that if you do not know, and the same applies to the Navy, that if you do not know what you have, or that you want more than you already have, then you go and ask somebody else for it.

Had Colonel Fielder come to me and said, "I want some information," I could give him the same amount in a paraphrased form without revealing the source, had I had Admiral Kimmel's permission. He did not do so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you did not give it to him?

Captain LAYTON. Well, he not being there I could not very well give it to him, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Is Colonel Fielder your opposite number in the Army?

[12971] Captain LAYTON. I would not say he was my opposite number in the Army, because the fleet might move from Pearl Harbor, say to San Francisco, for example, and then my opposite over there would be another person.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; I just want to try to get to the point and not take up too much time.

You were the intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army?

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Field, then Colonel Fielder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was he your opposite number?

Captain LAYTON. He was the opposite number of the commandant Fourteenth Naval District intelligence organization.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have an opposite number in the Army?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Captain LAYTON. I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There was not anybody in the Army that you were supposed to cooperate with, so far as intelligence is concerned?

Captain LAYTON. I would not want to use the word "cooperate," sir. I would cooperate with him any minute. It [12972] is a question of delineation of the line of command and authority.

Suppose the Army had set up on Oahu an amphibious force to go to sea and land on some island in accordance with the war plan, then the G-2 of that organization would be my opposite number, and not the G-2 of a local defense garrison.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you did not have any opposite number in the Army?

Captain LAYTON. I did not have any opposite number in the Army in the strict sense of the word, no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you were in the same position as Captain Rochefort when he testified here, that he did not give the information he had to the Army officials, but he sometimes gave it to them in paraphrased form, or changed, sanitized form, I believe he said.

Is that the practice you used?

Captain LAYTON. I gave it to Colonel Raley in the so-called sanitized form. He never knew the source of information, and he was requested not to ask and promised never to ask.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You gave it sanitized form, as did Captain Rochefort?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[12973] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain, you of course saw the message of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; and Admiral Kimmel ordered me to take that to General Short in person, which I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You, of course, were entirely familiar with that message?

Captain LAYTON. I was, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did not that give you sufficient knowledge about strained relations between the United States and Japan?

Captain LAYTON. It did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you also saw the war warning message of November 27?

Captain LAYTON. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have testified that that was different in form from any message that you had ever seen.

Captain LAYTON. The words "This is a war warning" were a shock to me, to see it written down. I never saw anything like it before, and I was impressed by it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were impressed by it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You considered it to be just what it said, a war warning?

[12974] Captain LAYTON. It was just exactly that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you did not consider that an unusual expression, "This is a war warning"?

Captain LAYTON. I thought that was very unusual. I never saw anything like it before.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It impressed you as such?

Captain LAYTON. Very much so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There was not anything following in that message that nullified that impression in your mind, was there?

Captain LAYTON. I would not say there was anything in that message that nullified that impression. It certainly gave me the idea that the Department in Washington had the same concept of the situation that we had, insofar as they said Japan was going to make an amphibious invasion in the future on the same places that we thought, the Philippines.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Guam?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; Guam was not mentioned in the war warning message, sir. The Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, possibly N. E. I. or possibly Borneo, I believe it was remarked at the time that Guam was left out of the second one, while it was mentioned in the first one. One person facetiously remarked, "I guess they thought Guam was going to fall, anyway, so it would not be worth while to put it in."

[12975] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Philippines were in the message of the 24th?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you hear Admiral Hart's testimony here today?

Captain LAYTON. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He thought that meant all the addressees should be watching and on guard, and that the Philippines and Guam should take special note.

Captain LAYTON. I heard the distinguished Admiral's testimony; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Did you agree with the interpretation that he placed on it?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I was not able to agree wholly; judging today from hindsight, I would say "Yes."

At that time I was concerned, as I said, with the picture before me, with what they said, and it was so definitely related to the Far East and it was so easy to put in there, if they had any suspicion of Hawaii, "Hawaii," that the thought of Hawaii did not then occur to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Well, you don't know of anybody in Washington or in Hawaii that actually expected the attack on Pearl Harbor [12976] that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, did you?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; and if I did, I would certainly shake his hand, because he would be a good guesser.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not know anybody either in Washington or Hawaii that expected that attack?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Will the gentleman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Even the man who wrote it never expected war to come in Hawaii, so he could not convey to you a different impression than he had himself. Would you expect him to?

Captain LAYTON. It is standard naval procedure that when you tell a man something, you tell him what you are thinking and try to project that thought into his mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the correct interpretation of such a message is interpreting what he had intended to convey?

Captain LAYTON. Reading the words he put there and trying, without any great mental gymnastics, to put your mind in the same frame his mind was in when he wrote it; had he wanted to put Hawaii in he would have put Hawaii in, I am sure, if he was thinking of it.

Mr. GEARHART. That is correct. And since that time we have had the man on the stand who wrote the message, and [12977] he said that he was surprised that war came to Hawaii, and therefore he could not attempt to convey to you the impression that he was not taken greatly by surprise.

Does not that sound logical?

Captain LAYTON. That sounds logical to me, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Captain.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, one or two questions with respect to the so-called bomb-plot message. You said hindsight leads you to believe that the Japs were talking about Pearl Harbor when they sent that message from the standpoint of an attack.

Can you read into that message any other thing that they were talking about, leaving hindsight out?

Captain LAYTON. Leaving hindsight out, you can always look into a message and find something that is different from your first impression.

It is typical of the Japanese that they desire to keep meticulous records on everybody, whether he is a friend or an enemy.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, leaving hindsight out of the picture, an individual who was working in the intelligence department, either in Washington or Hawaii, in view of the many messages that they had had of a similar nature, [12978] that you just discussed, could very well have easily reached the conclusion that you just have stated?

Captain LAYTON. Anyone reading that message at the time they did, which I believe was sometime around September, was it not, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I think September 24.

Captain LAYTON (continuing). Around September, at that time, could have made the very logical mistake of seeing it only as a Japanese flair for listing information, and particularly on the United States Pacific Fleet, since we were based there, since April 1940, they wanted to know how many ships were there, when they went in and when they went out.

I think the word "bomb-plot" message has been applied here.

[12979] Senator LUCAS. That is correct, it has.



Captain LAYTON. I do not intend to insinuate for one minute that had I had it I would have known what their intention was. I only say had we had that, and some other information, there would at least have grown in our minds a suspicion that something was stirring, that was growing right under our feet.

Senator LUCAS. You are correct in saying the term "bomb-plot" has been applied in this hearing. I think General Mitchell is the one who first used the term.

The situation you have described was especially true, and it became more true as time went on. In other words, from September 23 to December 7 is some two months and a half. Every day that passed after that bomb-plot message the so-called bomb-plot message, without any action on the part of the Japanese might indicate more definitely that they were asking for ship movements and other things that they were used to asking for without thinking about an attack. I mean the longer they put it off the more the chances for Intelligence, as you have suggested. Am I correct in that?

Captain LAYTON. I believe what you said to be correct; yes, sir. I do not think I am capable of commenting on it.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Captain, with respect to magic, you [12980] could translate out there, as I understand it, PA-K2.

Captain LAYTON. That is out of my field, sir. I had nothing to do with Commander Rochefort's unit, in its mechanics.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. Captain Rochefort testified before the committee that they could translate that code.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I heard his testimony, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They could translate messages that were sent in the code known as PA-K2. Now, in Exhibit 2, on page 22, is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941, which, as I understand, went out in that code, and which I understand Commander Rochefort could have decoded and translated if he had made an arrangement with the cable office, but did not do that. Can you tell the committee why no arrangement was made with the cable office there in Hawaii so that they would have been able to intercept this message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe Captain Rochefort testified, and from my point of view, as far as I know the side lights of it, it is correct, that his directive from the Chief of Naval Operations, under which he directly worked, was the interception of Japanese naval radio traffic; that he was told to work on certain Japanese naval codes and ciphers; [12981] that he was directed to pass other material to Washington. Now, if Washington were not receiving these intercepts, then it would be up to Washington to tell Rochefort to make these arrangements, or it would be up to Washington to make them themselves.

As I understand it, these were cabled. Now you can sit in here and you can intercept a Japanese radio transmission and not violate the laws of the United States.

Maybe I am wrong, but that is the way I understand it, but you sit down and tap that cable and you get a \$10,000 fine and 10 years in jail.

Senator LUCAS. Is it not a fact that the Navy were tapping the communication lines or the telephone lines of the Japs for 22 straight months there?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know the district Intelligence officer was tapping the lines. I did not know until I read it here in the committee. I did not want to know, incidentally.

Senator LUCAS. How is that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not want to know. Had I known it it would have been my responsibility to have reported it to Admiral Kimmel, and then he would have had the responsibility of directing that either this be approved by the authorities in Washington or be discontinued. It was against [12982] the law, and that is a Federal statute.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. It is a very strange thing to me that the district Intelligence officer could tap the Japanese telephone lines for 22 straight months and then on December 2, because of some information he received about the FBI doing the same thing, right at that particular time, the Navy, at the height of the crisis, stopped the work of tapping these confidential communications.

Captain LAYTON. I cannot account for Captain Mayfield's action, but had it been I, I might have pulled the tap for fear the FBI would pull it out for me, and give me a \$10,000 fine, or 10 years in jail.

They were not caught until the 2d or 3d of December, and then they pulled the tap.

Senator LUCAS. It is very strange to me that the FBI could violate the law.

Captain LAYTON. They may have had clearance from some high authority. I do not know, sir. I cannot comment on that matter.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, do you know Captain Bicknell?

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Bicknell, you mean?

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Bicknell.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I met him in Pearl Harbor. I think I met him down in Captain Mayfield's office at one [12983] of their weekly meetings.

Senator LUCAS. Are you familiar with the Mori message, so-called?

Captain LAYTON. My only connection with the Mori message—and I only learned of it here about a year ago—is on the evening of December 6, Captain Mayfield called me in and asked me if I was going to the office the next day.

I told him I expected to. He asked me if I would stop down in his office on the way down. I lived to the east of Honolulu. I asked him if there was anything I could do, and he said:

No, there is nothing you can do here because I haven't got the material, and I won't have it until tomorrow morning, but I would like to have you stop in here because I have something that I want your opinion on.

That is the last I ever heard of the so-called Mori message.

Senator LUCAS. What night was that?

Captain LAYTON. The night of December 6, 1941. As you know, the next morning the attack came. Then I next heard about it, as I recall, at the naval court of inquiry, when they asked me about it. I did not know what it was until they quizzed me about it, and then I thought that must be the circumstance.

Senator LUCAS. What happened that you did not see him [12984] on the night of the 6th?

Captain LAYTON. He told me he did not have the material and would not have it until the next morning, and did not therefore desire that I come down there until the next morning.

Senator LUCAS. Why would he call you if he did not have the material?

Captain LAYTON. He merely wanted to ascertain that I would be coming down the next day. He was informed apparently of the existence of this.

Senator LUCAS. Bicknell, in affidavit before Colonel Clausen, said he called General Fielder on the telephone and he said he had a very important message, and he had to deliver it to him.

Captain LAYTON. That illustrates my point awhile ago regarding the opposite numbers in liaison.

Mine was through Captain Mayfield. He called me in the evening about 6 o'clock and said, as I said before, he wanted to know if I was going to the office the following day, and I said I was, and he asked would I stop by, and I said I would.

I asked could I come down now, was there anything I could do. He said "no," that he did not have the material at that time, and would not have it until the next morning, but would I please stop by tomorrow morning because he had [12935] something he wanted my opinion on.

Senator LUCAS. And you learned after that that this was the Mori message?

Captain LAYTON. I did not learn until the next year that it was actually the Mori message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What message was it that he was talking about?

Captain LAYTON. He did not say. He just said he had something that he wanted to talk to me about.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you found out later, what was the message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe the judge advocate before the naval court of inquiry asked me, when I was called, if I knew something about the Mori message, and I said, "No, I never heard of it."

Mr. RICHARDSON. What message?

Captain LAYTON. M-o-r-i, the Mori message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What message was Mayfield calling you about?

Captain LAYTON. That was the same thing. It was only when I talked to the judge advocate and denied knowing anything about it, and he said, "Mayfield called you the night before?"

I said, "Yes," and he said, "Well, that was the Mori [12986] message that you heard on the radiotelephone," or something to that effect.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, one of the things that has puzzled me throughout the hearing is the fact that the Navy did not know that General Short was alerted only to sabotage.

Will you throw, or can you throw, any light on it.

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that either, sir.

I saw these troops move, I saw the trucks moving, I thought I saw weapons, and my first instinct was that they were in an alert the same as we were.

I did not ask my friend, Colonel Raley, either, what kind of an alert they were in.

I knew an alert had gone out, and I presumed it was the highest state of alert.

Senator LUCAS. Why did you make that assumption?

Captain LAYTON. The words, "This is a war warning" were pretty well impressed on my mind. When I got home that evening I was still thinking about it, and it impressed me very much.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, when you saw the troops moving—

Captain LAYTON. That was on my way home, sir.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). You did not realize it was a sabotage alert. You thought they were alerted because [12987] of the war warning message that came in on the 27th?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. I delivered the messages that evening, and I was a little late with the message to General Short. When I went home I saw the trucks and troops, and I saw the weapons moving, and I came to the conclusion, a natural one, too, that they were on the alert.

Senator LUCAS. Can you give this committee any basic reason as to why the Navy and the Army should not have closer liaison upon such an important problem as that?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe I am qualified to state as to why.

Senator LUCAS. Probably you are not. For instance, Admiral Smith, who was the chief of staff on Admiral Kimmel's force, testified that he did not know that Short's army was on the alert for sabotage. He thought, as you have testified, that they were on a full alert, because he saw them on that same day moving troops here and there.

Now, there is something that seems to be radically wrong.

After all these war warning messages came in, one after another, it seems to me radically wrong that the Navy would not know what the Army was doing, in view of the fact it was the Army's duty to defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor. [12988] I am not censuring you at all, sir, but nobody in the Navy has testified here, not even Kimmel himself, that he absolutely knew that the Army was not on a full alert.

Captain LAYTON. I can only offer this, Senator, and this is another Army and Navy custom of long standing.

If you pry into what another man is doing, he naturally resents it. He thinks he is capable of doing his own job.

Senator LUCAS. I can appreciate that.

Captain LAYTON. I think that is the only reason that someone did not go to the Army and ask what kind of alert they were on, and it is just the reason that the Army did not come to the Navy and ask what kind of alert we had on the ships in Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. I can appreciate that. This fleet was the most precious possession that we had in the Pacific, and under that joint agreement it was the duty of the Army to defend that fleet when it was in Pearl Harbor from a landing attack or an air raid. To me, it is inexcusable, unbelievable, that Short and Kimmel would not have a definite understanding with respect to what the other one was doing.

I have never been able to understand why Kimmel and all his chiefs of staff and other subordinates would not have known that Short was on a sabotage alert, alert No. 1, [12989] in view of the crisis pending.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 5 o'clock, so we will suspend until 8 o'clock this evening.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 8 p. m. of the same day.)

[12990]

EVENING SESSION—8 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have something at this point?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I have two certifications both from the War Department.

The first one is a memorandum furnishing to me at my request the number of patrol planes delivered by the United States between February 1 and December 7, 1941, under lend-lease. Also a memorandum under date of February 14 furnishing to me at my request the lend-lease figures on antiaircraft guns delivered under lend-lease from February 1 to December 7.

I would like to have these memoranda extended on the record in the usual and regular way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator GEORGE. Delivered to whom, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, about this—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Senator GEORGE. Delievered to whom?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the exhibit names and identifies the various countries who got the planes and who got the guns.

Senator GEORGE. Oh, it is a general statement then?

Mr. RICHARD. It is a general statement indicating that, for instance—

Senator FERGUSON. What was the total?

[12991] Mr. RICHARDSON. Between February 1 and December 1 in round figures there were 1,900 planes that went abroad, of which about 1,750 went to the British. Then of guns, interestingly enough, there were about 1,900 antiaircraft guns under lend-lease, of which some 1,500 went to the British.

Mr. MURPHY. That is from the 1st of the year 1941 to what date?

Mr. RICHARDSON. From the 1st of February to the 1st of December 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received as requested by counsel. (The documents referred to follow:)

# WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

4 D757

THE PENTAGON, 12 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Reference is made to your memorandum of 31 January 1946 asking for the number of patrol planes and antiaircraft guns delivered by the United States between 1 February and 7 December 1941 to countries subsequently allied with the United States.

Inclosed herewith is a table, based on information supplied by the Army Air Forces Office of Statistical Control, showing the number of bombers usable as patrol planes which were delivered at the factory to foreign countries (a) between 1 February and 30 November 1941 and (b) in December 1941. Information concerning such deliveries for the period 1 to 7 December 1941 is not

presently available in the War Department and search of field records will be necessary if that information is desired.

A search of War Department records relating to deliveries of anti-aircraft guns to foreign countries is still in process; when that search is completed, any pertinent information obtained will be promptly forwarded.

(Signed) **HARMON DUNCOMBE,**  
*Lt. Colonel, GSC.*

*U. S. Factory Deliveries of Bombers to Foreign Countries, 1 February to 30 November and 1-31 December 1941*

[12993] Type	Description	Recipient	Number	
			1 Feb-30 Nov 41	1-31 Dec. 41
B-17.....	AAF Heavy Bomber 4-eng.	British Empire.....	20	.....
B-24.....	AAF Heavy Bomber 4-eng.	British Empire.....	93	3
B-25.....	AAF Medium Bomber 2-eng.	Latin America.....	3	3
B-25.....		British Empire.....		14
B-25.....		U. S. S. R.....	5	.....
PBY.....	Navy Patrol Bomber 2-eng.	British Empire.....	129	25
PBY.....		Netherlands.....	36	.....
A-20.....	AAF Light Bomber 2-eng.	British Empire.....	455	.....
A-20.....		Netherlands.....	29	.....
A-20.....		U. S. S. R.....	79	2
A-28/29.....	AAF Light Bomber 2-eng.	British Empire.....	800	49
A-28/29.....		China.....		17
A-30.....	AAF Light Bomber 2-eng.	British Empire.....	78	58
167.....	—AAF Light Bomber 2-eng.	British Empire.....	90	.....
A-27.....	AAF Light Bomber 1-eng.	Latin America.....	10	.....
V-12.....	AAF Light Bomber 1-eng.	China.....	1	.....
SA.....	Navy Light Bomber 1-eng.	Norway.....	2	.....
SB2U.....	Navy Light Bomber 1-eng.	British Empire.....	50	.....
N3PB.....	Navy Light Bomber 1-eng.	Norway.....	24	.....
	Total.....		1,904	171

[12994]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, 14 February 1946.*

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Your memorandum of 31 January 1946 asked for the number of patrol planes and anti-aircraft guns delivered by the United States between 1 February and 7 December 1941 to countries subsequently allied with the United States. On 12 February this office forwarded information from the War Department files showing factory deliveries to foreign countries between 1 February and 31 December 1941 of bombers usable as patrol planes.

In further response to your request, there is transmitted herewith a memorandum signed by the Director of the International Division, Army Service Forces, on transfers of anti-aircraft weapons prior to 7 December 1941. This office has been advised by the International Division that the transfers listed in the memorandum were made after 11 March 1941, the effective date of the Lend-Lease act, and were all a part of lend-lease except for the transfer to the Netherlands East Indies, which was pursuant to a commercial contract.

(Signed) **HARMON DUNCOMBE,**  
*Lt. Colonel, GSC.*

[12995]

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES,  
*Washington, 25, D. C., Feb. 11 1946.*

SPLIX 400.318

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, W. D. G. S.

Attention: Major John C. Catlin

Subject: Anti-aircraft Weapons Transferred to Lend-Lease Countries Prior to December 1941.

1. Reference is made to telephone request of Major John C. Catlin of your office for information regarding anti-aircraft weapons transferred to Lend-Lease countries prior to 7 December 1941.

2. The records of this office indicate that the following anti-aircraft weapons were transferred to the countries noted.

United Kingdom :

	Quantity
Machine Gun, 50 Cal. w/c A. A.-----	1520
Gun, 3'', AA, Mobile-----	18

Russia :

Gun, 90 mm, AA, Mobile-----	4
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China :

Machine Gun, 50 Cal. w/c A. A.-----	285
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[12996] Netherlands East Indies :

Gun, 3'', A. A. Mobile-----	80
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(Procured by Netherlands East Indies on their own contract.)

For the Commanding General :

D. G. SHINGLER,  
Brigadier General, G. S. C.,  
Director, International Division.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. If we are going into part of lend-lease questions in this record and in view of references made by counsel, I ask that a copy of the Lend-Lease Act be inserted in the record and the date of its passage and a statement as to the organization which was set up by this Government for the purpose of determining what distribution should be made under lend-lease and what officials were responsible for such distribution.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The text of the Lend-Lease Act follows:)<sup>1</sup>

[12996-A]

[PUBLIC LAW 11—77TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 11—1ST SESSION]

[H. R. 1776]

AN ACT Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That this Act may be cited as "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States".

SEC. 2. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "defense article" means—

(1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat;

(2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in this subsection;

(3) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article described in this subsection;

(4) Any agricultural, industrial or other commodity or article for defense. Such term "defense article" includes any article described in this subsection: Manufactured or procured pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control.

(b) The term "defense information" means any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article.

SEC. 3. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

(2) To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose

<sup>1</sup> See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5305 et seq. for a letter on the operations of lend lease.

of, to any such government any defense article, but no defense article not manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph, except after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed \$1,300,000,000. The value of such defense articles [12996] shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned or such other department, agency or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise.

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract.

(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

(c) After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a); except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of conveying vessels by naval vessels of the United States.

(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

SEC. 4. All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information pursuant to section 2 shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of such foreign government.

SEC. 5. (a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such defense article or defense information is exported, immediately inform the department or agency designated [12996-C] by the President to administer section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714), of the quantities, character, value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so exported.

(b) The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session.

SEC. 6. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.



(b) All money and all property which is converted into money received under section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the respective appropriation or appropriations out of which funds were expended with respect to the defense article or defense information for which such consideration is received, and shall be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated by law, during the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year; but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after June 30, 1946.

SEC. 7. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall in all contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense article or defense information fully protect the rights of all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such article or information which is hereby authorized to be disposed of and the payments collected for royalties on such patents shall be paid to the owners and holders of such patents.

SEC. 8. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States.

SEC. 9. The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.

SEC. 10. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, the communication of information and other noncombatant purposes enumerated in this Act.

SEC. 11. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Approved, March 11, 1941.

[12997] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart, do you have something?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, the question that I wanted to ask was precisely the one that was propounded by the Senator from Michigan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Does counsel have anything else?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, do you have any statement you desire to make before your examination is resumed?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we have on this record, Mr. Richardson, the amount of planes that went to Hawaii and the Philippines during this same period and the amount of antiaircraft guns? Could you get that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will inquire and see if we have it and if we have not, I will endeavor to get the figures for you.

Senator FERGUSON. They should be in also.

Mr. MURPHY. I am sorry, Senator, I did not hear what you said.

Senator FERGUSON. I wondered whether the record showed the amount of planes that had been furnished to Hawaii and the Philippines, respectively, and the number of antiaircraft guns during the same period.

[12998] Mr. MURPHY. And are the dates also given in the breakdown, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that we may get those later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EDWIN T. LAYTON, UNITED STATES  
NAVY (Resumed)**

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Layton, you indicated that you had written to Captain McCollum a letter here in Washington. Was that sent through the mail or special pouch?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, I wrote the letter in pen myself with no copies and had it sealed, gave it to the flag secretary of the commander in chief, who in turn gave it to an officer courier passing through and going by air to the United States and to Washington, for hand-to-hand delivery to Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you get your answer back which you have read into the record in the same way?

Captain LAYTON. It came back via the locked box on the Clipper, which has previously been described here as a secure means of delivery of highly important and highly secret material.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you lost the two important men in July—is that when you lost them?

[12999] Captain LAYTON. We only lost one, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened to the other one?

Captain LAYTON. He was the one who was allowed to remain all during the year.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did he leave the Intelligence Service?

Captain LAYTON. He did not leave the Intelligence Service. He was transferred after about 2 more years, possibly 3, to Washington where he continued his highly specialized duties and did not leave his duties entirely until after VJ-day.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you been a captain?

Captain LAYTON. About 2 years, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not a captain, then, at the time that you were—

Captain LAYTON. I was a lieutenant commander on the outbreak of war on the senior part of the numbers.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to the question that I asked before, you were looking up in your book the amount of purple, or as we call it, of magic here and did you find anything in there?

Captain LAYTON. None other than the winds set-up message that I mentioned previously in testimony before this committee.

[13000] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did the Philippines send you any of their magic that they translated?

Captain LAYTON. The one I referred to specifically was from Com. 16, which was in the Philippines, setting up the five winds and the two winds hidden word codes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that purple, do you know, or J-19?

Captain LAYTON. I will check to see what it says. It didn't say which system, sir. It merely said:

Following Tokyo to net. Intercept translation received from Singapore X.

Senator FERGUSON. I imagine it came to you in English, did it not?

Captain LAYTON. Oh, yes, sir. It came to us in or by this special intelligence high security channel for transmitting this so-called magic purple messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, after getting Captain McCollum's letter did you believe up until after the attack that you had received all diplomatic messages in some form or another that they figured that you should have in Hawaii for action?

Captain LAYTON. I thought so until some 2 years later when I found to the contrary. I also so stated on examination before the Roberts Commission that I did not believe that Washington was holding out on us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that there was a dead line set on the 25th of November?

[13001] Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And shifted then to the 29th?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a message delivered on the 26th of November to Japan and a reply to it on the 6th and morning of the 7th of December?

Captain LAYTON. I knew nothing concerning our notes to Japan nor Japan's answers. I may have seen in the paper that we had delivered a note but I do not recall distinctly recalling that it was in the papers or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether or not after the 26th any Hawaii papers carried evidence that we were still negotiating back and forth from Japan to Washington?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I do not recall what the papers said at that time, although I might refresh my memory. I have made it a policy, however, not to use newspaper stories in evaluating intelligence unless they back up other known material or other material that was of some real value because a newspaper story can be slanted if they wish. For instance, what was coming out from Tokyo in those days under Domei I would not pay any attention to at all.

Senator FERGUSON. It appears that that wind code was J-19.

Captain LAYTON. Well, it did not say it in the message. [13002] It merely said, "Following Tokyo net intercept."

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all that you got from the Philippines?

Captain LAYTON. That is all that I recall at the present time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would go to Exhibit 2. Some of your answers indicated that you were talking about some other messages in Exhibit 2 and I want to go over them with you, if we might.

Page 12 was the one that you have talked about. That is the 24th of September 1941 where they lay it out in areas. Do you have that exhibit before you?

Captain LAYTON. I have it before me; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say that standing alone that would not be as clear, as I understood it, as with other evidence. Now, take the one from Tokyo, from Toyoda. Do you know who he was?

Captain LAYTON. Toyoda?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. Offhand, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he Foreign Minister?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; Togo was the Foreign Minister at that time, T-o-g-o.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[13003] Captain LAYTON. Toyoda would have been a department chief within the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, on the next one, on the 29th of September 1941, from Honolulu to Washington, giving certain information in relation to Honolulu. Do you see that message?

Captain LAYTON. What page is that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. That is on page 13. They say—

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir, I have it.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island. FV.

Alongside in Ford Island. FG.

Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier)—KT.

And then some other items, indicating that they were giving messages in relation to the ships in dock; was that not true?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13004] Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next one from Tokyo (Tojo) to Honolulu, the 15th of November, says:

As relations between Japan and United States are most critical, make your ships in harbor report irregular but at the rate of twice a week, although you are already no doubt aware please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Would that have been a significant message, that they wanted the ships in harbor report twice a week at Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we go to the next page, on November 18. If these were regular messages, why would they take the extra care?

They say: "Please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

Captain LAYTON. Senator, the Japanese love secrecy even among themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. And so that, in itself, would not have meant anything?

Captain LAYTON. That, plus the the fact that we had caught one of their agents snooping around and had him arrested. He being a Japanese naval officer, and at the insistence of the Secretary of State, he was released and deported.

The fact that he had been caught before would tend to make these people more suspicious and therefore they would [13005] want to take more secrecy.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you catch the Jap naval officer?

Captain LAYTON. The FBI caught him, sir, but he sent an agent of his out to Honolulu to obtain highly secret and confidential information on the United States Pacific Fleet, to come back to the west coast and report to him. Fortunately this agent that he approached had once been in the Navy and maintained loyalty, and having taken his story to the FBI and having been more or less told to await details, when he called on him again here he was told there was nothing much to do.

He then approached our Naval Intelligence agency in Los Angeles, and told his story.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Captain LAYTON. That was in mid-1941, as I recall, sir. It may have been late spring.

Senator FERGUSON. What finally happened to this Jap naval officer?

Captain LAYTON. Well, after we secured evidence, we waited for him and saw to it that he got it through our own agents. We saw to it that he got to the west coast, and saw to it the FBI could pick him up, and after that followed him to Washington where he had been in audience with the Japanese [13006] naval attaché here in Washington.

After this was over, we got permission of the Secretary of State to arrest him, and then in the interest of amity or other reasons, the prosecution was dropped, and he was deported as an undesirable alien. That was Lieutenant Tachibana.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, go to page 14.

Here is Honolulu again sending a message to Tokyo, and they are using the set-up that was provided for on page 12.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And they also give harbor locations.

Look under 3. There is care taken there to show how they come in and how long it takes them from the entrance of the harbor through area B to the buoys in area C—

to which they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

Relayed to (bank).

Captain LAYTON. I read it, sir.

[13007] Senator FERGUSON. Is that a significant message?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I would like to divorce hindsight from foresight on these. But were I reading these on December 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, I am sure they would have struck a responsive chord in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we have three on the next page, and they are all from Tokyo to Honolulu, seeking evidence.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor.

What bay is that? That is not Manila Bay?

Captain LAYTON. I think that is Manila Bay. That is near Honolulu Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing):

and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

That would be translated on the 5th, which would be on Friday the first week of December. The next one is from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu again.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet (blank) bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Now there has been some testimony here that where the blank line is there was something about air base, fleet air bases, which would make it even more significant, would [13008] it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the next one from Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29, 1941:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

We got that on a Friday.

Captain LAYTON. I think this caps them all by adding considerable significance to their individual messages taken collectively. A report when there are no movements is sometimes more significant than to have reports when there are movements.

Senator FERGUSON. Now there is some evidence in the entire record that the one on page 22 was translated in the rough by 2 o'clock, 1 or 2 o'clock, Saturday, here in the Navy. Would that one be significant?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were any of these messages decoded and sent to you, or the substance of them sent to you?

Captain LAYTON. None of them were decoded and sent to me or the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, I should say, prior to December 7, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have specific evidence, or [13009] any evidence that there was going to be an attack in the vicinity of the Kra Peninsula on Sunday?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to answer that in two parts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I wish you would.

Captain LAYTON. There was a considerable amount of evidence from reports from various agents, I mean proper agents, consular officials, military observers, and so forth, who predicted an attack on the Kra Peninsula.

The Sunday angle of it can be taken only from an observation of the movement, of those Japanese movements that were actually sighted in the South China Sea, and the time and distance factors lend themselves toward Sunday being a rather critical day.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the radio traffic give it to you?

Captain LAYTON. Not specifically as to the Kra Peninsula, but the radio traffic certainly showed the movement was to the south, south of French Indochina, south of Formosa, south of Hainan, and plus the one purple message we received on the Japanese intrigue in Thailand, which certainly pointed toward either the Thailand border or Malaya.

It was also shown that the Thai airfield at Singora [13010] on the very southern tip of Thailand and only a few miles from the border, being a good beach area, presented an ideal point for amphibious landings. This point was shown to Admiral Kimmel in the morning conference I had with him on the morning of December 6, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you were asked as to whether or not the Navy in Hawaii knew that the Army, whose duty it was to protect the base, or the fleet while in the base, knew that the Army was only alerted to sabotage. Did you know that the Navy here in Washington did not know what the Army was alerted to in the Hawaiian Islands, even though General Short had sent back a message on the 28th of November that he was alerted to sabotage, and there was no other mention of any other alert?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. The Navy did not know what ships were in the harbor, or what alert the Army was on; did you know that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that the naval officials here in Washington were unaware that the Army forces in Hawaii were on

a sabotage alert. I was not aware that the naval officials in Washington did not know what ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor, either.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it the custom of Pearl Harbor [13011] to report their ships in the harbor?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The location of ships?

Captain LAYTON. It was not customary, as I recall it, for them to report the ships in the harbor, but reports of all movements of all groups or units was reported to Washington. The sailing, for instance, of Admiral Halsey's Task Force, of Admiral Brown's Task Force, of Admiral Newton's Task Unit, I felt confident were a matter of dispatch to Washington, and I think the records will bear me out.

Senator FERGUSON. Now take the two messages on pages 40 and 41 of exhibit 37. As I understand it, these messages were sent about 5 minutes apart. Those on the 3d of December, 31850 and 31855, which would be 5 minutes apart.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you gave some evidence this morning, as I recall, that you thought one related to the other, or they were the same message.

Captain LAYTON. When they were received and read it was my interpretation that these two messages originated by two different people in Washington were based on the same information, insofar as they carried basically the same data.

[13012] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the first one names Washington. It says:

urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once.

That would indicate that they were to keep certain ciphers and certain codes, would it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

and to burn all other important and confidential secret documents.

Now, the next one on the next page was sent 5 minutes later. It is:

Ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December 2nd Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did those two messages mean war with the United States, as far as your evaluation was concerned?

Captain LAYTON. They added to my concern at the time I first read the message saying this was a war warning, but it did not necessarily mean war.

[13013] Let us examine this line of thought which I had at the time, and have previously testified to here. It was a matter of conjecture as to whether the Japanese would leave the Philippines on their flank and proceed further south.

If they were to try to go down into the south China Sea and to further their aggressive acts without treading on Uncle Sam's toes,

and if they thought they could get away with it, then it would not mean war, necessarily; but in case we were to take counteraction such as seizing their embassies, or their consulates, we would seize at that time their code machines, cryptographic material, and their secret documents.

So for the self-preservation, which everyone is born with, they decided to destroy certain or almost all of these documents which meant considerable to them.

It can be read another way, by saying that they had made a determination that the war warning was emphasized by these but this neither proves nor disproves. They merely add more background and emphasis.

This matter of destroying codes and the purple machine, which I have mentioned previously was very briefly discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and, as I recall it, stress was laid on the fact that the word was "most," meaning most of their codes [13014] and ciphers.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Did you know that the Navy here in Washington had notified the military attaché in Tokyo to destroy his code machine and codes about the 5th?

Captain LAYTON. I believe it was around the 5th that I was aware that the Navy had directed the naval attaché in Tokyo, and also other naval establishments in China, such as at Tientsin to destroy their cryptographic material.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get that message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe we were an information addressee in the messages sent them, and I know we received their plain language message, one of them which said "Boomerang," which was the code message saying all papers, codes, and ciphers, and so forth, to have destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what the policy of this Government was in case there was an attack only by Japan on the British?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; I was not on that level of high policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean that you did not know because you were not on that level? How could you evaluate the evidence, or the intelligence, if you did not know what the policy was?

[13015] Captain LAYTON. That same question I asked myself in December 1941, prior to the attack. I believe I heard it said no less than four or five times, five or six times, "I wish I knew what we were going to do," or words to that effect, by Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. In case of an attack just on the British?

Captain LAYTON. In case of eventualities in southeast Asia in which the United States was not immediately and directly involved.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did discuss that question with Admiral Kimmel, and it bothered you in evaluating the evidence?

Captain LAYTON. I would not say that Admiral Kimmel had discussed it with me. He had made these remarks in my hearing when the situation was brought to his attention regarding the movements of these ships, their position, their potentialities for attack, and the Japanese propensity for always trying to get something for nothing, if possible, as they had done in French Indochina, and if they were trying to do this again, for instance, in Thailand, hoping we would take no action, and knowing if they got in there and we would not



take any action, that would be another base for another move in the future.

[13016] At that time Admiral Kimmel said, "I wish I knew what we are going to do," or "This is the same thing that was true in relation to the Dutch East Indies." I do not recall if the Dutch East Indies was mentioned specifically by name. Actually it was a general discussion that dealt with the area of the South China Sea and Thailand, I believe was the only specific country mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. You made a statement that you believed, or you may have had a conversation with Colonel Raley concerning the geographic limit beyond which the British and Netherlands would not permit the Japanese to penetrate.

What was that?

Captain LAYTON. That is one of these rumors you hear, Senator. I had heard a rumor to the effect there was some geographic limit drawn, that only the high authorities knew it; that if the Japanese went beyond that limit, action would be taken by either the British or the Dutch or ourselves, perhaps.

There was no specific paper, or conversation by anyone in authority. It was one of those corridor gossip things that you pick up, but I passed it on to Colonel Raley for what it was worth.

[13017] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there were certain documents in Washington, for instance, Exhibit 17 which we have here, indicating that there was a line?

Captain LAYTON. I was not aware of the exact location of a geographic line, nor that there was a line, in fact.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That document was also in Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will ask, did you ever see this document?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We will get it.

Captain LAYTON. I didn't see every document that came in. Many documents that had to do with war plans alone were handled by the War Plans Division, which is a very understandable thing; you don't show everybody on the staff high plans and policies of future operations.

Senator FERGUSON. While they are looking for this document, do you know of anything else, Captain, that you can give us here that could help us in the solution of the problem that we have?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As to how this could happen and we not be alerted in Hawaii?

[13018] Captain LAYTON. Well, I formed a pretty good idea of how they did it. If you are interested in hearing how I think they did it and were able to come in undetected throughout I will be glad to give it to you in a couple of minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt but they came in and they were not detected.

Captain LAYTON. There is no doubt about that in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at that instrument?

Mr. GEARHART. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to hear that if he can tell it in a minute or so.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON. I mentioned this radio intelligence as being an inexact science. I also said that if you go under sealed orders, don't use your radio, and take the precaution that you will receive no radios yourself addressed to you, then you can move freely on the high seas, so long as you are not detected by planes, submarines, picket boats or casual merchant vessels. I have formed a definite conclusion that the Japanese realized that a blow on Pearl Harbor was necessary toward their major plan of operation and that they had carefully studied their own radio traffic and had [13019] made an analysis of it and that therefore they made their plans, gave it to the carrier task force commander, and thereafter never addressed him and, of course, he went under radio silence, and therefore he had no implications, no associations, no mention in traffic, he was just as if, what they wanted me to believe he was, in home ports. That can always be done.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you look at that instrument. The bottom of the page.

Captain LAYTON. I see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see that before?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Exhibit 17.

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 106.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 106. It was originally in Exhibit 17.

Mr. MURPHY. The page, for the record.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the page on that?

Captain LAYTON. This says page 4 here, but this is a very thick volume.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the November 5. Admiral Stark and General Marshall for the President.

Captain LAYTON. I never saw it. I had heard corridor gossip that there was a delineation line.

[13020] Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you, as the chief of intelligence for the fleet at Hawaii, were obliged to be passing corridor gossip about the question that the Senator asked you but Admiral Kimmel did not show you that recommendation of the Army and the Navy given to the President?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel did not see fit to so inform me.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, it would have been of help to you, as an intelligence officer, if you had that, since you found it necessary to indulge in corridor gossip to meet the situation; isn't that correct?

Captain LAYTON. I tried to pass on to my liaison in the Hawaiian Air Force everything that I had that I thought would help him, and if I was passing gossip I told him that it was gossip and he could evaluate it accordingly, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you had to indulge in gossip because the admiral hadn't shown you this particular paper which discussed the idea of the Army and the Navy as to the Japanese at the time; isn't that right?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you said that you could give us in a few minutes how the blow was brought about. You said that [13021] they could make plans and give those plans to a carrier task force, have the carriers proceed without traffic, and that that can always be done. You knew that before December 7, 1941, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also knew that the Japanese had 10 carriers, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew that you had only accounted for two, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Not in my sheet of December 2.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, how many had you accounted for? You had accounted for two going south and you thought there were two at the Marshalls; is that not right?

Captain LAYTON. There were a few more than that. I would like to read them.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Take it slowly so that I can follow your testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Captain LAYTON. Aye, sir.

On page 3 of my Location Sheet typed on December 1, corrected and submitted on December 2, I put: Cardiv-4, two carriers and four destroyers; Cardiv-3, two carriers and three destroyers; in the Bako-Takao area.

Mr. MURPHY. You also felt, did you not, that they were [13022] part of the second fleet under the commander in chief of the second fleet?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, go ahead.

Captain LAYTON. In the Marshall area I showed the *Koryu* plus plane guards, being one carrier and four destroyers in the Marshall area.

Mr. MURPHY. How many carriers?

Captain LAYTON. One.

Mr. MURPHY. One in the Marshalls?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I showed the *Kasuga Maru*, a converted carrier, as being also in the Bako-Takao area.

Mr. MURPHY. How many did you have going south?

Captain LAYTON. I had a total of five going south.

Mr. MURPHY. Five?

Captain LAYTON. Five; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And one in the Marshalls?

Captain LAYTON. One of those five was a converted carrier.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me review your testimony before the Roberts Commission. Before I do that, Captain, you said that the Secretary of State sent this man back to Japan for amity or other reasons. What would be the other reasons?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I wouldn't be in a position to know.

[13023] Mr. MURPHY. I thought there might have been something sinister in your "other reasons."

Captain LAYTON. No. I meant rather than have this Naval Japanese officer up for a trial of espionage in our country and the ensuing

row in the Japanese papers, I believed it was deemed, and I am not speaking first-hand, I am guessing now, better to let him go as an undesirable alien.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, were you familiar with Japanese broadcasts intercepted at Pearl Harbor on December 8, were they called to your attention?

Captain LAYTON. You mean the Japanese broadcasts in plain language, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. The broadcasts in which they told about the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you were familiar with the weather broadcasts put in the middle of that message?

Captain LAYTON. I don't recall that there was a weather broadcast in the middle of that message; there may have been.

[13024] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

In the message here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect.

This is the Naval report.

A weather forecast was made, as far as I recollect. No such weather forecast had ever been made before.

His exact words were:

Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time. West wind clear. Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy it may be some sort of a code.

Captain LAYTON. We heard that late the night of the 7th. It was reported to us that that west wind clear hidden code winds execute did come through late the night of the 7th, but we were not interested in it then.

Mr. MURPHY. West wind clear would refer to——

Captain LAYTON. England.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you had some discussion with Admiral Kimmel, did you not, between the 1st of December and the 7th of December, about the carriers you could not account for?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That was on the 2nd of December.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also had discussion with him of the fact that you were unable to account for battleships?

[13025] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

I believe that was in the middle of November, or possibly a little later.

Mr. MURPHY. You are sure it wasn't about the same time in December?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. Battleships were not brought up as a matter of conversation in the carrier conversation.

Mr. MURPHY. I refer you to your testimony on page 1090 before the Roberts board:

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander in Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant situation?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I was in conferences daily.

In that connection, I would like to ask if there was at any time a conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and yourself and some intelligence officer of the Army between those dates?

Captain LAYTON. I previously testified that General Short had a conference with Admiral Kimmel and other naval force commanders——

Mr. MURPHY. Do you understand my question?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there at any time——

Captain LAYTON. An Army Intelligence officer present.

[13026] Mr. MURPHY. At any meeting you ever had with General Short?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir, never.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also testified that you had liaison with the Air Corps, the Army Air Corps intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have liaison with the Navy Air Corps intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why would you have liaison with the Army Air Corps intelligence officer and not the Navy? What is the difference between the two?

Captain LAYTON. None, as I see it, except that Colonel Raley of the Hawaiian Air Force came to me in mid-1941 and said, or I understood him to say that he had been directed to establish liaison, which I was glad to do.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't it rather singular that the Army Air Corps, who knew what was going on, or at least part of what was going on, and Captain Davis and Admiral Bellinger, neither knew anything about these messages?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Davis was on the staff, sir. He was a subsection officer under Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. He was in charge of Air?

Captain LAYTON. Under the officer who had all of the [13027] intelligence that I had, and all of my evaluated intelligence reports and who was aware of all of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, if Captain Davis didn't know about it that would be his superior's responsibility?

Captain LAYTON. That would be his superior. His superior had directed me to show the book to his assistant in Operations.

[13028] Mr. MURPHY. Did you show it to Captain Davis?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. He saw several of the books without initialing because he had not been ordered or told to read the books.

Mr. MURPHY. He has testified under oath that he didn't know about these war warning messages and I wondered if you knew whether he had or not.

Captain LAYTON. I couldn't state positively here under oath that I know positively that he did. It would be my assumption that he was present when the war warning message was being discussed in the admiral's cabin.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether he was or not?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know positively.

Mr. MURPHY. What do you know about Admiral Bellinger. He was also an air officer. He has testified that he knew nothing about them.

Captain LAYTON. I do not know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also testified this afternoon that you felt that the Army was on an all-out alert. Was that your testimony? Captain LAYTON. That was my conception at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. You presumed the Army was on the highest state of alert?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13029] Mr. MURPHY. Why would you presume that when the fleet wasn't on the highest state of alert, they were only in the third condition.

Captain LAYTON. I didn't know there was a difference in the Army states of alert at that time. I thought they only had one.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't the Navy ships themselves on the lowest state of alert, with only one-fourth of the antiaircraft guns manned?

Captain LAYTON. They went into the one customarily in while in port.

Mr. MURPHY. They didn't take any special precautions after the war warning than they had for months previous; isn't that true?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is correct, although I don't know that first hand.

Mr. MURPHY. The Navy was in the normal ordinary routine alert and yet you thought that the Army was in the highest state of alert; the first hand.

Captain LAYTON. I thought the Army had only one state of alert. When I say "highest" I mean that they were on the alert.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you said you did not expect war in Hawaii.

[13030] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that so?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you expect an attack on the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel has testified before us that he did expect a submarine attack. Why would you differ with him?

Captain LAYTON. My words were loose. I meant air attack, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you are restricting it to an air attack. If you were to have a submarine attack that would be war in Hawaii, would it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. We had had submarine contacts off Hawaii many, many times, but you couldn't prove that they were submarines. We suspected that there were Japanese submarines lurking about trying to scout for information. We also had a report from the naval attaché in Tokyo that the crew of one submarine had returned and were bragging about having been in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew that there was a considerable submarine movement moving east?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You know they were sighted at Saipan?

[13031] Captain LAYTON. They weren't sighted.

Mr. MURPHY. I mean the sound—they were detected.

Captain LAYTON. Definitely, passing down to the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Rochefort did tell you in his daily intelligence summary that there was a submarine movement eastward?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; eastward toward the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the Marshalls are much closer to Hawaii than home waters, are they not?

Captain LAYTON. It would be a logical place to go for refueling and standing by for further exercises or operations.

Mr. MURPHY. How do you account for the fact that if the submarines were going to the Marshalls and you felt there were aircraft carriers at the Marshalls that the Army didn't know anything about it? General Short says that he never heard of it.

Captain LAYTON. I can only say that Washington had all the information that we had. Washington had close liaison with the Army. The Army in Washington knew who they were sending their information to. The Washington authorities had full right to send out their information. And it is my conception and belief, and it is sound, that if they didn't want to send it out to the authorities in [13032] Hawaii, that was a responsibility of the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, did you have any responsibility? What were you doing out there?

Captain LAYTON. My responsibility was as laid down by the staff instructions which I read this afternoon. They clearly outline the full scope.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, as the fleet intelligence officer you were to advise the fleet generally as to conditions wherever the fleet was; isn't that right?

Captain LAYTON. I was to see about the fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. And while the fleet was in the harbor the fleet was your responsibility, wasn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That is, my responsibility as far as intelligence went.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. It was up to you to know everything there was in the way of intelligence to protect that fleet wherever it was?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the fact is, you did expect hostile Japanese action in the first week of December, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You had that information from various sources, Naval Intelligence, reports of naval attachés, naval observers, [13033] the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the intelligence unit at Manila, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. And Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And the Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, about the middle of November you knew that the normal organization of the Japanese Fleet was disrupted?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew that the commander in chief of the Second Fleet was placed in a position far more important than his normal administrative job?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew and had been informed that that fleet was apparently getting together for an offensive action?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also had a report as to what ships were seen going south, didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Some reports; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You had detailed reports to some extent of warships, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13034] Mr. MURPHY. And there were a number of carriers not accounted for in that report, were there not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, no carriers were reported by citation at any time.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew that it appeared as if instead of protective operations by the fleet there was to be an operation by task forces or a task force, and the commander in chief of the Second Fleet was to be put in supreme command?

Captain LAYTON. We expected it, and he was.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew by radio intelligence that you had no contact as to the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in connection with the southward movement?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe that is correct. Would you repeat that?

Mr. MURPHY. I say, did you also know that there was no radio intelligence placing the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in the southward movement?

Captain LAYTON. Oh, yes, there was.

Mr. MURPHY. There was?

Captain LAYTON. Considerable.

Mr. MURPHY. To make you believe he was in charge?

Captain LAYTON. He was commander in chief of the Second Fleet and was taking supreme command of the task forces moving [13035] south?

Mr. MURPHY. Was he in charge of the one coming to Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. The commander in chief of that force was called the commander in chief of the First Air Fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt from radio intelligence that the movement would be south and that it would be amphibious in nature?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you felt that it would be to the Malay Barrier or against Singapore or to the Netherlands Indies or the Philippines, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you agreed entirely with what Washington had said to you in the dispatch they sent to you?

Captain LAYTON. Exactly. I considered their dispatches as dotting the i's and crossing the t's.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also knew that there had been no positive indications of the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception of Carrier Division 3, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I had positive location of Carrier Division 3. There was no positive location of Carrier [13036] Division 4 or these other units. I put one in the Marshalls and one in the south Formosa area. However, the extra carrier division had been in the past previously associated, even in a light way, with the com-



mander, Second Fleet, and commander, Third Fleet, and on the basis of that I placed that carrier division there.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask you whether or not before the Roberts Commission you gave this testimony:

Commander LAYTON. There had been no positive indications of the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception of Carrier Division 3, which was associated with the southern movement for some time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was Carrier Division 3? Two carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Two carriers, sir; the *Ryūō* and the *Hoshō*.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did your command have knowledge of the number of Japanese carriers in their Navy?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many were there?

Commander LAYTON. Ten, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you have accounted for two?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the other eight I understand you to [13036A] say there were no definite indications as to their location.

Commander LAYTON. No positive indications of their location.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct. No positive. I have tried to indicate, sir, that when you make a location sheet you have to use some of the very small evidence rather than the preponderance of the evidence to locate your forces because if you wait for all positive evidence you would only put down two or three ships.

Mr. MURPHY. On the information you received from Commander Rochefort, the daily intelligence summaries, there was carried as to the carriers "no information."

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the first time you heard from the commander in chief of the carrier fleet was on December 8?

Captain LAYTON. December 7, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. December 7.

Captain LAYTON. He opened up after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. You hadn't heard from him for some days and that morning you told Admiral Kimmel that you had heard from him for the first time in some time; isn't that right?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there was also a change in radio calls, was there not, in November?

[13037] Captain LAYTON. November 1; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And there was also a change the first of December?

Captain LAYTON. December 1; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That was extraordinary, wasn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Rather extraordinary. I would like to point out that the Japanese at that time were showing all the symptoms of taking increased radio security. I won't go into the technicalities but they were using multiple addresses and blanket coverage and what we call addressed to nobody from nobody, which everybody copied, and when they do that nobody is being talked to that you can identify, and therefore the forces are pretty hard to identify in traffic.

Mr. MURPHY. You did have a report from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and a report from the American observer in Singapore and the commander in chief of the British Far East Naval Forces that gave you some idea as to the initial distribution of the task force in the south, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. A part of it; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That left the carriers unaccounted for except two?

Captain LAYTON. Not precisely; no. That left a good [13038] part of that force unaccounted for by sighting, but they were definitely headed south. It left my distribution of carriers good in my mind. However, on that location sheet I did not list Cardivs 1 or 2 because they had not shown in traffic, had not been addressed, were in no way in the traffic headings, and had all the usual appearances of being in home ports or possibly standing by for a covering force in connection with the southern movement, remaining in home waters, I thought.

Mr. MURPHY. You say that the answer you made as to the inquiry as to the battleships not being accounted for was prior to November 27?

Captain LAYTON. It is my recollection. I have not read the Roberts report. I never saw a copy of it. It might have been after.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Roberts Board, on page 1090, you were questioned about the conferences between November 27 and December 7, and it was then that you said in answer to this question:

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander in Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant situation?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I was in conference daily.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you the slightest suspicion of a [13039] possible air attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not, when you had the warning and from what you knew about the situation that Japan would strike and probably strike hard and even before war was declared?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. That had all been considered.

The CHAIRMAN. That had all been considered?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, that had all been considered and discussed. The Admiral, in fact, said one day, "Where are the battleships". I said "I don't know. Their location had not been known for more than a week." He said, "Do you think they could be off here or out at sea without our knowing it?" I said, "Yes, if they have maintained radio silence." He said "Do you think they are?" and I said, "No." He said, "Where do you think they are?" and I said, "I estimate they are in port, having completed two weeks operations and they are having overhaul for new operations."

General McNARNEY. Was there some discussion held with reference to the carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, only not so specific. The Admiral knew of the carriers down there, I am sure.

You told us here tonight that they could maintain radio silence. Did you take that into consideration?

[13040] Captain LAYTON. That is always taken into consideration to a degree; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you also take into consideration, since you expected a submarine attack, in the plans you had in effect at Hawaii, that if there was a submarine attack it would in all probability be accompanied by an air attack?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe I recall having grouped those two together in my mind. I know that was one of the feasibilities and capabilities of the enemy as laid down. I knew that was in our standard operating procedure letter. I won't say definitely I had those two coupled in my mind during that time.

As I recall it, and my memory may be bad, that conference regarding the battleships was previously, because on this location sheet dated December 1, 1941, I showed battle division 1 and battle division 2 in the Kure-Sasebo area. Now, they were fairly well indicated as being there and they hadn't been showing the radio silence but had shown it previously. They had no traffic on them and the admiral asked where they were. This was not the only location sheet that I submitted. I also carried BatDiv 3 in this location sheet as in the southern task force and of course only two were there. The other two came to Hawaii. But all the battleship divisions were accounted for, so I think that [13041] perhaps is the conversation prior to the period mentioned there as it being a general question referring to conferences regarding the surprise attack. The conference regarding surprise attack was some time before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you mean you indicated any such date before the Roberts board?

Captain LAYTON. I don't think I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Roberts board did you make this answer: that Carrier Division 3 was enroute or in the China Sea, and one of the carrier divisions was reported to be in or near the Mandates, and others were getting their bases all set, but their location was not known.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, is it true that the strength of our two task forces that we had at Hawaii was superior in strength to the task force that attacked Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Superior, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I believe the task force that attacked Hawaii infinitely superior than a combination of our task forces, let alone any individual one.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you asked this question—of course, we may have more information since that time:

[13042] Admiral REEVES—

This is page 1093. You were discussing then before the Roberts board the strength of the Japanese Fleet:

Admiral REEVES. And that is the striking force.

Commander LAYTON. Yes. As I obtained that from the radio call sheet out of the plane.

Admiral REEVES. Then in strength, that is hardly equal to the strength of our task force, three of which we had out, except in carriers. That is, a carrier in each one, three heavy cruisers—

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And 12 destroyers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And that was 12. They did have more carriers in this one group?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Now, was that to indicate our strength was greater than theirs?

Captain LAYTON. I don't follow the line of that questioning. I have never had a chance to proofread it. I know they struck a lot from the record. It is my firm belief that the Japanese carrier task force, with 6 carriers fully trained, armed, ready to go, with 2 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 [13043] light cruiser

and 12 destroyers, was a powerful offensive force. They had weaknesses. If they were caught at night or in poor visibility, then they had a weakness because somebody could make slashing attack upon them without them being able to use their air.

[13044] Mr. MURPHY. I won't press it because it is a matter of certainty in the record as to what each force consisted of. We have that in the record without indulging in speculation or recollection.

Were you aware of the message that was sent from Hawaii on the night of December 6 as to the destruction of the codes at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. I was informed by then Commander Rochefort that he had very good pipe-line information to the effect that the Japanese consulate was destroying codes and official papers by burning.

Mr. MURPHY. Why didn't Admiral Kimmel know about that?

Captain LAYTON. I don't know that he didn't know about it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that he said he didn't. That was Com-14. Com-14 advised Washington on December 6:

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not including your eighteen double five of third.

Did you know about that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not see that message, although Commander Rochefort informed me of the purport.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel you certainly notified your commander in chief?

[13045] Captain LAYTON. I wouldn't be too positive. I may have been notified when Admiral Kimmel was not in or at some time when I didn't get the message to him immediately, but I have no definite recollection.

Mr. MURPHY. If you heard they were destroying their system, you would report it?

Captain LAYTON. Then I would report it.

Mr. MURPHY. If they were destroying all but one system, you would feel that was important enough to get it to the commander in chief as quickly as possible?

Captain LAYTON. I would think so, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What is the significance to you of the destruction of codes? That is pretty important information, isn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Would you consider that a matter of vital importance?

Captain LAYTON. If we had not had previous information that the Japanese were destroying codes, I would say it would be very vital. The previous information was well known and this would merely be added evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also testified that you delivered the message of the 24th direct to General Short.

Captain LAYTON. In person.

[13046] Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral Kimmel criticized you about one message, didn't he?

Captain LAYTON. That was the 27th, sir.

I believe he withdrew that criticism when he discovered that General Short had in fact received it.

Mr. MURPHY. I know just what I read in the record, and I believe there was some qualification of it. I don't want to say that is true either. I mean his characterization. Far from it.

Now, you also said that you heard it said by Admiral Kimmel as to what we would do if there was an attack on the British.

You knew at Hawaii that we were a democracy, and that Congress had the right to declare war?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I believe his statement was "I wish we knew what we were going to do."

Mr. MURPHY. You meant "What would we do when"?

Captain LAYTON. What would we do and when.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as to knowledge of ships being in Pearl Harbor, did you know as the intelligence officer what reports were being made to Washington as to the ships? You did testify that they would not, in your judgment, be the task forces?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13047] Mr. MURPHY. Is it not a fact that your reports to Washington were only as to the ships in the Harbor or that they were in the Hawaiian area?

Captain LAYTON. Very likely so. That was the province of Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. We had testimony before us and we have a map here showing some ship to the north of the island of Oahu on December 6. Did you know anything about that ship?

Captain LAYTON. My guess would be that it was a merchant ship that was torpedoed there on the morning of December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. But it wasn't there on the 7th. At least the map doesn't show it.

Captain LAYTON. It wasn't on my plot and I couldn't say.

Mr. MURPHY. The map shows it on the 6th and not on the 7th. In fact, it seems to trace it going into Pearl Harbor on the week end.

Captain LAYTON. It was customary for the ships to go in for the week end to give the crews needed rest and relaxation, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. This is my last question.

So far as liaison with the Army was concerned, you never received a single order from the commander in chief as to to any liaison whatever with any particular Army intelligence? [13048]

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. Nor did I have any requests from Army sources for liaison.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask a few questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, shortly after the Pearl Harbor disaster, we had unity of command in Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Is that still in existence?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe I am competent to answer that question because I am not real sure. I left Pearl Harbor on the 29th of November to come before this committee, sir, and I am a little bit rusty on what is going on out there.

[13049] Senator LUCAS. When you left on the 29th of November was unity of command still in operation at that time?

Captain LAYTON. To a limited degree, sir. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet still commanded the Pacific Ocean areas and the Army forces in that area came directly under General MacArthur. Under the unity of command principle that was in effect

prior to VJ-day or about that time the Army forces in the Pacific Ocean areas were under the direct military command of Admiral Nimitz through General Richardson, commanding general of the Central Pacific Forces.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, from what you know about the Pearl Harbor disaster and the events leading up to this disaster, did you feel that there was proper liaison between the Army and the Navy at that time?

Captain LAYTON. I believe the liaison at that time could be improved on in the light of war experience.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in light of what happened at Pearl Harbor and the war following you believe the liaison could be improved upon?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; but it must be done on a chain of command principle and not on parallel ladders, so to speak.

Senator LUCAS. I am not sure that I follow you on that last statement.

[13050] Captain LAYTON. For example, sir, under the principle of unity command in effect in the Pacific Ocean areas during the war, intelligence that funneled to the Pacific Ocean areas was a responsibility of the commander in chief of that area to get it to all forces in his area for their use. Before the setting up of that principle of that unity of command no single person was responsible for the intelligence for everybody else, so you had two parallel intelligence systems and as it turns out—and I did not know until afterward—the Army in Hawaii was receiving very little intelligence from Washington. The Navy was developing combat intelligence regarding the Japanese fleet but we received no Japanese troop movements or dispositions from the Army, and I don't believe the Army in Hawaii received them either.

If those funnels had been only funneled to one man whose responsibility it was, who in turn gives it to all the forces no matter what kind of a uniform they wear and is responsible for that, then you have a principle of single purpose, single responsibility, and a proper functioning organization. You cannot have two presidents of a corporation.

Senator LUCAS. I think that you have expressed it better than I would know how and it more or less coincides with what I believe should be done as a result of the testimony that has been adduced before this hearing.

[13051] In other words, do you agree with me that, either in peace or in war, if you are going to have a successful intelligence department either in Washington, Hawaii, the Philippines, or in any other outpost, you are going to have someone upon whom rests the sole responsibility for the proper evaluation and the dissemination of that information to every branch of the service, whether it is the Navy, the Army, or the Marine Corps?

Captain LAYTON. I quite agree with you whole-heartedly, Senator, and I believe the present new set-up that I have read about in the papers, wherein the State Department, Army, and Navy will form one central intelligence agency or whatever it is, will function to the benefit of this country in the future.

Senator LUCAS. You fellows in the Navy had some of the finest men that the Naval Academy ever turned out in the Pacific area during

that time, according to the testimony that has been given to this committee and Admiral Kimmel was in charge of the Pacific Fleet at that time as well as the Atlantic Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. On December the 7th?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Wasn't he commander in chief of the entire fleet?

[13052] Captain LAYTON. No, sir. He was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. And also the doctrines that he evolved, the techniques or matters of policy or standard operating procedure that he thought were good enough and having consulted with the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, were in fact issued by the commander in chief under the directive which he had to this United States Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at one time he was commander in chief of the United States Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. That was just a title, that was a hat he could wear, but it was not a tactical or administrative office.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the fact that this was a title or hat that he could wear, did that add anything to his importance out there as the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I don't think you can find anything higher than the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, it is a fact that General Short was out there and his was just a small part of the United States Army although he held a very responsible position.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

[13053] Senator LUCAS. I have obtained this sort of an idea and if I am wrong I want you to disabuse it from my mind. You fellows in the Navy are a pretty powerful group, and you had charge of the Pacific Fleet out there, and Short was more or less in charge of just an outpost, and, as far as the Army was concerned, was pretty small. I have gained sort of an impression that you fellows did not pay much attention to Short and his crowd; and I am wondering if I am wrong.

Captain LAYTON. If I answer that, you put me in an embarrassing position if I either agree with you and am not telling the truth.

Senator LUCAS. I won't press it if it is going to embarrass you, and I probably should have asked Admiral Kimmel that question when he was here.

Captain LAYTON. I say I think it is an embarrassing question, because I, for one, never thought of the Army as any small potato. In fact, I worked with the Army at our Army post all during this war, and they are a fine bunch of people, and if you really want to see how the services get together go out where they don't wear a collar and tie when they put them in the South Pacific. You can't tell the Army from the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. I am sure you always worked faithfully under any conditions, and that was the attitude in the Navy and Army, and I know that you worked faithfully since Pearl Harbor; there isn't any question about that; but the only thing I am talking about is previous to Pearl Harbor, when there was a sort of a nonchalant, lackadaisical attitude with the American people, and it seemed

to me that went right on into the Army and the Navy about that particular time. I may be wrong about that.

Captain LAYTON. I recall our attitude toward the impending crisis was anything but lackadaisical, Senator. As a matter of fact, there were some gray hairs sprouted out at that time.

Senator LUCAS. Some what?

Captain LAYTON. Gray hairs.

Senator LUCAS. There may have been some after Pearl Harbor, but do you think there were many before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I can only speak for myself, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How far did you think that the carrier and the two destroyers and what number aircraft they might have had was from Pearl Harbor when you made an estimate to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. I think that was really December 2.

Senator LUCAS. December 2.

Captain LAYTON. I considered them in the Marshalls themselves, and I was delighted when the Army proposed a distance long-range, overwater reconnaissance of the Marshalls [13055] and the central Carolines to spot this task force down there.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; well, how far did you think that these carriers were from Pearl Harbor at the time you made the estimate?

Captain LAYTON. I thought they were in the Marshalls themselves, and most likely at anchor in one of the atolls—Jaluit, possibly Wotje, and possibly Maleolap.

Senator LUCAS. How far in miles would that be, the nearest one, I mean, that the carrier might be based in?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to give you the exact distance if I can, sir.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir, I would like to have it.

Captain LAYTON. From Jaluit to Pearl Harbor is 2,096 nautical miles.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Is that the nearest port they might be located in?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that Wotje is a little closer. It is 1,970 miles. I believe that is about the nearest that has a good harbor and base facility.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, should that fact alone, Captain, have given the commander of the Pacific Fleet some concern and some warning, if there was an aircraft carrier that close on December the 3d?

Captain LAYTON. The attack that came did not come from [13056] the Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that.

Captain LAYTON. There had been aircraft carriers in the Marshall Islands before. The situation, of course, was not as tense.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Captain LAYTON. Now, one of the basic axioms of intelligence is to always think if you were the enemy what would you do and being in intelligence you say, "Now, this fellow has got a carrier out here. I am a Jap. What did I put him down there for?" My answer to that one was he was there to ferry down some planes for other divisions. I mean they were expanding and enlarging the movement



in preparation for what you would think then would be our most logical point of attack, an attack on the Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, it never occurred at that time, and I can understand it from the evidence, that this carrier might be there for the purpose of making a final attack upon Oahu?

Captain LAYTON. I did not think so, sir. The Senator will recall that there was a difference of opinion between the combat intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor and the one at Cavite as to the presence or absence of carriers in the Marshalls.

[13057] Senator LUCAS. That is right, I know there was a difference of opinion.

Captain LAYTON. And I had to evaluate this. One said none and the other one said two divisions, so I straddled the fence by putting one down there.

Now, there had been two and good evidence of two. They might be down there as a covering force and a scouting force to detect with their carrier planes the advance of our raiding force, which they could anticipate well by looking at the geography just along there where they stretched and thereby allow their land-based planes to make an attack in force without having to do scouting.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever learn thereafter whether your evaluation of that carrier was correct?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; I don't believe there has been anything found, any evidence found anywhere that one carrier was in the Marshalls. There was evidence of two carriers in the Palau area and they attacked the Philippines on the morning of December 8 Philippine time, December 7 our time.

Senator LUCAS. The fact is that the evidence before this committee shows that the Japs expected to lose one-third of their task force.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You are familiar with that?

[13058] Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know upon what basis they might have figured that in view of the complete surprise?

Captain LAYTON. That figuring was done before they had the complete surprise, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. They sat down and worked this out on a game board. They moved their forces and they had members of their general staff act as Americans, while the members of their task force who worked this out acted as their own selves, Japanese, and in working this out they did not, so I am told, anticipate getting off scot free and the umpires which you always have in a game of this nature assessed them one-third carrier damage. Based on that they anticipated one-third carrier loss.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in other words, regardless of how they finally reached the conclusion, they did not expect to be as successful in this surprise raid as they were.

Captain LAYTON. I believe their success surpassed their fondest dreams.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, they expected the Army and the Navy in Hawaii to be on the alert and give them some battle instead of finding them the way they were?

Captain LAYTON. That is true. They also gave the Army and [13059] Navy in Hawaii credit for far more planes than we had, in their war-college game board they worked out in advance.

Senator LUCAS. That is probably true. I am glad that we did not have more planes there the way it turned out. Of course, it may be that if we had had more planes they might not have struck, too; that is another angle. If we had had enough there to have had long-range reconnaissance around the perimeter, they probably may not have taken a chance.

Now, one other question. I think that is bordering along the line of a question I previously asked. I quote from Colonel Clausen's testimony. Senator Ferguson said this [reading]:

Did you find that that same thing took place in Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In Washington, sir, I think there was far more cordial and freer exchange, but the same thing applies, Senator.

For the sake of the country it should be known that there was evidently some jealousy between the services, and this thing existed prior to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. And it existed in Washington, Hawaii and the Philippines?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I understand. In other words, what a ludicrous situation is presented if you have [13060] a fleet intelligence officer, Captain Layton, saying he gave information to Colonel Raley but would not tell Colonel Raley where it came from. How would Colonel Raley know to evaluate it?

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I was going to get at for many days in this hearing here in Washington.

Colonel CLAUSEN. If I can make one simple contribution to this case, and if anything comes out of this hearing, it would be that you pursue the idea of having one agency and let that thing be coordinated on a business basis, so you do not have monopolistic agencies trying to hide the information for themselves.

And that is practically what you agreed to a little while ago in the question I propounded to you.

Captain LAYTON. That is basically what I said without the adjectives.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there a separate Coast Guard set-up at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I believe the Coast Guard set-up was separate but I am not positive.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether they had a separate intelligence service?

Captain LAYTON. Their radio intelligence personnel worked with and side by side with the Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. But they had a separate intelligence man; did they?

Captain LAYTON. If they did, I never saw him; I never heard of him. I do not believe that they did, sir. The Coast Guard was concerned with the coastal waters alone there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, they were firing on the morning of the 7th; weren't they?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I was not saying anything to detract from the Coast Guard's fine record.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Captain LAYTON. I meant that their service was entirely limited and as such they came under the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, and as a fleet intelligence officer I would not have cognizance over matters pertaining to the Coast Guard.

MR. MURPHY. I have been asked the question as to whether or not the Coast Guard were fully alerted on the morning of December 7 and ready to meet the attacks coming in there. Do you know anything about that?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

MR. MURPHY. That is all.

MR. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

[13062] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

MR. GEARHART. Captain, if I understood your testimony, you attributed great importance in the achieving of the success the Japanese carrier obtained to their ability to maintain radio silence over their ship movement.

Captain LAYTON. More than that, Mr. Gearhart. Radio silence alone would be a give-off if they had been in the traffic, but they were not in the traffic at all throughout the month. When the build-up came, they were not addressed. They had all the rest of these commanders addressed, but they were not. It was not unusual, but the fact they were not addressed and the fact that they were apparently unconcerned with this entire matter and operating no radio, whether as originators or as addressees, led us to the belief, erroneous as it was, that they were unconcerned and were remaining in home waters, probably preparing for future operations.

MR. GEARHART. Wouldn't you have described that as a complete radio silence? They were just simply not involved in radio at all.

Captain LAYTON. It is more than radio silence, sir. Radio silence involves a ship or unit or series of units not using their radio but being addressed.

MR. GEARHART. Well, if you are being addressed and there is no directional radio broadcasting, how can that help you?

[13063] Captain LAYTON. I mean if they are addressed in the traffic, their future activity may be forecast.

MR. GEARHART. I would like to have you define something that I have been hearing over and over again. What do you mean by "traffic"?

Captain LAYTON. Well, sir, traffic is a broad term for all the radio messages that pass on the many, many circuits that a Navy has. I imagine the Japanese had somewhere around 200 different circuits as of December 7 or before, and they have a peculiarity, maybe I should explain, that is different from that in ordinary usage.

For instance, if a ship is at Kure in southwest Japan, and it is going to Ominata in the Hanshu, under normal circumstances he would send a movement report in which he would address the chief of the main reporting division in Tokyo, the commandant in Kure, where he was leaving, and to the naval station in Ominata, telling him he was coming. That would then be placed on the Kure broadcast. It would then go to the Tokyo broadcast, it would be picked up and broadcast on the Ominata broadcast, and by putting these together and watching their sequence you could forecast that this ship was going to go from Kure to Ominata. That is the way we forecast the task force that was going to the south.

MR. GEARHART. I understand that all right, but I cannot [13064] understand what you mean when you say it is not the equivalent of radio silence when a ship is simply not mentioned on the radio at all,

no messages go from the ship and no messages are addressed to the ship. Now, isn't that absolute radio silence?

Captain LAYTON. It is more than radio silence, sir. If the ship itself merely remained silent and does not use its radio, that is generally called radio silence.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it is a complete condition of no sending.

Captain LAYTON. It is a blank condition obtaining.

Mr. GEARHART. That is what it is, yes.

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you attributed great importance to the Japanese attack—in their attack on Pearl Harbor—to the fact that they were able to achieve their super two-way silence.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, what I would like to know is, is your attachment of importance to that condition which was produced, is that a hindsight matter or was that a principle that you had in mind before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I think I stated, sir, that it was a hindsight observation that I would like to give in 2 minutes. The fact that ships could go under radio silence was well known but never in the history of the Japanese naval communication that I had observed over a period of years had such a phenomena ever occurred.

[13065] Mr. GEARHART. Well, an order for radio silence of some degree—I do not want to argue over terms, but an order for radio silence of some degree was imposed on American ships issued from the Pacific Fleet Command, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, an examination of logs of ships has disclosed, at least one of them, the *Boise*, that enemy ships were sighted in American waters adjacent to Guam on the last couple of days of November of 1941.

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is true.

Mr. GEARHART. You have learned that?

Captain LAYTON. I have read of that; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The fact that the *Boise* sighted enemy ships in American waters, adjacent to Guam, was never reported to you?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is because of the order of radio silence; is that it?

Captain LAYTON. That, I believe, was the result of the interpretation of the captain on radio silence.

Radio silence as ordered is general in terms. You will maintain radio silence and will only break it in case of emergency.

This being a peacetime mission that the *Boise* [13066] was on, he maintained a radio silence. Whether he had an alternate in his directive or not, I do not know.

As a matter of fact had the *Boise* reported sighting the ship near Guam, it would have added nothing to our store of knowledge, as we had already suspected some of the ships in the southern Pacific force were going down to Palau.

Mr. GEARHART. It would have been important to know because it would have been a confirmation or proof of a fact which you merely suspected?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Also, an examination of the log of the U. S. S. *Wright* in Hawaiian waters discloses that they sighted enemy ships on the 6th day of December 1941. Was that reported to you or to the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Would that have been important information for you to have received?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Under the orders for radio silence, do you think the commander of that ship or the captain of that ship was under an obligation not to report it, or did he exercise bad judgment?

Captain LAYTON. By no means, sir. I would say that was [13067] a case of bad judgment.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, can you tell me of any other instances where the order of radio silence prevented Admiral Kimmel's command from obtaining information they should have had until after the 7th day of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any at first-hand; no, sir. I do not recall any rumors either.

Mr. GEARHART. How is that?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any; no sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, does anything occur to you along that line that you should report to us?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I am being honest when I say I do not recall any such instance being brought to my attention at any time.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have anything to do with the issuing of that order for radio silence shortly before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. That would be the communications officer.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it not inspired or suggested by reason of your belief that the control of radio use was so important?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; none whatsoever.

Mr. GEARHART. I think that is all.

[13068] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. When Mr. Shivers was before the Roberts Board he spoke of a message of December 6, you spoke of one of December 5, and one of December 4, another of December 4, and one of December 3.

I do not know of any place in the record as to whether or not they were known in Hawaii before December 7.

De we, counsel?

Mr. MASTEN. They were messages from whom?

Mr. MURPHY. They were messages from Kita. I will ask it this way:

Captain, on December 6, 1941, from Togo. Foreign Minister, to the consul at Honolulu:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of movements of warships after the 4th.

Signed, "Togo."

Did you know about that before the 7th?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I believe Mr. Shivers got that after the 7th, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That series of messages?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He did not make it clear to the Roberts Board. [13069]

Captain LAYTON. Those are the ones Captain Rochefort referred to, that they worked on some after the 3d and were not able to break down until I believe it was the 10th, he said, at which time I know they were given to the district intelligence officer to use, and Mr. Shivers was shown those.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to inquire if the Japanese ships were up in the "vacant sea," and without receiving radio messages, would the throwing of the beam to those ships, as I understand you can do, and being intercepted by your station, would that indicate that they were reaching ships in the "vacant sea"?

Captain LAYTON. The which sea?

Senator FERGUSON. It has been referred to as the "vacant sea," from Japan over north 2 or 3 hundred miles, north of Oahu.

Captain LAYTON. Well, if they were using a beamed antenna, shooting its beams only in a directional way, and they were not heard in Hawaii, and they were not heard in Cavite, there was still a chance that the radio direction finder unit as Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians would have heard [13070] them, and being a part of Captain Rochefort's mid-Pacific direction-finder net, they would so have reported it, and that would have been given considerable weight.

Senator FERGUSON. Then if the Japanese information indicates that on the 6th they sent out the message "Climb Mount Niitaka," if that was broadcast to the fleet to the Jap Fleet, that should have been picked up by the Dutch Harbor unit?

Captain LAYTON. I read that Japanese report with considerable interest.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you an opinion on it?

Captain LAYTON. I am of the opinion that "Climb Mount Niitaka" or any other such code phrase, was never transmitted.

Senator FERGUSON. You believe they went in there under radio silence both ways?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In and out?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; they broke radio silence right after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean until the attack took place?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The fact is that the minute the attack was commenced, the direction-finder bearings were placed immediately on, [13071] I think, the *Akagi* and *Kaga* and they were immediately identified.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean by our radio station?

Captain LAYTON. At Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did not we send some planes up there?

Captain LAYTON. Unfortunately, Senator, the direction-finder bearing is bilateral; it runs two ways. They did have one direction finder which could take a unilateral bearing, or a one-direction bearing.

The communications in that station were completely out all the forenoon, until late afternoon. They sent their information in by sidecar, or bicycle, or some such slow transportation.

Our direction finder at Haeia on the north part of Oahu was sending, and was giving what had come to that set what was called bilateral bearings.

As an example, the first information I received was 10:40 local time, Oahu, bearing bilateral  $357^{\circ}$ , or  $178^{\circ}$  true from Haeia.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand you went south to find these ships instead of going north?

Captain LAYTON. It was not a case of misleading at all, sir. The radio direction finder gives you two bearings; [13072] this way and that way [indicating]. It is the nature of the instrument and it cannot be helped.

Additionally, at that same time, they had reports, vague as they were, of carriers to the south, and that gave cause for thinking that the carriers were to the south, plus the report previously by Com 16 intelligence unit that there had been carrier divisions in the Marshalls, and that also influenced their thought that they might have come from the Marshalls.

Therefore, the preponderance of evidence indicated a southerly direction, while actually that was not true.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the radar man found these planes coming in from the north.

Captain LAYTON. So I have heard, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not anyone think of calling up the radar man to find out whether some radar did find them coming in?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know at first-hand, but I was informed that several efforts had been made to obtain that information from Fort Shafter that morning, without results.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you familiar with Captain Rochefort's testimony before the Roberts commission, about him charting [13073] the planes to the north?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Haven't you known that Captain Rochefort did have some charts that pointed to the north, and he got it by cross-bearings?

Captain LAYTON. Those bearings I believe you referred to are the ones of the following day, when we had the direction finder fixed to the northeast of Midway and northwest of Oahu, but at that time they were seven-hundred-and-sixty-odd miles from Oahu and we had no planes available to carry bombs out that far and have a chance of getting back.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you clear on the fact that Captain Rochefort was speaking of the next day?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know whether Captain Rochefort was speaking of the next day. I know that the only fix we had—and I would be the person who got the fixes—was the following day.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you through, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask one question:

The Japanese have supplied information to the effect that they sent out the message "Climb Mount Niitaka" and the Navy, 3 months

ago or 4 months ago presented us with evidence to that effect. Have you ever expressed [13074] your doubt to anyone in the Navy before this occasion as to the authenticity of that testimony?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; only to my assistants in Pearl Harbor when I first read that report from the strategic bombing survey.

Mr. MURPHY. If you have been able to break the Japanese naval code—I don't want to press the thing—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which one? There are two.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about the fact we have been given evidence here, and I don't want to indulge in any arguments on it. I would like to have you, sir, since you made a flat assertion, state on this record why you disbelieve the testimony that is in the record.

Captain LAYTON. Had they transmitted that message, whether in code or plain language—and it is my understanding that in that code, or hidden-word message "Climb Mount Niitaka," they used plain language—

Mr. MURPHY (interposing). Have you read the testimony in this record?

Captain LAYTON. Not nearly all of it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Captain LAYTON. Not nearly all of it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about this specific incident. Have you read the testimony on that in this record?

[13075] Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you read the reports from Japan?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You have read the report as to how they did it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, what do you differ about in that report?

Captain LAYTON. Had they broadcast that, I think we would have heard it, if it were broadcast "Climb Mount Niitaka".

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. Had they encoded it and addressed it to Commander, Carrier Division, who was the commander concerned, we would have the address that day, but we did not have it.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel then if there was one message some time during the night that you would be most certain to catch it?

Captain LAYTON. There was an intense watch kept from about the 25th to the 26th of November to try to find carrier frequencies. You see, every once in a while the Japanese would change frequencies, and then you would have to search to find them. It is a very difficult problem, but [13076] it can be solved.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, everybody was looking for carrier frequencies right up to December 7?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; and they came up on regular frequencies that morning.

Mr. MURPHY. The only way you could find them, if you could not find them by radio, was by reconnaissance, was that right?

Captain LAYTON. By reconnaissance, or by some merchant ship, or by picket boats, or submarines.

Mr. MURPHY. Even though you were working intently to find them by radio and could not find them, there was no substitute other than by way of ships or planes to do it, was there?



Captain LAYTON. None that I am aware of.

Mr. MURPHY. You base your statement on this message not being broadcast, or on your failure to hear it at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one question.

Did you ever have any war games of an air attack upon Hawaii that came from any other direction than out of the north from the "vacant sea"?

[13077] Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Just one more.

Captain, do you care to express an opinion on whether or not our national defense and our security has been benefited or hurt as the result of this investigation?

Captain LAYTON. Do you want the truth, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Captain LAYTON. I believe that the investigation has hurt our national security to an incalculable degree by so much publicity being given to the decryption activities.

While it may serve a very fine purpose for the future, that is my personal belief. I have the conviction that any potential enemy we ever have now or in the future will be watching his code books and cipher machines, and call signs, and our information, that we have obtained with some success against Japan in the past, will not be in that fine shape that it was, mediocre as it was, on December 7.

After all, if you recall, there was a book once written by a man named Yardley, called "The Black Chamber," and he exposed the reading of the Japanese diplomatic notes to the Washington conference at the time of the 5-5-3 ratio in 1922.

Senator, you would hardly believe it, but the Japanese [13078] naval ciphers in those days were pretty simple. Their call signs were even more simple. They were abbreviations of the full name, like "Kag" for Kagani. After they read that book they treated us language students with suspicion and rightly so, and they changed their codes and ciphers very fast, and the information we were able to have in the past, which was a prop to national security was knocked out from under us.

I believe the investigation here will have the same effect in the future, and I say it with no disrespect to any member present.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, it is unbelievable that a hearing of this kind could be held during the war.

Captain LAYTON. The war would still be going on if you had, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Captain, for your appearance and the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry.

You may be excused, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will call the next witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel Schukraft.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is Colonel Schukraft here?

Please be sworn, Colonel,

[13079]      **TESTIMONY OF COL. ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(Having first been duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Please give your name, rank, and present assignment of duty to the reporter.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Robert E. Schukraft, colonel, Signal Corps. At present assigned to the Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Under Secretary of War.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Colonel, it is now 10 o'clock, so we suspend to 10 o'clock in the morning.

Please be here at 10 o'clock in the morning, sir.

(Whereupon, at 10 p. m., February 18, 1946, the committee adjourned until 10 a. m. of the following day, Tuesday, February 19, 1946.)

[13080]

# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[13081] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Is counsel ready to proceed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have a communication from the Hawaiian Broadcasting System of Honolulu asserting that there has appeared somewhere in the record—I haven't myself seen it—and also in the public press reference to the fact that this broadcasting system continued its broadcast of Japanese programs and news in Hawaii up to the time of the attack. Reference has been made to that, they assert, by way of criticism at their failure to cooperate with proper defense measures in Hawaii.

You will remember that representing the FBI in Honolulu during this debatable period was Mr. Robert L. Shivers. Mr. Shivers is not now in the employ of the FBI, but is holding a position, I think, inspector of customs, or customs collector, or something of that sort, in the Hawaiian district.

Mr. Shivers is now no longer with the FBI, but he has given to Mr. J. Howard Worrall, the president of the Hawaiian Broadcasting System, a detailed letter in which he certifies that the continuance of these Japanese broadcasts by this broadcasting system was directly responsive to his request, in cooperation with the Office of Military Intelligence. Both he, representing the FBI at the time, [13082] and the Office of Military Intelligence, he asserts, believed strongly it would be necessary to use those facilities to propagandize the Japanese and to disseminate Japanese information, and, therefore, they insisted that these broadcasts continue despite the desire of the broadcasting company to discontinue.

Now the request of the broadcasting system is that this letter of Mr. Shivers, that is not sworn to, be included in the record of this proceed-

ing to serve as a statement tending to show that they are not subject to criticism because they did, in response to these requests, continue their Japanese broadcasts.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection to the inclusion of this statement? If not, it will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter referred to follows:)

HONOLULU, T. H., January 16, 1946.

Mr. J. HOWARD WORRELL,

*President, Hawaiian Broadcasting System,  
Honolulu, T. H.*

DEAR MR. WORRELL: In view of the recent disclosures at the Pearl Harbor inquiry, which is being conducted by a Joint Committee of [13083] the Senate and House, concerning Japanese language broadcasts in Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941, I feel that in all fairness to your company and for the record, I should review some of the negotiations and conferences between you and me which caused the Hawaiian Broadcasting System to continue its Japanese language broadcasts right up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

You made repeated visits to my office to discuss the advisability of discontinuing the Japanese language broadcasts beginning as early as June, 1941. At times, you were accompanied by some of the directors of your company. I informed you that from an intelligence standpoint, it was highly desirable that the Japanese language broadcasts be continued as it afforded a medium through which the Japanese population could be propagandized and that the intelligence agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence, did not want these broadcasts discontinued because it was felt that to do so before the actual outbreak of war would result in our losing the Japanese audience to the Tokyo radio station and that once having lost the audience, it would be very difficult to regain it for the purpose of giving orders and instructions to the Japanese population after the outbreak of war.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Military Intelligence believed very strongly it would be [13084] necessary to use the facilities of the local broadcasting stations to propagandize the Japanese and to disseminate information to them after the outbreak of war.

As it became increasingly apparent that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable, you became more insistent in your request to discontinue the Japanese language broadcasts and you were urged by me not to do so. You finally agreed to compromise and continue the Japanese language broadcasts if I would recommend to you some individual familiar with the Japanese language whom you could employ to read and edit the broadcasts before they went out over your station. I accepted this compromise and did recommend to you an American citizen of Japanese ancestry whom you employed for that purpose at your station in Hilo, Hawaii. I also recommended Mr. Akiyoshi Hayashido, whom you employed for the same purpose at KGMB in Honolulu. Mr. Hayashida and the employee at Hilo had been carefully investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and their loyalty to the United States was beyond question. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had utilized the services of both of these men and after the war broke out, Mr. Hayashida was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a translator. He later worked in the same capacity for the Office of Military Intelligence and thereafter was employed by the Office of War Information as a translator [13085] and interpreter.

About the first of November, 1941, you came to my office and informed me you had definitely decided to discontinue the Japanese language broadcasts and that you would do so immediately. I urged you to defer this action until I had had an opportunity to consult with the officers of Military Intelligence, which you agreed to do. I conferred with the responsible officers in the Military Intelligence and advised them of your proposal to discontinue the Japanese language broadcasts immediately. They agreed with me that this action should not be taken and requested me to urge you again to continue the Japanese language broadcasts for the reasons I have previously outlined. I again communicated my desire and that of the officers of Military Intelligence to you and with considerable reluctance, you agreed to continue the broadcasts.

I have also observed statements which have been made before the Investigating Committee which were inferentially critical of the management of your station for having destroyed the records of the Japanese language broadcasts some time

after the Pearl Harbor attack. I want you to know that all of the Japanese language broadcasts over the Hawaiian Broadcasting System for several months prior to December 7, 1941, were carefully reviewed and investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval [19086] Intelligence, and the Office of Military Intelligence and nothing was found by either agency which in any way remotely indicated that your broadcasting station had been used for the dissemination of information to the enemy. Furthermore, it was discovered that nothing of a subversive nature had gone out from your stations in the Japanese language. Sometime in the latter part of 1942 or the early part of 1943, I was asked by officers of Military Intelligence if there were any further need to retain the records of the Japanese language broadcasts over your stations. I informed these officers that these broadcasts had been carefully reviewed and investigated by all three of the intelligence agencies and that so far as the Federal Bureau of Investigation was concerned, it interposed no objection to their destruction.

I have gone into this matter very fully—probably more so than is necessary. But, since practically all of our discussions and negotiations were verbal, I feel that while the facts surrounding this issue are still fresh in my mind, I should record them for our mutual benefit.

Very truly yours,

/S/ Robert L. Shivers.  
ROBERT L. SHIVERS.

[13087] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now I would like to bring up again at this time another matter, since open hearings are supposed to pause tomorrow, and that is the suggestion that I made concerning the memorandum which the Hawaiian Planters Association desire to have filed, tending to show their cooperation with the military forces in Hawaii during the period of the emergency.

As I stated before, that so-called memorandum is verified by the secretary of the association.

The suggestion was made, and I think with considerable point, that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the parties and therefore it might not be a proper part of the record. I have a feeling personally, after reading it, that the factual matter therein contained recites actual acts accomplished, and so forth, and it might be of some assistance to the committee as some source of material.

The committee held no hearings in Hawaii, and therefore there would be considerable difficulty in bringing the various people before the committee for the purpose of establishing these facts, and that is the reason why it appears in connection with this memorandum.

I suggested at the time that I would hold it in abeyance and bring it again to the attention of the committee, which I do now, and whatever action the committee desires to take [13088] with reference to it will be fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I suppose, for whatever weight may be given to it, it may be made part of the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You can give it whatever weight you want to.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record at this point.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand it will not be spread on the record, that it will just be an exhibit?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir; just an exhibit.

That is all we have.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 153.")

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you were just about to proceed to examine this witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

**TESTIMONY OF COL. ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, UNITED STATES  
ARMY (Resumed)**

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state your full name, Colonel?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Robert E. Schukraft.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Army?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I have been an officer since 1932.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and some time prior thereto, what was your assignment?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I was assigned to the office of the [13089] Chief Signal Officer in Washington, in charge of radio intercept for the Chief Signal Officer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your superior officer?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. My immediate superior was Colonel Minckler.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As a part of your duties prior to Pearl Harbor, was your attention ever called to what has been familiarly referred to as the winds code?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you see the original implementing intercepted dispatches which established that code?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir; I did. I saw both of them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have anything to do with a program of monitoring?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state to the committee just what you did in that regard?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. About November 28 Colonel Minckler and I went to Colonel Sadtler's office and went over the two messages setting up the winds code, and Colonel Sadtler desired that some action be taken——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel who?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Sadtler.

[13090] Mr. RICHARDSON. Statler?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. S-a-d-t-l-e-r, Sadtler.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Who was it you went with?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. With Colonel Minckler, sir; M-i-n-c-k-l-e-r, my boss.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Proceed.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Sadtler desired that some action be taken to monitor for the winds execute message. We knew at that time that the Navy was doing some monitoring for this and decided to coordinate our activity with the Navy. During the discussions it was decided that station 2 in San Francisco would probably have about the best chance of hearing this.

We had a double problem: One of them of getting the intercept into Washington, and the other problem of not telling the monitoring stations too much, not passing too much information to the monitoring stations. So that left the stations in the position that they had to monitor almost all of the broadcasts and forward the broadcasts intact to Washington, where they would be examined.

So to carry out this directive I had a teletype conference with the NCO in charge at the west coast, and told him to monitor certain

specific broadcasts, the general intelligence [13091] broadcasts, which they did.

At the same time it was decided to ask the FCC to monitor for the voice broadcasts. We were to monitor the code broadcasts and the FCC to monitor the voice broadcasts. This was because we had no Japanese linguists at the intercept stations.

Later in discussing the matter with Colonel Minckler, since considerable importance appeared to be attached to this, we decided we would also have station 7, which at that time was located in Fort Hunt, Va., monitor for the code broadcasts. I made a trip to Fort Hunt and discussed the matter with the officer in charge. I told him specifically what we were looking for, and they monitored from that point on, and I checked with them periodically.

That is all, Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it was contemplated that there might be responses to intercepts under this monitoring system, both of voice broadcasts and of code, Morse code intercepts?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir; both or either.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. What information, with reference to what key words or sentences you were looking for, did you give to these monitoring stations?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We gave no information to station 2. We merely told them to monitor certain specified Japanese [13092] broadcast stations. To station 7 I did give the officer in charge the information that we were looking for a broadcast which would follow the pattern that the Japs had set up, that is, that certain code word or code words would be repeated.

[13093] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you give them the code words?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I did not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just simply told them that there would be a repetition of words in the message that you were looking for.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would have required them to have translated every message that came in that had any such repetition?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It would require station 2—that is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, with reference to the voice broadcast, was there any information given to the monitoring stations as to the precise words you were interested in?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The English translation of the words was given to the FCC. It was not given to the Army monitoring stations at all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever see any asserted winds execute message, either in a voice broadcast or teletype description, as the result of these monitorings?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I have seen two such, sir.

I have seen the FCC one recently.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the one that is asserted to have been intercepted about the 7th or 8th of December?

[13094] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The 8th of December, I believe, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Now, what was the other one?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The other one was a piece of teletype paper which contained what appeared to be a winds execute message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who called your attention to that piece of paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler brought this piece of paper into my office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. About when?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was 2 or 3 days, as I recall, prior to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What time of day? Do you recall?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not recall exactly, except my impression is it was sometime in the morning, prior to noon.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there a conversation between you and Colonel Minckler concerning it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler asked me what I thought of this piece of paper.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he say where he got it?

[13095] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not recall whether he said exactly or not. The impression I had at the time was that he had received it from Colonel Sadtler.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What further conversation occurred between you?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. This message that he brought in was obviously not a true winds execute message. There were about three things wrong with it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Before you read it, was there any reference in the conversation to Kramer?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir; there was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. He had indicated—

Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). Who had indicated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler—that the Navy had thought this was a true winds execute message, and that Captain Kramer had seen it and had thought that this was a true winds execute message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Very well. Was that the substance of the identifying information that was discussed between you and Minckler?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, was this piece of paper handed to you?

[13096] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I never actually had it in my hand, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Describe the piece of paper and the message on it, as nearly as you can.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The pieces of paper was a piece of yellow teletype paper, 3 or 4 inches wide. Colonel Minckler, at the time I saw it, had this piece of paper folded in his hand.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many words, or lines were there on that sheet of paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. There were not more than one or two lines on that piece of paper.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the language on the paper Japanese?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you examine the paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I did.



Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you conclude that it was or was not a true winds execute?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I concluded very positively that it was not a true winds execute message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It did not follow the pattern specified by the Japanese in setting up the winds execute message.

As I remember, there were about three things wrong [13097] with it.

First of all, it was transmitted by a Morse station, and the message was in the voice form, which was impossible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by that?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Well, when you set up a code of this type, it must carry some means of identifying this as a message, otherwise, you have no means of knowing whether the identification that was set up by the Japanese was actually carried. Whereas, if sent by voice there would appear in a specified place in the message in the broadcast and would be repeated in a certain specified manner, the words that they had set up in their code. Those were the keys to the fact that this was a message and not a weather report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now diagnose this message you saw, and state what you think were its indications.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Well, my memory on it actually is rather hazy, but the one thing was that it was in a voice form.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean "in a voice form"?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Of the type of "East wind rain," of that type. Those were not the words on the message, as I remember.

[13098] So it was in the voice form transmitted by Morse station. It did not appear, the indications at the time were that it did not appear at the beginning of the message, but appeared in the middle of the broadcast, which, again is not correct for the Morse broadcast.

There was no indication that it was repeated at the end of the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your point is then that under the original code messages, there was a difference in the position of the key words where the message was to be sent in a voice news broadcast, and where the message was to be sent by Morse code?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With respect to the position of the words?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the difference?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. In the voice code it was to be sent in the middle of the news broadcast, repeated twice, and also at the end of the broadcast and again repeated twice and those are the keys which indicated that this was a code message and not a weather report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what was the requirement with respect to an intercept that would come in, in code?

[13099] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That it would be repeated five times at the beginning and end of the broadcast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, your voice broadcast code message would be No. 2353 which had the words Higashi No Kaze Ame and the other Japanese phrases appearing in the middle of the broadcast?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whereas the second message establishing a winds code was No. 2354 which had simply the single words Higashi and Kita and Nishi with the recital, "The above will be repeated five times and included at the beginning and end"?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What you are endeavoring to tell us, as I understand it, is that in order to qualify as a true winds execute, the executing message must comply with those requirements?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For you as an officer interpreting that message to give it authenticity?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct. It must comply absolutely with the rules laid down by the Japanese, otherwise they, their own people, would have no means of knowing that this was an execute message.

[13100] Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion to that effect between you and Colonel Minckler at the time you saw this message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Only that I pointed out to him what the discrepancies were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did you conclude from that that it was or was not a true winds execute?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is very positively was not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You don't know where Minckler got the message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what was the color of the paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was yellow.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And was the message the original typed message or the carbon copy?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. My memory is very clear on that point, that it was a carbon copy and was not an original.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What became of the message after you saw it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minckler left with the message, and that is the last I ever saw it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever see any other alleged winds message except the FCC one that you mentioned earlier in your testimony?

[13101] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there ever at any time any information given to you by anyone with whom you came in contact that a true winds execute message had been received, except the FCC one?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No sir; there has not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You never saw another?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And no one ever told you of another?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it would have been part of your duty, would it, to have seen and inspected and evaluated a message of that type?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not necessarily, sir. Since I was in charge of the intercepts, it very probably would have been called to my attention, or I would have heard about it in one way or another, but I would not necessarily have seen it. I did not see nor hear of the FCC message, for example, the message of December 8.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The FCC message did not come in through either the Army or Navy channels?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you supposed to have contact with intercepts that came in through Army sources?

[13102] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I had contact with all intercepts that came in, sir, regardless of where they came from.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Army or Navy?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Army or Navy, that came into our office.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Colonel, there has been some explanation with reference to this but I want to ask you a question about it.

There appears in connection with our exhibit which shows these intercepted messages, and their translation and deciphering a great deal of variation in point of time, point of elapsed time between the receipt of the original message and its ultimate decoding, translation.

What is the reason why one message will come in at 9 o'clock in the morning and be translated by 10 o'clock and another message will come in at 9 o'clock in the morning and not be translated for 2 or 3 days?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Actually there are very many reasons for that, sir.

First of all, in many cases, the key to a message had to be obtained before the message could be deciphered. This may take anywhere from 15 minutes to a week or even to a month, or we may never recover it.

It depends on many factors.

[13103] Then, after the message is deciphered, it would go to the translators, and in many cases the message would be scanned for information and the more important messages or the messages that appeared to the translator to be more important would be pulled out and translated first, and the messages which appeared of lesser importance would be translated during more or less free periods of the translators, when they did not have more important material to work on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the fact that there is a difference in the time in which various messages have been translated cannot be laid to any negligence or slothfulness or delay or oversight in handling the messages?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; I don't think so.

There is one thing on all of these messages coming in. There is no way of knowing what a message is about, or the importance of a message until it is actually deciphered and scanned by a translator. Externally there is nothing in the message except that you know that certain systems tend to be of more importance than others.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one question.

You saw the message that came in, you say, on the 8th of December?

[13104] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I saw that recently, sir. I did not see it at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Then my question would be of no value. That is all.

Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. In whose hands did you say you saw this message?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. Colonel Minckler brought it in, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you say that you did not know where he got the message, from whom he got the message?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. I do not recall that he specified who he had obtained it from, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In your first examination on that point, did you say you had the impression that he got it from Colonel Sadtler?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. I had the impression at the time that he had obtained it from Colonel Sadtler.

Senator GEORGE. That was just an impression?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. It was only an impression, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Do you remember the date of the message?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. The only recollection I have of that is that it was 2 or 3 days prior to Pearl Harbor. [13105] That would be about December 4 or 5. I cannot place it any closer than that, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You are satisfied that the paper you saw was not the winds execute message?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. I am positive that it was not, sir.

Senator GEORGE. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask this question, if you will: After you saw the message that was intercepted on the eighth, did you interpret it as being a true execute message?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. Yes, sir. I don't think there is any doubt that that was a true execute message, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had seen it on the day it had come in, you would have interpreted it as being a true execute message.

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. That is correct, sir. There would have been no doubt whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. You say this was not a genuine winds execute message and you give some very clear reasons for that statement.

The question in my mind is as to why this matter of whether this was or was not a winds execute should be debated at such length as to get all around to the departments, and [13106] have a disagreement here before this committee on it.

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. That was the thing that puzzled me at the time, sir.

Mr. CLARK. It was a highly important question, was it not?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. At that time, I don't think it was so important, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Why were you monitoring for it?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. We had started monitoring for it about November 26.

Mr. CLARK. Why did you do that, if it wasn't important?

Colonel SCHUCKRAFT. I think the importance of that message decreased as time went on.

You see, at the time that this came in, we knew that the Japanese were destroying codes.

Mr. CLARK. What I am trying to get at is why there was all this debate, if I might so term it, or discussion, of whether this was or

was not a true execute message, in the Navy Department, in the Army, and through all these hearings.

I am puzzled to know how that should occur if it was so plain that that was not a winds execute message.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, this is a guess on my part: I honestly have not remembered this incident until [13107] recently.

Mr. CLARK. What was that?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I had not remembered this particular incident until recently. I think the reason that is hazy in everyone's mind is that they had thought it was a true winds execute, and then had found out that it was not which more or less wiped the thing from their memory.

Mr. CLARK. But if the message so clearly indicated that it was not a winds execute message, as you have stated here and for the reasons you have stated here, how could anybody be uncertain about it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, I believe that is the same message that Captain Kramer had seen, I am positive that it is, although I do not know.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I think so too, for that matter.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Captain Kramer, if you will remember, testified that he did not check that the message appeared in the proper form or in the proper place in the broadcast. He checked only the translation.

Now, the thing that puzzled me at the time was how he could possibly have passed this as being a true winds message when it was obviously not, and I think his explanation of that explains what happened and why he did at the time think it was a true winds execute message.

[13108] Mr. CLARK. According to your testimony it showed on the face of it that it was not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was very obvious that it was not.

Mr. CLARK. Still there is all this debate through all these years, which surprises me a little, coming from the Army and the Navy Departments, about a matter of that kind. It looks like it is something that could have been settled.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I think it was settled and came up again much later after people had forgotten about it. I think that is what happened.

Mr. CLARK. It has certainly cut a big figure since that time.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas is not here. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Has Captain Safford talked to you?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I have not talked to Captain Safford in several years.

Mr. MURPHY. Has he ever talked to you about this particular piece of paper?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not to my memory.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster is not here, Mr Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have one further question now, Mr. [13109] Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you ever talked with Colonel Minckler about this message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir; I have. Colonel Minckler has a very hazy recollection of having handled what was believed to have been a winds execute message. In other words, another false alarm.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you discuss with Colonel Minckler whether he got this paper that you saw?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I did, sir; and he does not remember.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You are unable to tell us what words were used in the message you saw?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not remember what the words were, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were there more than one group of words?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. As I remember, there was one group of words and the message heading, and that about all that was on the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. How large a sheet of paper was it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was standard teletype width; about [13110] 3 or 4 inches in length.

Senator FERGUSON. Three or four inches in length.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that indicate that that was not the entire broadcast?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir; it was not the entire broadcast.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how could you tell that this wasn't used at the end of the broadcast? You say it was not used at the end and was not a genuine message.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. There would have had to have been some explaining on the message. I do not remember why I knew this had to appear at the end. There must have been some comment on it placed on it by the operator. I do not remember actually.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see any handwriting on the message, interpretations or translation?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I actually do not remember such, sir. It is my impression that there was some writing on it, but I honestly do not remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did Minckler tell you in substance that this was not repeated at the end of the original message received?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir. There was something on [13111] the paper, as I remember, which indicated that it had not been repeated.

Senator FERGUSON. Why are you so sure about the fact that it wasn't at the end and that is the reason you discarded this message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was not repeated, sir. You see, this particular broadcast called for it being repeated five times, and it was not repeated five times. There was nothing to indicate it had been repeated five times.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you tell the stations when they were monitoring not to send anything in that wasn't repeated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We told station 7 that, but did not tell station 2. We told station 2 to monitor those particular stations and transmit all, to send in all transmissions from these particular stations.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, where did it originate, the one that you saw, where did that message originate?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. At the time I had thought it was from the FCC. It could not possibly have been from the FCC, however, and it was not an Army intercept. If it had been an Army intercept I would have been the first to have received it.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you didn't have the entire [13112] message, I am at a loss to understand how you could tell, if it indicated it was torn off, how you could tell that this was not repeated at the end and repeated the proper number of times. Wasn't this true, that you had difficulty at times getting the entire message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is very true, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. By reason of static?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you would have to have some direct information as to whether or not the static did interfere, whether they did get the entire message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct. The operators would normally indicate that on the intercepted copy. They would make some such mark as "Transmission faded before the end," or some remark of that nature.

Senator FERGUSON. But this was not an Army intercept, this was somebody else's?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The Navy also did that. All of the intercept operators.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us if there was such a message on this or not such a message? I mean writing indicating that it did or did not fade?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not remember that there was, but still there must have been a comment by an operator or [13113] it would not have been obviously a false message.

Senator, if the message had contained only the heading and the message itself, "West Wind Clear", or whatever it may have been in Japanese, then there would be no way of knowing, except in this case there would be only one thing wrong with it, it would show the station call signs and frequency and one line of text, and then an operator's intercept time. That must occur on every copy. So if it contained the call sign of a code station and three words in the voice form, then it would not comply with the Japanese instructions to start with. However, that alone would not be conclusive.

The message must have had some comment that this appeared in the middle of it, weather broadcast, or some such words. I do not remember what did occur on the paper, however.

[13114] Senator FERGUSON. But you had forgotten all about this because in your present testimony you did not even mention it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And by sitting here in the room and hearing testimony from the Navy your memory was refreshed?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. Captain Kramer, when he was explaining what happened to this message that he thought it was original, explained what had puzzled me at the time and that brought the whole incident back to me.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had testified in a previous hearing that you had heard of an intercepted telephone conversation in which Kurusu used the expression—or Tokyo used it to him—"East wind,

rain", and that he had expressed the opinion that he was sorry to hear that, isn't that correct?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. When Colonel Clausen visited me in Italy he had a number of these intercepts with him. He did not have the complete file. He showed me, as I recall, one telephone conversation between Kurusu and Tokyo and I remembered very distinctly that there was a telephone conversation in which they had discussed a number of other things which Colonel Clausen did not have with him and my memory at that time, without having a complete file, [13115] was that a direction, wind direction had been in one of the conversations. My memory was faulty on that point. I had not thought of those conversations since December 1941, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Colonel, you swore to that in the affidavit, that you had remembered of a conversation between Tokyo and the embassy here in which the wind code was used, "East wind, rain" and that even the Ambassador, Kurusu, had expressed the opinion that he was sorry to hear that. Now, how could you be mistaken on a thing like that, which was so vital and so important at the time?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not think it was so vital or so important at the time, sir. Also, remember that this happened—this was nearly 4 years after the event.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. And I had not thought of the event since. There had been no reason to recall the event.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you now testify that you did never hear of a conversation between Tokyo and the embassy here in which "East wind, rain" was used and the expression by the Ambassador or someone at this end of the line that he was sorry to hear that?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Senator, I must have been mistaken on the matter, and a bad memory on my part because there is no [13116] such conversation in the files. There are conversations, one conversation in which they are discussing a special movement.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the fact that that is not in the file is what causes you to change your testimony?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir, it is not. Sir, in going through the file and seeing the complete things it has brought back many things that I had not thought of since then which fit into a pattern.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the reason for the change of the testimony?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, this message that you were picking up on the teletype, was it brought for you, brought to you, that you might evaluate it and determine specifically whether it was a genuine winds code execute message or not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not think so. I think actually that Colonel Minkler had intended to discuss it with another officer who was out at the time and that he showed it to me since I happened to be present.

Sir, incidentally, in respect to this message, we did call in one additional officer who verified that it was a false winds message.

Senator FERGUSON. This was not your duty, then, to determine whether or not this was a false winds message?

[13117] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. If we had received a winds message, it would have been passed on to other officers to evaluate in addi-



tion to myself. Sir, if we had received a winds message from station 7, for example, it would probably have come to me and I would have evaluated it and passed it on with whatever evaluation I placed on it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then even though this was a false winds message your duties would have caused you to pass it on to someone else to have their determination as to whether it was true or false?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for the one that you determined was false, as you now tell us, not being passed on by you to someone else to determine its truth or falsity?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Minkler was my chief at the time, sir, and we did call in an additional officer, who would have been one of the officers who would evaluate it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was that officer?

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who was that officer.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was Colonel Rowlett.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not get the name.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Colonel Rowlett.

Senator FERGUSON. Then would you say that he would be [13118] able to tell us about this consultation that you had over this winds code?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I have asked him, sir, and again he has no memory on the thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, why did this so-called wind execute message become of very little value around the 4th or 5th?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Largely because we knew at that time, this winds message, sir, indicated a tenseness in relationship and in addition to that carried instructions to destroy codes and confidential papers. We knew at that time that the Japanese were destroying codes and confidential papers because we had other messages directing that that be done.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had you ever seen the Batavia message where they interpreted the original codes as meaning war?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I had not at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So as I understand it, then, in your department at least, that when you received the other indication, the other notice following or indicating the destruction of codes and the tenseness of the situation, that you disregarded the winds message idea?

[13119] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not disregarded, sir, but the winds message would have had very little importance at that time. November 27 or 28, it probably would have been quite important, but after we had the code destruction instructions, but then it became of less and less importance.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, how do you account for the fact that you did not keep in your files all of these so-called wind execute messages whether they were true or false for some higher authority if they ever did want to look over them to determine your judgment?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, I don't think there was any reason for keeping them. We used to get in reams of paper and there was no point in filing a piece of paper which is determined to be worthless and that is what this piece of paper was.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on this Batavia code it appears that on the 5th of December Batavia sent to Miles—he was your chief, was he not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This you see decides the code meant war. You never saw that?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. So far as I know that message had—no, sir, I had not seen it until this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. And you cannot give us any idea what [13120] the words were, whether they were in Japanese or in English or whether a translation was written on the margin or at the bottom?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, I have an idea what the words would be. My memory of that, any memory I would have at this moment of them would be a reconstruction of what I think was on it. I do not actually remember.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want a guess.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel, for your appearance.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment, Mr. Chairman.

Were you working the 6th and the 7th?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir, I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any knowledge of the pilot message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did the pilot message come in and when was it translated as far as the War Department was concerned? You know what I mean by the pilot message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir, I do. Sir, Saturday morning I was home sick and I was called to come to the office by Colonel Minkler some time Saturday afternoon. The basis for that call, to the best of my knowledge, was the pilot message.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you saw it when you came in in the afternoon?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I did see it after I came in, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was completed and translated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what time would you say that was?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. As I remember, I got to the office about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And do you know of any reason why it was not distributed, if it was not distributed, that afternoon?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I am quite sure that it was, sir, because a message of that type would not have been held up.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a very important message, was it not? It indicated a certain time of delivery of a 14-part message which was to be a reply to the message of the 26th of Secretary Hull to the Japanese Government?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir, and that was the basis of opening up the Army SIS Saturday afternoon after it had been closed. [13122] Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, do you know when that pilot message would be delivered to the Navy? You say it was a very important message.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know on that specific message, sir. Normally those messages were sent over at the same time or prior to their delivery by us to G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you would not want to deliver the messages in their regular course, which was the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, the War Plans and G-2 and the various other deliveries?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We were responsible only for delivery to G-2, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. The distribution was made by G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. And when you delivered to G-2 you would deliver to the Navy?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. At the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. At the same time?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right, sir, or prior.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Or we would deliver to the Navy prior to delivery to G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is, you would not deliver to G-2 so that they could make their deliveries before the Navy [13123] officially knew that you had one?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; that would create an embarrassing situation. If the Secretary of State, for example, had a message and the President had not had it, it would not be too good.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. In other words, you were responsible for the Secretary of State and they were responsible for the President, so you felt that the delivery should be made simultaneously?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Insofar as possible, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Without unnecessarily delaying an important message.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. And this being an important message you feel that it was delivered to the Navy at the time?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I am quite positive that it was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Although I do not actually know.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean you do not remember the transaction of passing over the message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir, because that is one thing that we used to watch carefully, is that messages were delivered to the Navy.

[13124] Senator FERGUSON. And you being called in at this particular time because you had been ill and off that morning, you saw to it that these important messages went out, is that correct?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. We got rather mixed up on our days again Saturday night and Sunday and anyone that hap-

pened to be there more or less took charge of anything that was going on at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. But that was later at night?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That was later at night; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, isn't it true that you then knew there was a 14-part message coming in—in fact, it was coming in that afternoon, was it not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that, are you not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did bring the staff back so that they could work and get that message out?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. To the best of my knowledge that was the reason that they were called back, because we were anticipating the 14-part message and we wanted to be sure that we got it to the people concerned as quickly as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, that is what the pilot message was and that is why you were going to go back, to get the fourteenth part? [13125]

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right. The pilot message was alerting the Japanese, so we were alerting ourselves.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. When did you get the 13 parts completed?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not remember the exact time, sir. It is in the record, I believe. It was some time Saturday evening. I do not remember the exact time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would it be 9 o'clock?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. My memory actually is it is about 9 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. About 9 o'clock.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, did you get the 13 parts—why did you want to send out 13 parts and not send out 10 or 12? Was there any reason why you did not use 13 or decided to send 13 parts out?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Well, actually, sir, all the deciphering of that message was done by the Navy since they had started it. The normal practice was if you had several parts of a message you tried to get the message as complete as possible and find the set if it did not unnecessarily delay things. As I remember, the 13 parts in themselves were [13126] not too important and they were hoping they would get the part which would say more or less what would happen.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, then, why did you deliver the 13 parts? The evidence indicates it was delivered to the President around 9 o'clock.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Because the fourteenth part was missing and we did not have it and could not find it.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you think that you had missed that entirely?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We thought that we had missed it completely at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that the reason for delivering the 13 parts?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would your department call anyone to tell them that you were going to deliver a message later?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir. We delivered it to G-2 and then further discussion would be by them.

Senator FERGUSON. By them?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. And their set-up on that I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you work all night that night?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time the fourteenth part came in?

[13127] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know. So far as I know the only copy of that fourteenth part that was received was a copy from, I believe it was station S and the Navy received that copy and it was on a Navy cryptographic date so that they would have gone ahead and deciphered it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you see the fourteenth part?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I saw it some time Sunday morning, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How early?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not actually remember the time. It was a considerable time before noon, I recall, because we had sufficient time to get the message to the Secretary of State prior to 1 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you say you worked at the Department all night?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The whole night?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not remember seeing it early in the morning, the fourteenth part?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you see the so-called 1 o'clock message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I saw that shortly after it came in, [13128] sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at what hour?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Let's see, I might be able to find that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, my memory on that is rather hazy. The times are not actually shown as to when it came in. My memory actually is that I saw it shortly after I saw the fourteenth part, or about the same time. I think that was around 9 or 10 o'clock Sunday morning, but that is very, very dim.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, as I understand the hours that they were received it was around 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That was the time they were intercepted by the intercept station, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And you had the key to these messages, did you not, the fourteenth part, because it came in in the same key as the other parts?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; it came in in a different key.

Senator FERGUSON. It did?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It came in under the date of the 7th, sir. You see, part of this fourteenth part message was keyed on the 6th and part was keyed on the 7th.

[13129] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know if there was difficulty in finding the key for the fourteenth part?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I am positive we did not have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Positive?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for the fact that it took until 9 o'clock? You were working there all night; it came through your department. This message came in around 3 o'clock in the morning. Why would it be until 9 before it would be translated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Sir, we did not—that was a Navy date. We did not have it. However, I think I can explain it, because we were looking very, very hard for the fourteenth part and we had thought that we had missed it. If you will notice, that fourteenth part was filed about 12 to 14 hours after the thirteenth part.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, it came in about 12 hours later.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It was filed about 12 hours later, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was filed about 12 hours later?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right and there was no indication on the message that it was the fourteenth part until they started on it. What we were doing was looking and check- [13130] ing and rechecking every message that came in from Tokyo that was filed about the time of the other messages, of the other parts.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at the top of the translation, in forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appears the plain English phrase, "Very important".

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had a flag right on here.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not that it was the fourteenth part, and the fourteenth part was the most important thing we were looking for at the moment, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had a flag over here?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It does not necessarily mean anything.

Senator FERGUSON. It does not?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir. The priorities are a little bit inconsistent at times. In this particular case it did, but you could not use that as a rule to go by.

Senator FERGUSON. And that "S. T. T." at the end, what does that mean?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Station S forwarded by teletype, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the Army?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; it was not. That was a Navy station.

[13131] Senator FERGUSON. As a matter of fact, the Army did not get this message at all on teletype. They received it as translated.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir. So far as I know the station S copy of that message is the only copy that we ever received.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you get the 1 o'clock message? That is your translation, isn't it? That is on page 248, "the time of delivery one o'clock on the 7th, your time"?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir, that was translated because the Navy had no translators that morning. It was decoded by the Navy and they sent the plain text over, the plain text version to the Army and one of our translators translated the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that come into your department to be translated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Not the department that I had direct responsibility for, sir. It would have come into the section of which I was a member.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time it was translated?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, look across on page 249, the top [13132] message. [Reading:]

After deciphering part 14 of my 902, and also 907, 908 and 909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

When did you first see that message?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I also saw that one some time Sunday morning, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you give us the hour?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I cannot actually, sir. My memory actually for the 7th of December is rather hazy as far as events of the night and specific times. I had been there all night and I was getting pretty sleepy at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't suppose you received any more important message than the one that I just referred to, the 910, after they got these messages to destroy at once all the remaining cipher machines and all their codes; that ended it, didn't it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right. As I remember it, that message was given special handling, sir. That was given to G-2 as quickly as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. If it came in at 5 o'clock in the morning when should it have reached G-2 if it had had special handling?

[13133] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It would not have been by 5 o'clock in the morning. It was intercepted by station S at 5 o'clock in the morning.

Senator FERGUSON. How long should it take to be teletyped to your office?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It would have been teletyped to the Navy office, sir, and it would take probably a minimum of 20 minutes up to even 2 hours to be teletyped in.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see General Marshall at all Saturday or Sunday?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see General Gerow, General Miles?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir. Our contacts, Senator, would be with G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. 910 was filed by the Japanese at 6:44 p. m., Washington time, 4:44 a. m. 7th of December. Intercepted in Japanese code in naval station at Bainbridge Island, Washington, 5:09. Teletyped in Japanese code to the Navy—blank; decoded by the Navy—blank; sent by the Navy to the Army—blank; translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy code (A) 6th of December 1941; no hours given.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is right, sir. We checked very carefully at our end to try to find times on these and there [13134] just are no times in existence unfortunately.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you tell us what you worked at? The 13 parts were out and delivered by 9:30. What did you work on the rest of the night if you didn't work on these messages when they came in the next morning?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We were doing a number of things, sir. One of the things was trying to get the fourteenth part. That was our object, our major object in there at the time. We had stations send in notice of everything that they had in the hopes that one of them might have the fourteenth part. No one ever dreamed that the fourteenth part would have been following 14 hours later and I was looking for, as I recall it, a message that was filed about the time of the other 13 parts and when we did not get such a message, then we merely assumed or thought we had missed it.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Colonel, you had two other very important messages, 907 and 910, the 1 o'clock and the destruction of code messages.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Those were Navy dates, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Those were Navy dates. Those messages were messages the Navy processed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the fact that it was Navy day after midnight, is that what you have in mind?

[13135] Colonel SCHUKRAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you were not personally, your department was not personally responsible?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. Our responsibility would be to get the cipher text to the Navy, sir, if it came in from an Army station. If it came in from a Navy station, then the Navy would keep the message and process it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, then, you had these divided so that even though this was a very vital and important time and you were waiting for the fourteenth part and other messages in relation to it, you had split the time up so it was definite and you sat there and waited?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. No, sir; we did not. We went over and checked and rechecked all messages coming in in the hopes that one of them might be the fourteenth part, but we would not have looked for a message that came in there 14 hours later with any idea that it might be the fourteenth part of the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you were only over there and checking and you were there working the whole night, at 5:07 in the morning this No. 910 was in.

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. It came into the Navy, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you go to the Navy to check it?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. We were working very closely with [13136] them that night; yes, sir. We did not check on this particular message because we did not know of the existence of that message until after it was decoded and translated.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot give us any time then on these two messages, the 1 o'clock and the destruction of codes?

Colonel SCHUKRAFT. I do not remember, no, sir; except that I do know it was sometime Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.



The CHAIRMAN. That is all. Thank you very much, Colonel.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel Phillips.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips, will you be sworn?

**TESTIMONY OF COL. WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is your full name?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Walter C. Phillips.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And will you for the record state your Army experience?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have had almost 29 years' service. I came in on the examination, headed the examination in 1917, a graduate from the University of West Virginia, as a [13137] provisional second lieutenant. At the end of 2 years, which covered the World War period, I had served in command capacities most of the entire time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What do you mean by "command capacities"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I acted as a platoon commander; I commanded first a platoon and a company, for a time a battalion. I attained the rank of captain and for a short period was sent to the general staff of the Ninth Division as assistant G-2.

In 1919 I came to Washington attached to the general staff in G-2, or the Intelligence Department. I remained here until 1922 when I went to China in the capacity of G-2 for Maj. Gen. W. D. Connor. I remained in China until 1926 as G-2.

In 1926 I returned to Fort Benning, in which I completed the company officer's course. In 1927 I went to the Eighth Infantry in Georgia, later up at Charleston, S. C. In 1929 I returned to Fort Benning, took the advanced course and was retained as an instructor until 1934.

From 1934 to 1936 I was with the Sixth Infantry and in 1936, in the fall, I went to Fort Leavenworth, graduated in 1937.

I joined the First Division in 1937 and remained with the First Division, being the G-3 or operations and training officer of the division until January 1941: actually till Febru- [13138] ary 1941.

In December 1940, after a very successful series of maneuvers in the First Division, where I was operations officer, General Short requested that I come to Hawaii as chief of staff. I was going with the First Division, as I thought at that time; I was very well satisfied with my job and I requested some time to think this over.

In the meantime, having known General Marshall for many years—he was then Chief of Staff—I requested an appointment with him to talk over this jump to foreign service. I came to Washington and had my appointment with General Marshall, whom I had known since 1921.

He told me, speaking very freely, that General Short had spoken to him when he had conferred with him about having me come to Hawaii. General Marshall stated he thoroughly approved and directed that I attempt to bring the Hawaiian garrison as to training

up to the present training of the First Division, which he considered the best in the Army at that time.

I returned to my station in New York City and told my commanding general, Gen. Carl Truesdale, of this conference or the results of the conference. He had approved the conference prior to my going to Washington.

In February I sailed for Hawaii and joined the staff of [13139] the Hawaiian Department on March 1.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when you joined the Hawaiian Department did you become its chief of staff at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What was your first assignment when you arrived at the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My first assignment as a rather roving staff assignment was to go through the various staff sections and to thoroughly acquaint myself with their various and sundry problems. I had desired this opportunity and General Short approved. I moved through and worked in the various sections for a period of about 8 months.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when did you become chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. On November the 5th, 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that you had been in the Hawaiian Department since about the 1st of March?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Since the 1st of March.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And became the chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department on the 5th of November?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Of 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After the time of your appointment as chief of staff were you familiar with the coastal frontier defense [13140] plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Were you familiar with the message sent by the Navy to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, on November 24, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe I recall it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who called your attention to that message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would like to refresh my memory on that. I am not sure; I cannot recall it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Have you got the message before you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, we will come back to that.

Do you recall the receipt of the message from General Marshall under date of November 27, 1941, which is on page 8 of Exhibit No. 32?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the answer? I did not get it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Coming back to the message of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, which is Exhibit 37, on pages 32 and 33, I ask you to tell us whether those two messages were called to your attention at that time.

Colonel PHILLIPS. This one and the next one?

[13141] Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have seen the first message, I recall that, but I do not recall the second.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You recall the message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, under date of November 24, 1941, which is on page 32 of Exhibit No. 37; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was called to your attention on or about the date that the message bears, that is, namely, November 24, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; that is to the best of my recollection.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Up to that time you were familiar with the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was generally; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And did you become familiar with the correspondence between General Short and General Marshall which is in evidence here. Exhibit No. 53?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was acquainted with that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that was part of the studies that you made during the time you had this roving staff commission before you became chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

[13142] Mr. KAUFMAN. So that we have it that prior to the 24th of November you were familiar with the correspondence between General Marshall and General Short; that is correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And we have it that you were familiar with the growing tenseness of the situation in the Pacific?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And we have it that you were familiar with the coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the Martin-Bellinger report of 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had read that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And we have it also that you saw the message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, on or before November 24?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not positive about that date, on or before, but to the best of my recollection that is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in that message you saw that the Chief of Naval Operations advised the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet that the outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that a surprise attack might be expected in any direction at any time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Particularly to Guam and the Philippines, I believe—including Guam and the Philippines.

[13143] Mr. KAUFMAN. It says that a surprise movement in any direction, including attacks on the Philippines or Guam. Do you recall that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, a surprise move in any direction did not exclude Hawaii in your mind?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It did not include it at that time due to the inclusion of the Philippines and Guam.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did it exclude Hawaii in your mind?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not know that it did entirely. Such a thing was always a possibility.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then is it one of the things that you discussed with General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did, repeatedly.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then on November 27 you received the message from General Marshall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is on page 8 of Exhibit No. 32.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct?

Mr. KAUFMAN. And on the receipt of that message you conferred with General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And according to his testimony the conference did not include any other officers except you and General [13144] Short. Is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think that is correct. I was under the impression at one time that G-2, Colonel Fielder, now General Fielder, was present, but he may not have been present.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General Short testified that you and he were the only persons that considered that message at the time of its receipt.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that within a half an hour after the receipt of that message General Short made his answer.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is generally correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what conference did you and General Short have during the half-an-hour period between the receipt of this message of November 27 and the time he sent his telegram, his dispatch to the War Department stating the receipt of that message of November 27 and advising them that he has alerted against sabotage and made liaison with the Navy; what conference did you and General Short have?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have made some notes here in regard to the estimate of the situation that we made at that time.

The Army has always had a five-paragraph method for making a formal estimate of the situation. While we did not actually write this estimate out at the time, if it had been written it would have followed generally this form.

[13145] Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, are you answering my question, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I see.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am. This is part of the conference.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I see.

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was the entire conference, which consisted of the estimate of the situation, which was necessary to arrive at a decision on General Marshall's message.

The first paragraph in the estimate of the situation is the mission.

The Hawaiian Department had several missions. Our primary wartime job would be to defend the fleet and naval base at Pearl Har-

bor and to defend the airfields on Oahu. In peacetime our job was chiefly training and preparation for our wartime mission.

When I went to Hawaii, General Marshall told me specifically that he wanted the training brought up to the high standard set by the First Division. In late 1941 we had the very pressing duty of training air crews to ferry planes to Gen. Douglas MacArthur. We were part of MacArthur's support in this way.

No word from Washington in any way purported to relieve us of our training mission. We had only six B-17 Flying [13146] Fortresses in condition to use, which we needed for this Air Corps training.

Second paragraph. This is the estimate of the situation.

Second, the situation and the opposing lines of action. In this paragraph an Army commander and his staff consider the capabilities of the enemy and all the reasonable lines of action open to our side. Our facts were briefly these:

The Navy had task forces out and was conducting that kind of distant reconnaissance to the fullest extent they believed necessary and to the greatest degree possible consistent with their mission to prepare for raids on the Japanese mandated islands under WPL-46. The Navy was not worried, and we had only six planes which they could have borrowed to make their distant reconnaissance more effective. Six planes could cover an arc of only 8°. Six planes could only cover a small arc so far as degrees were concerned.

The Navy did not feel that such coverage would so substantially add to their security as to justify depriving us of the planes so vitally needed for training and for all possible support to General MacArthur in the Philippines.

Our enemy intelligence came from Washington and the Navy. We felt they had more than they gave us, but we assumed, and reasonably, that they could not be so foolish as [13147] to withhold vital intelligence from us.

Senator LUCAS. You mean the Navy in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You said "Washington and the Navy."

Colonel PHILLIPS. I meant Washington, sir. They told us only that an attack might be expected in the Philippines, Kra, Guam, Borneo, or somewhere in the East.

They told us to expect hostile action. We believed they meant sabotage. After we were alerted to prevent sabotage and so reported to them, we received three more sabotage messages. This made us absolutely sure they meant sabotage and not some other unmentioned form of hostile action.

[13148] Since General MacArthur might expect to be attacked, according to the intelligence sent from Washington, it became even more important that we continue our training of ferry crews because our mission included this type of support to him.

We weighed those considerations. We had three alerts to choose from.

Under the third paragraph we analyze the opposing lines of action open to the enemy. On this planning had been very careful. We knew we could prevent sabotage, and we did. We knew we could not stop an air attack. We did not have the necessary planes. The only

way to do it is to locate the carriers more than 300 miles at sea and sink them by plane or naval bombardment before they can launch their planes and begin the attack.

The Army could not locate the enemy at such distance. Radar was considered effective only to 100 miles, and at that time provided no means of friend or foe identification.

The Navy had the job of long-distance scouting and patrolling, and they were doing their job with task forces. They were doing it to the greatest extent consistent with their potential offensive mission to raid the Marshall Islands.

The Navy believed there was no danger of an air raid. We were there to support the Navy—to defend their base and [13149] the fleet within it.

Paragraph 4 of the estimate is:

We compared our lines of action. Alert 2 or 3, if adopted, might help to disorganize an air raid, but an air raid was only a bare possibility. On the basis of intelligence from Washington, on the basis of what the Navy thought, and in reliance on the effectiveness of the most complete reconnaissance the Navy could furnish, we felt that preparation to defend against a bare possibility should be weighed against the urgent need to continue training. We could adopt alert 1 and fulfill all our missions, our defense mission to prevent sabotage which we and the War Department expected, and our training mission. Or we could adopt alert 2, or 3, and stop training, abandon our urgent training mission, to better prepare ourselves for the bare possibility of an attack which the War Department did not expect.

I knew from the dispatches which Admiral Kimmel and General Short received that the War and Navy Departments did not want the Rainbow plan implemented until Japan committed the first overt act.

I knew also that General Short had been ordered not to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and not to inform any more than the minimum essential officers.

You can't put people out to shoot at enemy planes, unless [13150] you tell them to shoot. These were the lines of action as we compared them. We did not have the "magic" which Washington had, and we did not have the hindsight which is now open to everyone.

Paragraph 5 in our estimate is the decision. We made the decision to order an alert to prevent sabotage. We ordered it. We reported to the War Department, and as General Marshall testified, we were reasonable in our assumption that if Gerow or Marshall disagreed with what we had done, they would tell us what they wanted us to do.

In conclusion, I want to add that I fully approved of General Short's decision to order alert No. 1. I feel also that I share any responsibility that he bears for that decision. That decision turned out to be wrong, but it was as right as we could make it at the time on the information we had.

That is what we discussed during that 30-minute period.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You could not have discussed all of it, because a large part of what you have just read did not happen until long after the 27th of November.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Isn't that so?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

[13151] Mr. KAUFMAN. So what you have really given to us is your reasons, or your justification for having agreed with General Short in alert No. 1 against sabotage. Isn't that the fact?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have given you in that statement exactly what we covered. Generally speaking, we covered every subject, with the exception of the additions that I heard here.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who prepared this memorandum for you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was that memorandum seen by anybody besides yourself?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not positive about that. Of course I did not type it. I have no means of typing it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did General Short's counsel see that memorandum?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I showed him a copy of it; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When did you show it to him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say. Perhaps 10 days or 2 weeks ago, when I thought I was going to testify at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, did you inform the Navy that you were alerted against sabotage only?

[13152] Colonel PHILLIPS. We informed the Navy that we were alerted for sabotage. We had a naval liaison officer in the G-3 office that was thoroughly conversant with everything that was occurring in our headquarters.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, I will ask you, Colonel, whether you advised your corresponding number in the Navy, the chief of staff, that you were alerted only to sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, because that was not within my line of duty. That was not part of my job.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, you were the chief of staff of General Short in command of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And Admiral Smith was the chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the primary function of the Army was to protect the fleet at its base?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And do you want us to understand that you did not tell Admiral Smith, then Captain Smith, the chief of staff, that you had alerted only against sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not personally. We had liaison officers in our staff, whose primary duty things of that kind [13153] were.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you heard Admiral Smith testify, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, did you hear Admiral Kimmel testify?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you know both of them testified that neither of them knew that you had any alert other than a general alert? You knew that, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I heard Admiral Kimmel testify to that effect; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you know that Admiral Smith testified to the same effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know about that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The record shows that he so testified.

Senator LUCAS. Who is the liaison man?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who is the liaison man?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Burr.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Lieutenant Burr?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was at that time; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What did you mean in the dispatch that you sent to the War Department in reply to their message of November 27, that liaison with the Navy had been made?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My impression of the meaning of that [13154] sentence was that General Short—that was his message, not mine—General Short intended to convey to the War Department that he was working very closely with the Navy, and merely telling the War Department, or assuring them that we were cooperating fully in that respect.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was the Army justified in believing that liaison with the Navy meant the invocation of the coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think so at all.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You do not think that they were justified in so believing?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that the only impression you wanted to create on the War Department was that you had very close relations with the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

[13155] Mr. KAUFMAN. And those close relations did not even contemplate your telling, or General Short telling to their corresponding numbers in the Navy the fact that you had alerted only to sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was not part of my duties, as I have just stated. We had liaison officers for that purpose.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now you had liaison officers with the Navy whose purpose it was to do what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. A liaison officer's purpose is to keep—liaison from the Navy—is to keep the Navy completely informed of everything that occurs at our headquarters.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that liaison officer was directly under you, was he not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was in G-3, under my G-3. No, he was not under me; no, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you make any inquiry from G-3, or from anyone else, as to what information the liaison officer with the Navy had given to them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Personally I do not recall that I did. However, that was the biggest bit of information that had occurred in that headquarters for many weeks, and there was no question about everybody there knowing exactly what had happened.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then can you explain the testimony of [13156] Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Smith that they did not know that you were not on a general alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot explain the testimony of anybody.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It is apparent then that something went wrong either with your headquarters or with your liaison man?



Colonel PHILLIPS. Our liaison officer was a naval officer, liaison from Admiral Bloch's headquarters, whose duty it was to inform the Navy, and if there was any falling down or dereliction there on his part, I do not know about it. He was an officer of a very high type and had been specially selected, an outstanding naval officer.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Could I suggest, Colonel, that you have not answered the question that I just asked? Would you be good enough to read it, Mr. Reporter?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Colonel PHILLIPS. It may be it is apparent, but it is not particularly apparent to me that anything went wrong. Of course the liaison officer perhaps did not inform him about it, he may have forgotten it, but that was highly important and everybody knew of it. It is possible that the liaison officer from the Navy, although I do not know why, had no reason for it. He would be the best witness on that.

[13157] Mr. KEEFE. Will you permit an interruption at this time so I can get this clear in my mind?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Was this liaison officer sent to you from Admiral Bloch's Fourteenth Naval District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or from Admiral Kimmel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Admiral Bloch.

Mr. KEEFE. So he would report to Admiral Bloch, would he not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And not to Kimmel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That man you spoke about was from the Fourteenth Naval District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Under the command of Admiral Bloch, and not from the fleet command under the command of Admiral Kimmel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You testified before that the primary duty of the Army in Hawaii was to protect the fleet, did you not?

[13158] Colonel PHILLIPS. Protect the fleet, the installations on the Island of Oahu, the base of Oahu and the fleet when in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is right. So that you want this committee to understand that notwithstanding the fact that it was the prime duty of the Army to protect the fleet at its base, that nevertheless you did not conceive it your duty to make known to Admiral Kimmel, or to his chief of staff, that you had done nothing except to order an alert against sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My duty did not include informing Admiral Kimmel's staff. Our liaison, I will repeat again, was from Admiral Bloch's headquarters, and he knew everything that was occurring in our headquarters, and it is a reasonable assumption to expect that that officer was doing his duty at all times. He was a very high-type young officer.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am not talking about his duty, Colonel. I am talking about your duty as chief of staff. Within a few hours after you

dispatched the answer to General Marshall's warning to the Army you saw a copy of the dispatch to Admiral Kimmel, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Which dispatch was that, sir?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Of November 27. It started, "This is a war warning."

[13159] Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, yes, sir. I was told of that dispatch by General Short. I did not see a copy of it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You were told about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you were told that it started out with the phrase, "This is a war warning"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now did that put you on your toes any further?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; but it went on say that Kra Peninsula, I believe. Could I see a copy of it to refresh my memory?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

(The document was handed to Colonel Phillips.)

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is your answer now that you have seen this dispatch?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was told of that dispatch by General Short. Of course I felt, and we all did, that war was a possibility, but not in Hawaii. That dispatch of itself there states where we should look for war.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You say that you regarded this dispatch as excluding Hawaii, is that right?

[13160] Colonel PHILLIPS. Certainly not including it. It was a possibility, but Hawaii was never mentioned.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I realize that it was not mentioned, but will you point to the language in that message that excludes Hawaii as one of the theaters of operation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There is nothing that excludes Hawaii. I did not so state.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that Hawaii was included with more direct emphasis on other places as more likely probabilities, isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that Hawaii was included at all. It does not say so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, will you tell me where Hawaii is excluded in that dispatch?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It perhaps is excluded by not naming it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the message of November 24 indicated an attack in any possible direction, did it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; Guam and the Philippines particularly.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, then, will you explain why the Army should have been warned at all if Hawaii was excluded from the field of operations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Hawaii was not entirely excluded. [13161] We were there for that purpose. Our job was a defensive job.

Mr. KAUFMAN. A defensive job?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Purely and simply, and we were preparing in every possible way, if and when such a thing occurred. There was no indication up to that time that it was at all imminent or indicated in any way by any dispatch that we had received.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After the receipt of the message from General Marshall and your having been told of the Navy message to Admiral Kimmel, how many meetings did you have with Admiral Smith between the 27th of November and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had no meetings with Admiral Smith as Chief of Staff.

Mr. KAUFMAN. No talk with him at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No. I had some meetings with General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and perhaps a member of his staff would come to Fort Shafter, that is the headquarters of the Army. I would attend all of those meetings. Admiral Smith never came with Admiral Kimmel at that time to Fort Shafter, and vice versa. I never went with General Short during that period to Admiral Kimmel's headquarters.

Mr. KAUFMAN. How many meetings were there between Admiral [13162] Kimmel and General Short during that 10-day period?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say, Mr. Kaufman. I believe General Short testified as to that and had the dates. I should say four or five.

[13163] Mr. KAUFMAN. And you attended those meetings when they were held at Fort Shafter, but you did not attend them when they were held in Admiral Kimmel's office?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So how many meetings did you attend?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall, during that period.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you explain how it is that during the several meetings you attended, there was no mention made of the fact as to the alert that you had given your men, your command?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The subject as such perhaps did not arise. These meetings were usually called for specific purposes. One subject was relieving the Marine garrison at Wake by the Army, and another one, I believe, was taking pictures of the Marshalls. Those subjects were discussed rather fully, as I recall.

I am not sure on that point.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now coming back again to this message of November 27, to General Short, you are familiar with the words, "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." Do you recall that language?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You, in the memorandum you read to the [13164] committee a few moments ago, testified that you only had six reconnaissance planes, and therefore could not undertake reconnaissance.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Is that what you want us to understand?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was the Navy's job under the joint Hawaiian coastal defense plan to conduct distant reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do I understand you to say that the Army could not undertake the carrying out of this order of General Marshall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were conducting at the time the only reconnaissance we were required to conduct, and that is inshore patrol from Bellows Field, with short-distance reconnaissance planes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You know that this order from General Marshall did not refer to inshore patrol, do you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did not you want us to understand before, when you read that statement, that by reason of the fact the Army only had six reconnaissance planes, it could not undertake long-range reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, the Army's job was not to conduct long-range reconnaissance. Perhaps my memorandum, [13165] or purely notes, was misleading in that respect. That was the Navy's function entirely.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then you want the committee to understand that the coastal frontier defense plan had been invoked? Is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It had not, in its entirety; no, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Had any part of it been invoked?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had had many exercises, about 1 week, as I recall, as a matter of training for the distant reconnaissance with the Navy, and we expected that to go into effect whenever the Navy required our planes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, I think we ought to stick to the question.

I asked you a little while ago with respect to the order of General Marshall directing reconnaissance whether you want us to understand that by reason of the fact that the Army only had six planes, you could not undertake reconnaissance. You said that your memorandum was misleading on that point, because it was the Navy's job.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It was the Navy's job to do the reconnaissance; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The distant reconnaissance; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is right.

[13166] Now, the distant reconnaissance that was to be undertaken was under the coastal frontier defense plan, isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you know, do you not, that the coastal frontier defense plan, before it became operative, had to be invoked by action of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel? You knew that, did not you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You know that that defense plan had not been invoked, do you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, will you explain to the committee then how you could have expected the Navy to do the reconnaissance under the coastal frontier defense plan, if the plan had not been invoked?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They had planes, I forget the number, of the kind that were capable of carrying on distant reconnaissance. They were to call on us for what long distance bombers we had, and if they needed them, we were to supply them.

That could have been done any time.

[13167] Mr. KAUFMAN. Colonel, I still misunderstand you.

You told us a moment ago that you expected the Navy, under the coastal frontier defense plan, to do the long range reconnaissance.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You told us also that that reconnaissance was to be done under the provisions of the coastal frontier defense plan. You told us that.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You told us also that that was not to be done until the procedure under the plan was to be invoked by Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You told us also that the provisions of the plan had not been invoked, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, will you explain to the committee, if the plan had not been invoked, how you could have expected the Navy to make that long range reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The plan, as I recall, could have been invoked at any time. I am not extremely clear on that one point.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, it could have been invoked at any time, but it wasn't at any time, according to the [13168] testimony of General Short, and I understand your testimony to be to the same effect.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Captain Ford has given me a statement here, that I may read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whose statement is it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This is from General Short's statement which is now an exhibit, I believe, page 28, covering this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask: Do you want to testify, Colonel, from General Short's testimony, or do you want to give the committee your testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This is a statement of testimony from the Roberts Commission.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Whose testimony is it before the Roberts Commission?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Marshall's.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, do you want to testify from someone else's testimony, or give us your testimony; that is what I want to know.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I merely wish to state, sir, that long distance reconnaissance was the Navy's problem.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, if counsel will permit, Colonel, I don't think there is any doubt about that under [13169] this record, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think so either.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, why not answer counsel's question?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am trying to answer.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am trying to inquire from you, Colonel—it may be that I haven't made myself clear—I am trying to inquire from you as to how you could reasonably expect the Navy to make the long range reconnaissance which you have testified was to be done under the provisions of the coastal frontier defense plan without an invocation of that plan by General Short, and Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you told us that that plan had not been invoked.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was the Navy's duty to institute the long range reconnaissance.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It was the Navy's duty?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you blame it on the Navy that they didn't do their job; is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not. They were carrying out their reconnaissance in the way that they thought suitable for this purpose, as I stated in my notes here, with their [13170] task forces and with what planes they could afford to use.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, I read to you, Colonel, the provisions of paragraph 2, under subhead 2 of the coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian Department, Fourteenth Naval District, which is part of Exhibit 44 in this record. It says:

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District) agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficient imminent to warrant such action, the Commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other Commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warrant, in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans—

That contemplates, does it not, Colonel, that there must be an agreement by the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and General Short that conditions warrant the invocation of this plan; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It seems apparent, yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that until this plan was invoked, neither you, as Chief of Staff, nor General Short had the right to anticipate that the Navy was doing its job under [13171] this agreement until you agreed that they should do it, as a result of which you, the Army, would have certain reciprocal obligations; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It seems apparent.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that that is apparent, is it not, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that nobody, apparently, in the Army or the Navy made inquiry from each other after these warning messages as to whether any new condition arose that required attention; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. These messages at first were building up all the time. We were still waiting for some indication, if any, that we were in the line of fire, still considering that it was a possibility but only a possibility. There was no indication in any message that we got from Washington or that we got from the Navy that Hawaii was in the line of fire.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Is that the best answer you can make to that last question?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, Colonel, are you familiar with the so-called magic, now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have heard a great deal of it; yes, [13172] sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Have you read it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Somewhat.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Somewhat.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you state in the statement that you make here, the memorandum that you read, that if you had had that magic you would have been able to come to a better conclusion; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

For instance, the dead line of the 25th, 29th, and the dividing up of Pearl Harbor, and things of that kind would certainly have given us a better idea of what was going on.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, you say there are three things, as I understand it, which, if you had had at the time, would have given you the basis for better decision; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. Those three things, of course, any and all of the information which was pertinent, would have given us a much better idea of what was going on, and, of course, our decision was based on the information only that we had.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, what information do you claim there is in the intercepts that you did not get in the messages of November 24 and November 27?

[13173] Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot be specific on that, other than I have been, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, you have been specific to the extent of referring to the dead line date of November 25, and November 29; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Didn't you get a fair summary of everything that went before and even what came after in the telegram of November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We didn't so consider it at all.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You didn't?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you disregard the message and the directions that you got from the War Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all. We didn't get anything about a dead line date. We didn't get anything about dividing up Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, we will come to the division of Pearl Harbor in a minute. You are talking about the dead line date.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You have notice on the 27th that negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes?

[13174] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Isn't that a fair summary of everything that had gone before in the intercepts?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You don't know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know about that because I am not thoroughly conversant with all the intercepts.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then, if you are not thoroughly conversant with all of the intercepts, will you explain to the committee your statement that if you had had the intercepts you might have come to a different conclusion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am merely stating what I heard here.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You stated that because you heard Admiral Kimmel and General Short state it; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Do you know whether there was anything in any of the intercepts that mentioned Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that if you did have them all they wouldn't have helped you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course, the chopping up of the harbor certainly mentioned Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, we come to that. When you are talking [13175] about chopping up Pearl Harbor, you are talking about the message on page 12 of Exhibit 2; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I guess that is it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now you heard the testimony of various officers with respect to that message, didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have heard some testimony; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Most of them have testified that this has no relation to an air attack. You have heard most of them testify to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know about that, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Most of them have testified that this was a convenient way of charting the harbor so as to avoid extra words in messages; you heard that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; I have heard that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But you say notwithstanding that testimony and all of the facts with relation to the intercepts, that if you had had this particular piece of evidence on or about the date that it was translated, namely, October 9, 1941, that it would have changed your entire course?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have affected us, I am sure.

[13176] Mr. KAUFMAN. Affected you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Affected us very much in our decision.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, coming back again to the joint coastal defense, coastal frontier defense plan, did you not regard the war warning of November 26 and 27 as a sufficient basis for invoking the provisions of that agreement?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not have that in my power. That was General Short's, and I was his chief of staff.

[13177] Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you discuss it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The matter was discussed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you discuss it with General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was discussed at the time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You and General Short discussed it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was discussed, I think, in the staff meetings.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When was it discussed in the staff meetings?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we had many staff meetings after the 27th, sometimes two or three a day. The heads of the general staff.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you want us to understand that the question of invoking the joint coastal frontier defense plan was discussed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that it was determined by General Short and his staff and that it was unnecessary to invoke the provisions of that plan?



Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no decision ever made in the staff meeting; the matter was brought up to the general's attention, and it was thoroughly discussed at the time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Then do you want the committee to understand that it was suggested to General Short and that he just [13178] took no action with respect to the suggestions that were made?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all; no, sir. The matter was discussed in staff meetings and there was no specific suggestion one way or the other, as I recall. I have no notes of those meetings, and it has been 4 years ago.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What action was taken on the subject, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no action so far as I know.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, the message of November 27 called for reconnaissance, and reconnaissance could only be had under the coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short felt that the reconnaissance that the Navy was making at that time with their task forces and our inshore reconnaissance was fulfilling that directive.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, the directive was to the Army to make reconnaissance; was it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you didn't think that it was your duty to advise the War Department that you were just making the inshore patrols 20 miles out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The War Department had approved the plan of distant reconnaissance under the joint Hawaiian defense plan.

[13179] Mr. KAUFMAN. The War Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. And the Navy Department.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The War Department and the Navy Department both approved the joint coastal frontier defense plan that we have been talking about?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And that, as I indicated to you, and read from paragraph 2, contemplated that it would be put into effect on the agreement of the commander in chief, Hawaiian Department, and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Now, under those circumstances, I ask you again whether Washington was not justified by reason of your statement of liaison with the Navy, your telegram of November 27, to assume that you had invoked the provisions of this coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What information do you want this committee to understand you would have needed before you would have invoked the defense plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is very difficult to say. That was General Short's problem, and I am not capable of answering that question.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, Colonel, you testified a little while ago that by reason of this telegram of November 27 and parti- [13180] cularly that portion of it that directed you not to alarm the civilian population that you conceived that the only requirement was the one to alert for sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That seemed at the time to meet the situation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And meet the situation because you didn't want to alarm the civilian population?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was only part of the requirements. We were to restrict the information in this message to the fewest possible number. If we had alerted to alert No. 2, which was against sub-surface, surface, and air attack, we would have put everybody out all over the island, not just running around with a helmet on as in training, but going to actual war with ammunition. If we had gone to alert No. 3, the worst that the enemy could do, we would have put troops in position all over the island, around the perimeter, digging position, and, of course, the information to the entire command.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you say you wanted to do this thing very quietly because of the requirement not to—the requirement to avoid notifying except a limited number of officers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And also to avoid alarming the civil population? [13181]

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; not to disclose intent.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Not to disclose intent.

Now, I read to you from Admiral Smith's testimony. It is at page 9,087 of this record. Admiral Smith testified:

I saw the Army go on the alert on the late afternoon of the 27th, the streets were full of them, going in all directions, manning the bridges, public utilities, but I did not know how far their alert went.

Then at a later point he testified that the roads were all blocked up with your men taking their positions.

So that the civil population did know that there was something going on, did it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They perhaps knew that there was something going on. We were moving into radio stations, we were moving to bridges, as a drill. That is very simple. You have a very small proportion of your command. But I do not believe that the streets were blocked by troops moving at that time. I believe the admiral perhaps is mistaken.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe the admiral perhaps was mistaken. We didn't have that number of troops out, there weren't that number required on the sabotage alert.

[13182] Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, now, were you here yesterday when Captain Layton testified?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was here a part of the time only.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He testified yesterday, as I understand it, I was not here, that he understood your alert was the highest type of alert that the Army could have. Can you explain that testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot explain Captain Layton's testimony; no, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You knew Captain Layton, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He was the fleet intelligence officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is true.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And did you have any contact with him at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, personally.

Mr. KAUFMAN. During the week preceding December 7 was your attention called to the fact that the Japanese consul in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. During the week preceding December 7, as a matter of fact on the morning of December 6, it was reported to my staff meeting that the Japanese consul was burning papers. Not codes, codes were never mentioned, [13183] but burning papers at that time, or had shortly before that. That was reported by the assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, and that fact was reported by me as well as Colonel Fielder, the G-2, to General Short, that the Japanese consulate were burning papers.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was that a suspicious circumstances in your mind?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not particularly. We did the same thing. It is customary on foreign stations to burn many.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you make any inquiry as to the extent of the burning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No more than the report from Colonel Bicknell, Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell at that time.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you know during the weeks preceding December 7 that the Navy was concentrating on training?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know that I knew that specifically. We were all training. All services.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you know that they were getting ready to carry out the orders under WPL-46?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not know that specifically.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Didn't you read that in the message of November 27 to the Navy when it was shown to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That message of November 27 of the Navy—I was only informed of that message. I saw the [13184] 24th message that I have testified about.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Didn't you know that the message of November 27 to the Navy directed them to take defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks provided for in war plan 46?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I may have been acquainted with that at the time. I don't recall just now. General Short told me the contents, informed me of the contents of that message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But you didn't have it in mind at that time, apparently?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe that is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. If you had that in mind, would that not have imposed a greater obligation on the Army to protect the fleet while it was in the harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know that it would.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. It is practically 12:30. We will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[13185]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No further questions at this time, sir.

**TESTIMONY OF COL. WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
UNITED STATES ARMY (Resumed)**

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have any statement you desire to make, Colonel, before your examination is resumed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would like to amplify and finish a reply to a question that I was making this morning, by reading from the Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 1, page 26:

General MARSHALL. Distant reconnaissance was a naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided.

Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 1, page 43:

General MARSHALL. As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance, would have been in detaching the units to serve under the Navy.

Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 1, page 47:

General RUSSELL. Well, is it your view that both [13186] having seen the message of November 27, without more ado, the Navy could have started their distant reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. That is right. That is my view.

Now that was the view of General Short and General Short showed the message of the 27th to Admiral Kimmel.

That is all I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Colonel, what is your purpose in reading General Marshall's testimony before another inquiry to this committee?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The purpose was to complete my answer this morning, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you want General Marshall's testimony to stand as your testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was the testimony before the Pearl Harbor, Army Pearl Harbor Board, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why are you reading the testimony of General Marshall before the Army Pearl Harbor Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is part of my answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are taking General Marshall's testimony as your testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is part of my answer, sir, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You want it understood, then, that you are taking part of General Marshall's testimony before [13187] another inquiry as your answer to questions presented to you here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you adopt that as your answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, as part of my answer, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did that have anything to do with your knowledge of the facts as they existed out at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all. I know General Short's opinion. General Short's opinion was that he showed the message to Admiral Kimmel in regard to long-distance reconnaissance, and that was quite sufficient.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you know then what General Marshall said before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was exactly what General Short thought?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How do you know that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Because I know what General Short thought, and I have just read you what General Marshall testified, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why did you not just tell us what General Short thought out there at that time, and not what General Marshall might have thought?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was merely part of my reply [13188] this morning, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you knew what General Short thought out there at Hawaii at the time the thing happened, why did not you just tell us that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I tried to tell you that this morning, sir, that it merely added emphasis to it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You think by referring to General Marshall's testimony you can better tell us what General Short thought?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not necessarily, sir. I merely thought it added emphasis to my reply.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, as I indicated this morning, I do not think there could be any doubt from this record that it was the duty of the Navy to conduct long-range reconnaissance.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But that was not done, was it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Long-range reconnaissance was being conducted as the Navy commander, Admiral Kimmel, judged necessary, as far as we thought at the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you know that long-range reconnaissance was not to be conducted by the Navy at that time?

[13189] Colonel PHILLIPS. They had task forces at sea—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about task forces.

I am talking about long-range reconnaissance from Oahu.

Did you know the Navy was not conducting that type of long-range reconnaissance back in December 1941?

Now, you would know now what you knew then.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We knew they had task forces at sea, and that those reconnaissance that the task forces conducted were certainly long range.

[13190] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you know the Navy was not sending any long-range reconnaissance planes out from Oahu in December 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Personally, I did not know that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not know that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, you stated that you arrived in Hawaii March 1, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And became chief of staff, or, rather, took over the duties of chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department on November 5, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you spent about 8 months out there in Hawaii becoming familiar with your new duties as chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, most of your experience had been as a training officer, had it, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not entirely, by any means. I spent 9 years in general staff duty out of my service that I gave you this morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I understood General Short's testimony, he indicated very clearly that one of the main [13191] reasons that he wanted you out there was because of your special qualifications for training purposes. That is true, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Had you served as chief of staff of a division or department before?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Only temporarily as chief of staff of the First Division.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just a short period.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe about 2 weeks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Two weeks. But you had had a great deal of experience as a training officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had had much experience as a training officer, and also in a staff capacity, and much command.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were recognized in the Army as a man with special qualifications for training purposes, weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is very flattering, sir. I do not believe I was particularly. I had done a fair job with the First Division.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, when General Short states [13192] that to this committee you accept the compliment, don't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you know that is in substance what he stated here, don't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is not that about the effect of what he stated here, that he especially wanted you because of your ability as a training officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know his testimony on that at all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He rather emphasized the training feature of it in discussing you before this committee, as I recall.

Now you state that you saw the Navy message of November 24 to Admiral Kimmel.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You read that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; to the best of my recollection, I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You, of course, bore the contents of that message very definitely in mind?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In your work out there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13193] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now this message states:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

You understand that, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

This situation coupled with statement of Japanese Government and movements their Naval and Military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

You considered what that message said in that respect, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading further) :

The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressee to inform senior Army officers their areas.

And it goes on about the necessity of secrecy, and so forth.

Now, just what did that message mean to you, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That message meant to me Guam or the Philippines were in an attack in any direction, but it did not say any distance. Hawaii is thousands of miles from that locale.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You make a distinction between the [13194] use of the word "direction" and the word "distance"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Much distinction; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, then tell me about it. I am interested to know.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Simply because you can attack Guam and the Philippines, and that is not so very far, or you can attack the China coast, or you can go down to Borneo and the Kra Peninsula and still you haven't gone very far, but that is in most every direction.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And because the word "distance" was not used in this message it did not mean much to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; it meant a great deal, but it did not mean as much as it certainly would have meant if they had mentioned Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can understand that. But why would it have meant more to you if the word "distance" had appeared in it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Because distance has a great deal to do with the sailing of a ship, that is an amphibious attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the Army was not so much concerned with the distance that ships had to sail, was it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we were concerned with how an attack was going to get there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Did you ever consider that [13195] war was inevitable with Japan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, I think we all did. We thought it was imminent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you reach that conclusion?

Mr. MURPHY. What was that last?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He said he thought it was inevitable and he thought it was imminent.

When did you reach that decision, please, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I should say about that time, November 24 to 27, in that general period.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your definite conviction that from about November 24 to November 27 war was inevitable and imminent?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We felt so; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your personal view about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, then, let us look for a moment to the message of November 27. You stated that you did not see that message but General Short told you about it. That is the Navy message.

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Navy message; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Navy message of November 27.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13196] The VICE CHAIRMAN. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. You say you did not see it yourself but General Short told you about it, is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did he undertake to tell you in detail what the message contained?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And gave you full information about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Had you known or heard of any Army or Navy message before in your experience beginning with the expression, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have never heard that expression before, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And General Short told you that that was in this message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And what did that mean to you then, by those words being used in this message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just as I have stated, sir, It meant war was imminent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. War was imminent between Japan and [13197] the United States?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We already felt that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You already felt that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You then accepted this?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This is additional evidence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As additional evidence?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And after you knew of these words in this message there was not any doubt in your mind at all that war was inevitable and imminent between Japan and the United States?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would not say there was not a doubt, sir, at all. I felt that—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You felt it was coming?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I felt that it was coming; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now the message goes on to say:

Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.

You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.



You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13198] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That aggressive action by Japan was expected within the next few days?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was within a few days from November 27, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now that is a period. Down at that point there was not any doubt in your mind as to what this meant, was there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

That was additional information that was given you, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13199] The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

That was a definite direction, a positive order, from the chief of naval operations to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then the message followed with about three or four more lines.

Now, Colonel, you have told us that you saw and studied, with General Short, the message from General Marshall to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On November 27, 1941, the same date as this last Navy message we have been talking about?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, that message starts out:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

That was a direct, definite statement of information, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I don't believe I have that, sir.

[13200] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Can counsel supply the colonel with a copy of the message of the 27th from General Marshall?

(A copy of the message was handed to Colonel Phillips.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have it before you now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It begins:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a direct, definite statement of information?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

That is another sentence. You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You understood that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That is a statement for information, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

This policy should not repeat not be considered as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

That is definite instruction to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading) :

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

That is direct order from General Marshall to General Short, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you so understood it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13202] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, you say that after you and General Short received and studied that message for about a half an hour, then you sent a reply, General Short sent a reply to General Marshall that he was alerted to sabotage and had liaison with the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, point out to me where the word "sabotage" appears in this message of November 27 from General Marshall to General Short.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is not in the message. It does not appear, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

You stated this morning that you did not personally notify anybody in the Navy that the Army in Hawaii was alerted only to sabotage?.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that was my statement this morning. That was not my—I might amplify that, sir, by stating that liaison with the Navy was not part of my job. I was carrying out at General Short's directives, as he directed, how he desired his chief of staff to function. I was functioning strictly according to his directions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it has been a good many years since I served in the Army during the First World War, but the chief of staff to any commanding officer is [13203] just his right arm, isn't he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The duties of the chief of staff are prescribed sir, but how the commanding general employs his chief of staff, or any other member, is entirely a matter up to him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is right. It is up to the commanding officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; the commanding officer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One commanding officer or commanding general has a definite outline of duties for his chief of staff that sometimes are quite different from those of another commanding officer or commanding general; that is true, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Always different. I have never seen two alike.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think I agree with you on that.

In other words, it depends to a great extent on the personality of the commanding officer or commanding general, doesn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; entirely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Some of them rely more largely upon their chief of staff than others, don't they?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Some of them require much more of [13204] their chief of staff than others do; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what was your experience with General Short? Was he one of those who relied a great deal upon his chief of staff, or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He did, a great deal. He carried out the directions in our staff manual and my duties in the Hawaiian Department as well as the duties of Colonel Hayes whom I succeeded, were prescribed almost exactly in the staff manual.

If you care to have me read it, I will read it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No. But there isn't any manual or any written document that can cover all of the things that a commanding officer or a commanding general expects or requires of his chief of staff, is there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all. That is quite correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was my experience, and I served a little while as regimental adjutant. My colonel always told me, "Captain, every time you come to me, it is an admission that you are just not big enough to handle it yourself."

You have had experiences of that kind, haven't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think most everybody has that has been on much staff duty.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, did you ever have a [13205] conference with then Captain, now Admiral, Smith, who was Admiral Kimmel's chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir. That is, what date do you mean? I have had conference with him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, he testified before this committee that he never had had any conferences with you from the time you became chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department to December 7, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. After December 7, we had many.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After December 7, you had many?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. We had several, I should say. I don't say "many."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But they were after December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you also told us that you never had any conference with Captain Layton who was G-2 of the Navy in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have conferences with any of the Navy staff officers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I had conferences with, oh, Captain DeLany, who was the operations officer; I had conferences with a number of Admiral Bloch's staff on various and sundry subjects, and at different times.

[13206] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conferences with the members of Admiral Kimmel's staff before December 7, 1941, while you were serving as chief of staff of the Army there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe I did, sir. General Short handled that entirely himself, and he had naval liaison, a navy liaison officer, Major Fleming. He would—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you have answered my question. You said you didn't have.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I did not personally.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you read this morning a memorandum or a statement to the committee that you stated that you showed to General Short's counsel about 2 weeks ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you write that statement?

Colonel PHILLIPS. About that time; a little before that, I should say, maybe 2 weeks ago.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About 2 weeks ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; maybe three.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Maybe 3 weeks ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About 3 weeks ago you wrote this statement and showed it to Short's counsel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13207] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was Captain Ford?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Have you revised it or changed it any since you wrote it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Somewhat.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In what respect did you change it after you conferred with Captain Ford about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think I changed it in any material way at all. I just had the one copy here, and I gave it—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The reporter took it away from you.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you remember any changes that you made in your statement that you wrote 2 weeks ago after you conferred with Captain Ford, General Short's counsel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

The only thing I think I put in was—I had “seize Marshall Islands,” instead of “raid Marshall Islands.” That is the only change I made.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you write this statement from your own personal knowledge?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't confer with anybody or [13208] have any assistance from anybody?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At the time you wrote the statement?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is your own personal statement dictated by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Written by me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Written by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you write it out in your own handwriting?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then had it typed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was about 3 weeks ago.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so; 3 or 4, I am not positive about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now it reflects your recollection then of things that transpired out there at Pearl Harbor in November and December of 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was an effort on my part to set forth what would have been in a written estimate provided we had written one.

[13209] It is provided in the manual that—I am a book man, I am an Army-school man of quite some experience, and in making an estimate we have a certain form of mental process that you go through and I merely drew this up to conform to that regular form of the estimate of the situation which we made at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, in writing this statement 3 weeks ago did you write it as you would have written it on December 7, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I put some facts in there that I couldn't possibly put in on December 7, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. So in some respects it is your present knowledge?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Your present knowledge up to date?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Four years after the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, there wasn't any written estimate made by you back there the first part of December 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And was any written estimate made by you at any time after you assumed the duties of chief of staff?

[13210] Colonel PHILLIPS. There was not. I wrote a series of notes, just scratch notes, that I kept for a year or so and lost them in the shuffle somewhere. There was no written estimate at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, you mentioned three messages that would have enabled you to make a definite decision had you known about those messages at that time; that is true, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Mr. Cooper, I hadn't made a study of this magic at all. I haven't read the entire—anything like all that have been submitted, but I have heard here in testimony certain things that I can state now I am sure would have had a definite effect on our thinking had we known them at the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, you mentioned three.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The message dividing up Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the first one you mentioned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At least that is one of the three.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the date of that [13211] message dividing up Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I—I have no idea.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it was some time before the attack, wasn't it? Several months, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. The 24th of September.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me examine the witness.

Do you have any idea of what the date was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had it here this morning, sir. I have heard it was the 24th of September.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You heard that just recently?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I heard it just now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I was hoping to find out when you knew about it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you think that if you had known of that message on September 24, the date of it, why, you would have been able to take definite action then?

Colonel PHILLIPS. September 27, it would have affected our decision—I don't mean September 27, November 27, it would have affected our decision much had we known that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In what way? What would you have done that you didn't do?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have give us more of a [13212] background than we had.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just what would you have done on November 27 if you had had this message of September 24 that you didn't do on November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We at least would have thought that the Japanese were making a plan for the bombing of Pearl Harbor. I would say that that was a bomb plot, so far as I was concerned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you first hear the expression "bomb plot" used?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Years ago. That is a normal thing in aviation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you first hear the expression "bomb plot"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you know it was years ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You know that it wasn't since this hearing started when Mr. Mitchell started using the term?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You heard it years ago?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had never heard "bomb plot of Pearl Harbor", but I had heard "bomb plot" used. You put a "bomb plot" out for bombing practice.

[13213] The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you first consider this message of September 24, 1941, as a bomb-plot message for Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I heard it here in testimony.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Here in this testimony?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had never considered that term before, had you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had never heard of the message before.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Now, did you know that Japan had requested somewhat similar information for other places?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Panama Canal or the west coast or other places?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it is your considered opinion then that this message of September 24, 1941, couldn't mean anything but a bomb plot for Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I didn't say that, sir. I think that is what it could mean. It might have meant something else but to me that is what it meant; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what it means?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13214] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not agree with all the other witnesses here who have testified that it might simply mean the Japanese desired to get information of this type about this and various other installations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. What evidence is that, sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I say, you don't agree then, if evidence has been given to this committee that the Japanese desired to get this information, that that was rather in line with their desire to get detailed information about many other places and harbors and ports throughout the world?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot testify to what the Japanese desired.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. Now, the other two messages mentioned by you were the dead-line message of November 25 and the one of November 29?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what would you have done on November 27 that you didn't do if you had known about this message on November 29?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In making our estimate on November 27 we were influenced greatly by the small amount of information that we

actually had and any additional information that we could have gotten or that we might have had at that time [13215] would have its effect on our decision due to the fact that we must consider it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand, but you told me that on November 27, when this war-warning message came, that you were definitely of the opinion that war was inevitable and imminent.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; that is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. How much could have been added to that conviction that you already had by the messages of November 25 and 29?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Additional information. You cannot have too much intelligence in making a decision and we considered on the twenty-seventh that we had actually very little enemy information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you had a direct war-warning message in front of you, didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; we had a war-warning message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had direct orders from the War Department to do certain things, didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had the conviction at that time that war was inevitable and was imminent, didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We thought war was imminent but not [13216] war in Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You thought it was imminent between the United States and Japan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What you really wanted then was for the War Department to tell you when and where the attack would be made by Japan, was that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have been very nice, but we hardly expected that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What did you expect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We expected, of course, some indication, some indication from the War Department that at least Hawaii was in the battle zone.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Didn't you consider the message that hostile action might be expected in any direction, didn't that cause you to think that Hawaii might be in the battle zone?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "In any direction." That is, again, the distance there, sir. We considered that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is there in the message—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Hawaii is a long way from Japan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is there in the message of November 25 and November 29 that refers to Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I haven't made a definite study of [13217] those. I don't think there is anything that definitely says anything about pointing directly to Hawaii. However, it would have given us more information of additional enemy information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You say Hawaii or Pearl Harbor, is not mentioned, referred to even remotely, in the messages of November 25 and November 29, the two deadline messages?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is true.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then what additional information would that have given you about an attack on Pearl Harbor?



Colonel PHILLIPS. The deadline message would have given us the idea that war is coming at that particular time. We would have had the time anyway.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you had had the time you would have been expecting the attack on Pearl Harbor, wouldn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say that, no, sir; but that would be additional information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What, in either one of those messages, would have caused you to think it applied to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We at least would have had one element. The time and place. The place wasn't supplied but the time was, and it would have been given due consideration by General Short in arriving at the decision as to what form of alert he would take.

[13218] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the time that that message would have given you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course, the 25th; we would have had the 25th; the 29th we would have had the 29th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the attack didn't occur on either date?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Didn't come for over a week later?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So it wouldn't have been worth anything as far as time is concerned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just for consideration.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just for consideration?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It couldn't have been worth anything as a place because there wasn't any place indicated, was there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not so far as I know, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel, you say you did see the naval message of November 24?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In which it was stated that Japan might [13219] strike in any direction?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That was the effect of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. With an enumeration as to certain places it was believed that the strike would come. I believe that is in this message of the 24th.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Guam and the Philippines.

Senator GEORGE. In any direction, including an attack on the Philippines and Guam as a possibility. And General Marshall's message of November 27, of course, came directly to the Army in Hawaii. That is, the message of General Marshall to General Short.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. That same message, of course, was sent to General MacArthur, and to the commanders everywhere in all of the areas. That was received and it was on that message that you immediately acted?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And alert No. 1 was put into effect. I believe it was alert No. 1. That is, the alert against sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And there was immediate notice given [13220] to General Marshall by General Short that he had so interpreted his message of the 27th. Did you have any information at all that the sabotage alert was not adequate, in the light of the message of the 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had no information on that, sir. As a matter of fact, that afternoon we got a message from General Miles, the G-2 in the War Department, which definitely directed sabotage, as I recall. I haven't the message here. We got one from General Adams on the 28th to which we replied at great length also on sabotage, and we received one also on the 28th from General Arnold also on sabotage.

Senator GEORGE. In other words, following the message of November 27, you had three messages, all dealing with sabotage from Washington?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. But you had no message that what General Short had done there was inadequate? That is, no direct reply asking that anything else be done by him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, did you receive the December 3 message relating to the destruction of codes or machines by Japan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You didn't have any message of that kind?

[13221] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any message from Washington indicating that the Japanese were destroying their codes from the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th of December?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. We received no messages other than the three sabotage messages from Washington until the message from General Marshall which came in about 3:30 on December 7.

Senator GEORGE. After the attack.

Colonel PHILLIPS. After the attack.

Senator GEORGE. I have the impression, Colonel, that the December 3 message was received by General Short. It is from OPNAV for action CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14 and COM 16:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

You say you didn't receive this message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Well, did you have any information from the Navy in Hawaii that they had received this message, that the Navy had received it?

[13222] Colonel PHILLIPS. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Well, when you say that you didn't get this message, do you mean that you didn't get it as chief of staff, or that General Short didn't get it, so far as you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It didn't come in to our headquarters.

Senator GEORGE. It didn't come to your headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you had no notice from the Navy of the receipt of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. It would have been the duty of the Navy to have furnished you with this information, would it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know, sir. We expected to get everything that pertained to us from the Navy that they had.

Senator GEORGE. And then there was another message of December 3, which possibly does contain the same information.

In that message you are not mentioned as an action addressee, that in the Army, but you are mentioned as an information addressee, and you had no information about that message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

[13223] Senator GEORGE. That didn't come to the headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you learn of a message from Washington relating to the burning of codes on the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. All you had was information that the Japanese consul was destroying certain official papers or important papers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had information on the 6th, it was brought to our attention by the assistant G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, at the staff meeting at 8 o'clock on the 6th, that the Japanese consulate was burning papers. We had no information in regard to the codes.

Senator GEORGE. You had no information regarding burning of codes, and destruction of code machines, no such information was received in your headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you have already testified that you did not see nor know of the existence of the contents of the September 24 message, the one dividing Pearl Harbor up into areas?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have notice or any information [13224] regarding a subsequent message calling for the display of lights in houses on the island?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. I never heard anything about that until much later.

Senator GEORGE. Until after the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. I never heard anything about that until much later.

Senator GEORGE. Until after the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Much after.

Senator GEORGE. Colonel, you say that you had become convinced that war with Japan was inevitable and imminent even by the 24th or 27th of November, the 27th being the date on which you received the Marshall message, but you had had no suggestion from any source after you became chief of staff identifying Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Islands with the attack or with any direct attack by Japan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I believe I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Did the Japanese have an extensive espionage system on the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know, sir. We always suspected that. I have no information about it. General Fielder is perhaps a better witness on that than I am. He will appear [13225] before the committee shortly.

Mr. CLARK. Do you mean that you, as chief of staff didn't know whether they had a system of spies on the islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not positively. They had consular agents, and there were a number of them. That is what they called them. We assumed that they were conducting espionage. There was no particular necessity for it because there was nothing concealed. It was all open, anybody could go anywhere.

Mr. CLARK. I think it was perhaps Admiral Ingersoll who testified here that they could stand on the hills around Pearl Harbor and see everything that went on there; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. There is considerable elevation around Pearl Harbor, as I understand it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Did you know of the instance of wire tapping down there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir, not at the time. I learned of it much later.

Mr. CLARK. The Japs did have direct wire communications with Honolulu, I mean Tokyo, did they not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so. I think they could use [13226] our commercial lines, and our radio, and whatever they pleased. There was no restriction so far as I know.

Mr. CLARK. Of course, any alert that the Army would go on would be immediately known to the Japs on the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say that it would, sir. I don't know that that would be the case. Incidentally, we were very careful in alert No. 1 when we went on that and attempted to carry out the restrictions as to the number of people who knew what we were doing; we attempted to carry out that to the letter.

It is very simple on a sabotage alert to put sentries here and there and say that you will keep everybody out. That doesn't restrict you to the Japanese.

In Hawaii you have Puerto Ricans, you have all manners of peoples.

Mr. CLARK. Colonel, was it your opinion that the Japanese on the Hawaiian Islands were reporting to Japan practically everything that was being done there by the Army and the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They certainly could, I believe.

Mr. CLARK. I say, wasn't that your opinion as chief of staff to General Short that they were doing that every day?

[13227] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, I agree with that. There was nothing to stop them.

Mr. CLARK. That was pretty well known in Army and Navy circles, was it not that they were doing that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Everybody knew that, I think everybody knew that they could do it. We didn't know that they were doing it, but there was nothing to prevent them from doing it.

[13228] Mr. CLARK. Did none of these intercepts that were made there indicate that they were doing that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not see those intercepts, sir. I don't know what you refer to.

Mr. CLARK. You didn't know much about what was going on around there, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Well, wasn't it a matter of highest concern to the safety of both the Army and the Navy that you should have information on that subject?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Excuse me; I did not get that. I wish you would repeat it.

Mr. CLARK. I say wasn't it a matter of highest concern to both the Army and the Navy as to what the Japs were doing in that respect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that was of great interest, of course. Again I believe that General Fielder is a better witness on that than I, simply because he devoted much of his time to that work. He is to appear later before the committee.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. Well, you have laid some stress here upon the fact that you did not receive from Washington the so-called bomb plot information. Now, what comes into my mind is why steps were not taken either by you or by General [13229] Short or by the Navy to ascertain what the Japs were reporting to Tokyo right from Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think we had any authority for interrupting traffic of that kind at that time, or traffic of any kind.

Mr. CLARK. But you know that the detail of the movement of every ship and of all the troops on those islands was being observed and likely being reported to Tokyo?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No; we did not know that positively. It was open and anybody could see it and, of course, it is a likelihood that that is what was going on.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I will put it this way: You knew that the Japanese spies on the island could see every movement of either the Army or the Navy, a company of soldiers or a battleship or a cruiser, and you knew that the means of communicating that to Tokyo were available?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right. There were approximately 160,000 Japanese on the islands, about 40 percent of the entire population, and they were most everywhere.

Mr. CLARK. Now, you say you did not hear of the wire tapping prior to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. All right. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

[13230] Senator LUCAS. Colonel, I want to discuss briefly with you the November 27 message of General Marshall.

As I understand from your testimony, you were completely familiar with that message that came to General Short on the day it was sent.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You have also given to counsel a prepared memorandum that you recall discussing with General Short as to what should be done in view of the receipt of this message. I direct your attention to the first statement in that message, which says:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

Now, what was your interpretation of that when you discussed that part of the message with General Short? What did that mean to you out there in this outpost in the Pacific?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, that was information on Japan, which would normally come in a combat order, under information on the enemy and that is where we put it. Negotiations——

Senator LUCAS. Now, isn't it a fact that that is the first command that your post had ever received from General Marshall?

[13231] Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. He was Chief of Staff of the Army?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. There had been a command the year before which I was acquainted with.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. But that was not during my time.

Senator LUCAS. Since you were there as G-2 on General Short's staff——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Chief of Staff.

Senator LUCAS. I mean as Chief of Staff of General Short's staff, this is the first message in all that had been received out there that was signed by General Marshall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure. That is the first to my knowledge; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least you do not recall any other messages coming from the Chief of Staff in Washington, D. C., directing General Short and his group out there to do certain things?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, did the fact of General Marshall directing General Short in the Pacific to do certain things have any different effect upon the manner in which you interpreted a message of this kind than if it had come from G-2 or some other official in Washington?

[13232] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It did make a tremendous impression upon you, didn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The mere fact that the Chief of Staff of the United States Army had seen fit in this particular crisis to send direct to General Short a message of this character?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand it, this type of a message is a command message and there is a distinction between an operational order and an order which is really mere information that is sent out. Am I right on that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is quite correct. I might say that there is a command directive and a combat order, and a combat order is our normal form for a command directive. A combat order is an order that we teach in our schools in the alert form and we start from our

lowest and teach it right straight through till we finish at Leavenworth.

Senator LUCAS. Well, a combat order is one that is used when you are in war, is it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And he was not giving you a combat order because we were at peace at that time.

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was directing that we take up a [13233] formation here.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; he was directing you to prepare for any eventuality that might happen.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Senator LUCAS. As a result of what he says in the first paragraph:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

Now, he said following that:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what did you understand that meant from this message:

Hostile action possible at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. "Hostile action possible at any moment"? Why, we had, of course, the Navy message here of the 24th which we had gone through very carefully and——

Senator LUCAS. I am not talking about the Navy message. I am talking about the first message that you received from General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And the first time you had received a [13234] message of this character he told you definitely that hostilities—or rather that negotiations were about to cease and he said further:

Future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, where did you think hostile action was going to take place?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not anticipate an attack by air on Hawaii. Possibly action—a form of possible action is sabotage. With 160,000 Japanese sitting right on our islands that is a form of hostile action. We divided our standing operating procedure into three forms of defense.

Senator LUCAS. Did General Marshall know at any time——

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think he was through.

Senator LUCAS. I am very sorry, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our first or safety alert was the first form of hostile action that I could visualize.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is hostile action right there.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We took definite measures against that form of hostile action.

Senator LUCAS. All right, Colonel. When did you or General Short send to the War Department your 1, 2, and 3 alert?

[13235] Colonel PHILLIPS. Those alerts I have heard since I have been here, some testimony that they got there in March. I am not sure. It is a normal routine procedure that every—that a copy of every order, or perhaps six copies, I am not sure what the procedure is in the Adjutant General's office, but six copies of every order; I say six but I am not sure of that. At least one copy of every order is mailed as a routine matter to the War Department, every order that is issued in the Department and the normal thing was on November the 5th, when that was published and mailed, the normal thing would have been for the Adjutant General, Colonel Dunlop, to have put the number, as he mimeographed them to put the number on just as a routine matter, just as a mail clerk would have put them in the bag and they would have gone to the War Department.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the number 1, 2, and 3 alert procedures were prepared by General Short under your advice and assistance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't understand the question.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the 1, 2, and 3 alerts, Colonel Phillips—you and General Short and the staff had prepared those?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you prepared those without first taking it up with the Army here in Washington, D. C.?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; we prepared a tentative alert or a tentative standing operating procedure almost identical to the one that was adopted and a copy was sent to Washington in June and I think returned approved in September.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I would like to see that. If that is correct, I would like to see it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is the letter to General Marshall.

Senator LUCAS. Do we have a copy of that operating procedure that was sent in on July the 14th?

(No response.)

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, this is the message that came back from General Marshall. [Reading:]

The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of five hundred men for military police duty.

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view [13237] of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii.

I wish you would give this your personal consideration.

Now, did you see that letter that was addressed to General Short dated October 10, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. The standing operating procedure was taken and those changes made following or subsequent to this letter and the revised copy conforming to the recommendations not only of



the War Department, as stated there, were published on November the 5th and distributed.

Senator LUCAS. Well, whatever information you may have thought was sent, I think the record is very clear in this hearing before the committee that your orders, your operational orders of these three alerts never reached the War Department here until some time in March after the attack of December.

[13238] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So the Army, as far as this hearing is concerned, had no notice of the fact that General Short had placed sabotage on Number 1 alert and then the Number 2 and Number 3 alerts.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes. For that reason, sir, you will find that in the tentative standing operating procedure the numbers of the alerts were just the reverse, in the tentative one. In this one—they were—in that one adopted on November 5, 1941, the No. 1 alert was the sabotage alert. No. 2 and No. 3 was all-out.

Senator LUCAS. But in the tentative they were just reversed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just reverse.

Senator LUCAS. Number 1 was the all-out alert for defensive actions, where the troops would be stationed in different batteries?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right and for that reason in General Short's reply to this message of the 27th the numbers were not used. It was called defensive, a sabotage alert, and not a number. The number was left out of the message in order not to be confusing.

Senator LUCAS. You have stated that in that connection a copy of it was sent or should have been sent, at least, to [13239] the Army here in Washington, D. C.?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall now whether or not the Army ever answered acknowledging receipt of the so-called alert where sabotage became the No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know whether that would have been necessary. I don't believe they ever did.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it may not have been necessary but in view of what happened it would have been a good thing to have followed that up after it was sent in, would it not, Colonel, to ascertain whether or not the Army agreed with that kind of an alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That is hindsight.

Senator LUCAS. Of course it is hindsight.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not number them for that very reason in General Short's reply to this, so that the sabotage could not be mistaken, could not be confused with a number.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in other words, your position is, insofar as this message is concerned, that when General Marshall was talking about hostile action and when he says in the latter part of the message:

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan—

you contend that you thought that he was talking about sabotage?

[13240] Colonel PHILLIPS. I thought he was talking about hostilities.

Senator LUCAS. Well, he was talking about hostilities, but sabotage—

Colonel PHILLIPS. But sabotage is one form of hostilities.

Senator LUCAS. Sabotage is one form of hostilities?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That seemed to be our most imminent danger right there at the time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, when you take that part of the message, when it says further:

You are not restricted to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

Did you think that that would apply to sabotage activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We considered that at the time, sir, and the reconnaissance, of course, we were doing. The other measures that we thought should be carried out were:

So as not, repeat not, alarm the civil population or disclose intent—and:

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

It was deemed that the sabotage alert, which happened to [13241] be the number 1, was adequate.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were not carrying out any reconnaissance there, were you, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had inshore reconnaissance from Bellows Field.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, and you thought that that was what he was talking about?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

You thought that he was talking about the short-range reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Short-range reconnaissance at that time and the fact that he knew that the long-range reconnaissance was a mission and duty of the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. So from that November 27 message you and General Short concluded that all that General Marshall was talking about in that dynamic message was the question of sabotage in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That afternoon we received a message from General Miles, the next day we received two other messages which seemed to confirm us in our decision.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; I appreciate that fact that General Miles sent a message the following day, or the same day, and General Arnold sent a message the following day, but the point [13242] I am attempting to make is that you and General Short made up your minds with respect to what this message meant before either one of the other messages came in.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And the only thing that those other messages did was to confirm——

Colonel PHILLIPS. To confirm our decision.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). Your decision that you reached?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, I have been unable to understand just how you could construe that message in that manner. I am only a layman. I have examined it rather carefully. I have examined the reply of the commanding general of the Western Defense Command in San Francisco.

Have you seen his reply to this same message that General Marshall sent out to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, here is what he says and, mind you, the words are identical now in this message that was sent to DeWitt of the Western Command, of the Western Defense Command, as in the one that was sent to General Short. Here is what he said on November 28 [reading]:

Report following measures taken as per your radio [13243] November Twenty Seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with Corps Area and Naval District Commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, Sector and Subsector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov Twenty fifth which recommended that WPL Five Two be extended to include Pacific Coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As air forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP Five Two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to [13244] direct operations of Air Forces in defense of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

Now, was there anything in Rainbow 5 that talked about sabotage on the island, or do you recall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why DeWitt would construe that message any different than General Short himself did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. For one reason he does not have a standing operating procedure.

Senator LUCAS. He does not have what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He does not have a standing operating procedure. If I may, sir, I will read you what a standing operating procedure is and why we were directed in the Staff Officers' Field Manual which was in effect at that time to place in effect a standing operating pro-

cedure. It is FM-101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual, the Staff and Combat Orders. [Reading:]

## SECTION VI

## STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

[13245] a.—Standing operating procedure covers those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. It should be provided that the procedure is applicable unless prescribed otherwise in a particular case; thus the flexibility necessary in special situations is retained.

b.—The purposes of standing operating procedure are:

(1) To simplify and abbreviate combat orders, expedite their transmission, and permit their being understood easily and certainly.

(2) To simplify and perfect the training of the troops.

(3) To promote understanding and teamwork between the commander, staff, and troops.

(4) In general, to facilitate and expedite operations and minimize confusion and errors.

c.—Standing operating procedure should not hamper the effective tactical employment of the troops.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were working under that sort of a procedure, were you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were working under that under this directive. That is what the standing operating procedure was drawn up for, simply because the situation in Hawaii was sim- [13246] ply a limited perimeter defense.

Senator LUCAS. And you don't think that the—

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think the Western Command had anything of that kind in existence and he had to go into great detail in order to tell what he was doing.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the Western Command had no more information with respect to magic or in respect to what was going on in the Pacific than you did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In fact, they did not have as much.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And, yet, notwithstanding that fact they interpreted this order entirely differently than you or General Short interpreted it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now I take you over to the Panama Canal Zone. Do you see any reason why the commander in Panama should interpret it any differently than you did, or the same as you did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know about that, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, just briefly here is what he said. He sent a long telegram back and then he said that he was sending an air letter, which he did on November 29. He says:

[13247] In compliance with radiogram No. 461 from the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, report that the following measures are in effect for the protection of the Caribbean Area.

a. Naval Measures:—

He goes into it at great length.

At the present time, it is believed that the defensive measures for the Caribbean Defense Command center largely around the Panama Canal—

and so forth.

b. Measures for the Defense of the Panama Canal :

(1) Harbor Defense. Troops are on a continuous alert. Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval defense.

Here is a fellow down in Panama who has his troops all alerted. Here is this fellow on the west coast who has his troops all alerted and here you fellows who are 2,000 miles or more away, all you have your troops alerted to is sabotage.

Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval defense.

(3) Antiaircraft Artillery. All available antiaircraft equipment is installed and on a 24-hour alert.

(2) Aircraft Warning Service. The two detectors installed are on a 24-hour alert.

[13248] Would it have been possible for the aircraft warning service in Hawaii to be on a 24-hour alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think we could with the limited personnel we had. I don't know how long that could have lasted, I am not sure about that. General Powell is here and he will make a better witness on that than myself.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

Seven observation posts have been established at various places in Panama with direct radio communication to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

Did you have an information center there in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have a liaison man between the Navy and the Army?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Navy had supplied us a liaison officer, I believe; Lieutenant Taylor, I believe.

Senator LUCAS. The Navy testified here that they never received any information from the information center with respect to what was going on, at least on December the 7.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. It was purely a training matter at that time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I appreciate the handicaps that you were operating under at the time, Colonel, with respect to radar and a number of other things.

[13249] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. All I am wondering is whether or not you did the best you could with what you had and were really alert to the situation.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, antiaircraft artillery. Now, here is another one from the Panama Canal. Certainly it seems to me that if Panama is going to do these things under the same instructions, practically under the same message, that Hawaii should have done them, too. [Reading:]

All available antiaircraft equipment is installed and on a 24-hour alert.

Now, that was not true in Hawaii at all.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. We had small care-taking crews in permanent antiaircraft installations.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any antiaircraft equipment that was on any kind of an alert on the morning of December the 7th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. There were care-taking establishments in the permanent installations. There were care-taking troops in the permanent establishments on a sabotage alert. Of course, they were on 24 hours. They opened fire. I should say we had about six or seven, probably more, batteries. I have the report of Colonel Wing, who has [13250] made a report. I think it is an exhibit.

Senator LUCAS. Of only those that were on a sabotage alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right, that got into the action. I think 8 or 10 batteries.

Senator LUCAS. How many batteries did you have in all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter of record, sir. I do not recall.

Senator LUCAS. You cannot give a guess? I have forgotten it myself.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thirty-two, the record shows.

Senator LUCAS. What?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thirty-two, the record shows.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is about right.

Senator LUCAS (reading:)

(4) Antisabotage.

I am still reading from the report of General Andrews in the Panama Canal Zone.

Locks and other sensitive areas are continuously guarded, and all approaches to the sensitive areas are covered by mound bunkers. Approaches to bunkers and between bunkers where practicable, are covered by patrols. Transit guards are placed on all vessels transiting the Canal.

(5) Counter-espionage. Active counter-espionage measures are being taken continuously.

[13251] (6) Countersubversive activities.

(7) Air Force. A portion of the pursuit is on a continuous 24-hour alert. The Bomber Command headquarters maintains a 24-hour alert. This latter applies to the whole Caribbean Area.

Was there any more reason why the Caribbean area should be on a 24 bombing-command alert than there was at Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What is your opinion about it as an expert, Colonel, and a man who has had a lot of experience in the Army?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would have to know the conditions in Panama. I don't think the conditions in any two of those spots you have mentioned are similar at all.

Senator LUCAS. No; but the mere fact that you fellows were 2,000 miles closer to Japan, closer to the attack than either Panama or the west coast would indicate that at least the Army command and the Navy command should have been equally on the same type of alert as either Panama or the west coast.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, that is a matter of opinion. We were taking the facts as we found them in Hawaii and working on that basis alone.

Senator LUCAS. The point that I am making is that Panama [13252] Canal and the west coast had no more facts than in Hawaii. In fact, they did not have as many.

Colonel PHILLIPS. They had different circumstances to handle in a situation right there.

Senator LUCAS. They did, and they were on the alert, Colonel.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, it goes into the Caribbean theater, other than the Panama Canal Department.

It sets out about the Air Corps there, as to what they were doing.

Harbor Defenses: Less than one complete manning detail available for the harbor defense armament.

Signed, "F. M. Andrews, Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding."

In other words, it has always given me some concern as to why these two commanders on the west coast and the Panama command interpreted this entirely differently than General Short and his staff interpreted it, and in this message of November the 27th there is not a single word about where the Japs are expected to attack. That is true, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. On page 105 of the Pearl Harbor inquiry carried on by Justice Roberts as chairman, and others, General [13253] McNarney asked you this question:

What is your idea of the function of the Local Joint Planning Committee?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My idea is, of course, controlled more or less to conform to what we have as a joint plan, and I should say that whenever changes are necessary, why, that joint committee should meet and modify the joint plan that we have.

General McNARNEY. You did not consider that the situation as known to you on November 27 and 28 required any revision of the existing plans or any examination into the propriety of making a new plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were all familiar with the plan thoroughly, sir, and a change was not deemed necessary at that time.

General McNARNEY. What is the normal routine method by which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and the Commander of the 14th Naval District maintained close liaison and contact with reference to the existing situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. By personal conferences at one or the other headquarters.

General McNARNEY. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Department, confer with any Navy officers during the period [13254] November 27 to December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not. I was occupied with the duties of my office here at headquarters practically the entire period.

You probably have answered that question before in testifying here today, but can you give me again the reason why, Colonel, you, as chief of staff, failed to confer with a single Navy officer from November the 27th until December the 7th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Senator, I was carrying out my duties as chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department in conformity with the directions of General Short. I ran the headquarters and the staff. General Short attended personally conferences with the Navy, taking along his Navy liaison officer, as he called him. Major Fleming usually, General Martin, and perhaps maybe somebody from the Coast Artillery. I remained at his headquarters to free him of all the routine administrative work. That was his direction, and that was what I was carrying out to the letter.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, in view of what you know about the testimony that has been adduced before this hearing, do you believe that the liaison between the Navy and the Army is what it should have been?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter of opinion, Senator. I think that we had liaison. Whether it could have been im- [13255] proved upon is another thing. The commanding general was a very active man, he was taking part in every conference, he was always present, he had all the facts at his fingertips and, after all, he is the man concerned, he is the commander, and if he has the facts in hand that is quite sufficient. We had, however, a liaison officer from the Navy, from Admiral Bloch's staff, Lieutenant Burr, who sat in and had a desk in G-3 and was always there.

Senator LUCAS. Don't you believe as chief of staff of General Short's army down there in Hawaii that you should have known practically everything that General Short knew?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He told me, he acquainted me with the results of every staff meeting and what messages, if any, he had seen. I was thoroughly conversant with all those facts.

Senator LUCAS. But you never sat in on a single conference after the war warning message was received through the Navy and after you received this message from Marshall, with a single Navy man. That was all done by General Short, was it, and his aide?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short and our naval liaison officer. However, I believe that we did have—well, I am not sure of it. My memory is not good on that.

Senator LUCAS. What were your chief duties following this November the 27th message as chief of staff of that army out [13256] there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My chief duties following the 27th were, of course, first to initiate all orders, get them out to the troops concerned, right down through the staff, see that the staff sections, particularly the G-3, was out inspecting the positions and his entire office was out. I did some inspecting myself, although not required under my duties.

I went out to see if our message center was functioning at all times and, as far as the sabotage alert was concerned, that it was functioning fully.

Senator LUCAS. Had you ever had any previous experience on a joint command of this character?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, with the First Division in amphibious operations down in the Caribbean in 1937 and again in 1939, I believe, at the time we had joint operations off Puerto Rico. We defended there the southern coast of Puerto Rico for a strip of 35 miles and an amphibious operation landing under the Navy was made from the *Arkansas* and the *New York* by the Fifth Marines.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know on December the 6th the number of ships that were in Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say that I did; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if it was your duty to defend the Navy, it was the duty of the Army to defend the Navy, why [13257] wouldn't it be your duty to ascertain on December the 6th and every other day the number of those ships in and out of that harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That did not modify our defense in the least. Our defenses was a static proposition. We had so many guns and so many positions and whether there had been 1 ship in the harbor or 50 our defense would have gone into operation just the same.

Senator LUCAS. It would have been just the same?



Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have been just the same; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, the fact that there were two task forces out at sea and you did not know anything about that did not make any difference as far as the defense was concerned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It made a difference as far as the reconnaissance was concerned; yes, sir. We knew of that; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know that the task forces were out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We knew of that; yes, sir. General Short had been informed and so informed me.

Senator LUCAS. General McCoy asked a couple of questions which I want to interrogate you a little further on, on page 109 of those proceedings. [Reading:]

[13258] The CHAIRMAN. What was the objection to putting in two or three, if any?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no particular objection, sir. It was considered that I was what we desired and required.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have one; I am not quite ready yet.

General McCoy. I have one: Colonel Phillips, under Alert No. 1, the very first line, the very first sentence, 14, page 3, it states: "This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no threat from without."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, here was a warning telegram that did mention hostile action and unpredictable action from without, from the War Department.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. So that that line is absolutely inconsistent, then, with the instructions from the War Department, is it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It says, "with no threat from without," sir.

General McCoy. So that Alert No. 1 is not consistent, [13259] I take it, with these instructions from the War Department. Had that inconsistency in the very first paragraph of Alert No. 1 occurred to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It had not, sir. At the time I saw no inconsistency, sir.

Do you care to comment any further upon that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; other than I have already testified in regard to the fact that we thought that form of hostility right in our very midst was what should be guarded against and we had no information, from the War Department or from the Navy, our only sources, that an attack was expected in Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, as I understand it, you testified before the Roberts Commission first; thereafter you testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as well as before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as I recollect it, you made the answer, "I don't remember", at least 40 times. What have you done to refresh your memory since that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have attended some of the sessions [13260] here, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the testimony you are giving us now is what you have heard then during the hearings, is that it, and that has refreshed your memory, has it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. I at that time had had no opportunity to read the reports of the Roberts committee. I have read that and I have also read the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At

that time I was testifying there before the Navy committee I had just flown in from Burma and had no time to refresh my memory on anything.

Mr. MURPHY. Did I understand you to say to Senator Lucas that you made the rounds to see whether or not the message center was operating? Did I understand you on that correctly?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean now by that the air warning service?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I mean the message center.

Mr. MURPHY. That is a different thing than the air warning service?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Quite.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not know whether the air warning service was functioning or not, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was a training matter. It was a new thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether it was functioning or not?

[13261] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On the morning of December 7th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I did not personally.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that that was under the Signal Corps?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was under the Signal Corps for installation and the Air Corps for operation. It was a joint control, a training problem.

Mr. MURPHY. Up to the time of the attack you had no information whatsoever as to whether there had been a warning order given as to the radar, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you say now that you knew the task forces were out and what they were.

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short had told me; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you say you knew that on December 7—you knew on December 7 what task forces were out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, no. The testimony—we are speaking of the 27th; I am speaking of that.

Mr. MURPHY. I am speaking on the day of the attack.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know immediately before the 7th where the task forces were, whether they were in or out of the harbor? I don't want hindsight. Do you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't recall just now.

[13262] Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, I would like to, so that we may have it in one place in the record. I am going to hurriedly run over that testimony before the three boards.

You never saw the Navy message, did you, "This is a war warning?"

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you testified on page 213 of the Roberts Board, page 1010 in the committee's transcript, that you did have some record or receipts of these different messages at Pearl Harbor. Did you or didn't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We could not find those in the records.

Mr. MURPHY. When the Roberts Board asked you the question, asked you to get the records, you could not find them, could you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the night of December 6 you were at a dance at Schofield Barracks; weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. A charity ball.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, with your wife. Was that at Isadore's night club or wasn't there some place called Eleazar's or Isadore's?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is the Schofield Barracks Officers' Club.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the only thing?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is all there is: yes, sir.

[13263] Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, the message of the 27th came in at 1:16 p. m. and you saw two messages that afternoon and you made answer at 5:40 p. m.; isn't that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not understand that question.

Mr. MURPHY. I say the message of the 27th, the one that you received from General Marshall, came in at 1:16 p. m. of that afternoon and that afternoon you saw a second message, did you not, and sent the reply called the Short reply as of 5:40 p. m. that day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure as to the time. It was shortly thereafter.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you testified on page 220 and at page 104 before the Roberts Board:

Yes, sir. This was 1:16 p. m., the 27th, and this went out at 5:40 p. m., the 27th.

Was your recollection pretty clear at that time as to when it came in and when it went out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Apparently I checked that from the message. I did not have the message.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. You were head of the local joint planning committee, were you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And there never was a meeting of the local joint planning committee called at any time between November [13264] 27th and after the attack, was there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the question was asked you by General McCoy at page 229 of the Roberts board, page 108 of our hearing:

Were you informed that such distant reconnaissance was being carried out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that we were in so many words. We assumed that we were carrying our part of the plan, and I don't know that there was even any thought of anything else.

Was that the knowledge you had of what the Navy was doing on distant reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was my estimate at that time, at least, in reply to that question. I also assumed that they were carrying out and were doing their job all the time.

Mr. MURPHY. On the same page General McCoy said:

Were you informed by the naval district of the arrival of the battleships in the harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was not, sir. I can't say whether the Department Commander was or not. I was not, sir. I never knew whether the ships were in or out.

Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

[13265] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General McCoy. Wouldn't that affect any plan for defense that you might have, whatever?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, it should have affected that, sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew.

Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have just answered that——

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, but not in this manner.

Colonel PHILLIPS (continuing). For Senator Lucas.

Mr. MURPHY. Is what you said——

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our defense set-up in the standing operating procedure was a static defense.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, that is what you said before the Roberts Board back in January 1942:

Wouldn't that affect any plan for defense that you might have, whatsoever?  
Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, it should have affected that, sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew.

Were you incorrect when you testified that way before the Roberts Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is not a very good reply, "as chief of staff I never knew." I was never able to correct this or go over that. That does not make sense.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is that General Short was [13266] with his own liaison officer principally with the Navy. wasn't he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, he was the commanding general and he attended Navy meetings personally himself. He knew all the facts in the case. He had a liaison officer, Major Fleming, who also attended.

Mr. MURPHY. Both you and General Short in testifying here have talked about Major Fleming being your liaison officer. Was that really your liaison officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was the Army liaison; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Roberts Board he said it was Captain Truman.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No; Captain Truman was the aide who accompanied General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we never heard his name in this record now after 12,000 pages until this minute.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was merely the aide who accompanied him. I don't know what the question was or what it was about. I have only heard that since I have been here, sir.

[13267] Mr. MURPHY. The question was:

Were not you usually with him at these conferences with the Commander of the Fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I was not.

General McCoy. Were you with him when he had any conferences with the Navy during that period of November 27 to December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Who was with him on those conferences? Are you informed as to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe his aide, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is his aide?  
Colonel PHILLIPS. Captain Truman.

That was your answer to the Roberts Board, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That should have been amplified.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the answer you gave the Roberts Board in January 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. His aide was with him. That is all incorrect.

Mr. MURPHY. What?

Colonel PHILLIPS. His aide was with him. That is all incorrect.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, that is who you said was with him and that is the only one you said was with him.

[13263] Colonel PHILLIPS. That should have been amplified. That was incorrect. I knew that aide.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

General McCoy. At any time during the period of the alert from the 27th of November to December 7 did you have any conference with your vis-a-vis in the Navy or with any officer in the Navy?

That is on page 108 of the Roberts record, page 230 of our record. Your answer was:

No, sir, I did not.

General McCoy. Did anybody of your staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. None of my staff, no, sir.

Now, when I asked General Short this question he kind of laughed out. I asked whether or not there was any time when the Navy staff, Kimmel's staff and your staff sat down together? Did they at any time sit down that you knew of up to the time the war started?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They never had a joint staff meeting of that kind. That would have been a very unusual procedure.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you were asked this question by Justice Roberts at page 231, page 109 our number :

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it that that had not been activated prior to December 7, Colonel?

Referring to your radar.

[13269] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You made the answer :

We did not have Radars. They are still not installed. Making every effort that we can to get them in, sir, and that was the basis of the interceptor command, we felt: Aircraft Warning Service.

You were speaking there, I take it, about the permanent sets, were you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were asked whether or not you had an aerial warning service with sirens in the tower downtown, and so forth. Your answer was that you did not have them until after December 7. Was that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you were asked this question by the chairman at page 234, our number 110 :

Was there any discussion, in view of the possible outbreak of hostilities, of the necessity for working those Radar units 24 hours a day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No discussion of that so far as I know, sir.

Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was not entirely correct. We had discussed that.

[13270] Mr. MURPHY. Well, the chairman then said to you:

Then in spite of the availability of those units your Department depended simply upon the scouting forces of the Navy and such intelligence information as the Navy might otherwise obtain to warn you of any hostile attacks?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would say so, sir.

That is the answer you made in January of 1942, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. Our radar was working only on a training basis.

Mr. MURPHY. You said then on that same page, our page 111:

We had no trained operators. We were exerting every effort we could to train these men. They were all rank amateurs; nobody was a professional on the Radar. We were devoting—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. You considered everybody on radar then as rank amateurs; is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Perhaps that is the wrong adjective, but they were all learning. They were merely going to school. We only had two officers in the Department at that time prior to the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell from the States, who we had sent here to observe—we only had two [13271] officers in the Department that knew anything about it and they were conducting a school. It was purely in the training stage.

Mr. MURPHY. The chairman then asked you:

Well, was it because of that deficiency that you didn't give orders for the Radar equipment to be worked full time, or was it because that expedient didn't occur to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; there was no discussion of that, sir.

Was that a correct answer in January 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is not entirely correct.

Mr. MURPHY. What is it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is not entirely correct. There had been some discussion.

Mr. MURPHY. That is what you told the Roberts Board in January 1942, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

The radar and its operation was under the interceptor commander and also the Department signal officer at that time. He was training these people, and that was his function.

The CHAIRMAN. But inquiry could be made of one or [13272] both those men?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But as I understood your answer that expedient occurred to nobody and was discussed by nobody in the superior command?

Colonel PHILLIPS. So far as I know, sir, that was not discussed. It is possible that the Department Commander took consideration of that. I didn't.

Was that a correct answer in January of 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No; there was discussion. I modify that just the same as I did the one before. There had been some discussion

of it. It was a training matter, I repeat, and it was purely in the training stage.

Mr. MURPHY. You paid no attention to this did you, as chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had a G-3 on the staff that——

Mr. MURPHY. I say you personally paid no attention to it as chief of staff, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; I did. I gave it much attention, but there were many things that I had to pay attention to at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me read that answer again:

So far as I know, sir, that was not discussed. It is possible that the Department Commander took consider- [13273] ation of that. I didn't.

That is pretty plain, clear English, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Colonel PHILLIPS. We felt secure against a raid, particularly with the Fleet here, yes, sir.

In other words, you felt more secure with the fleet in than with the fleet out; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir. It would increase the armament, the antiaircraft guns and all of that.

Mr. MURPHY. You thought that the Japs were more likely to attack Hawaii than to attack the fleet as such, is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we were there to protect the installations when the fleet went in.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you talked about task forces and what you knew.

On page 236, our No. 11, the chairman asked you a question.

The CHAIRMAN. And you didn't know how many forces they had out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I said a while ago, sir, I never knew what the Navy had.

That was your answer in January of 1942, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13274] Mr. MURPHY. Now, you were asked before the Roberts Board as to your conversation with General Marshall and you were asked to go out and prepare some notes as to your recollection of that conversation. Do you remember that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then you subsequently came back later on with some notes as to what the conversation was.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, you talked to General Marshall on the afternoon of December 7 or sometime that day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. On the 8th.

Mr. MURPHY. This is in Washington you mean or Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I talked to him from Hawaii, called him on the scrambler phone.

Mr. MURPHY. General Marshall asked, then, of you, "Did you get a message?" Is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "Did you get my message?"

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. And your answer was what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "What message?"

Mr. MURPHY. And his answer was what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "The message"—I believe, to the best of my recollection—"The message I sent last night or yesterday." I am not sure of the day, whether it was last night [13275] or yesterday, but following that I said, "No, sir; we did not receive that message."

Mr. MURPHY. Now, we have heard a lot of conversation here and testimony about a Lieutenant Burr. As I understand it, he is being blamed for the lack of the Navy not knowing what was going on. He is the one who should have told your liaison officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was liaison officer, a staff officer of Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was your liaison officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Major Fleming was the general's Navy liaison.

Mr. MURPHY. Who else?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had a Colonel Dingman who was in the harbor control post and we also had two officers at one time from G-3 who operated not definitely as liaison but almost continuously in the drawing up of the local defense plan.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you say anything about Major Fleming before the Roberts Board as a liaison officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure what I testified there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, on page 243, our page 174, a question by General McCoy:

And who is the Army officer on duty over there at the District?

[13276] Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Colonel Dingman.

General McCoy. What are their respective duties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe they have ever been given prescribed duties. They are liaison officers.

In other words, they had no particular duties; they were over there to look around and find out what they could; is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our liaison officer is defined in our Army manual, it gives the definite duties, it tells them exactly what they are to do. An Army officer would know what those are.

Mr. MURPHY. Was this question asked of you in January 1942?

What are their respective duties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe they have ever been given prescribed duties.

Did you say that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. "They are liaison officers." That was an interruption in that answer. "They are liaison officers," I stated.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, then, when you were drawing up that standard operating procedure on November 5 did you have any meetings with the Navy since you were planning joint action? Did you have any meetings with the Navy, with Ad- [13277] miral Kimmel's staff, preparatory to bringing it to a completion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter that I am unable to answer. I am sure that the staff who were working on the various sections conferred with the Navy from time to time. I have no personal knowledge of it myself.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 245 of the Roberts Board, our No. 115, you said:

They had not been taken up with the Navy so far as I know, sir.



Was that your answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not officially. It was merely a publication of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General McCoy. Did you furnish the Navy with a copy of this Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say about that, sir. I did not myself.

General McCoy. Did the Navy have a corresponding plan, so far as you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge were the naval commanders advised that you had put Alert No. 1 into operation?

[13278] Colonel PHILLIPS. They were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that what was communicated to the Navy by General Short would be known by General Short and his aide, rather than by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing came to your knowledge with respect to the state of preparedness that the Navy was in view of these warnings?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Was that a correct answer in January 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In regard to the state of preparedness of the Navy?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. May I add there that the Navy—you will find later that the Roberts committee asked me to check on the Navy having received the standing operating procedure.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; and the answer came back that there were 10, yes, and 9 of them were still in the safe, isn't that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In the Navy safe.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In the Navy safe.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; 9 of them were in the Navy safe and [13279] only 1 of them out of the 10 that you gave the Navy. That was the answer, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think it was.

Mr. MURPHY. I believe it was.

Admiral Standley—

you are speaking now about cooperative measures under the standing operating procedure:

Admiral STANDLEY. But wouldn't the normal thing be to have this commanding general and the Commandant of the District discuss such a procedure as that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

Admiral STANDLEY. Prior to putting it into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Prior to its adoption, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether General Short had such a discussion or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

Was that a correct answer in 1942?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot recall just now, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to go with you to the Army Pearl Harbor Board which commences at page 1107 Pearl Harbor Board, our number 2108. General Grunert asked you:

The relation of a Chief of Staff to a Commanding General is that of "right-hand bower", his advisor, his confidential assistant?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

[13280] That is a true description of his duties; is it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is fairly descriptive, sir. There is much more to it than that.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, on page 1116, our No. 2112, General Grunert said the same day:

The same day? But the decision on the sabotage alert was made as a result of the conference on the two messages that I have read?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

In other words, you had the message of the 27th from General Marshall and one from Adams; did you not? Is that the other message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is not correct. No; we did not have any on the sabotage, we did not have any of the sabotage messages at that time. We had the message from General Marshall.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you not testified on three or four occasions that you did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think I have testified there and that was incorrect.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you remember my referring to it in the Roberts Board. I will come to it in the Navy Board. [13281] Now, let me read the exact question, 49.

General GRUNERT. The same day? But the decision on the sabotage alert was made as a result of the conference on the two messages that I have read?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. What can you tell us about the state of mind of the Army and Navy, particularly the higher commanders and staff, as to the probability or possibility or imminence of war?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In my opinion, General, we were all thoroughly alert and fully conscious of the possibility, the Navy as well as the Army. I do not speak for the Navy.

General GRUNERT. Did you expect an attack on Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Did I?

General GRUNERT. Yes. You had better tell me what you expected, and not talk for the rest.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was fully aware of the possibility of such a thing. It struck me as possible.

General GRUNERT. But still you concurred with the decision of the Commanding General as to alerts, that the alert against sabotage was the proper one?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was his decision, sir.

Was that a proper answer in January of 1942?

[13282] Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. That was the commanding general's decision.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course, that is a proper decision and that is why the alert went in.

[13283] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General GRUNERT. But still you concurred with the decision of the Commanding General as to alerts, that the alert against sabotage was the proper one?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was his decision, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I testified here that I concurred fully.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, then, you were questioned at page 1121, our page 2114, as to your training at Leavenworth and as to the proper way to make an estimate of the situation. Do you recall that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. When you make an estimate of the situation, you prepare for the worst, don't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that war was a possibility in Hawaii, but you only prepared for sabotage; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I said war was a possibility, yes, sir; that the worst was a landing.

Mr. MURPHY. The worst was what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The worst was a landing and seizure of the installations by the Japanese. We considered all the enemy possibilities in our estimate of the situation which I presented this morning.

Mr. MURPHY. You considered the worst a landing, but [13284] you prepared for the least; did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were prepared for what the information we had and the other circumstances concerned forced us to decide.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, at Leavenworth you were taught to prepare for the worst and bring that into your estimate; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. If the worst were probable. If it was possible, it was considered in the estimate.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean at Leavenworth they told you only to prepare for what was probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; when you arrive at your decision you must discard the least probable.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, in question 100, on page 1124, our No. 2115, General Frank stated to you:

You stated a minute ago that the normal procedure for a commander in meeting a military situation is to make an estimate of the situation, consider the worst thing that the enemy can do to you, and make your decision to meet it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

General FRANK. Do you feel that that was done in this case?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The worst thing that the enemy could do was certainly considered. That was the possibility [13285] of an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. But that was the worst possible thing that could occur.

General FRANK. You haven't answered my question.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Excuse me, sir. I misunderstood.

General FRANK. Do you consider that steps were taken to meet the worst situation with which the Japs could confront you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am thinking now in retrospect. I am going back from here. That is a very difficulty question to answer, sir. At the time the General made a decision to put in the sabotage alert I thoroughly agreed with it.

General FRANK. You just will not answer that question, will you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't answer it specifically, sir.

General FRANK. Do you mean to tell me that, had Alert No. 3 been in effect, the damage would have been as great as it was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is a matter of assumption. I don't know. I am not in position to say.

General FRANK. You were Chief of Staff, weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

General FRANK. How long would it have taken the planes to have gotten into the air had they been on No. 3 alert?

[13286] Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say as to that. It wouldn't have taken as long as it did take, of course.

I want to know, as chief of staff, how long it would take planes to leave the ground and go into the air.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew at the time but not after a year of combat.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew at the time, yes, sir; but not at the time I was testifying here. I had just flown from Burma when I testified before the Board, with a very few hours intervening.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Question 135, Army Pearl Harbor Board, page No. 1128, and our No. 2117:

General FRANK. Yes; but you did not follow all this Leavenworth teaching that you were talking about here a little while ago, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

General FRANK. Now, did you consider a Jap attack of this nature possible?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. Did you consider it probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not probable.

General FRANK. Why was it not probable?

General PHILLIPS. Due to the distance.

[13287] You considered it possible but not immediately probable.

General FRANK. Did you so advise General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I did not. This is when I first went to Hawaii. I made my decision—I made my estimate of the situation as a G-3 at that time in regard to the possibility of the attack, the probability.

General FRANK. Did you so advise General Short at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I advised him that the attack was possible.

General FRANK. Well, did you advise him that it was not probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

Did you make that answer before the Army Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On Pearl Harbor Army Board, page 1133, and our No. 2119, question No. 157:

General GRUNERT. Was the command war conscious, or peace-minded, or both?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think they were thoroughly war conscious, sir.

General GRUNERT. But you evidently thought war was in the distant future sometime?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Some did, perhaps; I did not.

[13288] Were you asked that question and did you make that answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now the question was asked you at page 1139, our No. 2121:

General FRANK. As a matter of fact, it would have been very easy to have carried on this anti-sabotage activity and, at the same time, have used the anti-aircraft and air force and air warning service on an active alert so as to have been prepared for this air attack, would it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, I am sure that could be done.

Was that a correct answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It could have been done but not comply with the provisions as stated in the Marshall message of the 27th, in not alarming the populace, not showing intent, and so forth.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you say one single word anywhere in your testimony before you came to this room about what you are saying now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In my testimony?

Mr. MURPHY. Anywhere, yes; before you came to this hearing and have been listening to these witnesses.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; I said so when we first went over this message of the 27th.

[13289] Mr. MURPHY. You did? Before what board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not before any board.

Mr. MURPHY. The first time you ever said that was here, wasn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I said it to General Short at the time of the consideration of the message of the 27th.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever say it before the Roberts board, the Army board, or the Navy board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was not asked such thing before the Navy board.

Mr. MURPHY. You did say, at any rate, "Yes; I am sure that could be done" before the Army board; did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And without qualification; isn't that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 1148, our No. 2125:

General GRUNERT. If you were war-minded, where did you think an attack was going to come?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, our mission was to defend Oahu from attack. The attack was coming on Oahu, if it came at all—the possibility.

That is the only place you had to defend, wasn't it, Oahu?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; that was our mission.

[13290] Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General FRANK. Then why in the world did you not prepare for an attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was considered.

General FRANK. What did you think you had? You had some 8-inch guns, and you had some British 75's, and you had a lot of infantry around there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

General FRANK. You had those 8-inch guns and the British 75's, and all your infantry mortars, and the AWS system, and the bombers, and the fighter planes, and your anti-aircraft shore defense batteries—and you think that was all put there against sabotage, do you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. That was for Alert 3, sir.

General FRANK. You say you were war-minded?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. And you had all these facilities to prepare for a war situation, and yet you did not prepare for a war situation, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. Did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we adopted a sabotage alert, sir.

General FRANK. That is not a war situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No.

General FRANK. It is a local sabotage?

[13291] Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Were you asked those question, and did you make those answers to the Army Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 1151 of the Army Board, our number 2126:

Colonel PHILLIPS. I told him of the possibility of an attack.

General FRANK. Yes. Did you present him with an opinion so it was possible for him to agree with you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I gave him no definite opinions.

General FRANK. Yet that was your duty as chief of staff, was it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly; if he desired it.

Were you asked those questions and did you make those answers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 1155, our number 2127, speaking of the radar:

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure about that. That is also in the record. It was operating under the Signal Officer, and with the air, under General Davidson. Now, who gave the instruction I do not know.

[13292] Was that a correct state of affairs?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly. That was a matter of record, as to who issued that order. It could be found in the record. At that time I had nothing available, not even notes of any type. I did not know who issued the orders. It was under General Davidson and Colonel Powell. They were operating there on a training schedule, had been on the 28th, and we know the hours of operation of that.

Mr. MURPHY. At page 1157, our number 2128:

General FRANK. Did you read the Air Estimate prepared by General Martin and Admiral Bellingier?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall. Undoubtedly I did. I can't say definitely.

And you were asked the question on page 1158, our number 2129:

General FRANK. That estimate anticipated an air attack by the Japs exactly along the lines and in the manner in which it happened, and since that was a part of the evidence in the files of the Hawaiian Department, it constituted a recommendation for the defensive action to be taken in a critical situation, did it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, undoubtedly.

General FRANK. Shouldn't you then, as Chief of Staff, have been conscious of it?

[13293] Colonel PHILLIPS. I undoubtedly should have known of it, but I must say again that I cannot recall ever having seen it.

General FRANK. And yet it was one of the outstanding plans, which, if carried out, would have prevented this catastrophe. And you don't remember it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think that I have seen it, sir.

Was that a correct answer before the Army board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was not correct. Today I have refreshed my memory, and I recall that very clearly.

Mr. MURPHY. In 1944 you so swore before the Army board, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Correct. Again I will say I had no opportunity to read the evidence in the Roberts Commission, or fresh my memory on anything that had occurred almost 4 years before.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would just like to refer briefly to your testimony before the Navy court of inquiry, and you say before the Navy court of inquiry you had difficulty remembering most things, did you not, because of your peculiar situation at that time?

Mr. Masten, do you have that page?

You were questioned at page 477 of the Navy board. I [13294] will just go over this briefly. Question 20, page 4710, our number, their number 479:

And naturally, then, you probably do not remember where these guns were placed?

A. I do not.

Do you know now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I know generally. I might say that I have never had access to that record. I have never seen that Navy board record.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice in reply to question 20 you say, "I do not."

In reply to question 24, "I do not recall."

In reply to question 25, "I do not."

In reply to question 26, "I do not."

In reply to question 28, "I cannot say definitely as to that."

In reply to question 31, "I cannot."

In reply to question No. 40, "I have not."

In reply to question 45, "I cannot recall that."

In reply to question 50, "I do not."

In reply to question 49, "I cannot recall."

In reply to question 56, "I cannot."

In reply to question 57, "I don't remember."

Mr. KEEFE. What does that mean?

[13295] Mr. MURPHY. That is in the evidence. I did not want to go into this thing. You can go into it further.

Those answers were in reply to questions where you were asked if you recall—

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would like to see the book. I don't know what they are. I have never seen that evidence at all.

Mr. MURPHY. All right; I will go over it with you, sir.

13. Q. Were there any problems related to the defense of Pearl Harbor that you recall?

A. No. I don't recall any.

That was the question on the discussion that you had with the Navy.

20. Q. And naturally, then, you probably do not remember where these guns were placed?

A. I do not.

22. Q. Do you remember what the official Army name for this type of alert was, by number or anything else?

A. It was alert No. 1, I believe, or No. 3; I am not sure. It was one or the other. The alerts were divided into three; one for sabotage, the second requiring more troops with the idea of increasing the defense for anti-aircraft, and the third was an all-out defense against a landing.

23. Q. Under the condition of Alert No. 1, can you [13296] recall whether that alert required any of your anti-aircraft guns to be manned?

A. I cannot recall right now the details that were in the plan.

24. Q. Do you know whether or not under the condition, Alert No. 1, that gun crews were required to be at their stations continuously?

A. I do not recall.

25. Q. Can you recall whether or not under the condition of Alert No. 1, ammunition had to be at the guns?

A. I do not.

26. Q. Since you have testified that you do not know the positions of the guns that were designated for the defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, and further you do not know where the men were quartered, you probably would not be able to give us any idea of how long it would take to man these guns in the event that a general alarm was given?

A. I could not.

27. Q. Do you have any idea as to the number of mobile guns that were available for antiaircraft fire in the Hawaiian Department just prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I knew at the time, but I have no idea now.

28. Q. Do you know if there was any plan in effect [13297] between 27 November 1941 and 7 December 1941, for coordinating the antiaircraft fire of Army units and Navy units in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I cannot say definitely as to that.

31. Q. Can you recall when the last meeting was held prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I cannot.

Now, then, the question was asked:

39. Q. Are you acquainted with criticism that has been made public through several sources of the lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy before the outbreak of the present war—that is prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I am, generally speaking.

40. Q. Do you have any idea of the source of these rumors or statements?

A. I have not.

41. Q. But in your opinion they are what?

A. Absurd.

Do you think it was right that you, as chief of staff, should know what the Navy was doing?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not understand that question, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did not know what the Navy was doing, did you? You were not at the conferences, were you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was at some conferences—all [13298] conferences held at Fort Shafter I attended.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you at any conference with anyone in the Navy staff before December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; we had conferences before December 7—back before November 28.

Mr. MURPHY. Between November 27 and December 7 were you at a single conference?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I did not attend any conference at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. If you had it to do over again, would you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter that I would have to consider under the circumstances. I was carrying out the directives of General Short. I was General Short's chief of staff, and the way I functioned in my office as chief of staff was in conformity with his directions.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me put it this way: Do you think the way you acted as chief of staff between November 27 and December 7 was a model procedure?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did the best I could.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not think you made a single mistake?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would not say it just like that.

Mr. MURPHY. The Army and Navy were following pretty much a model procedure at Hawaii; is that it?

[13299] Colonel PHILLIPS. That is my opinion.

Mr. MURPHY. What is your opinion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We are human, after all, and certainly have made mistakes, have made wrong decisions, which I stated in my testimony here.

Mr. MURPHY. You say the criticism is absurd. Now what did you mean by that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My answer to that question was it was criticism of failure to cooperate, I think. Isn't that correct? As I see it now, I heard the criticism about—if I may go back—

Mr. MURPHY. The question was: "Are you acquainted with criticism that has been made public through several sources of the lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy before the outbreak of the present war—that is, prior to December 7, 1941?"

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you think it was right that the Navy did not tell you about the destruction of the codes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course, I knew nothing at all about it then.

Mr. MURPHY. I am asking you the question now, sir: Do you think they should have told you?



Colonel PHILLIPS. It would have been of great assistance [13300] to us.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have told you about the destruction of the codes at Hawaii on December 6, the destruction of the system?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That also would have been of assistance.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have told you whether or not they were having task forces out or in?

Colonel PHILLIPS. All of that would have added to our knowledge.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have told you whether they were having reconnaissance or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have told you what kind of an alert they were on?

Colonel PHILLIPS. All that information added up.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think they should have given information to your intelligence officers in sanitized form?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not understand that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, that is the way they gave it—in sanitized form.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know what you mean by that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think it was right for your Air Corps intelligence officer to get material from the Navy, [13301] Captain Layton, and not your General Fielder?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It should have gone, of course, through normal channels right straight back.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, before the naval court of inquiry, question 64, our number 4713 and the Navy number 435. First, your answer to question 63:

My personal estimate was that it was possible but not very probable.

That is talking about the attack on Hawaii.

64. Q. Did your estimate include the form of attack that might be made by the Japanese?

A. An air attack more probably than any.

That is what you told the Navy court, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

65. Q. Would you distinguish whether this air attack was bombing or torpedo, or both?

A. Generally, an air attack including everything concerned therein.

66. Q. Did you receive any further information officially or in your conversations with your Commanding General after the information set out in Exhibit 19 that led you to believe that an attack on the Hawaiian area was more imminent than it had been?

A. We did not.

[13302] In other words, you told the Navy court of inquiry you thought an air attack was more probable than any other kind, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. More probable than a landing attack.

Mr. MURPHY. You said, "more probable than any," did you not? Let me read your words.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

63. Q. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is this: Did you form any estimate of your own based on the information you had on, say, 28 November 1941, as to whether the Japanese would attack any objective in the Hawaiian area?

A. My personal estimate was that it was possible but not very probable.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY (reading further) :

64. Q. Did your estimate include the form of attack that might be made by the Japanese?

A. An air attack more probably than any.

65. Q. Would you distinguish whether this air attack was bombing or torpedo, or both?

A. Generally, an air attack including everything concerned therein.

Did you make that answer before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. More probable than [13303] a landing attack, is what I meant to say.

Mr. MURPHY. You said, "more probably than any", without any qualifications, did not you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

80. Q. Then if it were functioning at that time, your answer is that you do not remember?

A. I do not remember.

That was speaking of the air warning service.

81. Q. Then you probably could not state what the set-up was in this Interceptor Command prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I cannot.

83. Q. You do not remember?

A. I do not remember.

85. Q. Do you know what the scheduled hours for this operation were?

A. I cannot say. I do not remember.

91. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Colonel, is this: Was the flight scheduled, and if it was, do you know the hour that the flight was due to arrive on the Island of Oahu?

A. I do not.

That was speaking of the B-17's.

92. Q. Can you remember, whether between October 1, 1941, and December 7, 1941, any joint Army and Navy drills [13304] were held involving long-range air reconnaissance?

A. I do not remember.

93. Q. Can you recall whether or not there were any drills held between the same period involving Navy fighters and Army pursuit ships?

A. I do not remember.

102. Q. Can you remember how long after you gave the directive for the general alert that it took to man the anti-aircraft guns for the defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not remember.

105. Q. About how long did it take them to get into the air?

A. I do not.

106. Q. Can you state approximately how many pursuit ships did get in the air at that time?

A. I cannot.

107. Q. Do you know whether or not any bombers were able to take the air after the general alert you have described?

A. I do not.

I might say that what I am saying as our numbers are galley-proof numbers, but I have given the question numbers also.

I have no other questions.

[13305] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have been advised that there is present in the room Sergeant Elliott, who, the record discloses, was one of the young men who had the radar first discover the approaching column of Japanese planes on the morning of the attack. Sergeant Elliott is just an observer here, and had no idea of being a witness, but I think the committee should hear his testimony, and I would like to ask the Chairman to invite him to be present at 9:30 in the morning when we reconvene.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be present at 9:30?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have you.

Thank you very much.

Senator Ferguson.

Mr. GEARHART. He is not here at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, do you have personal knowledge as to how you were selected as chief of staff in the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Other than to state what General Short has told me, and also from what General Marshall told me.

Senator FERGUSON. What did General Marshall tell you as [13306] to why you were selected?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Marshall told me after I had arrived here and asked for an appointment with him, and he came down from New York, to discuss with him the proposition of going as Chief of Staff with General Short at Hawaii. I had known General Marshall for 20 years, having served with him in China, having been an instructor under him while he was assistant commandant at the infantry school. He made a number of efficiency reports on me and knew me quite well.

I asked him about the set-up. I was entirely satisfied in my position at that time as G-3 of the First Division, but General Marshall replied something in these words: He spoke very freely. He said, "General Short has asked me to approve your going to Hawaii as his Chief of Staff and," he said, "I approve it and am convinced that you are thoroughly qualified. I want you to go out to Hawaii, and raise the training standards of the Hawaiian Garrison up to that of the First Division, as we now have it here in America."

When I first went to see General Marshall I felt that perhaps I was doing the wrong thing in accepting the offer to go to Hawaii, but on leaving his office I was convinced that I was doing the right thing. As a matter of fact, he practically directed me.

[13307] I caught the regular Army transport going out about the middle of February, which was arriving in Hawaii on March 1, about 6 weeks after General Short had arrived.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do I understand then that the approval of the Chief of Staff is necessary in order that a commander may select a chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. It was that way at that time. I was made chief of staff in the Hawaiian Department by War Department orders, by an arrangement through General Short with the Chief of Staff, and I did not become chief of staff until the War Department

issued those orders, which were effective on the departure of Colonel Hayes.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated that General Short also made a statement as to why you were selected. Will you give us such statement?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure what General Short's reasons were for my selection.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking for your personal knowledge.

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short was also a very old acquaintance. He had been my commander here in the War Department in 1920-21, and he stated that he wanted me to come out to be his chief of staff. That, normally, to an Army officer, is quite sufficient. A man is not selecting [13308] someone for his chief of staff for whom he does not have respect and in whom he cannot trust and feel he is a loyal subordinate.

Senator FERGUSON. How many hours after you received the message of the 27th did you put the sabotage alert on, or was the sabotage alert put into effect, if it was hours?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was, I should say, not an hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Now could you sum up the reasons for putting the sabotage alert into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The reasons for putting the sabotage alert into effect were brought out in my estimate of the situation from notes which I read this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel then that your reasons have been stated and summed up?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right. I haven't anything in addition.

Senator FERGUSON. You have nothing in addition to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was Colonel Bicknell present when the alert was determined upon?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Colonel Bicknell was not.

Senator FERGUSON. How is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was not.

Senator FERGUSON. He was not?

[13309] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know if he was notified about the kind of alert that was put into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. It was common knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. How?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was common knowledge throughout the entire staff in a very short time. We were, of course, limited by the directive in the message of the 27th and required to limit the dissemination of this information to the fewest possible officers. Colonel Bicknell, I am sure, learned of the alert on the 27th, or most certainly by early on the 28th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you ever have any conversations with Colonel Bicknell between that time and the time of the attack, as to the kind of an alert you were on?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I never did. So far as I know, Colonel Bicknell made no recommendations as to anything of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversations with him at all, whether it was on the kind of an alert or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any knowledge, as far as Bicknell or Mayfield are concerned, as to the burning of any code books or code papers?

[13310] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; I heard nothing about the burning of any codes. Colonel Bicknell brought up to the staff conference on the morning of the 6th the burning of papers by the local Japanese consul. I was also told on—well, I am not sure when it was, perhaps that was later on the morning of the attack—I wish to correct my statement about Bicknell's Mori message that he had taken up with General Short and Colonel Fielder. I did not hear about that until the next day, I believe. That was the night of the 6th. I made a statement that I had heard nothing from Bicknell. That is wrong to that extent.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course you had no knowledge as to what the people in Washington were talking about, or thinking about, when they prepared, or at the time they were preparing the message that was sent on the 27th, signed by General Marshall.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever seen Exhibit 45?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that I have.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you Exhibit 45, which is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, subject: "Far Eastern Situation, signed by "L. T. Gerow."

(The document was handed to Colonel Phillips.)

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I have never seen that before.

[13311] Senator FERGUSON. So you had never learned later as to what may have been in the minds of the people here in Washington when that message was sent?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you have been asked questions in relation to why General Short's reply to the message of General Marshall was not the same or similar to that of the Panama Command.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that General Miles, on the 5th of December, after the message had been sent to Panama, sent a wire to the effect—at least prepared it on the 5th—to this effect and in these words:

Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Signed, "Miles".

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have never heard of that message until this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that they were not satisfied with the reply of the Panama Command, would it not, and they were cautioning him that they would tell him if and when relations, that is, severance of the diplomatic relations, was imminent?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That could be so interpreted; yes, sir.

[13312] Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any word in any way as to the interpretation of the reply?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not, except an interpretation that a message by General Adams on the 28th, which General Short felt was in reply to his message of the 27th; is a sabotage alert, and he

felt that in sending that message the War Department had asked further details as to exactly what he was doing. The result was that his reply was very full, I think, extremely lengthy. That, with the exception of a similar message from General Arnold, was the last—that is on the 28th—was the last information we received in regard to the situation until after the attack, about 3:30 on the 7th, when we got General Marshall's message.

[13313] Senator FERGUSON. How do you account, Colonel, for the fact that little attention was paid to the Intelligence Branch of the Army? Wasn't the Intelligence to tell you if a war was going to occur?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. And when it was going to occur and where the attack would be and the strength of the attacking force?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Certainly we must have that information of the enemy before you can arrive at any reasonable decision or issue any sensible order.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you feel that the intelligence system was at all at fault in the fact that we were attacked, and didn't know that they were coming?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I have been astounded at the amount of intelligence I find that has been available since I have been listening at this hearing, and that we didn't get.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that apply to what you had on the island as well as what you had at Washington?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; we thought that we were getting all that was applicable to the Army from the Navy on the island. Locally—we had no source of intelligence, if I may go back a little bit—we had no sources of [13314] intelligence other than the War Department and the Navy. Locally our stuff was subversive and on spies, small, little stuff, that really didn't fit into the big picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this what happened at Hawaii that your intelligence branch had devoted itself to sabotage and had neglected the big question of whether or not a war was going to occur, when it was going to occur, where it was going to occur, and the strength of the enemy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think they had any information to base those things on. We had no sources, just as I said, except the War Department and the Navy. We had no sources of our own. We were entirely dependent on those two sources for our information.

Senator FERGUSON. You agree now, after hearing and reading the testimony, that probably the Japanese knew more about what the Army and the Navy were doing than the high commanding officers did, as far as Hawaii was concerned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Than the commanding officers knew about the Japanese, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. No; knew about their own.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, that might be.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that they were going to shut off the radar at 7 o'clock in the morning, Sunday morning?

[13315] Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes; that was the end of the training day.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Four to seven.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be the exact time, Colonel, wouldn't it, if you were going to have an early morning raid they would come in on the sun?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I didn't know—I will correct that—I didn't know on Sunday morning of the 7th that that radar was being cut off particularly at that time and everybody was quitting. Our normal was from 4 to 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, if you had an alert intelligence branch, why would you have had a normal day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The radar, of course, was in its pioneer stage. It was a new thing. We had very few who were capable of operating it.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an instrument of intelligence, was it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an arm that would extend out at least one-hundred-and-some miles to ascertain if there was any danger within this realm?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, why was that neglected? Why [13316] did you not have that alerted? That arm?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Powell is to be a witness here and he can give you more information on that. He is a better witness than I am.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am getting at is that you were the chief of staff and, apparently, the Japanese Fleet knew more than you knew about that arm of intelligence, and I am wondering how, as chief of staff, you didn't know that that arm of intelligence was not working that morning.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, Senator, we were on a training schedule entirely during that period. We were operating each day from 4 to 7 with our Opana station, our mobile station, and we had five others that were operating part of the time.

We had an information center that was also functioning in a training way. We had but two officers on the island that knew anything about a filter center or an information center and the radar. That is, prior to the 3d of December.

On the 3d, General Davidson and General Powell returned from the States having observed an exercise, I believe in the Northwest. They were just in the process of taking over our whole radar set-up and re-organizing the thing to get it functioning as we really should.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, on Sunday morning, at the [13317] break of day, war was coming over the horizon from the north?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. Here you were as chief of staff in a training state. Is it that you were not prepared for war?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our radar was not complete by any manner of means; it was just in the initial stage. We didn't have sufficient operators. We didn't have sufficient officers who knew the whole story on the radar by any manner of means.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we come to the conclusion that you, as far as the chief of staff was concerned, were blind and deaf, as far as that is concerned, that war was coming that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not expect an attack on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Nobody expected an attack on Hawaii, did they?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I haven't found anybody that expected an attack, everybody was surprised that the attack came on the morning of the 7th of December.

[13318] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were utterly surprised out there, weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Entirely.

Mr. KEEFE. So am I to conclude that in the face of all the war warnings that were sent and all the messages that were sent, and which you did have information about, Colonel, that pointed to the fact that war was imminent, with Japan, as far as you people were concerned, liable to take place at any minute, you all felt that it was going to take place some place else, down in the Far East; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; because every bit of information that we had pointed in that general direction, the Kra Peninsula, Borneo, the Philippines.

Mr. KEEFE. Thus, you continued the program for which you were sent out there, as I understand it and that was this training program?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Intensive training. A unit is no good unless it is trained. It is just like a weapon. You have to have ammunition. We were doing everything we could to get that training completed so that we would have an efficient weapon when we needed it.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, was there ever any talk or discussion [13319] among the officers out there as to the possibility of an attack on Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes; many, many discussions.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, they must have resulted in the feeling of security and that there wasn't any attack probable.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we felt that there was not a probability of an attack at all. It was a possible one, but not probable.

We certainly expected to get further information if there was anything of that kind coming along.

Mr. KEEFE. There were newspapers published out there and which you read?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Newspapers were published, of course, but oftentimes the newspaper reports are based on very little. But we had our intelligence people operating and we, of course, expected to get any and all information from the War Department or from the Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you read the newspapers that were published out there in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I have finished reading the file of those newspapers, and have been reading the files of the newspapers here in the United States. It is a most astonishing thing. This committee ought to have some of those files [13320] brought in and put into this record to show the current information that was being given day by day, as it appeared not only in the press in Hawaii, but appeared in the press here in the United States.

Astounding information as to what the probabilities were.

Now, there must have been somebody out there that had some idea that Hawaii was liable to be attacked, when the newspapers carried screaming headlines. Did you see those?



Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall just now. We read all of the papers, of course, available.

Mr. KEEFE. In any event, you were attacked, and you were caught flatfooted, and you weren't ready for it; that is the truth, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; made a mistake in our decision; our estimate of the situation was wrong.

Mr. KEEFE. I have been wondering whether this old Army and Navy line of command business that you fellows adhere to so meticulously has anything to do with that matter.

Now, here you get this war warning message of the 27th and General Short replies, tells them that he is alerted against sabotage and nobody at Washington here, apparently, paid any attention to his reply.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[13321] Mr. KEEFE. Then, that same afternoon you get a message from General Miles, Chief of G-2, cautioning about sabotage and espionage.

Then the next day he gets a wire from Adams, from the chief of staff, a long wire, telling him entirely about sabotage and espionage, and General Short makes a long reply and says what he has done as to sabotage and espionage.

Then that same day he gets a long wire from the Chief of the Air Corps, General Arnold, telling them to look out for sabotage of the airplanes, look out for espionage, and he replies again to that.

Still you fellows sat out there thinking that you were doing the right thing, and on the 7th, the Japs hit and everybody is surprised, including the people here in Washington.

All I have got to say, Mr. Chairman, is that you have put a pretty tough proposition up to this committee, so far as I am concerned.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, I want to ask you one or two questions.

You said the Navy had a liaison officer, but you didn't say that the Army had one out there. Did you or not have one?

[13322] Colonel PHILLIPS. In the Navy headquarters, the Navy had a liaison officer who had a desk in the G-3 office of Army headquarters, Lieutenant Burr, and when I was G-3, I asked Admiral Bloch's headquarters that he be sent over and he was.

The Army had nobody that compared with Lieutenant Burr in the Navy headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the liaison was sort of a one-way street; it was carried on by the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. From the Army to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nobody whom you sent over to the Navy headquarters to bring back information to you or to take information to the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Burr worked in both capacities.

The CHAIRMAN. You got no information from the Navy except when he came over?

Colonel PHILLIPS. When he arrived every morning he came directly from the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. If you got any information that the Navy ought to have, you didn't send it over until Burr came along and picked it up?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was just a matter of a few minutes, perhaps 20 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. How often did he make the rounds?

[13323] Colonel PHILLIPS. Whenever he felt it necessary. He made two trips a day, I should say, a trip in the morning and one in the afternoon normally, whether there was anything or not.

The CHAIRMAN. If you got information that the Navy ought to have, he wouldn't know about that until he came over?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We would send it. Major Fleming was the Navy liaison officer. We also had Colonel Dingman, who was in the harbor control boat working over at the Navy. He was there, and they were coming and going all the time. That is, from the Army to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you said that you saw the message of the 24th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In which it was stated that a sudden surprise attack might be made in any direction?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Including Guam and the Philippines?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You interpreted that neither to exclude nor include Hawaii; is that true?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The distance was considered in that by General Short, and we discussed that fully. They said [13324] "in any direction" but the distance from Japan to Hawaii was what ruled that out.

The CHAIRMAN. You decided that the distance was too great from Japan to Hawaii to enable them to make a surprise attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And thereby the Japanese surprised you; you didn't stop to consider that they would come that far from their home base?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right. The Navy didn't think they could, either. The Navy advised us to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Japanese thought they could and did?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when you were receiving information about the sudden attack, the surprise attack in any direction, what did you think about that surprise with relation to Hawaii? Why did you think the Navy Department had sent these messages to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and the War Department had sent them to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, merely to inform them of the situation; chiefly in the Philippines and Guam; and that war was perhaps imminent.

The CHAIRMAN. These were direct messages to Hawaii. [13325] They were not just for information?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When they said that, whether it was the Army or Navy, Chief of the Navy in this case, that a sudden surprise attack might take place in any direction, mentioning Guam and the Philippines, they merely emphasized the possibility of greater possibility or greater probability at Guam and the Philippines, but it did not eliminate Hawaii because "all directions" includes 360° around, doesn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Notwithstanding that, the War and Navy Departments here in Washington thought that it was important enough to give you this information, and when I say "you" I mean General Short and Admiral Kimmel and our set-up out there, you, in reaching your conclusions, and I am talking about all of you, decided that the War Department and the Navy Department here were wrong, because Hawaii was so far from Japan that they couldn't reach them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you concluded that the War and Navy Departments here were all wrong about even warning you about an attack at Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We didn't think they had warned us [13326] about an attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. "Any direction" would include them, and merely to mention two other places wouldn't exclude them, would it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, not entirely, no sir, but "in any direction" including Guam and the Philippines, we immediately went right straight on down to Borneo and the Kra Peninsula and the China coast.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in the message that General Marshall sent to General Short in which he set out the diplomatic situation between Japan and the United States, and then he gave directions, he didn't make a request; he didn't say, "Will you please do this." he directed General Short to institute reconnaissance—you know the difference and General Short knew the difference between reconnaissance and sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there wasn't any trouble about that. He didn't tell you—he didn't send you a message about sabotage. He didn't direct you to institute an investigation about sabotage. His direct instructions were to institute reconnaissance; isn't that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He must have known that your frontier [13327] war defense plan, whatever it is called, was not in effect, had not been invoked, because he was in touch with every situation, wasn't he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That would have been implemented; it could have been implemented.

The CHAIRMAN. If he knew that the plan under which it was the exclusive duty of the Navy to indulge in distant reconnaissance had not been invoked, why do you think he instructed General Short to institute reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was the great question in General Short's mind at that time, when he got that message to institute reconnaissance, because the distant reconnaissance as General Short understood the Chief of Staff knew was the mission of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. But not at that time, because the plan under which it was the mission of the Navy hadn't been put into effect; isn't that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct. It hadn't been implemented by Washington, but, of course, we had no means of making the distant reconnaissance unless the Navy took it over.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, the Army couldn't fall back on the alibi that the Navy wasn't doing it because it wouldn't be its job until this plan had been invoked?

[13328] Colonel PHILLIPS. Had been implemented at that time; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in replying to General Marshall did you and General Short collaborate in reply? Did you confer about what would be the answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You decided then that you would send this brief reply that you had alerted against sabotage and that you had liaison with the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By which you meant that the Navy had liaison with you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, it is a two-way road.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be but it was a one-way horse, apparently; it was not an entire chain of liaison officers, if you depended altogether on the Navy to do the liaison work. Did it occur to you or to General Short that if there was any misunderstanding about what General Marshall meant, that you could wire and ask what he meant to clear up any misunderstanding?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The normal procedure is that after an order is issued by a superior headquarters and there is any question about it being carried out in the way the superior desires, there is a check made by the superior.

[13329] We thought and of course General Short—I say, “we” which is General Short—General Short thought that when he received the message from General Adams on the 28th, first receiving General Miles' message, he knew that couldn't have come out before his reply got back to Washington, but the Adams message could, and he assumed that that was a reply to his alert for sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. General Short had replied to General Marshall before the Miles message, or the Adams message got to Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you or General Short think that a reply saying he was alerted for sabotage was in response to a direct instruction to institute reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was General Short's idea, sir. I concurred.

The CHAIRMAN. He thought then, if I understand you, that an alert against sabotage was carrying out the order of General Marshall to institute reconnaissance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He thought that General Marshall understood, General Marshall knew that the Navy was responsible for reconnaissance.

The CHAIRMAN. He also knew that General Marshall would know that the Navy was not responsible for reconnaissance until this plan had been put into effect, and which had [13330] not been put into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He concluded that General Marshall didn't know what he was talking about, did he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say as to that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Thank you.

(The witness was excused.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will direct the reporter to note the exhibit No. 153 on the Hawaiian exhibit.

(The document was marked previously as "Exhibit No. 153.")

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, we will call Mr. Sonnett.

The CHAIRMAN. Come around.

# TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SONNETT, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Sonnett, will you state your full name for the record?

Mr. SONNETT. John F. Sonnett; S-o-n-n-e-t-t.

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is your official position at the present time?

Mr. SONNETT. I am Assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge of the Claims Division of the Department of Justice.

[13331] Mr. KAUFMAN. And prior to your becoming Assistant Attorney General, were you in the Navy?

Mr. SONNETT. I was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what was your rank?

Mr. SONNETT. While I was on active duty I was a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And was there a time when you acted as counsel to Admiral Hewitt in connection with the so-called Hewitt investigation?

Mr. SONNETT. There was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when was that?

Mr. SONNETT. I acted as counsel for Admiral Hewitt in the spring of last year, running until about July.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And what were your functions in connection with the investigation conducted by Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. SONNETT. My functions were to investigate all prior investigations conducted by the Navy to recommend to the Admiral those subjects requiring further investigation, to interrogate witnesses and generally assemble documentary evidence in order that I might present to him such information as was deemed necessary to carry out the further investigation directed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. During the course of that inquiry did you have occasion to interview Captain Safford?

[13332] Mr. SONNETT. I did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And when was that, Mr. Sonnett?

Mr. SONNETT. I am sorry, I am not able to fix the exact date. It was sometime in the spring of 1945.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Safford, in his testimony here at page 9696:

It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieutenant Commander Sonnett that he was acting as a "counsel for the defense" for the late Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer.

Have you any comment to make with respect to that?

Mr. SONNETT. Only that my instructions from the Secretary of the Navy were to get all of the facts, no matter where we could find them,

without regard to any special interest that any particular individual might have.

Concerning Secretary Knox, I might say I never had the pleasure of meeting him, nor to the best of my recollection, have I ever met Admiral Stark.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Safford testified further on page 9697 of the record here:

I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May, 1945, and the third time a day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to persuade me [13333] that there had been no "winds execute" message, that my memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the "false winds message" with what I had been expecting and that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair.

In some cases the idea was stated outright. In some cases it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view.

Now, will you tell the committee, Mr. Sonnett, as nearly as you can, the substance of your talks with Captain Safford, and directing your attention particularly to any attempt by you to persuade Captain Safford to change any testimony that he had previously given?

Mr. SONNETT. In the first place, there was no such attempt at any time with respect to Captain Safford, or any other witness.

My instructions were to get the facts and nothing but the facts.

That is what I endeavored to do.

Any statement that I tried to get Captain Safford to change his testimony or any other witness to change his testimony is not true.

My experience with Captain Safford during the first several times I met him was that he produced at my request [13334] a memorandum in which he discussed the so-called winds message.

In that memorandum, in words or substance, at one point he said:

They have been accusing me of having hallucinations.

He implied that people, without identifying them, had regarded him as being of unsound mind.

I called him down after reading that memorandum—

Mr. KAUFMAN. When you say you called him down, you mean you called him to talk with him?

Mr. SONNETT. I called him on the telephone and asked him to come down so we could discuss it.

We discussed the memorandum. I held it for several days and discussed it with my assistant at the time, and then in a conversation with him subsequently. I said, "Captain Safford, I think for your own good, as a matter of your own personal welfare and just as a personal and friendly suggestion, I think you should withdraw this memorandum in which you state, in a formal Navy record, that people have been casting doubts on your sanity."

I told him that so far as I knew no one had ever cast any doubt on his sanity, that he was entitled to his opinion as to what the facts were, that all we wanted was his best recollection of the facts.

[13335] I told him that it didn't make any difference whether his recollection differed from someone else's, that what we wanted were facts and just facts.

I said, however, that his denial of the charge, in substance, was a denial of a charge that he was crazy. In a formal naval document it

seemed to me to put him in a very difficult position. I told him that I would forward his memorandum to Admiral Hewitt, if he wanted me to, but that as a personal matter, I didn't think it was good for him.

I told him that he would have the opportunity to testify fully concerning his recollection of the winds message.

Captain Safford withdrew the memorandum in question. He subsequently had the opportunity to testify fully concerning the winds message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did he testify fully before Admiral Hewitt regarding his version of the so-called winds message?

Mr. SONNETT. He did, Mr. Kaufman.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, Mr. Sonnett, I show you Exhibit 153 produced by Captain Safford, and ask you to pick out that portion of the memorandum that he gave you in which he refers to people charging him with having hallucinations.

Mr. SONNETT. In the memorandum dated May 14, 1945, for me by Captain Safford, which is a part of this exhibit—

[13336] Mr. KAUFMAN. Part of Exhibit 151.

Mr. SONNETT. At paragraph 9, Captain Safford stated—and it was this paragraph that led me to suggest after my talk with him—that in his own best interest he should withdraw the memorandum:

There is one final place where written confirmation of the Winds "execute" message may exist—the record of proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the winds "execute" did not slip into the record.

First they said I didn't know what was going on around me: Now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity as well as my intelligence and my veracity.

It seemed to me that the least duty I owed to a fellow naval officer who was denying an accusation of that type in a memorandum, which accusation I had never heard from anybody in the Navy, was to give him an opportunity to withdraw it.

I did give him that opportunity and he did withdraw it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you never saw it, he took that memorandum with him?

[13337] Mr. SONNETT. He did, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. He produced that memorandum here and it has been offered in evidence as part of Exhibit 115.

You just testified, Mr. Sonnett, that you were assisted in that proceeding?

Mr. SONNETT. I was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Who was your assistant?

Mr. SONNETT. Lt. Commdr. John Ford Baecher, who has been the naval liaison with this committee.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was he present at all of the meetings that you had with Captain Safford?

Mr. SONNETT. He was, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you at any time, in words or in substance, request Captain Safford to change his testimony?

Mr. SONNETT. I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did he testify fully before Admiral Hewitt?

Mr. SONNETT. He did.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I have none. Mr. Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark?

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

[13338] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Sonnett, Captain Safford before us, quoting Admiral Hart, said something to the effect that he misled him; second, he said he was not permitted to testify before the Roberts Board; third, he said he condemned, by gossip, General Marshall; fourth, he said there was a frame-up in the Chief of Naval Operations Office in 1941; fifth, he said the Chief of Naval Operations could not be trusted in 1944; sixth, he said there was some evidence of a conspiracy in the Army and Navy; seven, he talked of the destruction of records; eight, he gave some evidence of violation of security regulations; nine, he talked about falsification of records; ten, he talked about, apparently with some sinister implications, destruction of intercepting records at radio stations; eleven, he changed his own statement as to Pearl Harbor; twelve, he changed somewhat his statement as to the ability to receive messages in England; thirteen, he changed his testimony in some other particulars; and fourteenth, he charged you with subornation of perjury.

You say you did no such thing?

Mr. SONNETT. I cannot emphasize too much that Captain Safford had every opportunity to tell his story to Admiral Hewitt and to myself.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you received some citations for your service in the Navy?

[13339] Mr. SONNETT. I have, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What were they?

Mr. SONNETT. I received a citation from Secretary Forrestal for outstanding service as his special assistant. I also received a commendation from Admiral Hewitt at the completion of the Pearl Harbor investigation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I have a copy of them, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. You are a member of the bar of what State?

Mr. SONNETT. Member of the bar of the State of New York, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And have been practicing for how long?

Mr. SONNETT. Approximately 10 years.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you admitted to the bar of the United States Supreme Court?

Mr. SONNETT. I am not, sir, but I have appeared in the various Federal courts except that Court.

Mr. MURPHY. And have been rendering service for the Attorney General of the United States since you left the service of the United States Navy?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. It is apparent that I can't finish this evening.

[13340] The CHAIRMAN. We will recess then until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee recessed until 9:30 a. m. of the following day, Wednesday, February 20, 1946.)



[13341]

## PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:30 a. m., in the caucus room (318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[13342] The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the committee this morning several additional documents, which we would like to mark as exhibits.

The first is the yellow folder entitled "Correspondence between General Arnold and General Martin."

I believe some of this is already in evidence, but this is a complete compilation, as I understand it, of the correspondence between those two generals.

We would like to have that marked as "Exhibit 154."

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 154.")

Mr. MASTEN. Throughout the transcript there are various letters and dispatches on the subject of basing additional aircraft at Wake and Midway.

We have one additional letter, which is dated November 10, 1941, and signed by Admiral Kimmel, which we would like to have spread in the transcript at this point inasmuch as there is no exhibit on that general subject.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The letter of November 10, 1941, follows:)

[13343]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
L24/VZ/(95)  
Serial 01825

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., November 10, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet,  
To: Commander Aircraft, Battle Force  
Commander Patrol Wing TWO

Subject: Naval Air Station Wake and Naval Air Station Midway—Basing of Aircraft at.

1. In order to be able to meet emergency requirements for basing of aircraft at Wake and Midway, while minimizing logistic demands of those places for the present, the commander in chief desires that the following action be taken immediately.

(a) Make preparations at Wake for basing:

(1) 12 patrol planes.

(2) 12 Marine scout bombers or 12 Marine fighters.

(b) Make preparations at Midway for basing:

(1) 12 additional patrol planes (total 24).

(2) 18 Marine scout bombers of 18 Marine fighters.

2. These preparations shall include the following provisions and assumptions:

(a) When the aircraft movements are ordered, it [13344] shall be necessary only to fly the patrol planes and landplanes (from a carrier in the latter case) to the designated places and it shall be practicable to operate on arrival without attendant transportation of material or personnel by ship.

(b) It shall be practicable to continue operations on this basis for a period of six weeks, at the end of which time relief may be expected, either by air exchange of planes and flight crews or by provision of additional support transported by ship, or by combination of the two.

(c) Preparations shall, accordingly, include transportation to Wake and Midway of—

(1) Necessary tools, spares and equipment for minor repairs, adjustments and checks.

(2) Necessary minimum number of ground personnel to meet the requirements of subparagraph 2 (b) above, assuming the full availability of Naval Air Station personnel and Marine defense personnel already present for non-technical manpower assistance.

(3) Necessary additional bombs, with necessary additional bomb handling equipment. (Note: With delivery of the 48 1,000 lb. bombs approved for the patrol planes at Wake the bomb situation for patrol planes will be satisfactory at both Wake [13345] and Midway. The following additional bombs are needed for the Marine planes; Wake, 12 1,000 lb., 24 500 lb.; Midway, 18 1,000 lb., 36 500 lb., 150 100 lb. bombs each, of those already available at Wake and Midway, should be designated for the Marine planes. Aircraft machine gun ammunition already at Wake and Midway is sufficient).

(d) Patrol plane personnel at Wake shall base and subsist in excess accommodations available in Contractor's Camp No. 2 near the air station site. Patrol plane personnel at Midway shall base and subsist at the Naval Air Station with additional accommodations, if and as necessary, to be provided by the use of Contractor's space.

(e) Marine squadron personnel at Wake shall base and subsist adjacent to the landplane runways. Marine squadron personnel at Midway shall base and subsist on Eastern Island. At both places it is necessary to set up a suitable tent camp. The assistance of Marine defense personnel shall be used to accomplish this.

(f) Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall provide, by patrol plane tender, the necessary personnel and material transportation for both patrol plane and Marine aircraft preparations.

3. By copy of this letter the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is directed to take immediate steps to:

[13346] (a) Make available the 48 1,000 lb. bombs still due for patrol planes at Wake and the additional bombs for the Marine planes (paragraph 2 (c) (3) above).

(b) Provide for necessary storage of bombs and ammunition for Marine land-planes adjacent to landplane runways at Wake and Midway.

(c) Make available the Contractor's accommodations needed for patrol squadron personnel at Wake and Midway.

(d) Cover the bulk subsistence and potable water requirements of the personnel of the foregoing preparatory parties and anticipate the additional requirements resulting from actual aircraft basing.

(e) Expedite expansion of tank storage of aviation gasoline at Wake and anticipate the aviation gasoline and lubricating oil requirements at both Wake and Midway resulting from actual aircraft basing.

(f) Provide lumber needed for the tent camps of Marine aircraft personnel at Wake and Midway.

(g) Make available the needed assistance from Naval Air Station and Marine defense personnel for camp construction and, on arrival of aircraft, for aircraft operations.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

Combatfor

[13347] Comscofor

Combasefor

Comairscofor

Com-14

Nad, Oahu

C. O. Marine Air Group 21

/s/ P. C. Crosley,

/t/ P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

Received S-C FILES, Room 2055, Nov. 26, 1941. Route to: 38. Op File No. (SC)A43/V2. Doc. No. 38467. Copy No. 1 of 2. PRN 711.

[13348] Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 117 contains various correspondence relating to the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. That correspondence is in addition to other material which appears in the transcript or exhibits at various places.

We would like to add to Exhibit 117, as 117-A, the letter entitled "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," which is dated 17 February 1941, and signed by General Short.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit 117-A.")

Mr. MASTEN. Finally, we would like to add to Exhibit 123, which contains correspondence relating to joint operations centers on Oahu, the correspondence which was distributed to the committee this morning, and the first letter of which is dated January 10, 1942, from the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans, Admiral Turner, to the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

We would like to add that to Exhibit 123, as 123-A.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit 123-A.")

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Sonnett.

## [13349] TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SONNETT (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, I believe you were to examine. Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT, what is your present occupation?

Mr. SONNETT. I am an Assistant Attorney General of the United States and in charge of the so-called Claims or General Civil Division of the Department of Justice.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to the Department of Justice at the time you left the Navy?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had spent all of your service in the Navy in the Secretary's office?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that there was to be a new investigation under Admiral Hewitt?

Mr. SONNETT. Approximately in November of 1944, that there was to be a new investigation. The selection of Admiral Hewitt by the Secretary as the investigating, or hearing officer, came later.

Senator FERGUSON. About when did it come?

Mr. SONNETT. Sometime in the spring of 1945. I am unable to give you the exact date.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it in May?

[13350] Mr. SONNETT. It may have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you conduct a personal investigation between November and May?

Mr. SONNETT. To the extent, Senator, of reviewing all prior Navy investigations to determine what subjects had not adequately been covered by the previous investigations.

Senator FERGUSON. You were familiar with the report of the Navy Board?

Mr. SONNETT. I was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And didn't it recommend that no further proceedings be taken? Wasn't the last recommendation:

The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter, the court having finished the inquiry.

Then:

At 4 p. m. Thursday, October 19, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

Did you know that?

Mr. SONNETT. I am sure I did, Senator. I read the report at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, can you give us just what led up to the new investigation after the Board had recommended that no further proceedings be had in the matter?

Mr. SONNETT. The customary practice, Senator, under [13351] Naval regulations is that reports by courts of inquiry are advisory only to the convening authority.

The convening authority was the Secretary of the Navy.

In accordance with the usual practice under Navy regulations, he caused a review to be made of the proceedings of the court of inquiry. That review, in which I participated, led to the further investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did the actual reviewing of the testimony and the report?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, that was done by several people. It was done by myself, it was done by then Major Mathias F. Correa, who was a special assistant to the Secretary also, and it was done by the Secretary himself. How much of the actual record he read I am unable to state. I know that he read some of it.

[13352] Senator FERGUSON. Who was in charge of the review?

Mr. SONNETT. The Secretary of the Navy, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the Secretary of the Navy had many other things to do?

Mr. SONNETT. He did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't he designate you as the one in charge of review to get his report out?

Mr. SONNETT. I don't mean to argue, Senator, but I don't think I was in charge of the review. I assisted the Secretary in his review.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Mr. Baecher have to do with the review?

Mr. SONNETT. Mr. Baecher was selected by me as an assistant, Senator, in the spring of 1945, when it became apparent that further investigation was necessary. He reviewed documents, participated with me in the preliminary examination of prospective witnesses, and later participated throughout as assistant counsel during the Hewitt investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your duties as counsel for Admiral Hewitt?

Mr. SONNETT. To explore the documentary evidence, to investigate in a preliminary fashion by taking statements of witnesses, to make recommendations to the admiral as to the witnesses to be interrogated by him, and to put questions to [13353] witnesses during the course of the hearings, to assist in the preparation of the final report, and to give the Admiral any assistance I could generally.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been in the Navy at that time how long?

Mr. SONNETT. I went—that requires a little explanation, Senator. I went to the Navy in the fall of 1943 as a civilian special counsel. I worked in that capacity until January of 1944 when, at the request of then Under Secretary Forrestal, I applied for a commission and was commissioned. I was on active duty from January of 1944 until May of 1945. I then was appointed a civilian special assistant at the Secretary's suggestion, and continued in that capacity until approximately the end of August of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, in order that you might assist Admiral Hewitt, it was necessary for you to know what was to be developed or what your purpose was in conducting a further inquiry, was it not?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the purpose of the further inquiry?

Mr. SONNETT. To obtain all of the facts which had not adequately been obtained before, either by reinterrogation of previous witnesses, or, in addition, by the interrogation [13354] of other witnesses who had been in combat before and not available.

Senator FERGUSON. If a witness had fully testified before the Board, did you interrogate him if his testimony conflicted with someone else's?

Mr. SONNETT. Not unless there was some ambiguity or uncertainty in his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any uncertainty in Captain Safford's testimony?

Mr. SONNETT. There was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

Mr. SONNETT. The uncertainty consisted primarily, as I recall, in the fact that Captain Safford had told varying stories, in the sense of the date when he thought he saw the winds execute message, the names of other people whom he said also saw that winds message. I am unable at the moment to recall any of the other conflicts in his statements, but there were such.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any conflict in Admiral Stark's testimony?

Mr. SONNETT. It was my personal opinion, Senator, that the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark both had been fully stated in the naval court of inquiry and I was unable to see any item on which further investigation was [13355] required in order to obtain their full statements.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Admiral Hewitt review the evidence so that he knew of these conflicts?

Mr. SONNETT. He did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any so-called leads prepared?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, the scope of the further investigation, Senator, was decided by Admiral Hewitt in the form of his own view, and then presented in formal fashion to the Secretary of the Navy for his approval of the further investigation. I can get that for you. Commander Baccher has produced the memorandum by Admiral Hewitt to the Secretary dated May 18, 1945, setting forth the items of further review.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to see those.

Mr. SONNETT. And the approval of the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, prior to Admiral Hewitt coming in on the 18th of May, had you taken any statements or interviewed any witnesses?

Mr. SONNETT. I had, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the witnesses that you had interviewed prior to Admiral Hewitt's coming in?

Mr. SONNETT. I am unable to recall them all, Senator. I can recall, among others, Captain Safford; Captain Rochefort, [13356] I believe, was interrogated before the arrival of Admiral Hewitt. I can't give you offhand the names of the others.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you take any evidence down, or memorandums?

Mr. SONNETT. No. These were purely informal exploratory meetings, Senator, with the purpose of, in a preliminary fashion, arriving at some view as to what the witness could testify to.

Senator FERGUSON. Hadn't Captain Rochefort already testified and hadn't Captain Safford already testified?

Mr. SONNETT. They had, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Before Admiral Hewitt came in, you had a definite purpose that you were going to follow. Will you state what that purpose was, what were you going to prove or try to prove?

Mr. SONNETT. My instructions, Senator, from the Secretary of the Navy were to conduct a thorough review of all prior Navy investigations and upon completion of that to see whether in my opinion there was further investigation required. I did that. My later instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, when it was apparent that further investigation was necessary, were to obtain directly and as counsel to Admiral Hewitt all of the facts from whatever source.

[13357] Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the Roberts report?

Mr. SONNETT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And was it your duty, under your instructions from the Secretary, to review that as well as the Admiral Hart report, the Navy-board inquiry?

Mr. SONNETT. I am unable to state, Senator, whether I had any specific instructions concerning the Roberts report. I can state that I did review it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the evidence?

Mr. SONNETT. I examined portions of the evidence, as I recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the Secretary Knox report?

Mr. SONNETT. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever read that?

Mr. SONNETT. I had not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Mr. SONNETT. I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not in the Department?

Mr. SONNETT. I assume it was, Senator, but I am unable to state. I have never seen that report.

Senator FERGUSON. You had access to magic?

Mr. SONNETT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All of the magic, I assume?

Mr. SONNETT. I did, sir.

[13358] Senator FERGUSON. Did you go into the question in the Secretary of State's office?

Mr. SONNETT. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go into any question in the Executive Office—the White House?

Mr. SONNETT. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to find out what agreement or understanding there was if there was an attack on the British and not on America, what the policy was?

Mr. SONNETT. I didn't try to review any particular thing, Senator. As I stated before, my immediate function at the outset was to review the naval court of inquiry investigation and Admiral Hart's investigation; as part of the customary regular routine under naval regulations to assist the Secretary in his decision, whatever it might be, upon the advisory opinion of the naval court of inquiry.

[13359] Senator FERGUSON. You did not quite answer my question. My question was in relation to the A B C D understanding.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I am not familiar with that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

Mr. SONNETT. My attempt to answer your question was to state that I had my instructions and I complied with them. Those instructions were limited to the naval matters. I did not investigate outside of the Navy in any way, shape, or fashion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you take any testimony from any Army officers?

Mr. SONNETT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with Exhibits 16 and 17?

Mr. SONNETT. I do not remember them.

Senator FERGUSON. They were signed by Admiral Stark. They had to do with the so-called line in the Pacific.

Mr. SONNETT. If I could look at them, Senator, I could refresh my recollection. I do not know the numbers of the exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is 16 and we will have 17 in a minute. This is 17 [handing documents to witness].

Mr. SONNETT. Looking at 16 first, Senator, I note the recommendations at the end of that memorandum by the chief of staff and the Chief of Naval Operations.

[13360] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And it indicates to me that I have seen it before. As to Exhibit 17, I do not recall having seen it before.

Senator FERGUSON. The Exhibit 17?

Mr. SONNETT. I do not, Senator; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want to review your memo here of the 18th, so I am through at the present moment until I review it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. I do not have but a couple of questions.

I just wondered—I was not here at the beginning of your testimony, Mr. Sonnett—but I have before me the examination of Captain Kramer taken before Admiral Hewitt on the 22d day of May 1945. Now, prior to your interview with Captain Kramer he had previously testified, had he not?

Mr. SONNETT. He had, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He had testified before the naval court of inquiry.

Mr. SONNETT. That is my recollection, sir; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I believe he had not testified in the Hart inquiry, and then followed the final Hewitt inquiry, of which you were a part.

Now, just what was the purpose of going all over that [13361] again with Captain Kramer?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Mr. Congressman, there were a number of items upon the review of the prior investigations which were regarded as being important. Those items are in the document which Senator Ferguson is now examining. There were, I think, some 12 or 14 of them.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon the interruption. Items drawn up by whom?

Mr. SONNETT. By the Secretary of the Navy, sir, and by Admiral Hewitt, in whose opinions I should say that personally, if you want my personal opinion, I wholly concurred.

Of those items, one was the winds code execute. The only real importance that had, in the judgment of the Secretary and in the judgment of Admiral Hewitt, was because there was a conflict between the witnesses and because the evidence of the existence of such a mes-



sage rested almost entirely on the testimony of one man and was disputed by many others. In order to resolve that point the winds-code investigation was done, along with the investigation on the other more important matters.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, I fully realize that all of these subject matters were investigations pursuant to an act of Congress directing the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War to make investigations, with no prescribed method set forth in the resolution, and they could continue it in [13362] any form and in any manner that they saw fit.

Now, if I understand your testimony, when a review of the testimony taken by the Navy court of inquiry came before the Secretary of the Navy for review it was apparent that there were some disputes among the witnesses as to what were considered to be essential facts and you attempted to resolve those facts; is that right?

Mr. SONNETT. Not quite, Mr. Congressman; no. It was apparent that there were certain matters of great importance, particularly the question of the intelligence which Admiral Kimmel had at Pearl Harbor, apart from messages from Washington, was a matter of considerable importance.

That had not been adequately investigated. We investigated it and I trust did it adequately. That was important. The only importance the winds-code message had, as I indicated to you before, was because there was a conflict and that conflict required that there be further investigation. Captain Safford, for example, had named certain people as having seen the winds-code message, the execute or alleged execute. Those people had not been interrogated. We interrogated all of them and, incidentally, none of them—as you know, none of them saw the message; at least they so testified, but it was because—

[13363] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't agree with that at all. The testimony is quite to the contrary before the committee.

Mr. SONNETT. Not the testimony I am referring to, Mr. Congressman. The people named by Captain Safford in his previous testimony as having seen the winds code execute testified before us that they had not seen such a message.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain Kramer was one of them, wasn't he?

Mr. SONNETT. He was one of them.

Mr. KEEFE. He certainly did not testify that he did not see this winds execute.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I don't know what he testified to here, Mr. Congressman; I haven't been following this inquiry that closely, but I do know that before Admiral Hewitt he was unable to testify or state that he ever saw a genuine winds-code message prior to the attack relating to the United States.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't want to go off on a tangent about this winds execute. We have had 2 or 3 weeks about that kind of business and as far as I am personally concerned I don't care for my own thinking whether there was or was not a winds execute. Whatever the facts are they are before this committee and we can take them for what they are worth. I don't think, myself, that it was of very great importance in view of the other evidence and facts that were at hand, but I have before me Captain Kramer's testimony taken before the [13364]

Hewitt investigation. I note that he was examined at some length by Admiral Hewitt and then after Admiral Hewitt got through with him you examined him. That was on the second day of the examination.

Did you talk with Captain Kramer before you reduced his testimony to writing?

Mr. SONNETT. I am sure I did, Mr. Congressman; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. You went over the testimony that he had given before to point out the conflicts?

Mr. SONNETT. I don't know that we went over the exact testimony he gave before. I knew that we reviewed his recollection with him to try to find out what the facts were according to his best recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all I can say, Captain, after the full examination before the Army board, and the Navy board, and the Hart investigation, and the Hewitt investigation, and the Sonnett investigation, and this investigation here I think we are more muddled up than we were before we started so far as the winds message is concerned. We still haven't got any clear, definite picture as to exactly what did take place. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to resume now, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will be as soon as I finish [13365] reading it.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime I will ask a question.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Reference has been made to the statement of the Navy board:

The Board recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

That is a report to the Secretary of the Navy and I suppose it is based upon the last paragraph of their opinion, which says:

Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.

In other words, they exonerated in that paragraph everybody in the Navy and then the first recommendation was that there be no further proceedings.

I suppose that might be interpreted to mean that inasmuch as they found no offense had been committed and no serious blame on the part of anybody, not to proceed against anybody under courts martial or any other legal proceeding, but regardless of that the Secretary was not satisfied that an adequate investigation had been had of all these matters and, therefore, he set up this supplementary investigation under Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir, and after his re- [13366] view of the entire investigations and facts in all of them you will recall that his conclusions differed markedly from the court and were set forth in his endorsement.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. In other words, the mere fact that the board recommended that no further proceedings be had was not binding on the Secretary of the Navy, who had been directed by Congress to make an investigation, and the Secretary of War had been directed to make an investigation, and they had full authority to set up any commission or any board, or as many commissions or as many boards as they might think were necessary in order to get the facts?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if it were not for the fact that after these investigations that had been had by the Army and the Navy Congress itself and probably the country felt that the matter had not been adequately gone into, this committee has been sitting here since the 6th of September to get further facts with reference to the matter.

In other words, after each investigation it had been felt that some further inquiry was necessary and that is why this committee was created. I don't know whether there will be another one or not, but I can guarantee one thing, that if there is another one that this member will not be on the committee that carries it out.

[13367] Senator BREWSTER. Is that a threat or a promise?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in your case it will be a promise, I think.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I ask that there be spread on the record at this point the citation from the Secretary of the Navy and the citation from Admiral Hewitt as to the witness on the stand at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered. That is all I want to ask.

(The citations referred to follow:)

12 JULY 1945.

From: Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: John F. Sonnett: Commendation of.

1. John F. Sonnett served from 14 May 1945 to 11 July 1945 as my counsel for the further investigation into the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, directed by the Secretary of the Navy's precept of 2 May 1945.

2. During this period he exhibited professional skill to a high degree, and was of the greatest assistance to me.

3. His efficient conduct of these hearings and thorough development of the testimony contributed immeasurably [13368] to the completion of the investigation.

4. It is respectfully requested that the substance of this correspondence be made a part of his official record.

H. K. HEWITT.

#### THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOHN F. SONNETT

UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

#### CITATION

"For outstanding services as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from January 22, 1944, to May 5, 1945. Applying himself with keen foresight, effective resourcefulness, purposeful initiative and delicate tact to the complex problems inherent in confidential assignments of paramount importance, Lieutenant Commander Sonnett skillfully formulated and executed missions of the highest classification pertaining to, affecting and furthering the war effort. His constant devotion to duty and loyal discharge of weighty responsibilities reflect the highest credit upon Lieutenant Commander Sonnett and upon the United States Naval Service."

[13369] A copy of this citation has been made a part of Lieutenant Commander Sonnett's official record and he is hereby authorized to wear the Commendation Ribbon.

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL,  
Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT, under "F" on page 2 you were:

To determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo.

Did you make any investigation of that "F"?

Mr. SONNETT. We did, yes. We made an investigation of every one of those items, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you find on that particular one?

Mr. SONNETT. That related, Senator, as I recall it, to the question of Japanese intelligence or espionage at Hawaii, a subject which we felt had not been fully explored.

The statement in the book Battle Report indicated [13370] that the Japanese espionage had advised Tokyo of the fact that two task forces of ours were at sea.

We wanted to find out whether or not that was so and, as I recall it, although I am trusting to recollection a year old now, as I recall it we found there was no specific evidence so indicating, but that that was a fair inference from the various reports which the consul at Honolulu had sent to Tokyo.

[13371] Senator FERGUSON. Now do I understand then that the Hewitt investigation and your investigation prior to the Hewitt never made any report to the Secretary?

Mr. SONNETT. No; we made a report, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You did make a report?

Mr. SONNETT. We did, yes. My impression is it was before this committee. It is a rather long one with findings of fact and conclusions.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It is part of the Hewitt report.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have any discussion with the Secretary as to having the Court of Inquiry complete its work?

Mr. SONNETT. Not that I recall, Senator; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us any reason why the court was not continued to do this work? They had the previous history and they had all the facts that they had obtained, at least.

Mr. SONNETT. I am unable to give you any reason, Senator, except I am confident of one thing, that the Secretary wanted all of the facts and he wanted them accurately, and he wanted them from whatever source he could get them.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any dissatisfaction with the report that the Navy Court of Inquiry had made?

Mr. SONNETT. To the extent, Senator, that, first, their [13372] investigation was not complete, and second, that certain of their findings were erroneous; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That certain of their findings were erroneous?

Mr. SONNETT. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were those particular findings?

Mr. SONNETT. I cannot recall, but the Secretary's subsequent endorsement considers each one in detail and sets forth the Secretary's findings on the basis of the various findings of the Board.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Senator Ferguson, the Hewitt report is part of exhibit 107.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the third volume?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. And that includes the report by this witness?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this include your report also?

Mr. SONNETT. Senator, I made no report individually. I drafted, with the help of my assistants, Admiral Hewitt's report which he revised and then submitted to the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have in the record the two exhibits, if they are not already in, the one creating the Hewitt Board and the other one the [13373] further investigation of the facts, and then it proceeded to give what was to be investigated, so that the record will be complete.

The CHAIRMAN. All these matters are in the record as exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Commander Baecher tells me that one of these is not in at the present time. Commander Baecher says the one dated May 18, which sets forth the scope of the examination, is not in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask then that that be made part of the record here in the transcript, because I think it is material to many other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The matter referred to follows:)

SECRET

18 MAY 1945.

From: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

Reference: (a) Precept 2 May 1945 appointing Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy to conduct further Pearl Harbor investigation.

[13374] 1. In accordance with reference (a) a study has been made of the report of the Robert's Commission, of the record of examination of witnesses directed by the Secretary of the Navy 12 February 1944, the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy 13 July 1944, and of various other documents relating to this matter. It appears that further investigation is necessary in order

(A) to obtain the information now available concerning the composition and movements of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941;

(B) to obtain the information which was available at Pearl Harbor, at Cavite, and at Washington, during the period 26 November 1941 to 7 December 1941, concerning the location, composition and movements of Japanese naval forces, including (1) examination as to the activities of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor and the information obtained by it, with particular reference to the location of the major portion of the Japanese carriers, to the change in radio contact with units of the Japanese Fleet on or about 1 December 1941, and to the apparently erroneous belief that on 7 December 1941 the attacking force was located south of Hawaii; (2) examination [13375] as to ONI bulletins, such as the bulletin of 1 December 1941; (3) examination as to the information furnished by the Navy to the Army, at Washington and at Pearl Harbor, concerning Japanese naval movements and radio contact with Japanese units; (4) examination as to information of Japanese Naval units obtained by Army reconnaissance, with particular reference to the War Department's directions to General Short, about 26 November 1941, to conduct reconnaissance to Jaluit, to the

action taken, and to the question whether Admiral Kimmel was advised of this;

(C) to determine whether or not Japanese submarines operated in and around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941, including (1) whether a captured Japanese map, as indicated in the Army Pearl Harbor report, establishes that such submarines were in Pearl Harbor before that date, or, as indicated in the book entitled "Battle Report", that the map was made on that date and erroneously fixed the positions of United States ships in the harbor; (2) what submarines contacts were made in or around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941; (3) according to "Battle Report", at about 0500 on 7 December 1941, [13376] a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conversation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning the sighting of a submarine at approximately 1850. It should be determined what was done about this and why were the net gates allowed to remain open from 0445 until 0800;

(D) to obtain the information received in Hawaii through the interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages by the Office of Naval Intelligence, or so obtained by other agencies of the United States Government or of other governments and communicated to the Naval Intelligence at Hawaii;

(E) to determine who obtained the intercepted Japanese messages concerning ship movements, sent to and from Honolulu, which are set forth in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's Record, and how, when and where they were obtained and decoded;

(F) to determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage [13377] had so informed Tokyo."

(G) to determine whether or not there was a "winds code" message relating to the United States;

(H) to interview Admiral Wilkinson generally and with particular reference to combat intelligence and to the "winds code";

(I) to interview Captain McCollum generally and with particular reference to the "winds code";

(J) to determine what information the records of CinCPac and COMFOURTEEN contain concerning (1) Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal Defense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate, (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941, and the Secretary of War's reply, (3) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack, (4) the date when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 November 1941 to 31 December 1941;

(K) to determine what were the reasons for the air reconnaissance which Admiral Kimmel directed in [13378] or about July 1941, toward the Jaluits.

(L) to ascertain the facts in connection with such other questions as may arise during the investigation to be conducted by me.

2. Having found that such further investigation is necessary, I propose to examine the persons having knowledge of the facts in question and to obtain such documents as may be relevant thereto.

3. Counsel in this investigation will be John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting will be Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Griswold, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, U. S. N. R. Each of these men has taken a special oath to maintain the security of the information received during this investigation.

H. KENT HEWITT.

First endorsement:

5-21-45

The further investigation set forth herein is hereby approved.

(Copy)

FORRESTAL.

[13379] Senator FERGUSON. Did you, Mr. Sonnett, make a report after you made this preliminary investigation? Did you make a report to the Secretary of the Navy as to what you thought should be done?

Mr. SONNETT. I made no formal or written report, Senator, no.

Senator BREWSTER. As I understand, you made a draft of a report for the Secretary, on which his report was finally based, is that correct?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, on the Hewitt Report to the Secretary, I drafted that at the completion of the Hewitt investigation. Admiral Hewitt revised it and then submitted it to the Secretary as Admiral Hewitt's report.

Senator BREWSTER. Were there material variations from your recommendations, or did it follow substantially the outline of your conclusions?

Mr. SONNETT. There were some changes of substance which Admiral Hewitt made. He made a number of changes in form. Just what they were, off-hand I cannot state, but I know there were some.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you finished, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions? If not, thank you very much, Captain. I am not demoting you? Are [13380] you captain or commander?

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant commander, sir. You have promoted me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is next?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sergeant Elliott.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, please?

# **TESTIMONY OF GEORGE E. ELLIOTT, JR., FORMERLY SERGEANT, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES**

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sergeant Elliott, will you state your name for the record?

Mr. ELLIOTT. George E. Elliott, Jr.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How old are you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Twenty-eight, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are not in the service at present?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I am lucky enough to have been discharged 4 months ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were on duty in Hawaii at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In what division of the Army?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I was in the Signal Corps, Aircraft Warning.

[13381] Mr. RICHARDSON. And that brought you in contact with the radar sets that the Army had on Oahu?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were present at one of those mobile radar sets on the morning of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you indicate on this map, Sergeant, where the mobile station was located, and where you were on the morning of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Indicate on this map where the station is located where you were on the morning of the attack.

Mr. ELLIOTT. The station was located at the top of the mountain, I believe they call it Opana, at the northernmost point of the island of Oahu, as I indicate here [indicating].

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, coming to this map, Sergeant, this colored chart of what is supposed to be a radar chart of approaching Japanese planes prior to the attack, you were at this point [indicating]?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you indicate with the pointer where you saw any indication of approaching planes, where it would be on this map?

[13382] Mr. ELLIOTT. At this point up here [indicating] 3° northeast at the azimuth that they came in on.

We picked them up at the mileage of 136 or 137 miles. That was the very first indication of the flight that we had picked up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, follow with your pointer, just generally how the planes came down toward your station.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you place the time so it will be identified?

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the time when you first found any information of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was 7:02.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; now, follow with your pointer the course, as nearly as you can recall it, that the planes followed as you watched them on the radar.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that they came in on a very straight line. I do not recall of their being any differences, as indicated here. It was fairly straight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when they approached your station, did they disappear finally from your radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they disappeared at approximately 15 to 20 miles away from the island. We lost them due to distortion from a back wave from the mountains, and [13383] it was impossible to follow them further than we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Up to the time they disappeared, had there been any diversion of the planes? Were they still all in the main group which you had seen at 7:02?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they were all in the same group, so far as I know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the last you saw of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was with you, Sergeant, at the time these planes were sighted?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Another private, Joseph L. Lockard.



Mr. RICHARDSON. Who first saw these planes? You or Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We actually both saw them together.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What discussion was there between you with reference to the matter when you saw them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time I was receiving instructions on the operation of the scope. Lockard looking over my shoulder noticed that there was a target, so he, knowing more about the operation of the scope, actually took over the control there. I went over to the plotting board, and we got an azimuth and mileage and figured out a reading as to the location where the flight was, where the target was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did that take you, would you [13384] say?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, just a very short time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. A minute or two?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Less than a minute.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, go ahead.

Mr. ELLIOTT. At that time I suggested to Private Lockard that we send it in to the Information Center. Private Lockard, figuring that our problem was over at 7 o'clock, disagreed as to sending the reading.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by your problem was over at 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The normal operating period at that time was from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that true on weekdays as well as on Sundays?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, I believe it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For how long a period prior to the morning of the 7th had you been on the 4 to 7 status?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, our particular station at that time had only been set up, it was only in operation about 2 weeks before December 7th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And during that whole 2 weeks, were you on the 4 to 7 schedule?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, I believe we were.

[13385] Mr. RICHARDSON. Had there been other men in the station up to 7 o'clock that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; the only ones present at the station were Private Lockard and myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, before that, during the 4 to 7 period that morning, had there been other men on this station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what had become of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not quite understand.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What became of them? How did it happen that only you and Lockhart were left there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I will have to go back to December 6. It was a standing rule that we would keep two men at the unit at all times.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Twenty-four hours of the day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was for protection of the unit. They were armed with .45 guns.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was to protect the unit? It was not to operate the unit as a radar system?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, they were there to protect the unit but they did not operate.

When the men that operated came to the station, the [13386] two men that guarded the unit were there at the same time, although they did not do any operation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; go ahead now.

You got back to the 6th? What were your hours on the morning of the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, we went out to the station at Opana to relieve the two men that had been on the unit, guarding it all the week. We went out there to give them a break, more or less, to come in and get a pass to go to town.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go out as guards?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we went out as guards. The idea was we would stay there all night and be there at 4 o'clock in the morning, to start working on our problem.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This was the night of the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead. When did the other men that had been on the station during the night leave?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, there had been no other men there since 12 o'clock on December 6, when we relieved them, when Private Lockard and I relieved them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, as a matter of fact, from 4 until 7 on the morning of the 7th you two were the only men at that station?

[13387] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We were the only two at that station from noon of December 6 through 8 o'clock on the morning of December 7.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was the station at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At the farthest north station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The station most immediately adjacent to the whole northwest sector north of Oahu?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, at 7:02 you two men discovered planes on your target?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You suggested that you contact the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At first Lockard did not approve of that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was after we had figured out the reading from the azimuth and mileage. At that time I spoke to Private Lockard. I even recall saying to him since he did not want to send it in, even if we sent it in and the Army and Navy would work together, they may not [13388] know just whose planes they are, but if we worked out through the information center and had it not on any scheduled problem, that it would be more effective as to actually going out there and intercepting like, say, the Army go out and intercept planes, or vice versa.

Finally, after mentioning a few of those things to Private Lockard, he finally told me to go ahead and send it in if I liked.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long from the time you discovered the planes was it until you concluded to phone the information center? How many minutes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would say offhand 7 or 8.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During that time, you could still see the target on your charts, these planes coming from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You called up the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We had two phones in the mobile unit: One was a direct line, a tactical line, as it was called. That was from the plotting board directly to the information center which was located at Fort Shafter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which phone did you use?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I picked up the tactical phone on the plotting board, and I found nobody on the other end at the [13389] information center.

After that, I went to the administrative line and called the information center.

After getting the information center—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who answered?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A corporal or Private McDonald answered the phone. He was a switchboard operator at the information center.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

What conversation occurred?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At that time, I explained to Private McDonald what we had seen, and he told me that there was nobody around there, and he did not know what to do about it.

I asked him if he would get somebody that would know what to do and pass on the information, and have him take care of it.

Well, a few minutes later—

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many minutes? Just make a guess.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Two or three. I would say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Two or three. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Two or three minutes later, this lieutenant that is referred to, or was first referred to in the Roberts report, called back to the station, and Private Lockard [13390] picked up the phone and spoke to the lieutenant.

It was at this time that the lieutenant told us to forget about the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, you, of course, did not hear what the lieutenant said over the telephone.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you hear Lockard say over the telephone, to whomever he was talking?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, he only acknowledged that we were to forget it, that we were to forget the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did Lockard say anything to the lieutenant about having discovered planes coming on the chart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I believe he did. He again repeated the distance that we had picked up the planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When Lockard had finished his telephone conversation, what did he tell you the lieutenant on the other end said?

Mr. ELLIOTT. He told me that the lieutenant said to forget it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he say anything about the lieutenant mentioning what these planes might be, or from where the planes might be coming? Did he make any statement that the lieutenant had mentioned that subject to him over the telephone?

[13391] Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not recall whether or not he did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am referring to the question of whether the lieutenant mentioned the fact that a flight of B-17's from San Francisco was expected in that morning, and that these planes were probably those planes.

Was there any discussion on that subject by Lockard in reporting the telephone conversation to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is what I do not quite remember. I cannot place it together, whether we received that information then, or whether that came out after the publicity of the Roberts Commission.

I cannot say for sure.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what did you continue to do after the end of the conversation over the telephone with the lieutenant at the information center? What did you and Lockard continue to do, if anything?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard at that time wanted to shut down the unit and just go off the air, and the original intention was that I was to have gotten further training on the unit. I insisted again, and we continued to operate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You could still see the plane target?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you followed it in until it got within about 20 miles of your station?

[13392] Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, then, did you make any chart of the course of those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We had an overlaid chart; that is, a transparent paper that is put over the map itself, of the island, with true north on the overlay. That is, the grid lines on the overlay were true north on the map, and in the center is a radius, a mileage radius rule.

From your azimuth and your mileage you can plot exactly where your location is on the map. That is used so that you could have a record of all the flights that you had.

In other words, as you posted your target on this overlay, you could take it off of there and put it on a new sheet of transparent paper and continue on again.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you did complete a chart following the course of those planes as they approached your station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any readings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had a running log, a record of reading sheets that covered the time, mileage, azimuth, and coordinate readings.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you filled that out?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13393] Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you leave the station that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was approximately 15 minutes of 8.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did you go?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Our station at Opana was 9 miles away to our camp where he billeted and of course coming down the mountain to the highway took some time, and then the 9 miles was from the highway.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How did you go?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At approximately just shortly before 15 minutes of 8, a private —

Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). How did you go, by shank's mare or in a car?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is just what I am going to explain.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Just a few minutes before a quarter of 8, Private Farnback came out in a truck to pick us up, and take our bedding and ourselves back to the camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He took you back to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What time did you get back to the camp, do you think?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was very close to 8 o'clock.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have with you either your chart [13394] or your readings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We only had the record of readings, the log.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did your record or reading log show the direction from which these planes were coming?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It could have been replotted on the map with the information given to get the exact location of the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you do with that log?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That log was turned over to a Lieutenant Upson, the commanding officer of the two platoons that were out in that particular camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it turned over immediately upon your return to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We were very proud of the reading that we had gotten; that is, the distance out, and we brought it along, not knowing what was taking place, but it was just the fact that the reading was a very good reading.

We brought it back to show it off, so to speak.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you gave it to your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what he did with it?

[13395] Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A First Lieutenant—at that time Second Lieutenant John Upson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And he was in the Aircraft Warning Division?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was his superior, if you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A Captain Tetley.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And where was he stationed?

Mr. ELLIOTT. He was stationed in Schofield Barracks, at the headquarters. That is where the main body of the company stayed.

We had several headquarters. We had the Fort Shafter, at the Information Center was one headquarters; and also within the same company we had the headquarters at Schofield Barracks, where most of the men stayed; and then, of course, we had the outlying platoons, where we had our individual stations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where and to whom would your platoon commander have reported to his superior?

Mr. ELLIOTT. He would have reported directly to Captain Tetley.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At Schofield Barracks?

[13396] Mr. ELLIOTT. At Schofield Barracks; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know who was over Tetley?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Offhand, I believe it was Colonel Powell, although I am not sure of the chain of command.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were all in the aircraft warning section?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure about Colonel Powell. I believe he was head of the Signal Corps installations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the material which you had given to your platoon commander could have been read by any competent person to whom it came, and would indicate where you saw the planes, the direction from which they came, and when they disappeared from your view?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With the times of day involved?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; an identical chart could have been made, as is indicated up there on the map.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you remain in camp after you arrived there and during the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we stayed in camp only long enough to get up our main belongings that we would need, and we went right back to the unit 9 miles away.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you stayed at the unit the rest of the day?

[13397] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we stayed there day and night from then on; we did not go back to the camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There were two operating phones to that unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did anyone call you up while you were there to inquire concerning what you discovered and the details?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; they did not call me. They called back, but Private Lockard answered the phone.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who called him, do you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, as I said before, it is explained as this lieutenant through the Roberts report. That is the only knowledge I have actually as to who called.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Someone called him?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, the information was relayed by Corporal McDonald at the switchboard to the lieutenant.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You do not get what I mean, I don't think, Sergeant.

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean the lieutenant called—

Mr. RICHARDSON. After you came back from the camp on the morning of the attack, after you came in at 8 o'clock and turned over your reading, you then went back to the station, as I understand it.

[13398] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. While you were at the station did anyone contact you to find out what you knew about the incoming planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That, sir, I could not answer.

When we went back to the unit, we did not go back to—at least I did not, and I do not recall just what Private Lockard did—we did not go back to the operation. The operation of the unit was being manned by other men in the platoon.

As I recall, we were busy setting up tents, since we were not going to travel back and forth to our old camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, but, Sergeant, did anybody come to you during that day and ask you to tell them what you saw in the radar at 7 o'clock that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; only the men at our individual camp that were interested to know just what had gone on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, by the time you had worked around there for awhile, all of the men at that unit knew the story of what had happened to you and your companion after 7 o'clock in that radar station that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if anyone had called that unit on the telephone they could have gotten that information from [13399] practically anybody on the job, could not they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you went back from camp to your station, did you have any instructions from your officer in camp as to what you were to do, or anything of that kind?

Mr. ELLIOTT. None at the camp. We were just told to go back to the unit and that we would receive all of our instructions. That is, it was understood as to the working arrangement, what we were going to do, arranging the camp, and so forth, that would have been taken care of out there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you get any instructions after you got back to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only as I said before, that we broke up into different groups.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. And did the necessary work.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

When did you first know of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time that we arrived at our camp. However, as we were going to the camp, and just, oh, about a quarter way away from the camp, we noticed from our truck all of the men from the camp driving very fast in the opposite direction in which we were going. They were going to the unit.

[13400] They had their field packs, and helmets, and what not.

We still had no indication as to what had happened until we arrived at the camp, when we were told that we had been attacked by the Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, if I understand you, this unit up there on this mountain at the tip of the island, was under guard 24 hours of the day by somebody.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What were they guarding against?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, the only thing they were guarding against was to see that no one came around to interfere with the equipment we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, during 4 hours of that 24, or 3 hours, from 4 to 7 in the morning, the radar station was in operation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it in operation during those particular hours?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, those were the instructions that we had from our company commander, and, as I imagine, they came from—

The CHAIRMAN. Headquarters.

Mr. ELLIOTT. He had taken the orders from higher headquarters. [13401]

The CHAIRMAN. Did the selection of those 3 hours from 4 to 7 have any relationship, as far as you know? Was it generally understood that those hours were selected because they might have some relationship to a possible air attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As a matter of opinion, as I would have looked at it at the time, I would say we were not operating under those conditions. I mean, it was more practice than anything else.

[13402] The CHAIRMAN. As far as you were concerned, and Private Lockard, you were students, in a sense, you were practicing to become more proficient in the operation of the radar station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But there must have been some reason why, from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning was chosen as the hour during which the station was to be in operation. Would you be able to inform the committee, if you have any opinion, as to why those hours were chosen?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I could not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I could not form any opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Those hours were fixed by higher officers?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who determined that it should be done from 4 to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, only through the information center, down through the chain of command from Captain Tetley, our commanding officer. But that was understood, that we were to work from 4 to 7 in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any information passed down to you as to why those hours were selected?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

[13403] The CHAIRMAN. Did you learn anything about that at any time, either before or after the attack, as to why those hours were chosen for the operation of the radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. That angle of the question of 4 to 7 never came up, that I recollect.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether it had any relationship to the general feeling that if an attack occurred there it would be sometime in the early morning, around daylight or sunrise?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no information on that?



Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now how far were these planes when you first picked them up?

Mr. ELLIOTT. They were actually 137 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. One hundred and thirty-seven miles. And you traced them all the way in until they got within 20 miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I believe that is what it was, until they got within 20 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did that take you, or how long were they in making that flight from 137 miles to 20 miles, within that distance?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not particularly sure. I think it was about 20 minutes of 8.

[13404] The CHAIRMAN. About 20 minutes of 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Between 7:35 and 20 minutes of 8.

The CHAIRMAN. So from 2 minutes after 7 until approximately 20 minutes of 8 you were tracing these planes in toward the island?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did you call, or did Private Lockard, or either one of you, call the central information station while they were being traced in, or after you lost sight of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. We sent it in—I sent it in to the switchboard operator I would say about actually 7:07 or 7:08.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that.

Mr. ELLIOTT. 7:07 or 7:08. I picked up the flight at 7:02.

The CHAIRMAN. You picked up the flight at 7:02?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. At 7:07 or 7:08, 5 or 6 minutes after that, after you picked up the flight, you phoned in to the central information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We gave them the reading as of 7:02.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you continue to call them as you got [13405] the reading as the ships came in closer?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just that one call?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was when we carried on, when he was told to forget.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall the name of the lieutenant who told you to forget it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, at the time I did not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know at the time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think it was Lieutenant Tyler. I mean this information I received later.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Did you know anything about the expectation that some B-17's or P-17's were scheduled to come in from Francisco?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I know that I did not know about it before we picked up the target, and as I told Mr. Richardson here, I am not sure just when we actually did find out that those were B-17's.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know that they were coming in from San Francisco? Would you have known whether they were coming from the north, the direction in which these planes you picked up were coming, or would they have come [13406] in more directly from the east?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we would not have known that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not have known that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No. That would have been handled in the information center, probably by the liaison officer, and they would not pass that information to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with your knowledge of the island out there, and the directions generally from there toward Japan and toward California, would you be able to say, if you thought they were B-17's, would you have expected them to come in from that direction?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Ordinarily; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would they do that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that would have been the closest route.

The CHAIRMAN. From San Francisco to Oahu would they come in from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That would bring them in just about the place where the flight was picked up that morning, at 3° northeast.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. Cooper.

[13407] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, you were then a private?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You and Lockard were both privates?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long had you been engaged in this radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only about 3 months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Three months?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not quite three months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were still being trained for that type of work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was Lockard your instructor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; he was.

[13408] The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long had he been engaged in that radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure. I believe that it might have been a year or so. I can't say on that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then he was considered as an experienced, capable radar man and qualified to give instructions to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; so far as the operation of the unit went he knew the different phases of operation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you and he worked together there that Sunday morning in operating the radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. During the problem he operated the scope and I operated the plotting board. In other words, the targets that he would have picked up from the scope he would have relayed the information and I would have plotted it on the map and followed through on sending it to the information center at Fort Shafter where they would have coordinated with the liaison officers as to whether anybody had a flight in that particular area, and from then on they would have followed through.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was the name of that station where you were?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Opana.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. O-p-a-n-a?

[13409] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you had been on duty there from 12 o'clock noon on Saturday, the day before?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As guards of that station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then during the period from 4 o'clock on Sunday morning to 7 o'clock on Sunday morning you operated the station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you were due then to go off duty in the operation of the station at 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. The original plans were that we would stay there until 12 o'clock noon Sunday, December 7, and at that time the two men that we had relieved the day before would have been back on pass and they would have taken over the guarding of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They would have taken over as guards?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. And then we would have returned to our camp. However, that was changed and it was decided that since they came back from there, on a pass, earlier, they figured they would come out to the unit at 8 o'clock in the morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you were due to stop operating [13410] the unit at 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And from 7 o'clock on until you were relieved you were to just serve as guards there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; but that also at that time we were to continue on with my instructions, my further instructions as to the operation of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it was more or less voluntary on your part as you wanted to get as much training as you could?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And voluntary on Lockard's part to give you that training?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you were just staying on on a voluntary basis after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you just continued to practice?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then at 7:02, why, you picked [13411] up this light of planes coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I wonder if I could make mention of the fact that at the time that we reported off the air to the information center by our clock at the unit I am very sure that time was 6 minutes of 7 and I can't call just whether or not we had made a time check with the information center. But I know very definitely that the time

on the clock when we actually closed down the unit, that is, went off the air with the information center, was approximately 6 minutes of 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Six minutes before 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You notified the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We were told at that time that the problem was over and that we were to go off the air. In other words, we wouldn't forward then to the information center.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything you received after 6 minutes to 7 o'clock you would not send on to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The point I am trying to bring out there is that it was 6 minutes before 7 and I don't recall whether or not we had made a time check to verify the time with the information center.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, your clock showed 6 minutes [13412] to 7 and you don't know whether you synchronized your time with the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that from the time you were told by the information center at 6 minutes before 7 o'clock that you could go off, the remaining time then was just on a voluntary basis by you and Lockhart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you picked up this flight of planes coming in at 2 minutes after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And within 5 or 6 minutes after you first sighted them, why, you undertook to contact the information center to tell them about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. It was between 6 and 8 minutes, offhand. I can't recall just what it was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Between 6 and 8 minutes after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Somewhere between there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And when you used the first phone there was nobody that responded at the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. That was the actual phone that went through to the actual plotting table in the information center.

[13413] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the phone you were supposed to use to give that information?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And there was nobody that responded at the other end?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or, at the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you used the other phone which you say was the administration phone?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Private McDonald answered that switch-board?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you gave him the information and he told you that there was nobody there to tell him what to do about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you asked him to please get word as quickly as he could to somebody who would know what to do?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I might mention that as I was explaining it to McDonald on the switchboard I spoke in a very nervous voice and from the time that I spoke that way [13410] Lockard seemed to take more note of what I was trying to do in sending in the reading, although I didn't know at the time that they were enemy planes. It was just that I did talk over the phone in a very nervous tone of voice.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was probably your first experience of that type, was it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, it was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. It probably was the idea of getting such a large flight of planes at such a distance, because ordinarily before then we hadn't picked up anything really over 100 to 110 miles, I would say. But this was very big and it was very noticeable and it was just something out of the ordinary.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was out of the ordinary to the extent that you were a little bit excited about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And also proud of your achievement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes, sir. I only wish that it could have been followed through. It could have saved any number of lives.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you really did do a good job in the work you did there.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I hope I did, sir.

[13415] The VICE CHAIRMAN. How many men were there at that time that operated this radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In our platoon we had, I believe it was, 18 men. Out of that 18 men there were three drivers, I believe, truck drivers, and I believe there were two cooks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would leave——

Mr. ELLIOTT. That would leave——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thirteen.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Thirteen.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Operators.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Operators; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, although you were still in training and had not had the experience that Lockard had, why, the events of that occasion showed that you had become rather efficient in that line of work.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, just how did you conduct this type of work Sergeant? Was there a platoon or squad or definite number of men assigned to each of these radar units?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We had the men assigned, we had what we called the crew chiefs, and I believe with the assigned strength that we had they only had two men under them, and the three men together each operated the unit in shifts of, as I recall it on December 7 especially, very close to that [13416] time, we operated 4 hours on duty on the radar, 4 hours on guard on the unit, and then 4 hours off, and then repeating 4 hours on the unit and so forth; and I believe at that time we had four different crews.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Four different crews of two men each?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. There were three men, actually three men, on each crew.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Three men on each crew and you had four crews?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I believe that is the way it was set up; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had four crews?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, then you spent as much time on guard duty as you did in operating the unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The number of men we had at that time was not a sufficient number to operate 24 hours a day.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if all the operators had been used for operational purposes and ordinary infantry soldiers had been used for guard duty, you could have done that, couldn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And ordinary infantry soldiers could [13417] have been used for guard duty, and were used for guard duty at all other places around the island, weren't they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; but there were none assigned to us at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know, but that could have been done, for the guard duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then that would have left all of you operators to work in shifts just in operational work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes, although in the Army they sort of put you to work to the best advantage. In other words, they wouldn't have considered us working 4 hours on the unit and 8 hours' rest, whereas they probably would have fixed it up 8 hours' work and 4 hours' rest.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; that could have been done.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I mean that is the general practice, so to speak.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was done in that respect after the attack, after December 7, how did they do it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, at the time I believe we received a few more men from the company. I would say offhand four or five to help out in the operations. We operated under those conditions for approximately 3 weeks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After December 7?

[13418] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. And at that time our company was enlarged to a regiment and we had some men transferred there from the Infantry to enlarge our company and the infantrymen were to be trained in the operation of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They assigned other men there on the island to train in radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was done after December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; approximately, I am not sure whether it was 2 or 3 weeks. It was somewhere in between that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The forces were greatly enlarged then?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Instead of 18 men, as we had on December 7, we had approximately 40 men. That was 2 or 3 weeks after December 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. But they had to be trained.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But those same men had been on the island before December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what hours did you operate the unit after December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Twenty-four hours a day, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Twenty-four hours a day?

[13419] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You increased it from 3 hours to 24 hours a day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, didn't anybody have to go to the hospital as a result of that, did they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, none that I recall, sir. They were probably afraid to go to the hospital.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one other question.

You say that you called this information center about 7 or 8 minutes after 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And talked to Private McDonald at the switchboard. He was the switchboard operator?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long was it after that before Tyler came back and talked to Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Between 1 or 2 or 3 minutes, I don't recall. It was fairly shortly.

The CHAIRMAN. From the time of that conversation between Tyler and Lockard until you went into the information [13420] center did they call back any more to seek any information about these planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. The last time that we talked to the information center during the flight that we had plotted, the plane flight, there was no other conversation about it. Now then, when the flight was finished and we took the record of the reading sheets back to the platoon commander, he passed that on, I imagine, to the company commander.

The CHAIRMAN. That was about a quarter to 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time that we went.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the attack was on right away pretty soon after that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. As I understand it it was on about 5 minutes of 8.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There is one question I overlooked.

You told us that after December 7, why, the hours of operating the station were increased from 3 hours to a full 24-hour basis.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the men held up all right under that. Did this wear out the sets, radar sets, did they operate all right?

[13421] Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, our particular set was somewhat of a good set. I mean, we continued operating, I don't know just whether we were lucky or what, but we didn't have very much trouble. Another thing I might mention is that the different units on the islands could overlap each other and where one went off for servicing, and incidentally we did go off an hour a day for servicing and repair, they would cover the particular unit that went out.

But so far as having any serious trouble with the unit I don't recall any.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You don't recall any?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. You say you have been out of service about 4 months?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; since the 20th of September last year.

Senator GEORGE. When did you enter the service?

Mr. ELLIOTT. On November 12, 1940.

Senator GEORGE. Where did you enter the service, from what State?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I entered in Chicago, sir; Chicago, Ill.

Senator GEORGE. And do I understand that you and Mr. [13422] Lockard were the only two people at this station from midnight, say, of the 6th until the morning of the 7th, when you picked up this flight of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was no one else there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I might make a comment, if I may.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. On December 8, I believe it was—well, on December 7—Lockard, Private Lockard was called into the company commander, Captain Tetley, and Captain Tetley sent him back to the unit for a statement from Lockard and myself, a signed statement as to what had happened. And at that time Private Lockard told me that he wanted me to incorporate in the statement the name of a man that was not there, the man that ordinarily would have run the motor, the motored generator for the unit. It was put to me that they wanted to keep the records straight.

The C. O. called for no one to operate the unit unless the motorman was present to operate that motor and we were not qualified motormen or mechanics to do that.

However, in that statement that I have given reference to I wouldn't agree to that, to incorporating this other man's name in that statement. The statement itself was just, it was put in the form of "we". Everything that was written [13423] in there was "we" did this and "we" did that. There was no individual "I" did this or "I" did that.

Senator GEORGE. But actually you and Private Lockard were the only two people at the station at this unit?



Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I fix the time arbitrarily from midnight on because that was the important time. And you say at 7:02 you picked up the planes on the radar 3° east of north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Could you tell anything about the number of planes in the flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not definitely. You could just tell that there was a large number.

Senator GEORGE. Now, on that very point, Sergeant, I think the committee would like to have full information. Did you judge it to be a large number of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; by the size of the echo we judged it to be a fairly large number of planes.

Senator GEORGE. And not merely one or two or three or four planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We knew that it was not one or two or three or four since at that distance the echo would have shown up very much smaller. This was very definitely very [13424] big.

Senator GEORGE. And you picked up this flight actually at a distance of about 137 miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, you say that when you called to make the report you did not find anyone at the station except Private McDonald, as I believe you said his name was?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; McDonald.

Senator GEORGE. And within a very short time, 2 or 3 minutes, someone did call and Private Lockard did the talking to the officer who called?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Private Lockard was the nearest to the phone and picked it up and spoke to the lieutenant.

Senator GEORGE. You have since learned that the officer who called was a Lieutenant Tyler?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't believe at that time the name was mentioned, but the only thing that I knew was that it was some officer that had called and told Lockard to forget it.

Senator GEORGE. To forget it; just to forget it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. As I recall I never did know the name of the officer until sometime later.

Senator GEORGE. But your best information subsequently secured was that he was Lieutenant Tyler?

[13425] Mr. ELLIOTT. Not at that time.

Senator GEORGE. Not at that time, but I mean since that time. That is your present information, in other words?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Where is he now?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I don't know, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did he remain in the service on the island after the 7th of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't know anything about Lieutenant Tyler, with the exception that he has, as I understand, been promoted through the grades to lieutenant colonel. That is all I happen to know.

Senator GEORGE. I wanted to find out if he had been promoted.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is all that I know of the man in question.

Senator GEORGE. Now, I further understand you were able to follow this flight of planes in until your radar was broken by the projection of the mountains. In other words, you traced them in or followed them in until they were within about 20 miles of the island?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

[13426] Senator GEORGE. Were any other radar stations on the island in operation that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there were. Offhand, I don't know how many. One that I do know definitely of was on until 7 o'clock.

Senator GEORGE. Until 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe they continued on a little after 7 also, and they had a partial record of the flight that we had picked up. It wasn't quite out as far as the one we had picked up because the station itself was right on the coast—it wasn't up higher in the air.

Senator GEORGE. It didn't have the elevation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The efficiency wasn't as great, but that is the only station that I know of that actually picked up any portion of the flight that we recorded that morning.

Senator GEORGE. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Sergeant, what do you mean by the technical term "echo"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The screen goes about a circle—about a 5-inch circle. On this screen you will see a horizontal line, and that horizontal line was broken up from zero to 150 [13427] miles of scale. At the point that the target is hit by the transmission being sent out and referred back to the unit it will come up and there is a break in that line and there extends a vertical line up. Then, by the mechanism on the scope, we bring the air line over to the echo, and that is where you get your mileage. But the echo looks like a straight line, and at a right angle a vertical line up, which is the particular target that you see.

Senator LUCAS. When you first discovered these planes, did you find more than one?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I recall it, there were a couple of other flights, but we only followed the main flight because we had all we could do to follow that one.

Senator LUCAS. Would you care to give the committee an estimate of the number of planes you thought, from radar, was in that flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Any figure that I would say, or that we did have in mind would be only a guess.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that, but it would be interesting to the committee to get the guess, from your experience out there with this radar.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I really don't recall even guessing that there were any particular number. We knew that there were probably more than 50, but, of course, we didn't know. I [13428] mean, it all enters into the picture just how high the plane is flying and just where you strike it, as to the size of the echo you might get.

Senator LUCAS. Now, do you recall when you talked to Private McDonald over the phone, whether you indicated as to the number of planes you thought might be in this flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. There was no definite number stated. It was just that there were many, very many.

Senator LUCAS. Will you recall, and this may have been given before I came in, will you recall again the substance of the conversation that you had over the phone with McDonald?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I called Private McDonald on the administrative line and told him who I was and explained what we had found.

Senator LUCAS. Can you say what language you used? Can you remember the exact language that you used? I don't suppose you do recall.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. As I said before, I said it very nervously, and as to the exact wording, I couldn't say.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I gave him the information that there were a large number of planes coming in, and gave him the location, that is, the reading of those planes.

[13429] Senator LUCAS. Where was the information center on the island located with reference to Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that was down in Fort Shafter. Fort Shafter itself was about, I believe 8 miles from Honolulu.

Senator LUCAS. And Fort Shafter is where General Short and his staff were located?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was the Hawaiian Department headquarters.

Senator LUCAS. You had a direct communication from the radar station to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We had two lines. One, a tactical line was connected directly to the information desk where the individuals would place their targets in respect to the map.

Senator LUCAS. What was your understanding as to what the information center was supposed to do with the information that you sent day after day while you were in that training program?

Mr. ELLIOTT. By plotting the different targets that we sent in, the plotters on the end of the information center would plot the targets on the table with the map.

Directly overhead in a balcony would be the liaison officers and signal officers and they would determine as [13430] they saw the target going up in that locality, each unit, each liaison officer would decide whether it was his flight or not, and if nobody could identify that flight, of course, they had prearranged routes that their planes would be taking, and if no one could identify that flight it was considered an enemy flight.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever learn, Sergeant, whether or not those men who were charged with this responsibility were on duty that morning, December 7, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I had no contact with them. I mean, I assume that they were there. That is all I can say. I didn't have any direct conversation with any of them, to know.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

Now, how long had this training program been going on from 4 to 7 in Hawaii?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I recall, it was going on all the time that we were in operation which was 2 weeks prior to December 7.

Senator LUCAS. Two weeks prior to December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

As to the other units and the time for duty, 4 to 7, I would not be able to state.

Senator LUCAS. Did you get any different information [13431] or orders after November 27, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; none that I can recall.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now these men in the plotting room, these men in that plotting room, as I understand it, were presumed to take your findings and were supposed to work them out, between the hours of 4 and 7 each morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And were they too on duty after 7 o'clock; is that your understanding?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So could it be possible that the reason Lieutenant Tyler said, "Forget it," was because they had no one there to carry through?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It might be interpreted that way.

Senator LUCAS. But anyhow, if these men in the plotting room had taken this intercepted radar message and plotted it properly, there wouldn't have been any question but what they could have probably determined whether or not this particular flight was enemy planes or otherwise?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they could have, but I think it would have possibly reverted to the same thing that came up, and that was the B-17's coming in. It is just my opinion, but I think the Japs knew every move we made.

Unless they considered that it was not the B-17 flight, [13432] as you say, nothing, probably, would have been done about it.

Senator LUCAS. If these men in this room charged with the responsibility of making that determination were there, they undoubtedly would have known how many B-17's were coming in from the coast?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they would have had that information.

Senator LUCAS. And if they had that information and a flight of planes turned up on this radar screen to the extent that you said, possibly 50, then certainly they would have known definitely, under those circumstances, that there was something unusual and probably would have considered it an enemy flight of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I don't believe there were over 14 B-17s.

Was there anything, when you picked up the planes, was there anything in the way the planes were flying so that you could make a determination as to whether or not they might be fighters, pursuit planes, or bombers, or what not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I don't recall offhand how fast they were going. We could have figured it out by the [13433] time element just how fast they were going, but that would not have been our responsibility. I don't know as though we could determine just whether it was a fighter plane going slow or a bomber going faster. But at that time it was very hard to identify whether it was one plane or a large number of planes.

Senator LUCAS. That is testimony in the record. It was difficult, according to the testimony, to determine whether it was a hostile plane or a friendly plane that was coming in.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. As I said, from my knowledge of how the information center worked, the only way they could tell at that time whether it was enemy or a friendly plane, was by checking up on their own flights, and if they didn't have any flight in that particular area, it was considered an enemy plane.

Senator LUCAS. Sergeant, did General Short ever call you to headquarters to talk to you about this?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did Colonel Phillips ever talk to you about this?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

[13434] Senator LUCAS. Did anybody on General Short's staff ever take enough interest in this radar situation to call you and discuss it with you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. They hadn't called me in at all. Private Lockard was called in to speak to the company commander. Whether he spoke to anybody else after he spoke to the company commander I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Did your own company commander ever talk to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; he did not. He called private Lockard only, Private Lockard only testified before the Roberts committee.

Senator LUCAS. You did not. Have you testified before any committee heretofore?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have testified before the Army and Navy committees only.

Senator LUCAS. Your testimony, I presume there, was about the same as you have given here?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; only I have had a little more freedom, so to speak, here.

Senator LUCAS. You feel a little freer with Senators than you do with generals, is that it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Very definitely, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have got on a different uniform [13435] now.

Senator LUCAS. I want to include the Congressman in that, too.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He is wearing a different uniform now.

Senator LUCAS. So after the attack on December the 7th no one in the Army ever discussed this question with you at any time in trying to learn any additional or further information about what happened, until the Army Board got hold of you. I am talking now about anybody in General Short's command or any officer now. I am not talking about any particular private that you probably discussed it with.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't know whether you were in here when I told of the statement.

Senator LUCAS. No, I was not.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, anyhow there was a statement prepared by Lockard and myself to the effect as to what was done on that morning.

Senator LUCAS. Who asked you to prepare that statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was relayed to me through Lockard from the commanding officer, Captain Tetley, when he had gone in to see the company commander.

Senator LUCAS. They merely asked you and Lockard to get together and make a joint statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13436] Senator LUCAS. Nobody ever talked to you individually about it at all?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Mr. ELLIOTT. The statement was very brief.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, Sergeant.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Sergeant.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant, on December 7 it was then Private Lockard and Private Elliott, was it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. And you got your orders from Sergeant Murphy on Saturday, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. There were supposed to be four men out there, weren't there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The set-up originally I believe was set for three.

Mr. MURPHY. You were supposed to have four or five, weren't you? Weren't you supposed to have a crew chief? Weren't you supposed to have somebody plotting? Weren't you supposed to have somebody on the other part of the instrument [13437] and somebody was there watching after the equipment? Farmbeck was supposed to be out watching the equipment, is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They didn't show up, the other two; did they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was not adhered to. I mean the table of organization for the operation of the radar detector unit calls for—I believe it called at that time for five men, one motorman and the other a crew chief and three operators.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. And there were only two there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there were only two.

Mr. MURPHY. How is that? Where were the other three?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that I don't recall, other than just operating short-handed.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, isn't it a fact that you two were only out there to guard the machines with your guns as part of the antisabotage program?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would not go so far as to say that it was part of the program. It was just a—as we understood it a precaution that the company commander was taking for the equipment that was out at that station.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you tell the Army Board that you were there for antisabotage purposes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't recall whether they interpreted it that way or whether I said that or not.

[13438] Mr. MURPHY. Well, we will get your exact language, and I will get to that in a minute.

Now, I notice in that chart, Sergeant, you and Lockard were the only two at the Opana station, and you were there from Saturday noon until 7:39 on Sunday morning. Who was it that plotted those marks, "6:48, 6:45 and 6:51"? What about those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only thing that I can explain of that, as I can recall, was that there were no targets during the scheduled problem.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. The evidence is you had no targets, and while the radio interceptor station was working, in all probability there are enemy scouting planes out, and when you have them and think they are identified, call the interceptor station and tell them while the enemy are at a distance.

Is that a fair question then?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, if those planes were out there and we had them on our chart—

Mr. MURPHY. You had it on your chart, but you never called and told about it; did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not report it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we would have no reason for not [13439] reporting them.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is that you had no chart of any kind and you were there on the machine, you and Lockard, and there are planes out there; there is no evidence that they were our planes. We had no planes to the north, this question of the B-17's, because they did not come in there, and the only thing that is left to infer is that there are enemy scouting planes and they are not turned in to the interceptor station by you or Lockard, are they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if you could produce the chart so that I could verify it to you in my own mind?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Will you produce the chart, please? My only purpose, Sergeant, in asking this question—I don't want to embarrass you. There is some question about that interceptor station working from 4 to 7 and you were only following out the orders you got, weren't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And at that time, that time of the morning was very vital?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Here is planes at 6:30.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. 6:45 is the first one.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

[13440] Mr. MURPHY. That is an important schedule. Now, the actual attack does not come until around 7:30 and the fact is that there are no American planes out to the north and that is to the north of the island and in all probability there are enemy scouting planes out in there and I am wondering, if the interceptor command station is working, why Lockard did not have a message reflected to it of an attack coming, especially in view of the fact that there is so much testimony about the *Ward* sighting a submarine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What good does it do? This boy saw only one flight.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, sir, no one asked him this question and they were both there on the machine. Somebody plotted it and he should know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, nobody asked him about it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, nobody asked him but I think he should be asked about it. We are coming to the end of this hearing.

Who was it, sir, if you know, that made that plot as to those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Why, as I——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is this your plot as you made it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we have the plot that he did make. We have a picture made by officer Murphy, certified to by [13441] Murphy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him go ahead and finish his explanation.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ELLIOTT. This chart was not taken down after the completion of this schedule—I mean this flight at 7:02. That chart was left on the map and it was used on through, I believe for—I think you will find the times on there.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you had there a chart on which plots were made. Did you have a log book?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had the log.

Mr. MURPHY. Did the log book remain there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That would have been——

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't that be the regular procedure, to leave the log book there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And wouldn't it be the regular procedure to leave the log sheet there on December the 7th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you have told counsel that you took that log sheet down and gave it to Captain Upson.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I took the log sheet down. The sheet that I took was a more or less scrap paper report.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever testify——

[13442] Mr. ELLIOTT. I mean it was not the official four to seven scheduled period that we had. It was just something that you plot in on another form.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever testify before any other board that you took that sheet to this captain?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I don't believe that I have.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever say it to anybody until you came into this room?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I told one of the gentleman off the record last night that was talking to me about that.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was that off the record? Who was it on or off? Whom did you talk to for the first time about taking the log sheet down town? Who was it? Name him, please.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe it was you, wasn't it, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. MURPHY. You mean only to counsel, our own counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I had a conversation with him yesterday afternoon.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I am just wondering if that is the one. Who was it that you told yesterday about this log sheet?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have been talking to so many.

Mr. MURPHY. No, you were only talking to one about the log sheet. Who was it? Don't have any hesitancy.



[13443] Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe I talked to Captain Ford also on that.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was it you told about delivering a log sheet to Captain Upson? I am going to go into that.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe it was Mr. Richardson.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the only one?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, when you called that morning Tyler said, "Forget it," didn't he?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; well, that is the information that was passed on to me; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Lieutenant Tyler said, "Forget it"; and the fact is, sir, you thought they were our Navy planes coming in, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; later.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't you say before the other two boards that you thought they were our Navy planes coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also thought that it would be a fine problem if we could have Army interceptor planes go out to meet our own Navy planes as experience; isn't that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; that was an opinion I expressed at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, you testified here about [13444] nervousness on each occasion. Did you have the intimation at that time of morning that those were enemy planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I cannot truthfully say that I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. After Lockard said, "Come on, let's go home" you wanted to stay and you did stay until about 7:30, didn't you, after 7:30?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then the truck came and you went downtown?

Mr. ELLIOTT. To the camp.

Mr. MURPHY. To get breakfast?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And immediately upon getting there you found out that war was on, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And at that time you did not associate your chart at all with the war starting, did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if you would repeat that last question.

Mr. MURPHY. I say at that time when you heard that war had started did you associate the idea of having charted planes up on the hills and Japanese planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. After we found out what had happened we very definitely knew that the flight that we had plotted was the enemy flight.

[13445] Mr. MURPHY. You knew it that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We were fairly sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that what you told the Army board?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't recall telling it to the Army board.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it may not be of any importance, but you have mentioned a captain and there has been a lot of testimony about the failure of the officials, the top command, in getting this information.

Now, you have designated a lieutenant. Maybe I shouldn't mention names. You have designated a Captain Upson, about having given that sheet to him, and you never said a single word about it until 2 weeks ago and you testified you even went downtown and got breakfast after the start of the attack.

Now, that puts a burden on Captain Upson that I want to straighten out, because the papers will carry that story all over America. If you did, I would like to know it. If you did not, I would like to know it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am sure I did not have the question put to me before of what actually became of the record of reading sheets.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you never mentioned the sheet before, did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I—

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to interpose [13446] an objection, but I can't see how this is pertinent or material.

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman himself, Mr. Chairman, has asked a great many questions about that, if the Army knew about this thing and this witness has gone into it and I for one am not going to let some little second lieutenant carry the burden of this thing if it is not lying upon his shoulders, and there is not yet a single word of evidence in this case from Pearl Harbor about that little second lieutenant—maybe he is a big second lieutenant, I don't know; maybe he is a general.

Senator LUCAS. He is a lieutenant colonel now, I know that.

Mr. MURPHY. Maybe he is, but the fact is he is entitled to the same protection as anybody else and I think we ought to get the facts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed, but let us keep to information that you know of your own knowledge, Sergeant.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Sergeant, that was your plot that morning and there were only you and Lockard there and how did you come to put those designations on that plot, if you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean the original chart of that flight?

Mr. MURPHY. No, no; I am going beyond 7:02. Here somebody has charted some planes, apparently, at 6:45, that is a quarter to seven, 6:48, 6:50, 6:51, 6:51½. You two put them on there. There were only two of you there. Who put them on?

[13447] Mr. ELLIOTT. The writing there shown on the record of reading sheets I believe very definitely is my writing; I am very sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, was that that you saw some planes out in there at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The plot would have gone through to the information center. I mean there would be no reason for me and Lockard to hold back any plots.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He is just asking you whether those plots were put on there by you.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Let me see it again.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have it.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Murphy, this is the original signed by Lieutenant Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant, maybe I can help you.

Before the Army Board in question 22 General Frank said :

What I am trying to ascertain is whether on the morning of December 7th there was more activity than usual or whether there was less activity than usual or was it average?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, during out problem on Sunday there was practically no activity at all.

[13448] General FRANK. Prior to this time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Prior to seven o'clock, yes, sir. We had no plots to send in to our information center and had no targets.

General FRANK. That is, on the morning of December 7th. Now, it may be that at that time the Generals did not know about it, it may be that at that time you did not recall these particular indications on there and I do not want to place the responsibility on you.

All of these experts since Pearl Harbor, so far as I can see, have never gotten clear as to what those indications are, and it is getting one record for posterity, and certainly it is on the Board to show on the record what they are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What difference does it make to this Board if somebody else found something else?

Mr. MURPHY. He is the one that charted them on the plots indicating it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What of it?

Mr. MURPHY. The question is. Did he send them downtown?

Mr. RICHARDSON. He certainly knows that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if that had been put on the chart, and he was sure about that, that there were planes out there, and we had no planes out there, and there may have been 20 planes out, he should have sent that information in.

[13449] Well, I won't press it, Sergeant. You made the plot on there. Do you recall whether you called and reported this information that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only comment I can make is if those planes were picked up as a target it would have been reported. We would have been defeating our purpose, especially in getting up at 4 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, probably after 7 o'clock you were getting special training. Did you have the earphones on your ear in connection with the interceptor station before 7? Do you remember that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was it that had the earphones on, or did anybody?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard was the one that had the—that did the visual detecting at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. And then apparently he said something to you and you wrote in these little indications there on the sheet, or was that only practice? Maybe there were no planes, but you plotted it on there. Now, do you remember that?

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield a minute?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; sure.

Senator LUCAS. Does that plot show, 6:48 a. m. or 6:48 p. m. up there? As I recall, there was some testimony, [13450] although I am not certain now—

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if it is his handwriting he was not plotting at night, so it must be morning. He did not go back to plotting.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that may be true.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think you will find on this record-of-reading sheet, I believe the date is put in there and signed by a "Murphy". Will the gentleman take this apart, please?

Mr. MURPHY. May I just say this, Sergeant? The reason I am pursuing this, a witness before the Board here, the very first witness, Admiral Inglis, told us that the Japanese sent out scouting planes. That has not been pursued. It may be that those are the scouting planes; I don't know.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, on the 7th of December, as this record-of-reading sheet indicates and as I have admitted in my own handwriting, with the exception of the date—I don't believe that I put that in there. You notice the difference in the—

Mr. MURPHY. Is it your judgment, Sergeant, that the times indicated there from 6:45 on were in your handwriting?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And is it your judgment that you would not put them on there unless they indicated that there was a plane in that vicinity?

[13451] Mr. ELLIOTT. They would have been on the overlay; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They would have been put on the—

Mr. ELLIOTT. If they were put on this chart here as a target.

Mr. MURPHY. But at any rate if you put it there, by you putting it on there it would indicate that on that morning that in their place there was a plane. Do you have any recollection of it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you know how—

Mr. ELLIOTT. I know now we had—you see, during the problem I don't think it was really necessary at that time to have an overlay. That is, it is very possible that I went ahead and took these readings figuring out where the location was giving me the code names and code letters to forward that information.

Mr. MURPHY. What I mean is you would not put something on that chart that morning if there had not been a plane there to the north of the island at 6:45?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you have no recollection now, or do you have a recollection as to whether you reported that through your head phone set via Lockhart to the station downtown?

[13452] Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I was under the impression, so far as remembering that, that there were no flights at all. If there were, there were very few, as the few here indicates.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, our information is that there were only a few scouting planes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. But you do not have any distinct recollection about reporting that or any conversation in connection with it, do you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No; I am afraid I cannot remember back that far.

Mr. MURPHY. And one of the reasons why your memory is dim now, this is the first time you have been asked about it since December 7, 1941; is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right. The things that happened prior to that time you wouldn't have time to note that, not knowing.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to make it clear, Sergeant. Far be it from me to want to embarrass you. We want to know the facts. And you don't have any recollection. The fact is there is a problem before this committee.

I have no other questions.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. I am through.

[13453] Senator LUCAS. What was the ordinary practice that was followed by you and Lockard when you did find a plane through radar? What would you do about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Regardless of whether it was Lockard and myself or anyone else, the man operating the scope will get a line on the target, lining up the mileage and the antenna to get the azimuth. He will pass that information on to the information, on to the people—

Senator LUCAS. That was done every day that you were out there in the event that you located a plane or more than one plane coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was that part of your duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. To immediately transmit that information on to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And there was no reason why if you did locate these planes at 6:45, 6:48, 6:50, and at 7 that you did not turn that over, that you did not pursue the same course on December 7 that you had pursued at every other time that you had been out there operating this radar equipment?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; and I might explain what seems to be a mix-up here, too, that ordinarily before December 7 I am [13454] sure we did not plot the actual plots on the overlay unless there was a fairly good-sized flight, because we had the record with the information that the scope operator passed over to the plotter and keeping a record of the plots that are made you could retrace any flight that you wanted to mark on there, but the point I am getting at is this: That the flight that we picked up at 7:02, that we had to follow a different course because it was our duty and we followed on that follow-up all the way in.

Senator LUCAS. The only point I am trying to make here to clear up the situation is that up to 7 o'clock on December the 7th, 1941, you pursued and followed the same course that you had been following day after day out there as far as transmitting information down to the information center.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, after 7 o'clock in the morning, when you knew that everybody was off duty and you sighted this big group of planes, you immediately thought that it was necessary to make a special call on that and get it to the information center and you so did?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I might make the comment, too, that so far as reporting to the information center, regardless of whether it

was a distinct overlay, as long as it was on those record of reading sheets that would have been [13455] reported to the plotter at the information center. I mean there would be no point in writing these records down and not send it in.

Senator LUCAS. And, of course, you couldn't tell if you did plot these planes at 6:45 whether it was an enemy plane or whether it was one of our planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we couldn't tell that.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. I took you off before.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the paper which the witness has in his hand, which indicates the 6:45 mark and the others that are in his own handwriting, be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be done and spread on the record now as part of the record.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that it be a photostatic copy because it is in his own handwriting.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the counsel will take care of that.

(The document, subsequently introduced as "Exhibit No. 155," is included in this committee's exhibits.)

[13456] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Elliott, I was called out of the room for a short time.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Some of the questions that I want to ask you might have been asked heretofore.

First of all I want to know about your tour of duty on this machine on the 6th and on the 7th.

Mr. ELLIOTT. How do you mean that? You mean to explain it to you?

Mr. GEARHART. Well, what I mean is what hours did you go on duty with the machine and what hour did you leave it on the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I see. On the 6th of December we were sent out there to relieve two men, to so to speak, guard the unit. We were armed with .45 pistols.

Mr. GEARHART. You mean to guard the unit or operate the unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, to guard the unit.

Mr. GEARHART. All right; what time of the day did you arrive there on the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was around 12 noon. We relieved the two men and in sending us out there we were to remain there and at 4 o'clock the next morning we were to operate our scheduled [13457] operating period, 4 to 7 a. m.

Mr. GEARHART. Do I understand you correctly, you arrived out there at noon on the 6th with instructions to guard the machines until 4 the next morning and at 4 the next morning you were with Lockard to operate the machine; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir. I might explain about this guarding the unit. It was no walking guard post; it was not considered as such. That is the impression that we had. The impression that we had was that there were just to be men there in case anything came up, any prowlers around or anything like that and that is the reason







we had the gun there, but so far as any walking guard, or patrolling around there was brought up, there was nothing like that. It was just that somebody should be there and we got arms in case any prowler came around.

Mr. GEARHART. And you and Lockard were there from noon on the 6th day of December 1941 until 4 a. m. on the 7th day of December 1941 and during that time the machine was not operated at all?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The machine between 12 noon and 4 a. m.; the machine was not operated; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it warmed up?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not that I recall.

[13453] Mr. GEARHART. Did you enter the compartment in which the machine was contained between those hours that I have just mentioned?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had trouble with the oil pump on the generator motor in the power plant.

Mr. GEARHART. You spent some of that time repairing those particular items?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we repaired the oil pump.

Mr. GEARHART. How long did it take you to repair the oil pump on Saturday?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It took a good part of the afternoon.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that the reason why the machine was not operating for the entire day, or was it because you were not supposed to operate it that day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't believe there were any direct orders not to operate it. It just was not operated.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there was an officer's tent, war tent, near the mobile instrument, wasn't there, and that is where you slept that night?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Lieutenant Lockard slept there that night, too?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard at that time, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Private at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How were you awakened? By an alarm clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When was that set for?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Off-hand I do not recall. I imagine around a quarter of 4.

Mr. GEARHART. And when you got up did you have to do anything to the radar instrument to prepare it for service beginning at 4 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; as I recall, we had some small work to finish up on the oil pump. I believe we had worked through until it was dark and we stopped work on it, and all there was left was just to make the connections, and we planned to do that in the morning.

Mr. GEARHART. It was still dark at a quarter of 4, wasn't it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As soon as you were awake did you start to work on your oil pump?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13460] Mr. GEARHART. Before 4 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have the machine ready to operate at 4 o'clock in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We went on the air at 4:15, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You went on the air before you had completed the oil pump repair?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we finished our oil pump repair and reported on the air approximately 4:15.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. 4:15.

Mr. GEARHART. Then these repairs delayed you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Fifteen minutes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you went on the air?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now you said you came on duty, in reference to that machine, at noon on the 6th, the day before?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now had the men you relieved at that time been operating the machine, or had they merely been on guard on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure as to whether they operated it. [13461] I believe they did plotting. They knew how to do it, but they had them assigned there and that was their duty, their straight duty, was to remain there 24 hours a day.

Mr. GEARHART. But you don't know whether or not these men that you relieved at noon on the 6th were operating the machine or merely guarding it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And under your general orders you could have operated it after 12 o'clock if you wanted to and the instrument had been usable?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I am sure we could have.

Mr. GEARHART. You are definite on the point that you put the machine in operation at 4 or 4:15 o'clock in the morning of the day following?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you kept it in operation until 7 on the morning of the 7th day of December 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now there is some confusion in my mind in reference to the hours under which you were working. Did you have a different tour of duty on Sundays and holidays from that which you had on week days?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean in connection with the time for the problem from 4 to 7?

[13462] Mr. GEARHART. The operation of the machine.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that was the same through the week, 4 to 7 in the morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, how many days had you been with Lockard assigned to that machine prior to the 7th day of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. For actual operation, 2 weeks, and for setting up the unit another 2 weeks. We moved out there just about a month before December 7.

Mr. GEARHART. Now you want me to understand now that the hours during all that 2 weeks for the operation of that machine were from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I have testified before, I am not sure just how long we had been working from 4 to 7. I believe that all the time we were out there in those 2 weeks we operated from 4 to 7, but I am not positive.

Mr. GEARHART. Now are you willing to say, as a matter of fact, that on weekdays the operation hours were from 7 in the morning until 5 in the afternoon, and that it was only on Sundays and holidays that you operated from 4 in the morning to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not as I recall it; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I happen to have the sworn testimony of Lt. Joseph Lockard before me, in which these [13463] questions were propounded and to which he gave these answers:

Q. They were operating with approximately six men?

A. That is right. There were approximately six men of our unit. We had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 9 o'clock.

I think that 9 o'clock should have been "5," from the text.

Q. Nobody operated at night time, so far as you know?

A. If there was an alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something of that kind, there was a night operation.

Q. From 7 to 5, except for lunch periods, you were on daily?

A. Yes, during the week.

Q. Sunday was a day off normally?

A. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.

Q. When did you first arrive on the island—

and so forth.

Now, that is the testimony of Private Lockard at that time, which is very definitely in conflict with that which you tell us now. Could you make a mistake of that wide variation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not think I could have more than he [13464] could have. I make this testimony from what I remember. As I remember it, we worked from 4 to 7 in the morning straight through on a problem, as we had been scheduled throughout the week and also on Sunday. That is from what I remember. I may be wrong, I don't know.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you have been asked to make statements about this affair on several different occasions, haven't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the first time you made a statement about it was shortly after the event, wasn't it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there ever an investigation conducted in which you testified or wherein you were not asked what was your tour of duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In explaining my tour of duty, I do not recall whether I was asked about the other days of the week or not.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, are you willing to say that Lieutenant Lockard was entirely wrong when he said it was only on Sundays and holidays that they started the machine in operation at 4 in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I would not know what to say on that, sir. The only thing I can say again is, as I remember it, we operated from

4 to 7 every day, and that that was our scheduled operating period for our problem. That is as I remember it.

[13465] Mr. GEARHART. You remember now that you were on this assignment from the first day of December 1941, at least. You first said about 2 weeks, but you are certain you were on for 1 week prior to December 7, aren't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean as to operating myself?

Mr. GEARHART. No; that you were on this particular assignment with Private Lockard.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That may have varied at any time. I mean they could have assigned Lockard and someone else. We did not work as a particular team. Any man in the unit could work with Lockard.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

How many of the days of the first week of December did you work with Private Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I cannot recall either.

Mr. GEARHART. How many nights during the first week of December 1941 did you sleep in this officer's tent at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only the 1 night, sir, the Saturday night before Sunday, December 7.

Mr. GEARHART. Then do you want to tell me that you did not work on that instrument from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock every day on the first week of December, including the morning of the 7th?

[13466] Mr. ELLIOTT. I cannot recall that either, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact you do not know what the tour of duty was on those instruments on Sundays and holidays, do you; it might be just as the then Private Lockard pointed out; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That could be correct; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, when I returned to the room, I heard you testify when 7 o'clock arrived there that morning—

The CHAIRMAN. You are going into another phase of it. It is now 12:30.

Mr. GEARHART. I am perfectly willing to suspend here.

However, it is only 12:20.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. GEARHART. As I came in you were testifying when 7 o'clock arrived, Lieutenant Lockard, then Private Lockard, was about to turn the machine off, and you said, "No, let it go on for a while."

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How is that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. Why did you want it to go on a while?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Because I was there for instruction purposes. I was there to learn more about the unit, and since [13467] we had had the unit on from 4 until 7, disregarding the 15 minutes late, I figured on continuing operating, that he could give me the instruction that I desired.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you want this committee to understand that the only reason why the machine was continued in operation after 7 o'clock on the morning of the 7th was because you asked Private Lockard for an opportunity for a little extra training on the instrument?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was prearranged. Permission was obtained from Sergeant Murphy, our platoon sergeant, and that was

the understanding, that I was to get further training after the problem, that we were to continue on the air.

Mr. GEARHART. But you had been on that instrument from 4 o'clock in the morning, clear down to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did not you consider that training enough in one period?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was training in one field, sir. There was more than one type of training on the job. I was very familiar with plotting. The training I was to get was the operation of the scope where you actually detect the planes.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, has not this idea of additional training, your continuing on the instrument after the hour [13468] of 7, been suggested to you by a number of other people as something you might say to explain for having stayed on the instrument? Has anybody suggested to you that that would be a good explanation that you might give?

Mr. ELLIOTT. For picking up planes, you mean, on December 7?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. He is asking you whether somebody told you what to say.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as a matter of fact, did not you stay on that instrument, and, as a matter of fact, is it not true that it was not turned off for the sole and only reason that the truck that was to take you to breakfast had not arrived?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you read that question to him?

Mr. GEARHART. It is a little complicated. I will ask it in a simpler form.

As a matter of fact, did not that instrument continue in operation simply because the truck that was going to take you to breakfast had not yet arrived?

Mr. ELLIOTT. There also is some discrepancy—not discrepancy, but I do not recall exactly what the set-up was in this truck coming back. Originally, it was intended that we were to stay there until 12 o'clock. I believe when [13469] we called—when I called through the administration line, we had to call to our platoon, and they put us on through to the information center, and it was at that time, I believe that we were told instead of working until 12 noon, as was previously stated, we would only work until 8.

Then, after 7, why, we continued the operation.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, haven't you testified here before that the reason the instrument stayed in operation, the reason why you did not turn it off, was simply because the truck that was supposed to take you to breakfast had not yet arrived?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not recall making that statement; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, reading further the testimony of now Lieutenant Lockard, then Private Lockard—

Mr. ELLIOTT (interposing). Pardon me, sir. What testimony is that of Private Lockard? To which board or committee?

Mr. GEARHART. Testimony by Private Lockard given to the Office of the Chief Signal Officer in the Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., on October 30, 1944.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I see, sir.

Mr. GEARHART (reading) :

Q. As you were operating this thing, [13470] you did not see anything at all until about two minutes after 7. When 7 o'clock came what did you say to Elliott?

A. We mentioned the fact that the truck had not arrived, and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

Is that correct, or is that incorrect?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not know how much my word is against his, but in my opinion, if he made that statement, he lied, because at 7 o'clock he had already started to shut down the unit, and it was put on again through my efforts. The unit was already being turned off at 7 o'clock when we were told by the information center that the problem was over.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, will you say that his statement here, plain as day, is a lie?

Answer. We mentioned the fact that the truck had not arrived, and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I personally think it would have been more comfortable laying in the grass than working inside.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then you are saying that that is a lie?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman. I do not think the witness ought to be required to say that any [13471] testimony that has been taken is a lie.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, the witness has injected that word. I haven't.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the witness did.

Mr. GEARHART. He said Lieutenant Lockard lied, and I am asking if this is one of those lies, since he has used a shortening of the word. Is it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I was not following you, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I guess you were not following very much of anything, even then.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the member of the committee disputing the fact that this radar instrument was in operation?

Mr. GEARHART. I will not ask you again to pass upon the veracity of Lieutenant Lockard, since I think you have already done so.

Q. Then, you tracked it to about 22 miles. By that time the truck had arrived?

A. No. By that time we had lost it in the permanent distortion.

Q. You cut off the machine?

A. We looked around a little further for somebody else and did not see anything, so we closed down the machine.

Q. Had the truck arrived by that time?

A. Yes.

[13472] Is that a correct statement of what occurred at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The unit was closed, and off the air before the truck arrived. We were taking our bedding along to the officer's tent that you referred to, and were preparing to get on the truck when it arrived, but the unit was definitely shut down between 20 minutes of 8 and a quarter of 8. That was the time that we went off the air.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I just want to ask you this question in conclusion.

You had no regular written order telling you when you should be operating the machine and when you should be just there guarding the machine; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; that was just a verbal order.

Mr. GEARHART. Who gave you those verbal orders?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was passed on to us by Sergeant Murphy, the sergeant in charge of the platoon.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, where did you work on the 5th, 4th, and 3d of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. There again, I don't recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you assigned to operate other machines besides the one which was at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I was not.

[13473] Mr. GEARHART. During the last week of November and the first week of December, your only connection with a radar instrument was the portable machine which was stationed at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you are not able to tell us whether or not your tour of duty was different on weekdays from the Sundays and holidays which occurred in that 2 weeks' period?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have made my statement from my memory. If my memory isn't right, why I don't know just what else I can say.

As I recall it, we worked from 4 o'clock in the morning until 7. That is, on the problem.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you went on duty on the afternoon of Saturday, or noontime Saturday?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And did not do anything but repair the instrument until the following morning at 4. Who told you to put it on at 4 the following morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Those were our instructions from Sergeant Murphy, to go on the air at 4 o'clock. That was understood that we were to work from 4 to 7.

Mr. GEARHART. How long had you been under training [13474] for this kind of work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Approximately a month and a half.

Mr. GEARHART. Where were you trained? At Schofield Barracks?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Partially, yes, sir. Partially there and partially in the field, after the unit was set up.

Mr. GEARHART. Was Lieutenant Lockard or Private Lockard, in those days, under training with you at the same places?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would not say he was under training. I do not recall that he was.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, he had been under training way back the previous June, had he not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I imagine he had.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, you regarded him as an expert in radar operation, did you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In the operation I might have; yes, sir. He knew how to do it. I don't know how much of an expert I would call him.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, he did the operational work, did he not, and you did the plotting and recording?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And he had supervision of your work as well, did he not?

[13475] Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 1:30 o'clock.

You be back then, Sergeant.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the committee recessed to 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[13476]

AFTERNOON SESSION—1:30 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Sergeant Elliott.

### TESTIMONY OF GEORGE E. ELLIOTT, JR. (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Sergeant, you had a sheet of paper there this morning. Would you let me know what that is? You said you had some figures on it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That is a record-of-readings sheet. It has on it the log of all the plots that you make of the targets at the time that you make them.

Senator FERGUSON. And was that sheet made daily by the people who operated the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was made daily by the plotter.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would it show what time the machine was operating, what time you started to work, and what time you quit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I don't believe that is covered on the log. The only indication that you would have there is the time of the plots.

In other words, the first plot to the last plot would give you, the interceding plots, would give you the time.

[13477] Senator FERGUSON. But it wouldn't indicate when you were working on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; it wouldn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we have heard a lot about decorations from various witnesses. Were you decorated during the war in any way?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have received a letter of commendation from Lieutenant General Emmons, Major Tinker, and Brigadier General Davidson, of the Hawaiian Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that for the part you took in the events on the morning of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, your fellow private who was there, what decorations did he get for what he did at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only one that I know of that he has is the Distinguished Service Medal.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he got it for his conduct that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Distinguished Service Medal.

Do you know whether Lieutenant Tyler, the officer that was called on the telephone, received also the Distinguished Service Medal for his part?



[13478] Mr. ELLIOTT. That I don't know, whether he did or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you told us something about a statement that you made. Did you sign that statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us the substance of what was in that statement outside of what you told us this morning that they wanted you to certify that there were three men there and in fact there were only two?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The statement, in substance, was that. As I mentioned this morning it was very brief. We didn't break it up actually into things that were done.

In other words, such as him doing the scoping and I doing the plotting. We just put down "we" picked up this flight and "we" gave the time, and so forth. It was very brief.

Senator FERGUSON. How many pages?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It only covered one page. I believe it was double-spaced type.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you sworn to it or not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe I was, by the officer that I signed it before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it purport to state what had taken place that morning as far as you seeing this flight was concerned?

[13479] Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. Are you speaking of myself individually?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What was in the statement.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No. Everything was "we."

Senator FERGUSON. It was a joint statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was a joint statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am not quite clear on this record as to when you went back to where the machine was at Opana.

Mr. ELLIOTT. We arrived around 8 o'clock. The attack had been going on for about 5 minutes or so. The time element there was only the length of time enough to get our belongings or equipment and to get back on the truck and get back out to the unit which I imagine did not take more than a half-hour, to get back there.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say that around 8:30 to 9 o'clock you were back to the radar station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in a position at that time to ascertain if it was then being operated by some other men?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was being operated by other men; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you near the station; did you see any plotting then?

[13480] Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I didn't. You see, having our camp 9 miles away, we didn't have any living facilities at the unit itself. We went out there and started clearing off some ground to put up the tents.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you didn't pay attention to what they were doing on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not until my next tour of duty, which was much later in the day.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand this machine that you had, this radar, you couldn't tell the number of planes but by the sound wave you could tell there were a great number of planes, or more than two or three planes, is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not by the sound wave. By the visual electrical impulse which you see.

Senator FERGUSON. By the impulse?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We could tell that there was probably more than ordinarily by the size of the echo.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, "ordinary" doesn't mean much to the committee at the present moment. More than how many?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I testified this morning it may have been 50 to 100, but I couldn't say.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you indicate when you telephoned [13481] in any way that your machine showed 50 or 100?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not by number, but just explaining that there were a large number of planes. I mean, we knew there were a larger number of planes than ordinarily.

Senator FERGUSON. So instead of the number being used the word "large" was used, the adjective "large"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or "many." Which was it? Was it "large" or "many"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Large.

Senator FERGUSON. Large?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there was a plat shown you this morning, a tissue plat. Do you recall that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I have it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that the original paper that you made or used on the morning of the 7th of December, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator FERGUSON. Your own handwriting or markings are on there; is that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice that the line of flight was not as regular as this one on this chart that was [13482] made for us. Would you put those dots on that paper that is now before you.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that would be an accurate chart of everything that happened up until 7:40 as far as you were concerned that morning.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And after that, of course, you allowed the paper to remain on the machine so that some other private or some officer would use it from that time on?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were only speaking of it as of the time that you left there, which was about a quarter to 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I now ask that this original paper be made an exhibit in this case.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any reason, Sergeant, why you wish to keep that as your personal property? This is the original.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is a part of the files. It doesn't belong to this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the original be filed as an exhibit.

Mr. MASTEN. 155.

[13483] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 155.")

Senator FERGUSON. Sergeant, I have only a few other questions. On these markings, that is, 6:48 and 6:45, and the one that hasn't a number, could they be more than one plane, do you know? That doesn't designate one plane or more than one, does it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; that is one of the flights that I referred to, it was less or out of the ordinary—I mean it was ordinary.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an ordinary flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was an ordinary flight. I mean there was no exceptional echo on the scope.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this map show how far out the plane to our left on this map, 6:48, would be from your station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It doesn't show on the map. I mean, on the overlay. You would have to have the map in the radius room that this chart was made from. You see, the overlay is marked with two of the grids of the particular map that was used.

Senator FERGUSON. With a scale on it, is that what it is? [13484] The overlay has a scale on it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The scale has been put in later. That was not on on December 7. We didn't put any scale rule on there. The scale that we used on the plotting table was just the radius rod, which is calibrated in miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you estimate the distance from this 6:48 to your Opana station here?

Mr. MURPHY. There are two 6:48's on there.

[13485] Senator FERGUSON. I mean the one to our left as we are looking at this map.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would judge about 95 miles.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear any conversation there on the day after you went back that they had used this machine to follow out the Japanese planes as they were leaving the island going back?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe they tracked some of the planes.

However, it was pretty much of a mixed-up affair. I mean they were dispersed. I mean, they didn't come—they didn't go out in the same formation that they came in. And I think that what happened was that they had plots here and there, and it was just almost impossible to keep up with all of the targets as they left the island of Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, after they got out, looking at the plot before you, there are some planes at 10:39, 10:27—you see them on that plot before you, going north? Are they on your original map?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am just wondering whether you are under the impression that the two targets you point out there are at that mileage away from the island. There is no indication up here. It would be very—I retract that. I see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on your original map. Do you [13486] see those chartings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a way on the machine to know whether a plane is coming in to the machine or going out, is there not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Very definitely.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the people operating the machine would be able to determine if there were planes leaving, as shown by this plat, that they were going north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That machine only had two methods of reaching the center, and they were both by telephone, there were no other means of communication. No teletype?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just by telephone?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Just by the two telephone lines; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew of no bombing in the vicinity of where you were working with this machine, so as to interrupt the telephones, so far as the center was concerned?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You are speaking of after the attack?

[13487] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was the communications center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Down at Fort Shafter.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was bombed?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I don't. I really couldn't say.

Senator FERGUSON. There was communication by road between Opana and Fort Shafter?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I understand that there was.

Senator FERGUSON. About how many miles; do you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Offhand, about 50 miles away from Fort Shafter.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is there anything that you could tell us here today that we haven't asked you about that may be of benefit to us on this question?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there is one point.

In reading the Roberts report, it states in there in substance that a noncommissioned officer was instructing a private and at that time there was no noncommissioned officer involved. Private Lockard and myself, both privates, were there only.

However, when Private Lockard was called into the Roberts committee, a staff sergeant went along with Private [13488] Lockard, although I don't know whether he went before the committee.

Now, this staff sergeant was put in charge of the unit sometime during the day of December 7, over the Sergeant Murphy that had been in charge.

And, as I stated before, I don't know whether he testified before the Roberts committee, although I do know that he went in with Private Lockard, together, the day that he testified.

Senator FERGUSON. I have the language now before me, and I wonder whether this is the language you are talking about.

On page 11 of the Roberts report:

A non-commissioned officer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed to remain at one of the stations and was granted leave to do so. At about 7:02, he discovered what he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east of north of Oahu at a distance of about 130 miles.

Was that the sentence that you had in mind?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted to state that there were no commissioned officers, two privates were all that were there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

[13489] Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. I shall be very brief.

I gather from your testimony, Mr. Elliott, that you were operating this radar equipment fundamentally for training purposes, is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you went out to this particular task did you get instructions from any superior officer as to what you were to do and what reports you were to make, if any?

Mr. ELLIOTT. None other, sir, than just the reporting of any targets that we had found.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, who gave you those instructions?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that came down through the chain of command from the commanding officer.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, you were directed to report any targets which you found in the operation of this machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when were you to make the reports—immediately?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; as soon as possible.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is why that phone on the chart board was there on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was the main purpose of our [13490] training, was getting that information as soon as could be possible to the information center.

Mr. KEEFE. So that it was considered to be part of your training to be able to spot a plane or a target, as you say, and to immediately report that, with the necessary directions and distances, and so on, to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that if the occasion came when it was necessary to utilize that information in that field you would be trained to perform properly; is that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you had no ideas that there were any Jap planes liable to come in on Oahu that day; did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You hadn't any idea as a private in the United States Army that there was any thought of an attack on Oahu imminent or liable to take place?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that as far as your charting these targets on your report, it was merely routine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. It was more or less of a theoretical problem.

Mr. KEEFE. And you would have made your report whether those were Jap planes or American planes just the same?

[13491] Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. But I understood your testimony to be that you were concerned because of the large number of targets that showed up; is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that caused you some concern and some nervousness, as you said, when you reported it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if there had only been an ordinary number of targets, three or four or five, you would have reported that exactly the same way; would you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is definitely right.

Mr. KEEFE. How soon after you observed the planes or targets, as you have described, would you normally report to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would judge offhand 30 to 45 seconds.

Mr. KEEFE. So that I assume that when you found out later that the planes that you had noticed on your machine turned out to be Jap planes you were as much surprised as anybody else?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

[13492] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant Elliott, I notice on the chart there there are two 6:48's, so that would indicate that at least at that moment you sighted on your machine at least one plane in each of those locations; isn't that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir, if the times are both the same day.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I understand that that shows December 7. I will just show you what I mean.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that this overlay here will show a little more than December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there is a plane there, or at least a pip in there at 6:48, there is another 6:48. Would that mean that you found a plane here, at least one plane here and another plane here at the same time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is possible; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And would you know whether or not there was one plane or several planes in each of those places?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Depending on the size of the echo.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, assuming there was only two or three, you couldn't tell the difference from whether it was one there, could you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not at all.

Mr. MURPHY. Then I notice on this 6:58 and 6:59 there [13493] are red stars instead of white. Do you know what that would indicate?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if I may examine the chart?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; I wish you would, take your time. 6:58 and 6:59, as well as these three over here, 7:40, 7:43, and 7:53, are indicated by red stars, whereas the others are indicated by white blocks. Was there any set procedure as to one having a red star and the other having a white block that you know of?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; none that I know of.

Mr. MURPHY. I have one other thing. In answer to the Senator from Michigan you said that those at 6:48 were ordinary. By that you mean ordinary in size; is that it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one question, Sergeant. You were asked this morning about the testimony of Private Lockard in regard to the truck being late arriving at the station and also about some suggestion that it would have been more comfortable out on the grass than on the inside of the station.

Regardless of that, whether it would have been more comfortable or not on the grass, or whether the truck was late, the station was in operation at the time you have testified and it was taking these readings that you have described here [13494] to the committee?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. No matter what the cause of your delay in getting away from the station, whether you had prearranged to stay until 8 o'clock or whether the truck was late or whether it would have been more comfortable somewhere else, you were at the station and at the machine taking these readings as these planes came in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Private Lockard was there with you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There was one other question, but I have forgotten what it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel wishes to ask a question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sergeant, you did put the information which came in over your radar station on this plot that you have been examining here all morning and at the time you saw these ships coming in from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You are referring to the 7:02 plot?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, did you take off at the same time a log which would be a station record showing the progress of [13495] those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what was the paper, if any, that you took in with you that you gave to your platoon commander when you came to camp at 8 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was a copy of the record of reading sheets with the recorded plots on them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the log that you took remained in the station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I do not know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The one that you took in and gave to the company commander showing that was not the official record?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; there was no official record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any other record of the progress of the planes by way of a log, except the one you gave to your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are sure you gave that paper to him when you came to your camp at 8 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we gave it to him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That it all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask a question just to be sure?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[13496] Mr. KEEFE. I don't know a great deal about radar.

Would your scope—I believe you referred to it?

Mr. GEARHART. Oscilloscope.

Mr. KEEFE. Oscilloscope, would that show a ship that came on the surface of the water?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it would. Ordinarily you cannot pick up a ship at sea I would say over 30 some miles out because the ship is over the horizon and it is an impossibility to do that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if there was in fact a ship within that 30 mile visibility limit that you have expressed, it would show on your oscilloscope; would it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It might even be a whale surfacing; might it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It could; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or a submarine if it came to the surface.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't want to be quoted on that. I believe it would; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But as to planes, they would show on the oscilloscope at a greater distance because of the visibility above the horizon; is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not necessarily. I mean if you had a plane 30 miles out, the size of the echo would probably be much [13497] larger than an ordinary ship at sea at the same distance.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am thinking of these pips or targets or whatever it is that shows on this oscilloscope that you can see visually.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You also hear; do you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; you do not hear.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, these pips would be large or small, depending upon the distance away?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Depending upon distance and the size of the object.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, sergeant, the lower the approaching object gets, the closer it goes to the surface of the sea or the land that you are looking over, the harder it is to pick it up with your radar; is it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct as to the training that we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the fact that you could see these planes first 137 miles away showed they had a pretty good elevation in the air; did it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13498] Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you estimate what that elevation was?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I could not.



Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of the echo throughout your testimony here. You referred to the echo. That is not a sound that you yourself heard. It is the registration on this instrument of the sound made by the planes at the distance? .

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not hear that at all but you would see it as it is recorded on this chart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. We call it an electrical impulse or an echo.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not an echo as we——

Mr. ELLIOTT. Or it is commonly called a pip.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not an echo as we understand an echo that we hear?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I am sorry I have thrown you off.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted that explained. Thank you very much, Sergeant. We appreciate your willingness to come here and give your testimony and you are now excused.

Senator BREWSTER. Perhaps one question. I haven't been here much of the day. There has been a round robin questioning and maybe this has been asked before. Is there anything [13499] further that you know, that you have not been queried about, that you think would be helpful?

The CHAIRMAN. He was asked that by Senator Ferguson.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I believe that I do not have any more. I appreciate gratefully being called here. I just came down as an observer yesterday and I certainly did not intend to be here today and neither did my boss.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is your home now?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Long Branch, N. J., sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your occupation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am with the New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As a construction clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. I see, all right. Thank you very much.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Thank you again, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to call Captain Creighton.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain Creighton, please come forward.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. We discussed the probability of Lieutenant Lockard being called as a witness in this case and I have [13600] ascertained that he has business that will consume the entire day. In view of this situation and the conflicts on some of the points in the testimony of the witness who has just left the chair, I think we should include the testimony of Lieutenant Lockard at this point in the record.

I have a copy of the transcript of his testimony given on October 30, 1944, in my hand. I ask that it be included in the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that given in any of our reports, Congressman?

Mr. GEARHART. No; it is in addition. This is a special investigation conducted by the Signal Corps in preparation for the writing of a history of that part of the Army.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that it at least is of the grade of the Clausen affidavits, to say the least. I do not see any objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I see no objection to making it part of the record at this point.

(The testimony of Lieutenant Lockard referred to follows:)

[13501]

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSCRIPT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LT. JOSEPH LOCKARD (SIGNAL CORPS—SCAWH), WHO, ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, DETECTED THE APPROACH OF JAPANESE PLANES TO PEARL HARBOR

Place of examination: Conference room: Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., October 30, 1944.

[13502]

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT LOCKARD

FRASER. When you were in the islands, there were six 270-B's; were installed?

LOCKARD. There were no 270-A's. The 270-A was a unit that was initially designed. We never had any of them. There were only six units on the island.

F: That was the latest machine available?

L: It was the latest available to us. They may have had other equipment in the laboratories, but it was not yet available to us.

F: They were operating with approximately six men?

L: That is right. There were approximately six men per unit. We have six in ours. We operated from 7 to 5 o'clock.

F: Nobody operated at nighttime so far as you know.

L: If there was an alert or if maneuvers were going on or something of that kind, there was night operation.

F: From 7 to 5, except for lunch periods, you were on daily?

L: Yes, during the week.

F: Sunday was a day off normally?

L: We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.

F: When did you first arrive on the islands.

[13503] L: I landed on December 10, 1940.

F: You were really there only three days under a year.

L: That is right.

F: Did George Elliott come there at that time.

L: I don't know. He was an Air Corps man.

F: How old was he?

L: About 21 or 22.

F: What was the first job assigned to you when you arrived in 1940?

L: At that time, I went directly to this particular outfit that I was with all the time I was here. At that time we had no equipment and were carrying on training and a program similar to Signal line-up.

F: Was there instruction in the use of the 270-B's.

L: No, because we had no equipment.

F: Did your instruction cover any sort of machine at all or was it all of a general nature?

L: We were at that time conducting a company school in radio theory. Most of our operation was as a radio Signal company. We had the old 171 and 131's, a small field transmitter.

F: What is the maximum range of these equipments?

L: The 171 is good for ten miles. We are lucky if we get two or three miles out of the 131. Those are actually World War I sets.

[13504] F: When did the first radars arrive?

L: They came in July and there were six of them, all 270-B's.

F: You went right to work learning how to use them?

L: No. One of these units was set up adjacent to the company area. No one seemed to know too much about them. We had the manuals which came with them. We proceeded to learn the functioning and operation of the equipment. The entire company was trained in the operation.

F: Was there somebody there who really knew how to operate the equipment from the beginning?

L: I don't know. There didn't seem to be too much information available. Shortly thereafter, Lieut. Bell came over. He was very familiar with the equipment.

F: Did he train the men in the operation of the equipment?

L: No. He was more interested in the maintenance and logging and the operational abilities of the equipment.

F: Was there a school or course which trained the men?

L: There was no established school. The company was running the training program.

F: Is Col. Murphy whom you speak of the Colonel William H. Murphy who was killed in an automobile accident in Florida last winter?

L: I don't know if it was he or someone else.

F: Is it very difficult to learn to operate a 270-B?

[13505] L: No. The biggest problem in the operational function is that of being able to distinguish and interpret the pictures which appear upon the screen.

F: I suppose to set down the log and track would take some mechanical knowledge.

L: No.

F: Do you recall if any of these machines were out of order while you were there?

L: Certainly. No machine is mechanically perfect. We had to do most of our own maintenance at first.

F: Do you recall when you first started using the particular machine that you were using on December 7?

L: It was about the middle of November. The unit was set up at Schofield Barracks and we dismounted it and moved it to Opana and set it up there.

F: Was there any particular reason why they moved the equipment?

L: It had been set up at Schofield for purposes of training. We were living in the old Chemical Warfare Barracks in Opana. It was set up right in that vicinity. It wasn't sent to Schofield for operational purposes. It was used merely for training. After we moved the equipment to Opana, we were doing our training on the job. As new individuals came into the outfit who hadn't had the training, they were allocated for training.

[13506] F: Did you train Elliott?

L: I helped.

F: You had been working on that machine since about Thanksgiving Day?

L: I guess so. Yes.

F: When you speak of a truck that was supposed to come, was it a regular army truck?

L: It was what is called a four by four.

F: It came every Sunday or holiday morning to pick up whoever was operating the machine and carry them back to wherever they were living?

L: We hadn't been under that set-up for too long a time prior to that date. We didn't usually operate on Sunday. We had been doing it for only three or four weeks.

F: Did you have any written instructions as to whom to report to, if you saw anything extraordinary on the scope?

L: No.

F: On that particular Sunday morning, you were sleeping in a small tent almost next to the machine. Was it any particular type of tent?

L: It was an officer's war tent.

F: Then you had to walk only a few feet to the 270-B?

L: Yes.

[13507] F: How was the equipment housed?

L: It was a mobile unit, mounted on two trucks. The trucks are van-type.

F: The antenna is the same antenna they have on all 270-B's?

L: Yes.

F: In order to operate the machine, you had to mount the truck?

L: We had to unlock the vans and open them.

F: There was nothing in this van except the machine itself?

L: That is right.

F: Was Elliott doing the actual computation or were you?

L: I was doing the computation. Elliott was doing the plotting and keeping the log.

F: What do you mean by "operating the equipment"?

L: Operations consist of controlling the movement of the antenna and reading the information from the oscilloscope, both on the screen and on its mileage scale.

F: As you were operating this thing, you didn't see anything at all until about two minutes after seven. When seven o'clock came, what did you say to Elliott?

L: We mentioned the fact that the truck hadn't arrived and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

F: At about two minutes after seven, you were the first [13508] to notice anything on the scope?

L: Yes.

F: You noticed it as a big thing coming up?

L: Yes.

F: What did you say to Elliott when you first saw that thing?

L: I don't know offhand. I asked him to look at it. I thought at first there was something wrong with the equipment.

F: That was at a range of 136 miles?

L: Approximately.

F: You kept observing it to 132 miles and at 132 miles you decided to call?

L: We reported it in at 132 miles. We had accomplished all the preliminaries to a telephone conversation. It takes a relatively short amount of time to check the equipment.

[13509] F: Can you estimate the time elapsed between 136 miles and 132 miles?

L: An average airplane travels three miles a minute. It was about one minute and a half.

F: Then you called the main switchboard operator. When you told this fellow you had something you wanted to report—

L: Yes, I called the switchboard operator and told him I wanted to report. I asked if there was anyone around the Information Center. He said they had all left. I asked him to find somebody.

F: Do you recall his name?

L: Yes. Joe McDonald.

F: He left the switchboard or did he call up somebody?

L: No. He left the board and relayed the information.

F: Couldn't he plug in and ring somebody at their quarters?

L: No. Not with that switchboard; it merely connected the various radar stations on the island with the I. C.

F: You couldn't have plugged in if you wanted any commanding officer?

L: I don't know really how the exchange was set up.

F: He left his post and found somebody?

L: Yes. McDonald relayed the information I had given him. The officer he spoke to didn't appear interested and I asked to talk to him.

F: Then when you spoke to him, can you recall what you said?

[13510] L: I merely mentioned the fact that there was something unusual on the scope both in size and direction. They were expecting a flight of B-17's that morning from California. He probably assumed that was what it was.

F: The B-17's did come in?

L: Yes and they got a hot welcome too.

F: Didn't you also say that "I have never seen anything like this in my experience"?

L: That is right. I said it was the largest formation I had ever seen.

F: You said that it was coming in due north and what did he answer?

L: I don't recall exactly. He said it was all right, that that was all he wanted to know.

F: Then you went back to your scope. How had the situation changed?

L: The formation appeared a little closer.

F: Did Elliott make any comment and did you try anything else?

L: There was nothing else we could do.

F: Did Elliott seem to be alarmed?

L: No, we were just interested.

F: Then you tracked it in to about 22 miles; by that time the truck had arrived.

L: No. By that time, we had lost it in the permanent distortion.

[13511] F: You cut off the machine?

L: We looked around a little further for somebody else and didn't see anything so we closed down the machine.

F: Had the truck arrived by that time?

L: Yes.

F: Then you got in with Elliott. He was in back of the truck and you were up front with the driver.

L: That was about right.

F: Did you mention to the driver what had been puzzling you?

L: No.

F: Then you went back to Kawaihoa. About halfway back, you met a similar truck carrying some of your colleagues.

L: Yes. They were going very fast back toward the unit.

F: They simply waved?

L: We blew the horn and slowed down. We wanted to ask why they were going back but they simply blew their horn and went on very fast.

F: Would you say that was at approximately a quarter to eight or about seven thirty?

L: It would have to have been about 7:55. That is supposedly when the first bomb fell.

F: How long did it take you to go from your radar unit to your base?

L: It would take about 20 minutes or 25 minutes. It was about a mile and a half or two miles over a very bad dirt road. [13512] We had to go down this dirt road to get to the highway.

F: Was it during that mile and a half that the Japanese planes actually struck?

L: I don't know. It shouldn't have taken very long. After I lost them at 22 miles, it shouldn't have taken them very long to get those last miles.

F: Can you tell how many minutes elapsed between losing them in the distortion and the arrival of the truck?

L: As I recall it, not over five minutes.

F: When you got back to your base and the truck drove up, what did it carry besides you and Elliott?

L: Nothing. It came up for the purpose of bringing us back.

F: When you reached your base the first thing you saw was a group of men looking at the sky?

L: That is right. Lt. Carcarus was there.

F: They all had the information that Pearl Harbor had been attacked and as soon as you got the information, you turned to Elliott and said: "I bet that is what we saw."

L: Something like that.

F: Then you joined the crowd and they questioned you as to what you had seen?

L: Yes. We told them what had happened.

F: What did you do next?

L: After a hurried breakfast, we put a few things together and went right back to the unit. The other crew had it [13513] in operation when we got there and we started taking shifts.

F: Each unit had six men?

L: Well, six or more.

F: It could be operated with only two men?

L: It wasn't comfortable. Twenty-four hour operation with six men means that you pull a four-hour shift and at the same time you had to do guard duty. We had to conduct the operation, the maintenance, and guard the equipment 24 hours a day.

F: Normally you didn't have to have any guard.

L: No.

F: Was it difficult to operate with only six men when you didn't have to have a guard?

L: No. That was all right; It gave everyone something to do.

F: On the way home to your base, you noticed these heavy oil clouds?

L: We noticed this black oil smoke in the sky. The island on two sides is mountainous. Down the center is a plateau which starts from the sea level area and runs up gradually between these two ranges of mountains to the plateau where the palms grow. On the other side, it goes down approximately 200 feet to the sea again.

F: These clouds were so heavy that, by the time you got [13514] half way to your base, they were visible?

L: They were visible to us and we knew they were coming from the harbor.

F: When you saw these oil clouds, they didn't have any particular meaning to you?

L: We thought there might have been some sort of an accident or a fire.

F: After you got back to your base, did you get any official request from anybody to report your own findings on the scope?

L: No, the story wasn't accredited yet.

F: When was it first taken notice of officially?

L: It must have been about a week.

F: Can you recall how Colonel Murphy looked?

L: He was rather short, heavy set, with graying hair and a florid complexion.

(At this point Mr. Fraser referred Lt. Lockard to the large detailed map of Pearl Harbor, supplied by the War Department, and traced his (Lt. Lockard's) movements thereon from Kawaihoa base to Opana and return. Lt. Lockard also noted position—as of December 7, 1941—of the five other radar (271-B's) installations on the map.)

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Lieutenant, you have been very helpful.

LOCKARD. I am glad to have been of any help.

(Termination of interview.)

#### [13515] TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JOHN M. CREIGHTON, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state your name, Captain, for the record?

Captain CREIGHTON. My name is John M. Creighton.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, your name was brought up into this hearing in connection with the examination of Admiral Hart; that is, in connection with a message received by Admiral Hart which had some reference to what has been designated here as the A B C D.

In that connection Senator Ferguson asked that you be presented as a witness.

I think, Mr. Chairman, with your permission and in view of that fact, we would probably save time if I turned the witness over to the committee to permit the Senator to conduct the examination he wishes of this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. It is entirely agreeable and if the counsel has turned the witness over to the committee, the chairman of the committee will turn him over to Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Creighton—

Mr. MURPHY. I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the objection is overruled.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Creighton, the other day Admiral Hart stated that you had been the naval attaché at [13516] Singapore and that you had sent him a message some time on the 6th. Have you made a search to ascertain whether you could find that message and have you found it?

Captain CREIGHTON. When I read in the evening paper on the day of Admiral Hart's testimony a record of what you have just related it meant nothing to me at all, nor could I remember what he was referring to, and after thinking about it that night and again the next morning and still recalling nothing that he might have meant by his testimony, I called him up to tell him that I could remember nothing of the sort and while we were very busy in Singapore and many messages were sent and received, at least I could not support his evidence by recalling the matter.

So he said, "Well, you sent it all right because I can produce a copy of it." So I made an appointment with him this morning at the hotel and he called his office and authorized his secretary to give me the key to this file and sent me down there to get it and on the way down I picked up a Reserve officer named John Moser, now a captain on duty here in the Navy Department, who had been my assistant in the 6 months I was in Singapore before Pearl Harbor.

Like myself he recalled nothing of the kind either, so we came in together and found the telegram and read it and after reading it I am sorry to say that our memory is no more clear [13517] than before having seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have the cablegram?

Captain CREIGHTON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you produce the cablegram?

Captain CREIGHTON. I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, all right. Now, will you read it into the record?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the number and all that is on the page.

Senator BREWSTER. The date.

Senator FERGUSON. The date and the hour and all that.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do that, may I ask, Senator, whether the witness is able to identify it as a telegram or a cablegram that he sent?

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Creighton, do you now identify this as a cablegram that you did send on the 6th or 7th?

Captain CREIGHTON. I have no better memory of having seen it before than before having seen it, but if that sounds a little odd I will explain, if you will give me a moment or two, what we were doing in Singapore, for we had two offices 18 miles apart, one in the city attached to the consulate and another in the dockyard.

I was alone, except for a Reserve officer and a chief yeoman. [13518] I felt it my duty to be so physically acquainted with everything taking place in the dockyard that if contingents of our fleet came there I could guide them to all of the shops and put them in touch with the proper people to get repairs done on guns, batteries, or anything else.

I was also the routing officer for all American merchant ships in that area and our office in town was constantly filled with merchant captains and shipping agents. We were in intimate relationship with the consulate across the hall, whose shipping adviser was constantly in our office, and besides I was equipped with special passes to get a constant stream of American people out of airports, where they arrived with dispatches and money and sometimes pistols which they could not get through the gates, so we were living in a very fast-moving

life and because I cannot remember that telegram even is not as important as it might otherwise look.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not purport to say that this was not a telegram sent from your office under your authority to Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. Not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, you identify it, do you not, as being a copy of a telegram from your office to CinCAF?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, he has not identified it at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you identify it as that?

[13519] Captain CREIGHTON. I do so on one premise.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, what is it?

Captain CREIGHTON. That I have such a trust in the fidelity of the Navy communication system that I accept this as such a telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. As a genuine telegram?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I interrupt there for just a minute?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever talk with Admiral Hart about this telegram since you found it?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes, I did this morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And does he identify it as the one that he received and was testifying about the other day?

Captain CREIGHTON. He does in that he said, "You will find that in my office" and I went to his office and got it and here it is.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, now will you read it?

Captain CREIGHTON. This is in December 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. What date?

Captain CREIGHTON. The time of the dispatch is 06, meaning the 6th of the month; 1526, meaning the hour, 3:26 p. m.

[13520] Senator BREWSTER. What kind of time is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that Greenwich?

Captain CREIGHTON. Since it is not marked otherwise I presume that it is Greenwich time.

Senator BREWSTER. What time would that be here in Washington?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not know offhand and it never came to Washington, but in Singapore it was about 9 p. m. of the 6th and also in Manila.

Senator BREWSTER. That would be 9 p. m. of the 5th here?

Captain CREIGHTON. Roughly, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. And about 10 o'clock in the morning under Washington time.

Captain CREIGHTON. I can't do it that fast.

The CHAIRMAN. It couldn't be 9 p. m. and 10 a. m. both at the same time.

Captain CREIGHTON. In any event the telegram came from one address to another, both in the time zone of Singapore. It was not addressed to Washington and never came there.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Captain CREIGHTON. This is the telegram:

Brooke Popham received Saturday from War Department London Quote "We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows:



Afirm we are obliged [13521] execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam XX Baker if Dutch Indies are attacked and we go to their defense XX Cast if Japs attack us the British XX Therefore without reference to London put plan in action if first you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra second if the Nips violate any part of Thailand Para if NEI are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon between British and Dutch" Unquote.

This is marked as having been received in Manila on the 7th of December. The hour is not marked.

Senator FERGUSON. Who signs it? Does it show who sends it?

Captain CREIGHTON. It shows that it came from "ALUSNA," which was my code title in Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom?

Captain CREIGHTON. To Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was in Manila?

Captain CREIGHTON. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the first name used—what is it, [13522] Popham?

Captain CREIGHTON. Brooke-Popham.

Senator FERGUSON. Brooke-Popham?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was he?

Captain CREIGHTON. Brooke-Popham was an air marshal who was at the same time in command of the Royal Air Force in Malaya and of the British Army Forces.

Senator FERGUSON. You were personally acquainted with him?

Captain CREIGHTON. Not well at all. There was in addition to myself in Singapore a colonel in the United States Army named Francis G. Brink. As Brink was an Army officer, he was between us the person to consult with Brooke-Popham and not I, who was there for liaison with Admiral Geoffrey Layton, the British Navy commander.

Senator FERGUSON. You were liaison or naval attaché to whom in Singapore?

Captain CREIGHTON. Well, the right title was naval observer.

Senator FERGUSON. Naval observer?

Captain CREIGHTON. And my business there was to keep in liaison with the British Admiral but not with Brooke-Popham.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Captain CREIGHTON. I say not with Brooke-Popham.

[13523] Senator FERGUSON. The Admiral was Admiral Phillips?

Captain CREIGHTON. Admiral Phillips arrived in Malaya only 3 or 4 or 5 days before he was killed in the *Prince of Wales*. His predecessor was Sir Geoffrey Layton and after the death of Admiral Phillips, Admiral Layton, who was prepared to depart, reassumed command of the naval forces there.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to the conclusion that the Japs were going to attack somewhere on the 6th or the 7th?

Captain CREIGHTON. On the night of—now, I must guess at something which there is no difficulty in establishing elsewhere. The 4th or the 5th of December we received a report in Malaya which had

come, we were told, from the pilot of a British reconnaissance airplane whose duty it was to fly from a certain point in northeast of Malaya on a regular patrol up toward Siam.

The report reaching me was that on his passage over that area in the late afternoon he had encountered a large convoy of what looked to him like transports, several old battleships, an aircraft carrier, and attendant destroyers. They were headed west and almost south of the south point of Siam.

The report said further that when he went closer in his plane to observe them that Japanese fighter planes came up off the deck of the carrier and went straight at him, making it [13524] perfectly evident that they would keep him from approaching the convoy. That is when we presumed that one of the following things would occur. Whether after nightfall they would continue west to the Kra Peninsula, north of Malaya, or shift northwest toward Bangkok, toward which many threats had been made recently, we could not tell. So when you ask me when I thought something would happen, that is when I concluded that.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you answered my question.

Now, when did you know or receive word that they were going to attack the Kra Peninsula? They did attack the Kra Peninsula, did they not?

Captain CREIGHTON. They did.

Senator FERGUSON. They did. Well, when did you first know that?

Captain CREIGHTON. I did not know it until the same night that Singapore was bombed, when word reached us that the Japanese were disembarking troops and supplies not only at Khota Baru but at a harbor the name of which I think is Petani, on the Kra Peninsula, just to the north of the Malayan boundary. In other words, I heard it when the whole world knew it and not before that.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever received any word as to what America's policy was, other than the word that you sent [13525] here, the one that you have read, in case there was a Japanese attack upon the British and/or the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies?

Captain CREIGHTON. I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no word as to what our policy was other than contained in this message?

Captain CREIGHTON. I had not and this itself is a matter of hearsay.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but it comes to you from a commander that you were taking information from in Singapore.

Captain CREIGHTON. That is a presumption that is not justified by my knowledge. If one reads the opening phrase here, I do not blame you for thinking so, but actually, looking at this with the wisdom that one has now and which he hardly had then, I must tell you that I never knew Brooke-Popham intimately enough to have received from him directly such information as this, nor did I receive this information directly from him.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get the information?

Captain CREIGHTON. I am sorry to tell you that I haven't the faintest idea at the moment to be able to tell you who Brooke-Popham had told that to—who told me that Brooke-Popham had told him of those things.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you wired it as a fact to the Asiatic commander in chief? [13526]

Captain CREIGHTON. If the language had been as long as a legal document invites, but that the Navy rules out in telegraphing, it might be that all of that might have been put in there that somebody told me that somebody had said something.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what code it was sent in?

Captain CREIGHTON. Will you repeat that?

Senator FERGUSON. Was it sent in the Navy Code to Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. I can't tell from this text but I am confident that it was.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be sent as a secret message?

Captain CREIGHTON. Of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know as to whether or not the Japanese were intercepting and translating any of your messages?

Captain CREIGHTON. I did not know it, and I presumed that they were not.

Senator FERGUSON. You were acting on that assumption when you sent messages?

Captain CREIGHTON. Of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever seen the note or the message that Admiral Hart sent to Washington after he received [13527] your message?

Captain CREIGHTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I show you Exhibit 40.

Captain CREIGHTON. I have read it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will now ask you again, have you ever learned of that?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not understand your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of that before you saw it here today?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes; in a newspaper the day before yesterday, but prior to that, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Not prior to that. Do you know of any other messages you sent from, say, the 4th to Admiral Hart in relation to an attack, or that might help us here?

Captain CREIGHTON. I know of no other message related to this as a matter of policy, for example, nor except for my telling about the convoy coming west around the south end of Siam, anything about a portending attack.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did send the information that you obtained about the fighter planes leaving the deck?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And what you have related. That was all wired to Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes. It was, according to my memory, [13528] also sent to Admiral Kimmel and the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have copies of those messages?

Captain CREIGHTON. When we left Singapore, Senator, it looked so much as though it were going to fall promptly that we burned everything we had except a small folder of the most recent messages which I carried out to Java myself and 6 or 7 weeks later we were

being driven out of Java and leaving on a night when you either left or did not go away, we burned everything else except a further group of dispatches that I carried to Australia and I have no records from Singapore to help me remember or tie to or rejuvenate a memory of those things.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you know on what day that you sent to Admiral Hart the message of what the British planes had ascertained in the Gulf of Siam?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not, sir; but I do not think my memory is necessary to determine it. I am sure that the message I sent was received in the Navy Department and can be found here.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, do we have that message? I had not seen it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I haven't seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Commander Baecher?

Commander BAECHEER. I never heard of it before, Senator.

[13529] Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you look it up and try to provide it?<sup>1</sup>

Commander BAECHEER. Very well, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is all, then.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, did you know this man Brooke-Popham of whom you speak?

Captain CREIGHTON. I knew him only to this degree, sir; that he was the most important military figure in Malaya and while it was my housemate's duty to know him well, since they were both Army officers and that was the business of Colonel Brink, my housemate, I saw him at several conferences, really, after the war.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his title, if you know?

Captain CREIGHTON. Well, I know his proper title in the RAF. It was air marshal.

The CHAIRMAN. Air marshal. He did not tell you this, he did not give you this information or this rumor or whatever it was that you wired to Admiral Hart in person?

Captain CREIGHTON. He did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not tell you that?

Captain CREIGHTON. He did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Somebody else told you that he had been told that?

Captain CREIGHTON. He couldn't have because I was never in [13530] a private circumstance with the air marshal.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that.

Captain CREIGHTON. I say I had not, sir, nor was I ever in a circumstance where he could have.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, now, did Admiral Sir—

Captain CREIGHTON. Geoffrey Layton.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, did he ever give you this information or anything like it?

Captain CREIGHTON. He did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know or recall who it was who told you that he had gotten this from somebody, the substance of what you wired to Admiral Hart?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

<sup>1</sup> See memorandum dated May 10, 1946, from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5484.

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not, sir. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know where he got it?

Captain CREIGHTON. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know how many hands it had gone through before it got to you?

Captain CREIGHTON. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that when it got to you it was really nothing more than rumor?

Captain CREIGHTON. That is right.

[13531] The CHAIRMAN. But you thought it your duty to pass that on to Admiral Hart, for whatever it was worth?

Captain CREIGHTON. I might say, sir, when I went to Manila en route to Singapore it was plain to me, in being on Admiral Hart's flagship for about 6 weeks, in a course of education going to Singapore, at least he felt he was constantly suffering from a lack of information from home, and I felt it my duty, wherever I was, to try to give him any current information or reports I received.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if that information did not come from home?

Captain CREIGHTON. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. You realize, of course, as a naval officer, that a policy involving whether we were going to assist Britain in a contingency had to come from Washington and not London?

Captain CREIGHTON. Of course I do.

The CHAIRMAN. This so-called rumor, or information, or report, or whatever it was, that Mr. Brooke-Popham was said to have gotten from the British War Department in London, you have no way of knowing how reliable that was as it came out of London to him, or from what source it came?

Captain CREIGHTON. I have none. I did not know that Brooke-Popham actually said this.

[13532] The CHAIRMAN. You did not know whether the fellow who gave him the information, or rumor, knew what he was talking about either?

Captain CREIGHTON. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Hart has testified that based upon your message to him he wired Washington, the Chief of Naval Operations, that he had gotten this message from you and that he had received no corresponding instructions from the Navy Department here, and that he received no reply to that message.

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that indicate to you, whatever this information may have been, or whatever rumor or statement may have come out of London, was or was not authentic insofar as any commitment of the United States Government to Great Britain in any of the contingencies were concerned?

Captain CREIGHTON. I would think, sir, even if the Navy Department were perfectly sure that the report had no substance, that they would, in time, have told Admiral Hart their conclusions.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime, though, the war took place immediately, the attack on Pearl Harbor was almost on at the time that you sent this message?

Captain CREIGHTON. That is correct.

[13533] The CHAIRMAN. After that the war came and we were involved and there was no particular reason to follow up your message, was there?

Captain CREIGHTON. I would conclude that that was the cycle of events; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

[13534] Senator FERGUSON. I have some questions since the Chairman has asked questions.

I show you page 5125 and I show you a longer message signed by Admiral Phillips as well as Admiral Hart, to Washington, that was replied to, and the reply follows the message that I handed you, and I want you to see whether or not that does not reply to the message of Admiral Hart, and also to your message as to what our intentions were.

(The document was handed to Captain Creighton.)

Captain CREIGHTON. You are asking my opinion about something very intricate, that I never heard of before, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Commander Baecher telling you just now?

Captain CREIGHTON. He was trying to explain that this matter which had been produced since the war, that Admiral Hart had sent it in. Quite frankly, I was so busy reading, I did not pay attention.

Senator FERGUSON. It was prior to the war, and it was a reply prior to the war, but that actual message was not sent until after the attack. It shows an answer to Admiral Hart's inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Captain CREIGHTON. Are you asking my opinion on this [13535] matter, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, if you know anything about it.

Captain CREIGHTON. It means nothing to me at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much, Captain.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me ask a question of the Captain, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood you to say, Captain, that you were pretty busy all the time at the dockyards to arrange for incoming ships, their repairs, berthing, and all that sort of thing, that you were tremendously busy where you were.

Do you have any recollection of the convoys that came into Singapore consisting of American ships carrying British troops late in November 1941?

Captain CREIGHTON. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any recollection of the American liner *Manhattan*, which had been converted into a troop carrier, which came into Singapore in the latter part of November 1941?

Captain CREIGHTON. I recall only that she arrived there [13536] with troops after we were in Java. I do not remember the circumstances that you are speaking of.

Mr. KEEFE. It did not come until after you had gotten out of Singapore?

Captain CREIGHTON. I think by the difference between the date you give me and the one I remember, there were two different arrivals. I am thinking of February, and you of November.

Mr. KEEFE. The reason I ask you that, I just finished reading last night a diary of a sailor on this *Manhattan* who described the course of this convoy from Halifax to Singapore.

Captain CREIGHTON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Convoying or carrying troops, one of a large number of ships, American warcraft, that went to Singapore convoying these troop carriers.

I am wondering if you were there when they arrived.

Captain CREIGHTON. If they came in November, I was there, but I do not remember their arrival. They could come very easily without my seeing them, or being aware that they were there.

Then, too, they might have gone to the civilian anchorage, which is very large, of course, or to the dock yard itself, in which case I would have seen them.

[13537] Mr. KEEFE. Well, if American men-of-war came with them as part of the convoy, you would have known about that, would you not?

Captain CREIGHTON. I can hardly imagine not knowing about it, because some of our officers would have come ashore and they would have come right to the consulate, and to my office, too.

Mr. KEEFE. But you have no recollection of it?

Captain CREIGHTON. I have not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman give the source of his articles, so we can check it?

The CHAIRMAN. He can do that without the witness remaining on the stand.

Thank you very much, Captain. We appreciate your appearance.

You are now excused.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Colonel Bicknell.

#### TESTIMONY OF GEORGE W. BICKNELL<sup>1</sup>

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you state your full name, Colonel, for the record?

Mr. BICKNELL. George W. Bicknell.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel, were you in the Army at [13538] Hawaii prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; I went on duty in October 1940.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were there during 1940 and 1941?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your section?

Mr. BICKNELL. I was the Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, and also the contact officer for the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you explain to the committee what your general duties were under your assignment?

Mr. BICKNELL. My general duties were to keep the department commander thoroughly informed as to activities within the civil population on the Island of Oahu, and the other Hawaiian Islands, and to contact all visiting officials and businessmen coming back from the Orient especially, in order to obtain any information which they might have on the general situation in the Pacific area.

<sup>1</sup> Formerly colonel, Army of the United States.

I also was responsible for the internal security of the islands, and for observations of all measures necessary, counter-intelligence measures necessary, to protect any information from getting into enemy hands, or prevent any espionage that might be conducted in the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Colonel, with what other organizations [13539] did you have immediate liaison?

Mr. BICKNELL. I had immediate liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, the Federal Communications Commission and, in fact, all Territorial and Federal departments, such as customs, immigration, and Treasury.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your immediate superior?

Mr. BICKNELL. My immediate superior was General Fielder, who was at that time Colonel Fielder, of G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. From what source did you seek to get the information that you were supposed to report?

Mr. BICKNELL. We used every available source. Our principal source for obtaining economic information and information about the Far East was from businessmen returning on liners or coming in on the clipper ships from the Orient, interviewing them, getting their opinions; interviewing any officials of the British or other national military organizations that came through Hawaii, as well as picking up the intercepts on all Japanese radio stations, reading the Japanese-language papers and obtaining some papers from the Orient and piecing all of that information together.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Colonel, was your job a uniform job, or did you do most of your work in civilian clothes?

[13540] Mr. BICKNELL. Practically all of my work was done in civilian clothes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you have to do with the furnishing of the information based on the alleged burning of codes and papers by the Japanese consul?

Mr. BICKNELL. That information was given to me by the agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and I in turn passed it on to the chief of staff and staff of the Hawaiian Department at their regular staff meeting on Saturday morning, December 6, 1941.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How often were staff meetings held?

Mr. BICKNELL. Staff meetings were held every Saturday.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And who was supposed to attend those staff meetings?

Mr. BICKNELL. All members of the general and special staff of the department commander.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was the department commander?

Mr. BICKNELL. At that time, General Short.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would he attend these Saturday convocations of his staff?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who would attend in his place?

Mr. BICKNELL. The chief of staff, Colonel Phillips.

[13541] Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there a general discussion at those meetings of the fact, or of the intelligence, that you would report?



Mr. BICKNELL. There was hardly ever any discussion of it. The facts were simply laid out. Once in a while there would be a question asked about the significance of the fact, but very seldom.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall the incident of the Mori message?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who brought that to your attention?

Mr. BICKNELL. That was brought to my attention by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What steps did you take to acquaint General Short with that message?

Mr. BICKNELL. I called Colonel Fielder and told him that I had some information that was extremely important, that it should be given immediately to the department commander, and Colonel Fielder said that they were planning on going out for dinner, but he would talk with General Short.

I asked him to urge the importance of it upon the General, that we see him, and he told me to be out at Fort Shafter within the next 10 minutes, that they would wait for me.

[13542] So I went out there, and did arrive. General Short and Colonel Fielder were waiting and the message was shown to them.

It had been in my hands only a matter of less than an hour.

I told them I felt that the thing was highly suspicious and highly significant, that I had not had time to evaluate the message but it did seem to me of utmost importance at that particular time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They heard you?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long was your conference?

Mr. BICKNELL. Not more than 5 minutes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no unpleasantness or criticism in connection with it?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there a remark made there by General Short that indicated he thought you were a little too sensitive on the question of intelligence?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would not say there was any remark made like that. The remark made by General Short was that the message was a very true picture of what was going on in Hawaii at that time.

I remember I thought that was just the trouble with it; [13543] it was too accurate a picture.

I would say that the general reaction was perhaps I was somewhat intelligence-conscious, but nobody told me so in so many words.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You spoke a moment ago about the fact that the espionage condition in Hawaii was part of your duty.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will ask you whether you have prepared, as a part of your notes, a statement in relation to your estimate of the espionage situation there in Hawaii?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, I have, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I wonder if you would consult that and read it to us? It is not very long, as I remember it.

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I might say, for the information of the committee, that I feel, and have felt that our testimony here, specifically on questions of espionage, was a little vague.

I went over this statement. It seemed to be a very admirable statement and it would save time if the Colonel was permitted to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel, go ahead.

Mr. BICKNELL. From the angle of security Hawaii, [13544] during the period 1930-1941, was totally unguarded and presented a mecca to agents and observers of any foreign government. This state of affairs, however unwelcome to the Army and Navy, had the full protection of our civil law, a condition which should never be allowed to exist again.

Pearl Harbor, lying low under the surrounding hills, was constantly in view of any and all who cared to look. Japanese training ships, tankers, and auxiliary vessels frequently called in port with all crew members, both officers and men, fully equipped with binoculars and cameras, enjoying shore leave and the hospitality of the local Japanese colony. Invariably, parties of officers were entertained in Japanese homes, on the heights, where the entire installation of Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, and other airport facilities could be leisurely and minutely observed. At some of these homes, situated on the crown of high ground, elaborate, lattice-work orchid houses had been constructed from which careful observation could be made by large parties of individuals who would remain completely screened from observation by neighbors or others passing on nearby roads.

Photography, in the earlier part of this period, flourished in Hawaii. As late as 1939, after the visit of the United States Fleet, a large photograph showing the entire panoramic view of Pearl Harbor, with each ship clearly defined [31545] at its anchorage, was publicly displayed in the show windows of a Japanese photography shop. There were no prohibitions except those placed in effect by the commanding officers of various posts, stations, or cantonments. General prohibition of photos of the crater in Diamond Head as well as certain other specific military and naval areas were adopted and placed in effect by Territorial law which restricted flying over these areas. It was physically impossible to prevent promiscuous photography inasmuch as every road, every hilltop, and many private homes offered the most excellent vantage points for obtaining clear and detailed photographs.

Because of these topographical features, practically all of the islands' protective installations were accessible to photographic recording. In view of this, it was perhaps an exercise of good judgment on the part of the military authorities not to waste much effort in attempting to put an end to this practice.

Another source of complete, detailed, and vital statistics as readily available to enemy agents as to other interested persons, were the many publications issued at frequent intervals by official and semi-official agencies of the Government. Reports of planning commissions, including detailed and accurate drawings, charts, and statistics on all matters such as communications, telephones, electric power plants, [13546] distribution lines, transformer stations; public transportation such as railroads, busses, and streetcars; water supply, including sources, reservoirs, distribution mains, gates and shut-offs; and all such data could be purchased for 35 or 50 cents.

In some instances the demands for appeasement and betterment of labor conditions added to the problem. Many of the plantations, uti-

lizing the services of Japanese labor, made every endeavor to improve their morale and contentment. Such a program included the maintenance of homeland culture and practices with the erection of temples, entertaining of visiting Japanese priests, officials or crew members in large parties, sometimes given at company expense.

Personal contacts would thus be established with individuals who often had detailed information relative to maneuvers, new gun placements, and other similar matters. In many instances, friends or relatives of these employees lived adjacent to the channel into Pearl Harbor and were intimately acquainted with the movements of naval vessels in and out of the base, their silhouettes, new equipment, and other features viewed from only one or two hundred yards away.

No positive identification was required of seamen leaving and returning to a visiting Japanese vessel. Passes were [13547] issued, but not photographic passes. To the average customs guard one Japanese closely resembled another. It was not impossible for an individual to leave the boat and for another, entirely different, person to don the uniform and use the pass to reembark with no suspicion being aroused. Hence, all precautions against illegal entries were frustrated.

In considering such illegal entries, it should be remembered that a great many Japanese ships passed by and entered into Hawaiian waters. Precautions were adopted against smuggling by having each ship closely followed into port by a Coast Guard cutter. However, the ever-present Japanese fishermen, equipped with sampans having cruising ranges of thousands of miles were quite capable of meeting the larger ships many miles away from any possible observation. Indications do exist that such methods were employed to bring in some undesirable individuals who were not discovered prior to the opening of hostilities.

The sampan fleets were divided into three main classes; deep-sea and long-range; offshore and short-range operations; and shallow-water, bait-catching equipment. In the first classification, the boats were large, seaworthy, radio-equipped, and quite capable of prolonged cruising at sea. The second classification included smaller but often equally well equipped craft which cruised around each of the islands [13548] in the Hawaiian group, and whose crews were intimately acquainted with reefs, caves, landing places, tides, currents, and local wind and sea conditions. Thirdly, small boats operated within the bays, locks, and harbors, netting small fish to be used as bait for the larger craft.

The operators of these boats knew every detail of these waters, the depths, nature of bottoms and, most important of all, were always present to observe any operations or maneuvers. Through 1938, 1939, and part of 1940 these small boats had access to Pearl Harbor itself, cruised about where naval craft were at anchor, enroached upon landing areas of large seaplanes, and were constantly aware of any change in details of channels, currents, and other features.

The fishermen themselves were a clannish group, having their own "huis" or associations and acting for their own interests in maintaining price levels, demanding special privileges, and so forth. They also made trips back to the homeland and spent periods of time in the Japanese fishing schools in order to become more efficient in their art.

At intervals, officials from these schools visited Hawaii and brought new ideas, methods, or operation, and perhaps, even other thoughts from the Empire. When these fishermen were back in Japan they were "entertained" by various officials, and it is safe to assume that their information was carefully [13549] evaluated. In some cases they were royally entertained and visited certain naval establishments in Japan. Every indication points toward a well-planned system of total espionage with perhaps the individuals themselves having little or no knowledge of their own direct contribution.

The Japanese themselves developed a system of such total espionage which perhaps outranks any other similar system in the world. Even at home, in everyday life, it is carried out meticulously. The supervisor of the organization in the Government directs his state or provincial deputies. They, in turn, direct the district or city leader. Under these the territory is broken down into areas or wards, then to neighborhoods and, finally, to blocks. The block leader has in his possession a plan showing each house in his block. He has further data on who lives in the house; how many children; where each is employed; details as to possession of an automobile, electric ice box, telephone, radio receiver, sewing machine, and other information, including a list of visitors who call at regular or irregular intervals, where mail is sent and from whom received. All such data is minutely recorded and reported periodically. Should an individual move to another block, the information on him is passed on to the new block leader and dropped from the records of the first. Such a means of constant surveil- [13550] lance precludes any suspicious acts on the part of the individual from passing unnoticed. Mail and communications from relatives or friends abroad, and the business and financial affairs of the family, are always under complete observation.

Everyone is familiar with the usual depiction of the prewar Japanese tourist or traveler. His field glasses, camera, and sketch pad were always in evidence. He took pictures by the millions and all went back to Japan for examination. As a tourist, member of a trade mission, a minor official, an observer, a priest, or a student, he flooded our country as well as others, always taking photos, collecting picture post cards, vital statistics, trade journals, pamphlets—in fact, everything on which appeared even a scrap of vital information. These, too, always went back to Japan and became available for evaluation, compilation, and file. Japanese banks, business houses, transportation companies, tourists, bureaus, and so forth, were opened in many cities and localities both in Hawaii and on the mainland. Each formed a little collection center of its own and gathered data of a specific nature.

No comparable system either for the collection of world-wide information or to protect the interests of our country existed in the United States prior to the war. The American [13551] people have always demonstrated a complete lack of appreciation of such institutions and a simple, naive belief that these practices are not in keeping with the American way of life. Nevertheless, this Nation seems somewhat alone in such ideals. Others carry on intelligence activities in times of peace to prepare for war. Under normal peacetime conditions we rely solely on our military, naval, and commercial attachés for such information and ignore the fact that they are handicapped from the start through their official status and that their movements and

activities are greatly curtailed. No further argument is required when we realize the great wealth of information in the hands of Japan at the start of this war as compared to the meager dribbles of similar information in our possession on Japan and the Japanese.

It can be safely stated that the enemy had complete knowledge of our Hawaiian fortifications, general defenses, armament, naval and air strength, as well as many details of our military, naval, and air facilities. The only thing they lacked was knowledge of our secret military plans, which had been well guarded, resting solely in the hands of military and naval commanders and members of their immediate staffs.

The much-debated question as to whether the attack by [13552] Japan could have been foreseen in time to have taken protective action is involved and highly controversial. During the entire year preceding Pearl Harbor, the situation had been developing in steady steps with an absolute certainty of the result.

The Japanese had long been discussing, preaching, and advocating the greater East Asia sphere of coprosperity. Selected representatives of many Asiatic countries convened in Japan to hear discussions of the principles of East Asian coprosperity. In these delegations were many Japanese residents of each area represented. Some Japanese from Hawaii participated.

The war with China gave clear indication of Japanese action and a pattern of the methods adopted by and to be expected from their Government. We had felt the ever-increasing tension with the bombing of the *Panay* and other similar events which took place in the Far East. We had listened to their great volume of radio propaganda directed toward those countries included in their conception of the sphere of prosperity. These programs clearly indicated the working of the master minds and gave every reason to believe that it was their intention to build up an empire in Asia from which would be expelled every influence and semblance of control by the British, Dutch, and Americans. There was [13553] no denial of this intention. Japan desired to strengthen her economic and military position. Raw materials needed in her island empire were to be obtained in China, India, Burma, Thailand, and the Dutch East Indies. Strong points for the defense of this empire also were to be located in these countries.

Should it be possible to oust western influence and power from the countries included in the greater East Asia sphere of coprosperity, Japan would be able to control the Asian situation. With the Dutch and British already involved in war with Germany, the opportunity for expansion was present. Should the United States become involved in the war in the Atlantic, her resources and strength might well be diverted from the Pacific. If Japan had assurances from Germany that the attention of our forces could be held in the Atlantic, there seemed to be no logical reason why the Japanese should not strike.

To assure a successful coup, it was only required that what strength the United States and Britain had in the Pacific be neutralized in one great blow. Germany had demonstrated the power of the blitzkrieg—an example for the master minds.

As a result of the years of gathering information from every conceivable source, Tokyo was well aware of all strong- [13554] points and defenses, as well as the general offensive strength which could be thrown against her in the Pacific. She had been softening up the peoples of Thailand, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies through general fifth-column activities and radio propaganda. Her military and naval machines were fully equipped, well supplied, and ready to move at the moment's notice. All was in readiness. It was only to be determined how and when the strike would be made.

To succeed fully, Japan had to predetermine what counter-action unsympathetic nations would be able to take against this great move to envelop all eastern Asia. American forces in the Philippines, particularly the Air Force, might cause some trouble and delay. Reinforcement of the garrison in these islands must be prevented. To obstruct reinforcement it would be necessary to prevent any American or British naval support from becoming available for convoy and protective service, without which no troop or supply movements could be made into the Philippines in the face of Japan's superior naval strength, submarine, and air support.

The espionage system was working well: information was available daily from Hawaii, reporting ships in port, arrivals, and departures. Other sources kept Tokyo well informed of the location of Dutch naval units and the few British ships [13555] then available. The Japanese staff had a complete picture and could readily determine the plan for action.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Colonel, let me ask you this question:

From your experience in Hawaii, as Assistant G-2, your observation of espionage development there, did you have any doubt at any time during the 2 months prior to Pearl Harbor that Tokyo had complete information as to Pearl Harbor, the location of the ships from time to time in Pearl Harbor, the way in which our fleet was using Pearl Harbor, and all of the details in reference to the military occupation or military use of the harbor as a base?

Mr. BICKNELL. I have no doubt whatsoever.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then in estimating your espionage problem in Hawaii, you took it for granted that Tokyo knew all of those details?

Mr. BICKNELL. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you communicate your information and judgment with respect to that to General Short, or Colonel Phillips?

Mr. BICKNELL. Those estimates were submitted, Mr. Senator, through the form of intelligence estimates.

The CHAIRMAN. Written?

[13556] Mr. BICKNELL. Written. They were mimeographed, I think some 50 copies were printed.

The CHAIRMAN. How often were those estimates furnished?

Mr. BICKNELL. They came out at least biweekly, and in some cases weekly.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your size-up of the situation, as you have outlined it here in this memorandum was known to the commanding officers in the Hawaiian Islands, and at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Both military and naval?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you got this message on the night of the 6th of December, which you felt was important enough to take it over to General Short and Colonel Phillips—

Mr. BICKNELL. Colonel Fielder.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Fielder, who was with General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not Phillips?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Fielder was your immediate superior?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They were both going to the same dinner [13557] that evening?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was it that they instructed you to take this message?

Mr. BICKNELL. To Colonel Fielder's quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. To Colonel Fielder's quarters?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Short was to be there?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes. Both waited there for me.

The CHAIRMAN. They waited there to receive it before going to the dinner?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And they went on to the dinner after they got the message?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it in the manner or bearing of General Short that created the impression in your mind that he was a little impatient with your intelligence complex, if that is the proper word?

Mr. BICKNELL. Well, it was the general reaction that the points in the message which I considered most suspicious seemed to be everyday affairs in their minds..

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, what you had thought was unusual and therefore that you were impelled to seek them out [13558] to divulge, was by them regarded as just a matter of routine, and of no more importance than any other message they had received?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What time in the evening was that?

Mr. BICKNELL. That was somewhere in the vicinity of 6 o'clock in the evening.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not see them after that?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Until after the attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the equipment, by way of airplanes and antiaircraft and all other equipment, radar stations, and all the whole series of things that were there both on the part of the Army and Navy at the time of the attack and immediately before it?

Mr. BICKNELL. Only in a general way; that is, I did not know the complete details of where every gun or where every position was.

The CHAIRMAN. You were familiar with it in a general way?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had an over-all picture of what was there?

[13559] Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it part of your duty to form an estimate as to the effectiveness of what was there by way of material and equipment?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; that was not within my province.

My province was more counterintelligence and external intelligence, rather than anything pertaining to operations which was more of a combat intelligence nature.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be able to express an opinion as to whether the fullest possible use was made of what was there in the way of equipment, men, and material, on the day of the attack or immediately before it in preparation for it, or in an anticipation of any possible attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. Well, I am in a position to say that I could observe the action of the Navy, because I saw the attack from a point 2 miles behind Pearl Harbor, and 900 feet above it.

Within 4 minutes, 3 or 4 minutes after the original torpedo had been dropped, into Pearl Harbor, the entire naval forces opened up with all of their antiaircraft and in fact on the second round of that one plane that was shot down there in Pearl Harbor. So I should say, from what I could observe, a very effective and efficient use was made of all of the equipment which the Navy had [13560] on hand.

That was all that was within my immediate line of vision.

I could not say anything as to the Army equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be in a position to express any opinion as to whether the steps taken in anticipation of a possible attack, or to avoid it, or to counteract it, were fully realized and appreciated, and made effective?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would not know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not know about that?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I understood it, Colonel, you were G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. BICKNELL. I was the Assistant G-2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You made these evaluations as to the local situation existing there with respect to espionage?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Every week for some of the time, or [13561] part of the time every 2 weeks?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And those reports went to the commanding officer, General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That continued throughout the whole period that General Short was in command there?



Mr. BICKNELL. Those reports were originated, if I am not mistaken, late in September of 1941, and continued through the time of the attack.

I believe around October 17, one of those reports included the paragraph that war would be expected to break out with Japan either at the end of November, or if not then, then not until April of 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was your estimate that you made?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Based on the information you had been able to secure?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That war might be expected to break out between the United States and Japan toward the end of November?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

[13562] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of 1941?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And if it did not occur then, that it might go until the following April?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was in your estimate, in your report submitted?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, as I understood from you, you received this information about 5 o'clock on the afternoon of December 6, 1941, from the FBI agent in charge there at Honolulu, about the Japanese consul burning these important papers?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; that was the Mori message I received at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of December 6.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. BICKNELL. The information in regard to the burning of the codes came to me from the FBI, I believe, on the 5th of December, and that information on the burning of the papers was given to the assembled staff on the morning of December 6.

The Mori message did not come to my attention until 5 o'clock on the afternoon of December 6, and it then was reported immediately to General Short.

[13563] The VICE CHAIRMAN. By 6 o'clock you had reported it to General Short in person?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Together with General Fielder?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then it was that you got the impression that he thought you were too intelligence-minded?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark?

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, when you received this message on December 6, what was the conversation that you had with the FBI about the message?

Mr. BICKNELL. I was at home on the afternoon of December 6, and Mr. Shivers, the agent in charge, called me at home and said he had something of high importance that he thought I should see immediately. I went down, and was in town within 20 minutes, and he showed me this message, which had just been finally translated, and said this thing looked very significant to him, that something was going to happen. I read the message over and agreed with him, and immediately called General Fielder.

[13564] Senator LUCAS. How long had you known Mr. Shivers?

Mr. BICKNELL. I had known Mr. Shivers ever since he came to the islands in 1939.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know that the FBI were tapping the telephone lines of the Japs at the time?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know that the Navy was also tapping telephone lines?

Mr. BICKNELL. I did not.

Senator LUCAS. The Navy never gave you that information?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what information was exchanged in the way of intelligence between your Intelligence Department and the Intelligence Department of the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. As far as my Department was concerned, everything that we received was given to the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, whatever you received in the way of intelligence, you evaluated it and transmitted it to the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In Hawaii?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What about the Navy giving to you the information that they had?

[13565] Mr. BICKNELL. They gave us whatever they thought was proper to give, but I know that certain information never was received from them.

Senator LUCAS. What do you mean by that?

Mr. BICKNELL. Well, just as an example, these intercepted telephone calls. I knew they were intercepting them, I knew what calls they were intercepting, but they never told me anything about it. I know when the original winds message came down that Captain Mayfield knew about it, but he never told me anything about it. Instances of that kind, where I felt there was certain information which they were not allowed to pass on to their corresponding numbers in the Army.

Senator LUCAS. Was that a regulation that the Navy had, not to permit to pass that on?

Mr. BICKNELL. I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Even though it might have been the regulation not to transmit magic word for word, was there any regulation which prohibited them from transmitting to the Army the substance of whatever they received, regardless of where they got it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would not know that, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Anyhow, there were certain important matters that came to the Navy in the way of intelligence that [13566] you, as the intelligence officer, did not receive?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Now the Army was out there to defend the Navy in case of attack. That was its primary duty, was it not?

Mr. BICKNELL. According to the orders, that is correct.

Senator LUCAS. I understand according to the orders that was the primary duty of the Army. And in order to defend the Navy, is it a fair assumption that the Intelligence officer should have evaluated and transmitted to him all the essential information that the Navy might have?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is the only system I know of whereby Intelligence can function.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, were you in on the meetings when General Short decided to put alert No. 1 into effect, which was the sabotage alert?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know anything about that?

Mr. BICKNELL. The warning message of November 27 was read to the assembled staff by Colonel Phillips. I was present at that meeting when that message was read. But when General Short conferred with other staff members relative to the type of alert, I was not present.

Senator LUCAS. Did he ever discuss that question with you? [13567]

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You were the Intelligence officer at that time, were you not?

Mr. BICKNELL. I was the assistant Intelligence officer.

Senator LUCAS. The assistant Intelligence officer?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did General Fielder ever discuss that question with you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know that the Army was alerted to sabotage only on December 7?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How did you get that information?

Mr. BICKNELL. I saw where the troops were, and after the movement had started I learned that the order had been issued to alert No. 1. In my outfit a counter-intelligence crew had been on a full alert since the 1st of November. We had been on a 24-hour watch, and had been since the 1st of November, so it made no difference to us. When the order was finally issued that alert No. 1 went into effect, then we learned of that, but it made no difference to our set-up, because we were already in full alert.

Senator LUCAS. Regardless of the fact that the order [13568] was issued, your outfit continued to be on the alert that you had been following previous to the time of the last order that came out by General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Had the FBI man received similar messages previous to this, or had he tapped wires to obtain information of this kind?

Mr. BICKNELL. To the best of my knowledge, that was the first one that had been received.

Senator LUCAS. Now here it is:

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

As I read this I would like to have you stop me, if you will, and point out, if necessary, what you consider the significant part of this message which caused you and the FBI man to become somewhat worried about the situation.

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

What does the (J) mean there?

Mr. BICKNELL. J?

Senator LUCAS. J says "Hello, is this Mori?"

Mr. BICKNELL. That is Japan.

Senator LUCAS. And "(H) Hello, this is Mori."

What does the "(H)" mean?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is Honolulu.

[13569] Senator LUCAS (reading):

Japan: I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

Honolulu: Not at all.

Japan: I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

Hawaii: Yes, lots of them fly around.

Japan: Are they large planes?

Honolulu: Yes, they are quite big.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is all significant—are the airplanes flying daily, and what type. If they are quite big they could be long-range reconnaissance planes, and "They are flying daily" gives some idea of whether they were carrying on long-range reconnaissance in daylight hours.

Senator LUCAS. Now did you discuss that phase of it with General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Or General Fielder?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did they read this message in its entirety?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did they say anything about that particular [13570] phase of it?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; they said that that was a very true picture of what was going on in Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. That is all they said?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They were in a hurry, were they?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Japan: Are they flying from morning till night?

Hawaii: Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is another significant statement, I take it?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

Japan : I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

Hawaii : There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

Japan : Is that so?

Hawaii : I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

Japan : Are any Japanese people there holding meetings [13571] to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is very significant. I believe there was a great doubt in the minds of the Japanese officials as to what the Japanese in Hawaii would do in case war should break out between the United States and Japan.

They had been subjected to American influences for a long time. Many of the American-Japanese had been back to their mother country and had found that they could not speak that language, that they had lost their taste for Japanese customs of old, and that they did not like Japan, and that they were happier back at home in Hawaii.

I believe the Japanese, in thinking of any possibility of reaction in Hawaii, were especially apprehensive themselves as to what the younger Japanese would do, whether they would support Japan or whether they would support the United States. They had no doubt whatsoever as what the older ones would do, they were bound to be loyal to Japan, but they did have a very great doubt as to the action of the younger generation of Japanese.

As to holding large numbers of meetings, at that time, as you perhaps recall, Japan was beaming propaganda in large degrees to the countries which it was about to attack. They also beamed more innocuous stuff to Hawaii. They were perhaps looking to find out whether or not their propaganda [13572] was bearing fruit, and were these ideas which were being broadcast on the radio being taken up, and were the people holding meetings, and was there any indication of activity amongst the local Japanese.

That is a possibility; I do not say it is a probability.

Senator LUCAS. Were they holding meetings at that time in Hawaii?

Mr. BICKNELL. They were holding meetings, but they were holding meetings at that time in Hawaii at our instigation, where we were trying to Americanize them and cement their loyalty to the United States, so any information they got on that might be misleading.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, did you feel that the Japanese situation in Hawaii was so desperate that nothing but a sabotage alert should have been in existence after that war-warning message came on November 27?

Mr. BICKNELL. My feelings on that question have been expressed to practically every commanding general whom I have come in contact with, and that was that we would never have any sabotage trouble with the local Japanese, and we did not.

Senator LUCAS. Were you there in 1940?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You had an all-out alert at that time; [13573] did you not?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And did you experience any difficulty with the Japanese people at that time?

Mr. BICKNELL. None whatsoever.

Senator LUCAS. And following the attack on Pearl Harbor, do you know of any acts of sabotage that were committed by the Japanese?

Mr. BICKNELL. There was not a single act of sabotage on December 7 or thereafter; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the message goes on:

Japan: Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

Hawaii: No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

Japan: Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

Hawaii: Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd [13574] things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

Japan: That's fine.

Hawaii: Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amused.

Japan: Has there been any increase in—

and there is a blank there—

of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

Hawaii: There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

Japan: What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

Hawaii: Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

Japan: Are there many big factories there?

Hawaii: No, there are no factories, but a lot of small [13575] buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

Japan: Is that so?

Hawaii: It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

Japan: How large is the population?

Hawaii: The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

Japan: What is the population?

Hawaii: About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

Japan: What about night time?

Hawaii: There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is significant, that taken together with the next question.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, the next question is:

Japan: What about searchlights?

Hawaii: Well, not much to talk about.

Japan: Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

Hawaii. No.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is very significant. If we put the searchlights on at night when the planes are flying around, that means long-range reconnaissance ships are trying [13576] to find the island to come back. That is the only reason the searchlights are turned on, to help the ship find its way back after a trip. If the ship leaves in the

morning and it does not come back until after dark it gives you some idea as to how far the reconnaissance may be.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, as the assistant intelligence officer, did you have the right to make any significant suggestions that you thought this message contained when you talked to General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would have had the right, sir, if I had more time to evaluate it, but I just received the message in my own hands, and realizing that it was significant, I went directly to the general with it. I had not had time to even give this thing more than one or two readings.

As I said, I felt it was highly significant, and I still feel it was highly significant. It may be perfectly innocent, but from an intelligence angle, and putting it together with the information that we already had, that the Japanese consul was burning papers, and we knew that the condition in the Pacific was serious, a message of this type did, and still does, seem highly significant to me.

Senator LUCAS. If you had not thought it was significant you would not have requested an interview with General Short around his dinner hour: would you?

[13577] Mr. BICKNELL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Did both General Short and Colonel Fielder read this message?

Mr. BICKNELL. As I remember it, they put it down on the table and Colonel Fielder read it over General Short's shoulder as he turned the pages.

Senator LUCAS. Then this telephone conversation continues:

Japan: What about the Honolulu newspapers?

Hawaii: The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

Japan: What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

Hawaii: A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

Japan: Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

Hawaii: There are almost none wishing to do that.

Japan: What is the climate there now?

Hawaii: These last few days have been very cold with [13578] occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

Mr. BICKNELL. That information would be very helpful about the weather, especially the fact that it was unusual weather, to a task force commander. Of course I do not want to be accused of taking advantage of information we had after the attack, but to inquire about weather conditions and the extent of any cold front, that information right there would be extremely valuable to them.

I have felt that it was quite possible, in reconstructing the attack on Pearl Harbor, that the Japanese task force came in behind the cold front which they used as a screen against a possible observation from the air. The official Japanese movies of the attack show a cold front when the airplanes were taking off from the carriers. The timing of the attack is such that there is a strong possibility in my mind that that is how it was planned, to move behind that cold front and use it as a screen to prevent any aerial reconnaissance from sighting

the fleet, and therefore the date of the attack was primarily the date when they could come nearest to the islands, within striking range of the islands behind that cold front. It might even have been the 6th, 7th, or 8th. But that type of information in that [13579] one paragraph would be extremely helpful to anyone desiring to know those conditions.

Senator LUCAS. Well, this fellow Mori was not just talking for his health.

Mr. BICKNELL. Mrs. Mori was talking.

Senator LUCAS. What is that?

Mr. BICKNELL. Mrs. Mori was talking. This is his wife. The doctor did not talk.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever find out to whom she was talking?

Mr. BICKNELL. It was a Japanese newspaper that the call originated from. But there is one thing again that must be borne in mind. This conversation was between Honolulu and Tokyo. It was scrambled. The Japanese had the scrambler in Tokyo in order to unscramble it. Anybody in the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and Tokyo with a scrambler could unscramble this and listen to it, whether they were in Tokyo or whether they were a thousand miles from Hawaii.

This information is open to interception by anybody having the scrambling device which was used on that circuit.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Japan: Is that so?

Hawaii: Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. [13580] He made no statements on any problems.

Japan: Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

Hawaii: No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

Japan: Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

Hawaii: Yes.

Japan: What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

Hawaii: A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

Japan: Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

Hawaii: Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

Japan: Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

Hawaii: No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet.

Mr. BICKNELL. That, to me, is also very significant. That could be a very nice cover-up. The Japanese already knew all about the fleet, they did not have to talk on the [13581] telephone about that. They were getting daily reports from their consul as to movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. They did not have to ask any questions about that at all.

Senator LUCAS. Hawaii further says:

At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't know if all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

Japan: Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is significant.

Senator LUCAS. Why is that significant?

Mr. BICKNELL. Perhaps I am too intelligence conscious, but in the last war I spent a lot of my time in intelligence and cryptography, and



an open code is one of the most commonly used methods of passing on information.

What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

What in the world does a Japanese newspaper want to know about flowers in Hawaii? Then, as you go on, you see that this conversation will pick out the two flowers, only two flowers of the many that were blooming in Hawaii at that time. And there is some misunderstanding about the poinsettias which you will discover in the next question.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Hawaii: Presently, the flowers in bloom [13582] are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

Then there is a note:

Japan does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

Japan: Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?"

Well, when the fellow in Japan who was talking did not catch the significance of poinsettias undoubtedly the so-called secret code, or whatever they had, was not working quite properly.

Mr. BICKNELL. The thing is, on the original record of this interception, there seems to be somewhat of an argument in there. It is badly mixed up with static. But the best we could make out of it in listening to the original was there was some question in his mind as to what the real point was in this.

Senator LUCAS. Continuing further:

Japan: Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

Hawaii: Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

[13583] Japan: What do you lack most?

Hawaii: I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

Japan: Thanks very much.

Hawaii: By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

[13584] (H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune", that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the *Taiyo Maru*. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

Mr. BICKNELL. We go back to that same question.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. You explained that before.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

Mr. BICKNELL. Highly significant.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. BICKNELL. They are again trying to find out what [13585] the Japanese feelings are; are they more inclined toward loyalty to Japan or loyalty to the United States.

Senator LUCAS (reading) :

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Off phone.

Now, Colonel, did the Navy, the Army, or the FBI pick up Mrs. Mori following the outbreak of war?

Mr. BICKNELL. We picked up, on the afternoon of the 7th of December, both of them, Mrs. and Dr. Mori.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever have a talk with Mrs. Mori about this conversation?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[13586] Senator LUCAS. What did she say?

Mr. BICKNELL. Nothing.

Senator LUCAS. She didn't have much to say?

Mr. BICKNELL. No.

Senator LUCAS. What happened to them?

Mr. BICKNELL. The last I knew they were still over here in detention somewhere on the mainland.

Senator LUCAS. What was Mori's business there?

Mr. BICKNELL. I have forgotten his business.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Dentist.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right; dentist.

Senator LUCAS. Was this conversation picked up through his office or his home?

Mr. BICKNELL. This was his home. Of course, the reason that this was intercepted was the fact that he was already on our suspect list.

Senator LUCAS. How long had he been there?

Mr. BICKNELL. Ever since we had one.

Senator LUCAS. Ever since what?

Mr. BICKNELL. Ever since we had a list.

Senator LUCAS. Were you surprised that the attack came?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of anybody that wasn't?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

[13587] Senator LUCAS. Notwithstanding all of this information that you had, notwithstanding the fact that you transmitted it on the night of the 6th to General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. I think it would have been very difficult indeed to make any conclusions out of this that would have predicted accurately that we were to be attacked on the following morning by air. I think it is an indication that something will happen and quickly, but to draw the inference that it was going to hit Pearl Harbor would really be stretching the imagination.

Senator LUCAS. Did you know about the ship movements; did you know that the Japanese were reporting ship movements in and out of the harbor?

Mr. BICKNELL. I did not know that until after this. I knew it on the day of the 7th.

Senator LUCAS. How did you learn that?

Mr. BICKNELL. Because the minute the war started we placed the Japanese consulate under protective custody of the Honolulu police force. The boys went in the consulate and found a large tub of papers burning in one of the rooms. So they explained to the consul that that was considerable of a fire risk and put the fire out, put the papers in burlap bags, which later we received, and found in them portions of messages, portions of code books, being burned, [13588] and these were transmitted immediately to Captain Rochefort and within a short time he was able to give us some information on some of these messages, a few of them being movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor.

Then on the next day or two we also subpoenaed all of the records of the various cable companies and from those we got a complete file of the reports they had made.

Senator LUCAS. Were any of these messages, that you pieced together there and found that the Japanese consulate had received, decoded, and translated previous to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. BICKNELL. Not that I know of.

Senator LUCAS. What was this conversation that you had with the general staff about the burning of papers—on December 5, was it?

Mr. BICKNELL. The 6th.

Senator LUCAS. The 6th.

Mr. BICKNELL. That was at the regular weekly meeting of the staff where all matters of importance were brought up, and I told them that reliable reports had been received to the effect that the Japanese consulate were burning their secret papers.

Senator LUCAS. Was General Short there when you made that statement?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

[13589] Senator LUCAS. Was Colonel Phillips there?

Mr. BICKNELL. Colonel Phillips was there; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. He was?

Mr. BICKNELL. He was there.

Senator LUCAS. There is some question as to what you said. According to the evidence here it is contended that they believed that it was another routine daily duty of where they burn a lot of papers.

Mr. BICKNELL. If it was a routine duty why would one of the trusted members of the consulate be telephoning to somebody else in great

excitement about it? If it was a routine affair they certainly wouldn't be telephoning to each other about it.

Senator LUCAS. Was that explained?

Mr. BICKNELL. At that time I didn't know that; at that conference I didn't know those facts.

Senator LUCAS. Did any members of the staff know of this conversation?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What did you say, in substance, about these particular papers when you discussed the question before the staff?

Mr. BICKNELL. I said, substantially, that I had received confidential information of a very reliable nature that the [13590] Japanese consulate were burning all of their secret papers.

Senator LUCAS. All of their secret papers?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And that information came from the FBI?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know whether or not that information was ever transmitted to the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator LUCAS. Whose responsibility was it for having that transmitted to the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. That was Mr. Shivers' responsibility.

Senator LUCAS. So it not only went to the Army, that they were burning all of the important papers in the consulate, but it also went to the Navy?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was on December 6th?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That very question was discussed at the staff meeting at that time?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And it was following this meeting with the staff where you had the discussion as to the burning of important papers that the Mori message came along?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[13591] Senator LUCAS. That was submitted on the same day to General Short and Colonel Phillips?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Bicknell, I want to ask you two questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to announce that at the conclusion of Colonel Bicknell's testimony I desire to have a brief executive session.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel Bicknell, what difference do you think it would make in the disposition of the forces in Hawaii up to December 7, 1941, if General Short and Admiral Kimmel had the magic which was available to Washington?

Mr. BICKNELL. That would be rather hard for me to say, but I would say that if we had had in Hawaii all the information which was available from all intelligence sources, I feel certain that General Short would have gone into a full alert.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am going to separate the two. First of all, there was considerable information in Hawaii which the Navy had which you didn't have?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then assuming that there was available to [13592] you the information that was available to the Navy so that you could in turn make recommendations to General Short, what difference would it make, in your judgment, in the disposition of the forces?

Mr. BICKNELL. I feel that the information that the Navy had, especially with regard to the winds message, and perhaps some other items that I can't recall at the moment, but there were a number of others, that we would have been able to put up a much stronger case and to argue, if necessary, with the department commander on the seriousness of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Assuming you had known on the 3d of December that the Japanese were destroying their codes in the different centers of the world, and that information was available to the Navy at Hawaii, what recommendation would you have made based on that?

Mr. BICKNELL. We had that information.

Mr. MURPHY. You did have it?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. General Short said he never got it.

Mr. BICKNELL. I didn't get it officially, either.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you suppose General Short had it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't think so.

Mr. MURPHY. When we were questioning General Short about [13593] the message of General Marshall, when he was questioned about the message of General Marshall, he said the most significant thing in that message to him was the information about the burning of codes; that was highly important.

Do you know whether or not he had information about the Japs burning these codes before December 7?

Mr. BICKNELL. I doubt very much that he had, other than what information I have just related about the local Japanese consulate. There was a great deal of confusion existing that we didn't get straightened out until after the attack. The message that you have mentioned, relative to the Japanese burning their codes, destroying their codes in other parts of the world, and the local Japanese situation. That came about due to the fact that Captain Mayfield, district intelligence officer, called Mr. Shivers, I believe somewhere around the 3d or 4th of December, and asked him if he knew that the Japanese consuls were burning their codes. The FBI did not know about it and thought he meant the local consulate. They redoubled their efforts and observation of the local consulate and then discovered that the local Japanese consulate was burning their codes. That was turned back to the Navy as confirmation that they were burning the codes, but at that time the FBI did not know that Captain Mayfield was talking about another message.

[13594] Mr. MURPHY. Well, the confirmation as to the Japanese at Hawaii, that wasn't until the 6th of December, was it?

Mr. BICKNELL. There is some question as to date on that. My belief was that I received that information late on the 5th, but I may be mistaken.

In refreshing my memory with Mr. Shivers while he was in Hawaii just recently, he seemed to think it was the 4th. I can't remember those dates.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the Navy at Hawaii had messages on the 3d about codes; they had messages on the 4th about codes. Did they pass that on to the Army?

Mr. BICKNELL. They didn't pass it on to me.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you hear about it on the 3d or 4th?

Mr. BICKNELL. I heard about it.

Mr. MURPHY. What difference do you think it would make, in your judgment, if you knew that on the 3d?

Mr. BICKNELL. If I had known that on the 3d I would have gone to the General with that message and pointed out to him the significance, the probable significance of that, the same as I did with the other ones.

Mr. MURPHY. What significance would you give to it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I would say that when an Embassy or legation starts destroying its codes it is a sign that we are coming to a very rapid end of peaceful relations.

[13595] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you had no contact directly with Captain Layton, did you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did General Fielder have any contact directly with him?

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know that Captain Layton was giving in sanitized form certain information to the intelligence officer of the Air Corps?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you wonder why he would give it to him and not to your office?

Mr. BICKNELL. It didn't make much difference so long as I got it.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you get it from the Air Corps?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, the Air Corps man would get it from Captain Layton and transfer it to you?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you were never permitted to see any of the messages, as such, were you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You got it in sanitized form second-hand?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[13596] Mr. MURPHY. You do think it would make a difference if you had magic in Hawaii?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right; no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. In the answers to the Senator from Illinois when he read you the Mori message, do you want to convey to the committee that you conveyed all that information to General Fielder and General Short?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what is now known as hindsight?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. An examination of the details of this message leads you to that conclusion.

Mr. BICKNELL. Exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, after you told them about the message and the information that you gave them that evening, did you examine it again in detail until after the attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. I took that message back to the office and examined it for about an hour, and we had then just ended a period of 24-hour duty and I decided that I needed [13597] to get some rest and so I locked it up in the safe and went home about 9 o'clock to get rested up. Needless to say, I didn't have a chance to look at the message for some time thereafter.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicated that an examination of the Mori message led you to the opinion that they were speaking there as to what the attitude of the Japanese would be in the case of attack. Did you know a man by the name of Saiki?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a full-page advertisement in the Hilo Tribune Herald calling a mass meeting of alien Japanese at 2 p. m. on Sunday the 7th?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As an intelligence officer, did you ever look into that question?

Mr. BICKNELL. Never heard of it before, sir. That is on the Island of Hawaii. It never got to me.

Senator FERGUSON. It never got to you?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that there was some claim that they got mixed up on their dates, because of the international date line; would that refresh your memory?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

[13598] Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, as I understand it, you didn't get directly from the Navy the fact that they were burning codes in Washington or destroying the code machine?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever convey that message to General Fielder, then Colonel Fielder?

Mr. BICKNELL. I never received any information that I could substantiate enough to say that it was authentic.

Senator FERGUSON. So you didn't convey it to anyone else?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It had never reached even a good rumor stage; is that it?

Mr. BICKNELL. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. I noticed in your affidavit to Colonel Clausen this language:

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941 I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you and I have been talking about?

[13599] Mr. BICKELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That you thought it was from Navy sources?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But it wasn't such that you conveyed it to anyone?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then that should be added to your statement to Colonel Clausen?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In explaining that message?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, had you ever known the Embassy in Hawaii to burn any papers in the yard?

Mr. BICKNELL. I have known that everybody in Hawaii burns papers in the yard, but they don't burn them inside.

Senator FERGUSON. When was it they first burned them inside, was that on Sunday?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; that was the date that I am in doubt about. It was either the 3d or 4th, when the FBI intercepted a telephone call from one of the attachés of the consul saying that they were burning all of these secret papers.

Senator FERGUSON. But you learned later that that [13600] was not a fact because they were burning them on the day of the attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. They had to retain one code right up to the very last minute. There was a tremendous volume of messages to burn. They were burning those inside the house in a tub. They couldn't possibly burn all of the papers there were to burn in such a short period of time. When the police went in there on the morning of the 7th there was five burlap sacks of stuff that still had not been burned, but which had been torn in pieces. There was a pile of ashes there of all the papers that had been burned.

So it was the volume that prevented them from getting rid of it. If they had built a bonfire outside they could have disposed of them, but they were burning them inside the consulate.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you mention to General Short or General Fielder that this message, the Mori message, had been on a scrambler phone?

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't think I mentioned it because it was so obvious. All messages were scrambled.

Senator FERGUSON. You say all messages were scrambled?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; every message was scrambled.

Senator FERGUSON. Between private citizens?

Mr. BICKNELL. All radiotelephone, overseas telephone [13601] calls, all messages are scrambled, to protect the privacy of the conversation. If it weren't for that, you could tune in and listen to any conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the man in Hawaii who was calling, did you ever learn?

Mr. BICKNELL. The man in Tokyo, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't know who that was.



Senator FERGUSON. You stated at one place in your testimony that it was the wife that was talking and when they ended up they say:

Oh, no. That was fine. Best regards to your wife.

Mr. BICKNELL. As I remember the original record, it was a woman's voice. We may be mistaken. It may have been Dr. Mori himself. But he denied that he had the conversation and said that it was his wife who did the talking when we examined him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever figure out what the hibiscus and the poinsettias meant?

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't think anyone will ever figure that out unless somebody tells us what it meant. It would be almost impossible to draw any conclusion with only one reference of that type. If we had more identification, or more messages, with the recurring phrase, it might be possible [13602] to get what they were talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you didn't have the code words to ever figure that out?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you look over these ads in the various papers, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and the other papers, the Advertiser?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever look over those ads?

Mr. BICKNELL. You mean the jumbo silk ad?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find anything?

Mr. BICKNELL. Absolutely nothing.

[13603] Senator FERGUSON. At this time, I would like to make this statement:

I asked Captain Zacharias about that ad. Since then I have had a letter from the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, and also a memorandum from Riley Allen on the same question.

I think to complete this record, that this ought to go in the record. I have shown it to Mr. Kaufman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that may be done.

Do you want it printed in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I think that it ought to be spread on the record.

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire if it is claimed there is any significance to it?

Senator FERGUSON. No; it is claimed there was not. This witness' testimony was along the same line. You saw no significance about this ad at all?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be spread on the record.

(The letters referred to follow:)

[13604]

HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN,

Honolulu 2, Hawaii, U. S. A., February 5, 1946.

Senator HOMER FERGUSON (Mich.),

Member Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR FERGUSON: News dispatches from Washington report that an advertisement which appeared in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin December 3, 1941, has become a matter of inquiry and discussion by the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee.

The question appears to be whether this advertisement was inserted for a subversive purpose by agents of, or sympathizers with, the Japanese government, and whether such agents or sympathizers sought to disseminate information unfriendly to and dangerous to the security of the Hawaiian Islands at a time when the Japanese carrier fleet was approaching Oahu to strike on the morning of Sunday, December 7.

It was perhaps natural that immediately after that surprise attack, and when we who live in Hawaii had ample reason to fear another and greater assault, rumors of information and propaganda "planted" in the newspapers and in radio broadcasts should become current.

[13605] The story of the Hawaii Importing Company's ad is one of those rumors, which quickly grew to considerable proportions by word of mouth repetition, but which, like other reports of sabotage and "fifth columnist" activities, proved under competent, impartial examination, completely baseless.

Our own office, in common with the intelligence service of the Army and the Navy, and the FBI, investigated this particular rumor. All were satisfied the advertisement had no enemy motive or design.

The facts are covered in the enclosed affidavit from Porter Dickinson, assistant general manager of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, who, at the time of the Japanese attack and thereafter was advertising manager of the Star-Bulletin.

I send this to you so that if you feel there are any unanswered questions concerning the authenticity and the bona fides of this advertisement, the answers will, I think, be apparent. Like some others of the imaginative reports which leaped into circulation here and on the mainland after Pearl Harbor, this rumor may be hard to exterminate forever, and we are ready at any time to reiterate the accompanying statement.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Riley H. Allen,  
/t/ RILEY H. ALLEN,  
Editor.

[13606]

FEBRUARY 1, 1946.

Memo to Riley Allen,

Re Hawaii Importing Co. Ad of December 3, 1941.

Now that the Hawaii Importing Co. ad which appeared in the Star-Bulletin on December 3, 1941 has been brought up before the Pearl Harbor investigating committee, it might be well to review what happened at the time and shortly after publication of this ad.

1. The same ad appeared in both the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and the Honolulu Advertiser. The Star-Bulletin published the ad on December 3, 1941, and the Advertiser published it on December 5, 1941.

2. It had been the practice of the Hawaii Importing Co. to repeat ads which appeared first in the Star-Bulletin a few days later in the Honolulu Advertiser.

3. The Hawaii Importing Co. had run practically the same ad a year previous on December 2, 1940. The ad was of the same size, and carried the same illustrated heading. A good many items were the same as carried in the December 3, 1941 ad.

4. The Hawaii Importing Co. had run for several years previous on approximately the same date, ads of similar type.

5. The names carried in the ad were questioned by [13607] many, but proved to be bona fide names of materials.

6. The drawing used for the heading of this particular ad was the same that appeared in the ad of December 2, 1940.

7. Shortly after December 7, 1941 the FBI, office of Naval Intelligence and Army Intelligence, all investigated this copy through the management and personnel of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Hawaii Importing Co.

8. Following a very close examination of the copy and all persons involved in the placement of this copy, the three agencies gave the Hawaii Importing Co. a clean bill of health.

/s/ Porter Dickinson,  
/t/ PORTER DICKINSON,  
Assistant General Manager, Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Second day of February, 1946.

[NOTARY SEAL]

/s/ JOHN F. STONE,  
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.

My commission expires July 15, 1949.

[13608] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not your testimony or your ideas as to the conversation between you and General Fielder on the night of the 6th in any way conflicts, or have you talked it over since that time?

Mr. BICKNELL. I haven't had an opportunity to talk with General Fielder on that. I don't think there is any conflict.

Senator FERGUSON. So there can't be any doubt about the record, I wish that you would try to recall as nearly as you can, if not the exact words at least the substance of the conversation that you had in relation to the message, the Mori message on the 6th.

Mr. BICKNELL. It is 5 years ago. Five years is a long time.

The one thing that I do remember is General Short saying, in effect, that he didn't see anything very wrong with the message, because it was a very accurate picture of what was going on in Hawaii, and I ventured the remark that I perhaps felt it was too accurate a picture.

Now, I haven't any recollection other than that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the substance of the conversation as you remember it today?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know of anything that [13609] you can give us here that would aid us in the solution of this problem that we are confronted with, as to how this could happen and Hawaii not be alerted to it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I might say, if it is not the wrong thing, that I feel we might expect another Pearl Harbor unless we can develop an intelligence service that is a coordinated and efficient intelligence service, where all information obtained from all sources comes to some one central point and is properly evaluated and made available to all the agencies involved.

Unless we do that and unless we place ourselves in such a position, and if we have one or two or three or four separate agencies working on intelligence and not coordinating their endeavors, we are not safeguarding the interests of our Nation.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, when you divide intelligence and do not give all of the services the entire picture, you really destroy the value of intelligence?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is true. I think that this trouble we have had, that you are now trying to solve, is not a question of personalities. It is a question of system, the system was wrong.

We did not have trained intelligence people. We had very few trained intelligence officers in the Army and Navy [13610] anyway, and when you try to put that information in a pigeonhole and do not give it proper circulation in relation to other available information, you are destroying the entire objective of your plan.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Army in a way treat this intelligence as a minor branch, in your opinion? Did they give it the full meaning that it should have had?

Mr. BICKNELL. I think that is a question of personality.

Some few general officers that I have known give intelligence the highest regard. Others give it little.

General Herron, formerly department commander at the time I went on duty in Hawaii, gave it the highest importance. That is one of the reasons he called me back, was to reorganize his Intelligence

Department and his G-2 in such a way that it would function properly, should any emergency arise.

Senator FERGUSON. And, now, should we understand that you personally feel as an Intelligence officer in G-2, second in command, that you did all that you could with the information that you were furnished, that you feel that if you had had all of the information here in Washington, as well as elsewhere, that America had, that you would have been able to see a different picture at Hawaii on the 6th and 7th of December 1941?

[13611] Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Colonel, all of this—from all of the intelligence that you had, and all of the information that was available to you as Assistant Chief of Intelligence, of G-2 in Hawaii for some time prior to the 6th of December, did you have or obtain any impression or idea that Hawaii was to be the object of an attack by the Japs?

Mr. BICKNELL. There was nothing, sir, to give you any idea a definite idea, but there was always—in considering intelligence, one of the first precepts is to avoid surprise.

And probabilities are just as important.

I believe that in figuring out any military problem that the possibilities and probabilities must be given consideration.

Now, the fact that the fleet was in Hawaii, the fact that our air forces were in Hawaii, and the general evaluation of the Japanese plan to work down through the Indies and Singapore, which seemed evident, it would appear that the only thing that would deter them in doing that would be interference from our air or Navy forces. Therefore, it would seem to me that Hawaii could be placed very near the top of [13612] a list of possible attacks by the enemy.

Mr. KEEFE. I gathered the impression from a statement that you made a few moments ago that it was your opinion that if you had had certain intelligence that was available in Washington, and which was not furnished the Hawaiian Department, that you perhaps would have been in a better position to stand up and argue with the commanding general on the question of alerting.

Mr. BICKNELL. I think that is true. If we had had all information, we might have been able to do that.

If we had had meteorological information as to the formations to the west and northwest, if we had had the full import of the so-called winds message, if we had had the magic, it would have been much easier to say that the possibility of an attack was increasing in importance rather than decreasing.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you surprised, yourself, by the attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. Well, naturally, when you are looking out of your window on a peaceful Sunday morning and see a battleship blow up under your eyes, you are pretty apt to be surprised.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't mean that, of course. I mean, was the fact that the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning a surprise to you, as the Assistant Chief of G-2 of the [13613] Hawaiian Department?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; I think it was.

Mr. KEEFE. I am trying to find someone among all of these witnesses who have been here, who was not surprised. You were veering pretty close to that position.

Mr. BUCKNELL. I think I must admit I was surprised.

Mr. KEEFE. You finally landed in the same category with everybody else. Everybody was surprised here in Washington and in Hawaii.

That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Colonel, you said that General Herron had placed intelligence as being of the highest importance.

Where did General Short place it?

Mr. BICKNELL. I never became as well acquainted with General Short as I was with General Herron, perhaps due to the fact that I had not served with General Short long enough, and that he did not have much confidence in a Reserve officer. But I have the feeling that with intelligence from the information that I was passing on, that I have previously reviewed this afternoon, and these estimates in these military attaché reports that went to Washington every week, and all of the information that was going [19614] through, it was rather uncommon not to have some questions asked about it by the department commander.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you had predicted war at the end of November, had you not?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you ever asked about your prediction?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Nobody paid any attention to it, did they?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir; they did not.

Mr. MURPHY. And the reason you shifted it over to February because of the weather conditions?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, if they didn't attack toward the end of November, there would be such a change in weather conditions that you predicted an attack in February?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said that you didn't have the meteorological information.

Mr. BICKNELL. We didn't have it.

Mr. MURPHY. But the Navy had some pretty good men on it, didn't they?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[19615] Mr. MURPHY. And they did have quite a Navy set-up for meteorological data, which was not furnished to you?

Mr. BICKNELL. That is right. That is the point that I made in my remarks about a correlated intelligence agency. The information should be available.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know anything about the lost carriers, the carriers that couldn't be accounted for?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know anything about the expectation that there were carriers in the Marshalls?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know about the submarines that were sighted at Saipan and were predicted as moving eastward?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. If you had had the data which you now know the Navy did have at Hawaii, do you think that the magic at Washington would have added much to it in order to inform you so that you could predict more likely a possibility of attack?

Mr. BICKNELL. You are telling me something that I never heard before. I will say again that if we had information of that type, perhaps I could go even further in my statement to you and say that we would have been in a better position to make more definite predictions as to [13616] what might be expected.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you in Intelligence shown the message of the 24th of November which said that there is a possibility of an attack in any direction? Did you know such a message was sent to Hawaii that there was a possibility of an attack in any direction, on November 24?

Mr. BICKNELL. I have a vague recollection of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you shown the war warning of the 27th?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir; I heard that. Colonel Phillips read it to the staff.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he read it on that Saturday morning, or before that?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, that was the day it arrived.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you see the Navy message, "This is a war warning"?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever know they had sent a message "This is a war warning"?

Mr. BICKNELL. I knew it after the 7th.

Mr. MURPHY. You never heard it before?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you in Intelligence were pretty much in the dark as to what the Navy was doing in Hawaii?

[13617] Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Colonel, I have been interested by your statement in regard to the consolidation of the intelligence service, and I have also noted what you said about the use of magic had it been available in Hawaii.

You recognize also the great importance of carefully safeguarding the information gained through magic?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. It played a tremendous part in the subsequent conduct of the war?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And the system that seemed to have been followed was to receive the magic here in Washington.

Mr. BICKNELL. Right.

Mr. CLARK. And carefully safeguard it.

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And then issue orders to the command in Hawaii. There is something to be said for that system, too, is there not?

Mr. BICKNELL. I didn't understand.

Mr. CLARK. I say, there is something to be said for that system too?  
[13618] Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir, but in these days of modern communications, and in these days of situations we are so rapidly facing, that question is not as important as it used to be.

For instance, here on the mainland, we can handle information of a highly secret nature over protected wire circuits.

It could be sent from Washington to San Francisco in perfect safety over a special wire network. It is now possible to go from Hawaii to—from San Francisco to Hawaii in 9½ hours by airplane with courier. It isn't like the old days when it used to take many many hours to get a message through by codes and ciphers and all the machinery that is gone through.

A courier might be well on his way to a distant point with the message in the time that it would take to do that, with the message in personal custody.

Mr. CLARK. Under conditions as they existed in the last war, General Marshall seems to have taken particular precautions to safeguard the secrecy of magic by confining it to just as small a circle as possible.

Mr. BICKNELL. That is true.

[13618A] Mr. CLARK. Now, do you agree or disagree with that?

Mr. BICKNEL. I think it is perfectly possible in a case like that that you do not have to send out the information that you obtain from magic sources, but orders could be properly prepared based on that information and forwarded to the necessary commanders.

Mr. CLARK. Well, you think those orders should have gone beyond what were issued in this case?

Mr. BICKNELL. I do not know enough about the Washington angle of this thing to form an opinion.

Mr. CLARK. I will take as an illustration the message from General Marshall of the 27th. Do you think that more should have been stated in that order?

Mr. BICKNELL. There again is a question of judgment. My personal point of view is that the department commander is to judge what the local conditions are and take action that he considers appropriate. That is why we have a department commander and a lieutenant general, who does not wait for somebody else to tell him what to do. He must draw his own conclusions and take action.

Mr. CLARK. And when he receives a message of that character he would be supposed to exercise that independence of judgment?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[13619] Mr. CLARK. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question on that point, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. You were familiar with the message sent by General Marshall on the 27th?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Were you also familiar with the reply of General Short's?

Mr. BICKNELL. Only from what I have read in the newspapers.

Senator LUCAS. You were not consulted?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You never saw the message?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You know what it is. All he said in reply was, "Alerted to sabotage, and liaison with the Navy." Do you think that was responsive to that original message of the 27th? Maybe I shouldn't ask you that.

Mr. BICKNELL. I don't think I can answer that.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say you were a Reserve officer?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think you remarked that General Short [13620] did not think much of Reserve officers.

Mr. BICKNELL. I have that feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a chronic attitude of Regular Army officers toward Reserve officers?

Mr. BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BICKNELL. I am regional manager of the Veterans' Administration in Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see. Under General Bradley?

Mr. BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Colonel, the committee thanks you for your appearance here and for the trouble you went to to get here from Honolulu to testify and appreciate very much your cooperation.

Mr. BICKNELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You are now excused.

(The witness was excused.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum here that Colonel Bratton referred to, he got it from the Army, made by Pettigrew, that he had written for Bratton and that Bratton had turned it over for higher authority, but I would like to have it marked as an exhibit, not part of the record, but as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be marked as Exhibit 156. I think.

[13621] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering on that exhibit of Pettigrew, if it is the whole exhibit. I thought it was a lot bigger than that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Five pages.

Mr. MURPHY. I know, but isn't that the beginning of a big exhibit?

Mr. KAUFMAN. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I thought there was a lot that followed that.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 156.")

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, we have prepared in our office a complete list—there is in one of the exhibits in some one of the earlier hearings a partial list—of the current newspaper headlines in the Hawaiian and Honolulu daily newspapers relating to the general international war situation.

We have prepared a complete copy of those headlines which we would like to have extended in the record so that there will be in the record a complete list.

The CHAIRMAN. You want that printed as part of the hearings?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The headlines referred to follow:)



[13622]

## HONOLULU ADVERTISER

## HEADLINES

*November 7, 1941*

Kurusu Carrying Special Note to F. D. R. From Premier Tojo—Japan Ready to Act Unless Tension Eases.

Japan Waits Before Move in Far East—Aggression in Pacific Appears Shelved Until Kurusu's Mission has been Completed in U. S.

Invasion Held too Difficult by Officials—Offensive May Start in Middle East Soon; Invasion of Continent Impracticable at Present.

*November 13, 1941*

Tokyo Radio Asserts War Is Already on—Any Military Moves Only Logical Result of Encirclement Policy, Japanese Staff Says.

Envoy Undismayed—Carries Broad Powers to Act—Kurusu Denies Taking Message, Implies Errand of Bigger Scope.

[13623] *November 14, 1941*

Japanese Confident of Naval Victory.

*November 26, 1941*

Americans Get Warning to Leave Japan, China.

Hull Reply to Japan Ready.

*November 27, 1941*

U. S.-Japan Talks Broken Off as Hull Rejects Appeasement—Full Surrender Demanded in U. S. Statement.

Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades.

*November 28, 1941*

PARRIS ISLAND, S. C.—This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage balloon at Parris Island, S. C., looking for all the world like an air monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged structure protected there from bomb splinters. The helium sausage may be used to protect beachheads, bridgeheads and other strong points, thereby differing from the British technique which keeps them flying over London. The Marines encamped on Parris Island, S. C., have a special training school on these balloons.

[13624] *November 29, 1941*

U. S. Rejects Compromise in Far East—Washington Insists on Maintenance of Status Quo, Withdrawal from China by Japan Army.

U. S. Warplanes May Protect Burma Road—Protective Force of 200 Planes, 500 Pilots Held Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japanese.

*November 30, 1941*

Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle—Foreign Affairs Expert Attacks Tokyo Madness.

Leaders Call Troops Back in Singapore—Hope Wanes as Nations Fail at Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in P. I.; Hawaii Troops Allerted.

*December 1, 1941*

Japanese Press Warns Thailand.

Burma Troops Are Reinforced—British, Indian Units Arrive at Rangoon.

F. D. R. Hurries to Parleys on Orient Crisis.

*December 2, 1941*

Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S.— [13625]  
Thailand Now in Allied Bloc, Press Charges.

Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations—Prepares for Action in Event of Failure.

Malaya Forces Called to Full Mobilization.

Quezon Held to Blame in P. I. Defense Delay.

*December 3, 1941*

Huge Pincerattack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted—Pepper Visions Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns.

U. S. Demands Explanation of Japan Moves—Americans Prepare for Any Emergency; Navy Declared Ready.

*December 4, 1941*

Hawaii Martial Law Measure Killed for Present Session.

Japanese Pin Blame on U. S.—Army Paper Charges Violation by F. D. R.

*December 5, 1941*

Probe of Japanese Activities Here Will Be Made by Senate—Spy Inquiry Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. by State Department.

[13626] *December 5, 1941*

Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today.

Japan Calls in Nationals.

Japan Has Secret Shanghai Agents.

*December 6, 1941*

America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China—Hull May Ask Proof, Suggest Troop's Recall.

Japan Troops Concentrated on Thai Front—Military Observers Say Few Units Have Been Posted In North.

*December 7, 1941*

F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis—Japanese Deny Massing Troops for Thai War.

British Fear Tientsin Row, Call Up Guards—May Isolate Concession to "Prevent" Agitation over U. S.-Japan Rumors.

Hirohito Holds Power to Stop Japanese Army.

[13627]

HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN

#### HEADLINES

*November 10, 1941*

Navy Control for Honolulu Harbor.

*December 1, 1941*

U. S. Army Allerted in Manila—Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows.

Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension.

*December 4, 1941*

Japan Spurns U. S. Program—Press Holds Acceptance Not Possible.

*December 5, 1941*

Japan Parries Open U. S. Break.

Further Peace Efforts Urged—Tokyo Claims Policy "Misunderstood" in Washington as One of Force and Conquest.

*December 6, 1941*

Singapore on War Footing—Sudden Order Calls Troops to Positions—State of Readiness is Completed; No Explanation Given.

New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo—Joint Commission to Iron Out Deadlock with U. S. Proposed.

[13628] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I should like to request that Exhibit 143, which is the so-called Roberts report, consisting of the transcript from that hearing and the exhibits, and Exhibit 144, consisting of the Hart transcript of evidence and the exhibits, and Exhibit 146, the Navy court of inquiry and exhibits; Exhibit 149, which is the Hewitt transcript and exhibits; Exhibit 145,

which is the Army Pearl Harbor Board transcript and exhibits; Exhibit 148, which consists of the volume of Clausen affidavits and attached exhibits, and Exhibit 147, which is the so-called Clarke report. be received in evidence as such exhibits, the evidentiary part thereof to be received by the committee with the same force and effect as though the witnesses who were then in these various respective reports sworn and testified—with the same force and effect as though the witnesses had been heard and their testimony taken in this proceeding.

With reference to that part of my request affecting the Clausen affidavits, there was extensive examination here about them. While I do not regard them as of the same grade of evidence as I do the sworn testimony by question and answer which was taken on the other groups of so-called investigations, my reason for including them in my request is that I think the committee is amply able to give those affidavits the weight that they may consider them entitled to, and in view of the fact that much reference has been made to various of the [13629] affidavits here and considerable testimony taken concerning them, it would be wise to include the Clausen affidavits and exhibits as a part of this testimony and as a part of the recording this proceeding from an evidentiary standpoint.

Now, it has not been our intention to include in these exhibits as thus identified the various conclusions and findings and decisions of whatever nature that may have been reached in, upon or concerning any of these prior investigations. It had been our intention to include those documents in a separate volume which could be available for the examination of the committee in a volume by itself, which raises the question as to whether you would rather have it in that form or have the particular findings and conclusions and whatever decisions there may be appear in the record adjacent to the particular exhibit, which would be the report of the transcript and exhibits themselves.

It struck us that the separate volume idea, containing all of those reports and decisions, would be better as a reference matter particularly than to bring them into exhibits relating to transcripts of testimony and other exhibits which are a formal part of this record as a matter of the factual record.

The CHAIRMAN. That matter was suggested some days ago and I thought that we had decided that all these opinions and findings, and so forth, to which you have referred would be printed [13630] in a separate volume for convenience.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We agreed to that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that we decided to do that.

Mr. RICHARESON. All right, if that is the understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered without objection, to have them handled in that way rather than to have to run back through a lot of other volumes and pick out the findings and opinions that have been rendered by all these various boards. I thought we had decided to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I noted one thing that Mr. Richardson has asked us. In effect we are stating that we are going to treat the evidence, for instance, given in the Hart and the Hewitt evidence as if it were produced here in open hearing.

I don't think that we were going that far. I think that we as members of the committee should consider it but I think it has a different value

than that which is given here and where every member of the committee has had the right of examination with the aid of counsel, and I don't think we should agree as a committee that we are going to give it the same weight as the evidence in open hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair did not understand that the counsel suggested that. That it would be considered for whatever weight it has as if the same testimony were given here.

[13631] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The point that I have in mind is that you have the right to quote from the testimony of Mr. X, who testified in a particular investigation as a factual basis for a conclusion you arrive at if you believe that the testimony therein given is credible and true.

The CHAIRMAN. That is satisfactory. The committee will agree in determining what weight to give any of this testimony that is filed here but which has not been produced in our hearing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would doubt your right to use that testimony as testimony if it was not as testimony made a part of your record here as distinguished from being simply an exhibit.

Mr. CLARK. Not with the same force and effect, necessarily.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The force and effect is entirely up to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter for the committee.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It is dependent upon the extent and character and propriety of the examination and the circumstances of cross-examination or no cross-examination and the presence of counsel and all those things.

[13632] Senator FERGUSON. The fact that it was not a public hearing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you will permit me to say for the record one thing—

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done. If you are through with that point, that will be done as a part of the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me say for the record in connection with my request, that there are two phases in connection with it. There are, first, a considerable group of witnesses who have testified here orally, whom you have examined and cross-examined, whose testimony also appears in one or more of these earlier hearings. That constitutes, in my opinion, the best grade of testimony that you have because you then connect it up in your own examination.

The second group of testimony here is with reference to the very numerous witnesses who have testified in these various hearings who have not been called here and whom you have not examined. In that case it would seem to me that it would be necessary for the committee to make a very careful examination of the circumstances under which they testified, their cross-examination, the applicability of the questions that were asked them and the breadth and intelligence of the investigation before you depended on their testimony with the freedom that you would the testimony of the witnesses you have had to examine here.

[13633] So there is that difference, but to my mind the reason that I make that request is that it is all testimony and the weight that ought to be given it in the last analysis depends upon your estimate of what it is worth.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else for the record now?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Masten has some matters that he wishes to bring in the record and then there is one further matter I would like to call to your attention, since the record is being closed here.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Masten is recognized.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, from time to time various members of the committee have made requests which we have endeavored to comply with and obtain the information requested. We have recently gone through the transcript and forwarded to the War, Navy, and State Departments complete lists of any unanswered requests and we will do the same with the testimony during the last week or so, which we have not completed.

We have received some answers to certain requests which run back fairly early into the transcript and the reason for that is because of our having brought it to the attention of the respective departments only recently.

The first is in response to a request of Senator Ferguson at page 209 of the transcript for information regarding the vessel known as the *American Leader*. In response to that re- [13634] quest we are advised by the Navy Department that the captain of the *American Leader* in November and December of 1941 was Capt. Haakon A. Pederson, whose present address is 9701 Shore Road, Brooklyn, N. Y.

In answer to further questions regarding the departure of the vessel from Honolulu, the Navy Department refers us to the log of the U. S. S. *Boise*, which is Exhibit 68 in this proceeding, for the period November 20 to December 7, 1941, which states that the ship arrived at Manila Harbor, Philippine Islands, on December 4, 1941, having been part of a convoy consisting of steamships *Cape Fairweather*, *President Grant*, *Dona Noti*, *John Lykes* and *American Leader*.

At page 547 of the transcript Mr. Gearhart made a request for the specific data from which Captain Kniskern made his report to the Bureau of Ships on damage at Pearl Harbor.<sup>1</sup>

The Navy Department advises that these reports and data relating to the capital ships at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, consist of 9 volumes and 3 lengthy letter reports with photographs and charts, and they suggest that this material be retained in the Navy Department for examination by the committee if it is still so desired.

At page 549 of the transcript Mr. Gearhart requested Admiral Kimmel's circular letters re berthing of ships at Pearl Harbor.

The Navy Department has forwarded to us copies of Pacific [13636] Fleet confidential letter 2CL-41, dated February 15, 1941, and Pacific Fleet confidential letter 2CL-41 revised, dated October 14, 1941. The latter letter is a part of Exhibit 44 and with your permission we will have the earlier letter included in the transcript at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be ordered.

<sup>1</sup> See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2677-2678.

(The document referred to follows:)

[13636]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

A2-11/FF1/

A4-3/QL/(0271)

Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 15, 1941.

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: FLEET.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

- (a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40.
- (b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40.
- (d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (e) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (f) Section 4, Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions:

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor [13637] by sinking an obstruction in the Channel,
- (3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(B) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part or in their entirety as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *Maintain continuous patrols:*

- (1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer moored near coal dock.
- (2) Boom.
- (3) Harbor.

(B) *Intermittent patrols:*

(1) *Patrol Wing TWO* shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operating forces and in early morning on subsequent days.

(2) *An off-shore destroyer patrol* of three destroyers beginning twelve hours prior to the sortie and/or entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle of a radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled by [13638] the Channel Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, on request of Task Force Commander.

(3) *An air patrol* shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship to search that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is South of latitude 21°-20' N. This air patrol shall be furnished: for sortie, from ship or carrier-based aircraft by the Senior Officer Present Afloat of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of the Sortie Task Force Commander; for entry, by the Task Force Commander entering; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the Task Force Commander entering.

(4) *Daily sweeps.* Sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

(C) *Operating areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (e).

(2) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and patrol aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. The organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

[13639] (a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available in the priority:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wing TWO and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require

(D) *Sortie and Entrance:*

(1) Comply with instructions in U. S. F. 10.

(2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above, shall be established and commanded by the Sortie Commander except when forces are entering only, in which case they shall be established and commanded by the officer commanding the Task Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the command of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task Force Commander on completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task Force Commander. These patrols shall continue until released by the Task Force Commander of the sortie in case of [13640] sortie only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in case of entry or successive sortie and entry.

(3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be energized in water of less than sixty fathoms. Unless the Entrance Channel has been swept for magnetic mines, Commander Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship without protection to precede the first heavy ship in which the degaussing gear is inoperative. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(E) *Conditions of ships at sea:*

(1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if directed by the former, shall maintain inner air patrol for disposition or formations, when in assigned operating areas.

(3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(4) Maintain condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition or readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges [13641] ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless specially directed.

(5) Maintain material condition XRAY, or equivalent, in all ships.

(6) Steam darkened at night in defensive position either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(9) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarines squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area.

While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they will maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(11) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (9) and (10) above, shall be on the surface.

[13642] (12) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they have been designated, shall be furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. Commanders of surface task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly notified thereof.

(F) *Condition of ships in port:*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (b), (c) and (d).

(G) *Defense against air attack:*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire, berths in the harbor [13643] are assigned to air defense sectors as follows:

Sector I—Berths F2-F8, \*2, C1 to C5. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berth.)

Sector II—Berths F1, F9, B1-3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, T1-4, WL-2-3, D2-7, X22, X23. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 190° to 270° true from assigned berths.)

Sector III—Berths D1, D9, F10-13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths.)

Sector IV—Berths X3, X4, X5, X6, to X14, X17, C6. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths.)

Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships moored at that sector's berth. But ships at other sector berths may be used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall [13644] normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and will be responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he will:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for co-ordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.



(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

[13645] (6) Notify all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed: Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure will be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane [13646] guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit.

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require.

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

(a) *Ship Attacked.* Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details and addressed to all ships present in Hawaiian Waters. To insure rapid delivery of this despatch should be transmitted by the attacked ship to the Task Force Commander, to all ships present in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit in effect, and to Radio Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kcs. for Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

#### *Ships other than one attacked*

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except all aircraft will be placed in Condition ONE, armed. Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched

unarmed. (At [13648] least one squadron with depth charges when they become available). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers*. Same as for battleships, except that one-half available aircraft (armed) will be used for own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent to scene of attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers*. Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines*. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig-zagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Mincraft*. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force*. If ship attack is damaged, tugs in operating areas slip tows and join her at best speed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels [13649] proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wing TWO*. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft*. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District*. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor*. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at sea*. Co-ordinate offensive and defense measures. When immediate defense measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines [13650] awaiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution:

(List II, Case 1):

O; X; AA1; AAA1; EN1; EN3; NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary.*

[13651] Mr. MASTEN. At page 2064 of the transcript Senator Brewster made a request for information regarding the relative strength of the Japanese and United States Fleet and Air Forces in 1932.

In answer to that request the Navy Department has forwarded a table which we request permission to spread in the transcript at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[13652] OP-23-F141

16 JANUARY 1946.

*Fleet and air strength of United States and Japan as of 1932*

UNITED STATES			JAPAN		
Fleet :			Fleet :		
BB-----	15	(456,300 tons)	BB-----	10	(301,220 tons)
CV-----	3	( 78,700 " )	CV-----	3	( 66,000 " )
CA-----	8	( 74,000 " )	CA-----	12	(124,400 " )
CL-----	10	( 70,500 " )	CL-----	18	( 85,170 " )
DD-----	184	(220,800 " )	DD-----	67	( 77,860 " )
Small DD's-----	13	( 13,000 " )	Small DD's-----	34	( 27,230 " )
Fleet SS's-----	7	( 18,920 " )	Fleet SS's-----	24	( 38,108 " )
SS's-----	31	( 27,000 " )	SS's-----	35	( 29,175 " )
Total Combatant Tonnage-----			959,220 tons	Total Combatant Tonnage-----	
				749,163 tons	
Air :			Air :		
Army : (no figures available)			Army :		
			Total, all types-----		938
			Total Operational-----	approx--	500
			Training-----	"	80
			Reserve-----	"	250
Navy :			Navy :		
Fleet-----	approx--	570	Fleet-----		329
(Carrier Air—194 on board)			(Carrier Air—136 on board)		
Marine Air-----	approx--	160	Shore-----		472
			(Includes Training Types)		
Total Navy Operational----			730	Total Navy, all types-----	
				801	

R#127

[13653] Mr. MASTEN. At page 4031 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested that certain documents be submitted to the War, Navy, and State Departments for information as to whether the papers could be located in their official files.

The War Department advises that there has been found in the War Department files a copy of all the material inclosed except for (a) the page listing oil reserves of principal foreign countries as of January 1939 and (b) the heading of the May 16, 1941, letter to the Honorable Gifford Pinchot.

The Navy Department advises that a thorough search of their files fails to disclose any of the papers or any of the references thereto.

The State Department advises that a careful search has been made of the State Department files but no record can be found of the correspondence referred to and the State Department has returned to us the papers originally submitted by Senator Ferguson.

At page 5327 of the transcript Mr. Murphy asked for a copy of Admiral R. K. Turner's memorandum of February 5, 1941, which was referred to by a handwritten note at the end of April 17, 1941, ONI memorandum on the British-Japanese crisis.

The Navy Department advises that a thorough search of its files fails to disclose any copy of the memorandum in question.

At page 5368 of the transcript Mr. Murphy requested [13654] copies of Commander Ansel's daily "Short Strategic Summaries of

the International, Military, and Political Situation, which were prepared by Commander Ansel, under Admiral Turner and Captain Wright, for Admiral Stark to submit to the President.

The Navy Department has furnished us those summaries. I am going to hand them to Mr. Murphy for his examination.

At page 7236 of the transcript further information was to be furnished regarding the state of watertight integrity of certain of the vessels in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The Navy Department advises as follows:

The logs of the *USS California*, *Maryland*, *Nevada* and *Tennessee* have been examined for any record of any inspections, and for any references concerning watertight integrity precedent to or in preparation for any inspections on 5, 6, and 7 December 1941, with negative results.

We would like the transcript to show that in response to Mr. Murphy's request at page 7567 for a photographic copy of intercept SIS 19631, that that intercept has been previously handed to Mr. Murphy.

At page 7584 of the transcript Mr. Murphy requested information about the condition of the B-17's that flew to Hawaii immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In response to that request we have received a number of [13655] documents from the War Department which we request be spread on the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be so ordered.  
(The documents referred to follow:)

[13656]

WAR DEPARTMENT.  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
OPERATIONS DIVISION,  
Washington 25, D. C., 26 January 1946.

Memorandum for L & L Division.

(Att: Lt. Col. Duncombe.)

Subject: B-17 Flights to Hawaii.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum of 21 January 1946 to Lt. Col. Duncombe from Mr. Richardson requesting information regarding the B-17's that were flown to Hawaii immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

2. Inclosed herewith are pertinent documents from the files of the Army Air Forces. Inclosure No. 1 is a copy of a memorandum from the Chief of the Air Staff to the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command confirming a telephone conversation on 8 December 1941 making arrangements for a 10 December flight of nine (9) B-17's to Hawaii. Inclosure No. 2 is a copy of a 6 January 1942 letter from the Adjutant General to the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, concerning the transfer of aircraft and crews to Hawaii.

S/G John C. Catlin,  
JOHN C. CATLIN,  
Major, GSC,  
Current Group, OPD.

[13657] Incls

1. 2 cys memo fr C\*AS to CG, AFCC
2. cy ltr 6 Jan 42 fr TAG to CG, AFCC

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES  
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tally No. AAF \_\_\_\_\_

A line will be drawn across sheet after each comment.

Subject: Transfer of nine (9) B-17's to Hawaii.

From	To	Date	Comments	AAF/A-3 MMacC-ek
AAF C/AS	CG AFCC	1941 12-9	This confirms a telephone conversation on December 8, 1941, between Colonel Naiden and Colonel Chauncey: It is desired that nine (9) B-17's be transferred from the United States to Hawaii departure to be made on Wednesday, December 10 1941.	

It is desired that these airplanes be flown over by the Hawaiian crews with the guns properly manned. The additional combat personnel will be transferred to the Hawaiian Department.

[13658]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, January 6, 1942.

Secret.

AG 580.81 (1-3-42) MSC-G-M.

Subject: Transfer of Aircraft and Crews.

To: The Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.

1. It is desired that you issue the following instructions, to transfer nine B-17-E airplanes from Sacramento Air Depot, California, to Hawaii. These planes are to depart from the United States as soon as practicable.

2. It is also desired that you provide the Combat Crews, and they will be made available for transfer to Hawaii.

3. The airplanes will be fully equipped and ready to combat before release to the Chief of the Air Corps.

4. Each airplane making the flight will be manned by a combat crew consisting of the following:

- one (1) officer pilot
- one (1) officer co-pilot
- one (1) officer navigator
- one (1) enlisted man, bombardier-gunner
- one (1) enlisted man, assistant aerial engineer-gunner.
- two (2) enlisted men, radio operator-gunners
- one (1) enlisted man, aerial engineer-gunner

[13659] 5. The flight will be under the command of the Chief of the Air Corps after crews and planes are released by you, until arrival in Hawaii.

6. All personnel will be equipped with both summer and winter clothing.

7. This is a PERMANENT change of station.

8. The Chief of the Army Air Forces will be notified where practicable, of the arrival and departure of the flights by secret codes.

9. Secret Code will be used in transmission of all messages.

10. Obligate the following procurement authorities to the extent necessary:

[13660]

*Travel of the Army*

FD 1492 P 1-06, 3-06, 15-06, 17-06, A 0412-2

(For travel of officers, and enlisted men; and for travel of dependents of officers and enlisted men of the first three grades.)

*Army-Transportation-Commercial*

QM 1615 P 54-01, 54-02, 54-13, 54-07 A 0525-2 "D"

(For packing, crating, and shipping authorized household goods allowances of officers and enlisted men of the first four grades)

11. It is desired that a copy of all travel orders involved in this movement be furnished the Chief of the Air Corps (attention Fiscal Section) with the estimated cost by procurement numbers under procurement authorities listed above.

12. *a.* All personnel will require physical examinations as prescribed by Paragraph 14 AR 40-100 prior to departure from home station.

*b.* The following immunization in conformity with War Department instructions will be initiated and completed if necessary after arrival at destination.

(1) Revaccinate with smallpox vaccine and complete all typhoid inoculations as required by AR 40-215 provided these have not been completed within twelve months prior to departure from continental United States.

(2) Vaccinate with tetanus toxoid as directed in Circular letter, SGO, No. 34, April 16, 1941.

[13661] (3) Vaccinate with yellow fever vaccine as directed in Circular letter, SGO, No. 9, February 12, 1941.

13. Dependents will not accompany troops. See letter June 7, 1941, AG 341.1 (5-26-41) MO-D-M. subject: Transportation of dependents and household goods to overseas stations.

14. Attention is invited to Section II, War Department circular No. 220, October 17, 1941, which directs that extract copies of SECRET orders, without SECRET markings, will be furnished to the unit personnel section or other reporting source in order to permit the preparation of reports of changes (SD AGO Form No. 303) for units of individuals covered by such SECRET orders.

15. The soldiers will be provided with *identification tags* in accordance with Circular 142, WD, 1941.

16. Upon arrival at destination personnel will be advised to have their friends and relatives address their mail to them using the mailing address of unit at that station.

17. Direct communication consistent with the SECRET classification of this directive is authorized by all concerned in effecting the movement referred to herein.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. L. CLARK,  
Adjutant General.

[13662] Mr. MASTEN. We have received from the War Department a further memorandum regarding the microfilms received from General MacArthur's headquarters. Copies of the enclosures to this memorandum have been distributed to the committee and to the press.

With your permission I would like to read the covering memorandum into the record as it is the only copy we have and the press is not informed as to the nature of the enclosures.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MASTEN. The memorandum is dated February 15, 1946, and reads as follows:

A memorandum to Mr. Mitchell, dated 9 January and read into the record at page 7874 of the Committee transcript, noted that General MacArthur's headquarters had forwarded 12 reels of microfilms, which contained a Japanese file

relating to negotiations between the United States and Japan prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. Four of the 12 reels had then been processed, and their contents were described. Photostats of the remaining eight reels have now been made from the microfilms and have been examined by qualified Japanese linguists. The examination shows that the eight reels contain the following.

1. The Japanese texts of 374 diplomatic messages [13663] practically all sent either from Washington to Tokyo or from Tokyo to Washington. Of the 374 messages, 362 were intercepted by the U. S. Army or Navy at the time of transmission in 1941. Two others, which were intercepted only in part, are found in their entirety in the Japanese file:

a. Message No. 881, Washington to Tokyo, dated 30 September 1941, Part 1 of which is printed at page 45 of Committee Exhibit 1. A translation of Part 2, recently made from the copy in the Japanese file, is attached as "Inclosure A."

That is the first document that was distributed this afternoon.

b. Message No. 941, Washington to Tokyo, dated 13 October 1941, Part 4 of which is printed at pages 67-68 of Committee Exhibit 1. The message gives a lengthy account of a conversation between Mr. Wakasugi and Under Secretary Welles. In view of the very full account of that conversation given in Mr. Welles' memorandum (pp. 680-86 of Volume 2, Foreign Relations of the United States), the other parts of the message found in the Japanese file will not be translated unless the Committee so requests.

The remaining 10 of the 374 messages were not intercepted in 1941, and have been translated by the War Department during the past few weeks. Only three of the 10 messages [13664] appear to be of any possible interest to the Committee: Tokyo Circular 2288, dated 8 November 1941; the somewhat similar Tokyo Circular 2313, dated 12 November 1941; and Tokyo Circular 2193, dated 10 November 1941.

These three messages are attached as "Inclosure B," and are the next three of the papers that have been distributed.

2. A small number of statements and other documents in English text. Most of these appear in Peace and War or in Foreign Relations of the United States. It may be of interest to the Committee to note that the file contains the English-text version of the Japanese 14-part memorandum, Tokyo to Washington message No. 902 (printed at pp. 239-45 of Committee Exhibit 1), and that in the margin opposite the 14th part there is some Japanese writing which means in English: "Part 14 is to be held up until 4:00 p. m. on Sunday". (As appears from Committee Exhibit 41, the 14th part was filed by the Japanese in Tokyo at 4:38 p. m., 7 December, Tokyo time, or 2:38 a. m., 7 December, Washington time.)

3. Memorandum of three conversations in the latter half of August 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and the Japanese Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister attached as inclosure C).

4. Two memoranda, dated September 1941, relating to proposed conditions for peace between Japan and China [13665] (attached as inclosure D).

5. A memorandum dated 26 November 1941, on the progress of Japanese-American negotiations (attached as Inclosure E).

It may also be of interest to the Committee to know that the films do not contain Tokyo to Berlin message No. 985, dated 30 November 1941 (Parts 1 and 3 of which appear at p. 204 of Committee Exhibit 1).

(Signed) HARMON DUNCOMBE,  
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

The last message referred to is the message, Senator Ferguson, which you have inquired about several times as part 2.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission we would like to add these to Exhibit 132, which was the exhibit in which were placed the other memoranda submitted, and ask that these be received now as Exhibit 132-A.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered and filed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you locate part 2?

Mr. MASTEN. No. The memorandum states it was not included in the microfilms.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 132-A").

Mr. MASTEN. We have also received from the War Department a short memorandum dated today, February 20, 1946, reading as follows:

[13666] Inclosed is a report, dated 1 February 1946, just received from General MacArthur's Headquarters, on the subject "Pre Pearl Harbor Transmission of Coded Messages from Hawaii". The report is based on information obtained from Lt. Comdr. Suzuki, formerly of the Japanese Navy, who was aboard a Japanese warship during the Pearl Harbor attack. It is to be noted that at the bottom of the report the following evaluation appears:

Of source—D (Not usually reliable).

Of information—4 (Doubtful).

The memorandum is signed "Harmon Duncombe" and we request that this material be spread into the record at this point.

Senator LUCAS. What is the substance of that? Can you give it to me just briefly.

Mr. MASTEN. I haven't yet read all of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You want it printed in the record as a part of the record?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to follows):

[13667]

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS—UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

APO 500.

1 FEBRUARY 1946.

CI 750105.

Subject: Pre-Pearl Harbor Transmission of Coded Messages from Hawaii.

To: Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Forwarded herewith is Summary of Information dated 25 January 1946. Subject: Pre-Pearl Harbor Transmission of Coded Messages from Hawaii. This information was obtained from Lieutenant Commander SUZUKI, formerly of the Japanese Navy, who was aboard a Japanese warship during the Pearl Harbor attack.

2. This headquarters is attempting to determine the present whereabouts of Lt. Commander KIYOSUKE, formerly of the Japanese Navy, and HIYOSHI of the Foreign Department, so that they may be interviewed regarding the transmission of coded messages from Hawaii and the United States prior to the Pearl Harbor Incident.

3. Forwarded for your information.

4. Distribution of Report:

[13668] 2 copies MIS WAR Dept

2 copies AC of S, G-2, AFMIDPAC

2 copies AC of S, G-2 AFPAC

1 Copies File

For the Chief of Counter-Intelligence:

CONFIDENTIAL

T. P. MATHEWSON,  
Lt. Col., Infantry,  
Asst. Exec. Officer.

1 Incl: Incl. 1. Summary of Info.



## CONFIDENTIAL

## GENERAL HEADQUARTERS—UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

## 441ST COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

Advance Echelon.  
APO 500.  
28 January 1946.

Subject: Pre-Pearl Harbor Transmission of Coded Messages from Hawaii.

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

A confidential informant of this headquarters reported that a Lieutenant Commander SUZUKI, formerly of the Japanese Navy had information regarding pre-Pearl Harbor transmission of coded messages from Hawaii. On 7 January 1946 SUZUKI, Sadoaki, was interviewed at the Sendai Police Radio Station [13669] where he is now employed as chief operator and gave the following information.

On 4 December 1941, the Japanese fleet was alerted by the message "Fujisan nobore 1208" which when decoded meant "Attack Pearl Harbor 8 December." Those were the only attack instructions that the fleet received from Radio Tokyo.

In Hawaii, there were two telegraph stations and one commercial radio station (location unknown by SUZUKI) which transmitted coded messages to Japan. It is SUZUKI's opinion that there were Japanese agents in these three places who had in their possession all the latest Japanese codes and they might have used the following method to send out messages.

A signal from the operator in Hawaii that the frequency was bad and that he was about to change frequencies, followed by a series of dots and dashes, would mean to the operator in Japan that there were so many battleships, or aircraft carriers, etc., in Pearl Harbor. Different series of dots and dashes signified different ships.

If the famous poem by General NOGI were broadcast three times in one day, from Radio Tokyo, it was a signal to these agents in Hawaii to broadcast a report on the American naval strength at Pearl Harbor.

Japanese submarines off the coast of Hawaii also sent coded messages to Japan concerning the arrival and departure [13670] of American ships at Pearl Harbor.

On 6 December 1941, the Japanese consul at Honolulu made a pleasure flight over Pearl Harbor, after which he sent a coded telegram to Tokyo telling how many and what type of ships were at Pearl Harbor. Tokyo relayed the information to the Japanese task forces by means of a number code—a certain combination of numbers meaning a certain types of ship, for example, an aircraft carrier 53247, a battleship 44598.

On either 6 or 7 December 1941, a Japanese journalist in Honolulu had a telephone conversation with Tokyo wherein he said that it was almost Christmas time, and that there were a lot of sailors in town having a good time. From this conversation, it was apparent to the officials in Tokyo that there was quite a large concentration of American naval strength in Pearl Harbor.

SUZUKI stated that it is his opinion that most of the spies in Hawaii were either Iseis or Niseis.

SUZUKI said that he is not familiar with any methods of communication employed by Japanese intelligence agents other than codes and wireless, and that the above information is all that he knows concerning those two methods.

On 11th and 12th of January SUZUKI was interrogated regarding detailed information he might possess relative to Japanese intelligence activities prior to the attack on Pearl [13671] Harbor. Also a personal history of SUZUKI was obtained at this time.

SUZUKI states that while he was at the Tokyo Main Naval Bureau, May 1940–April 1941, he did not know of any messages being received from Hawaii other than the messages that were in the diplomatic code.

He delivered some of the messages to the communication section of the Foreign Office where they were decoded. The personnel of the Naval Bureau did not normally have access to the diplomatic codes. SUZUKI remembered one time when the communication section of the Foreign Office was so busy that he

had to go over and help them decode their messages. All that he remembers about the messages he decoded was that some of the messages were from Naval Attachés in Washington, D. C., and one of the messages was about an American ship being in New York and one was a weekly message which contained the week's news events in the United States; what the American attitude was toward the events that were taking place in Europe; matters pertaining to state problems and reaction of American people; expansion of army and navy installations; new ships built and launched. These messages had been sent by Postal telegraph SUZUKI claimed.

SUZUKI stated that a man by the name of Hiyoshi, (FNU), who was at the Funabashi Foreign Department wireless station might be able to furnish more information about the diplo- [13672] matic messages, that were received from Hawaii. Suzuki stated that he did not know the text or substance of any intelligence messages that might have been sent from Hawaii until, a few days before the Japanese Fleet attacked Pearl Harbor.

During the latter part of November and early December 1941 SUZUKI claimed that he listened to commercial broadcasts from Hawaii so that the navy could keep up with events that were going on there, but he did not receive any messages that were coded in any way.

On 4 December 1941 this message was received from Tokyo, "Fujisan Nobore 1208". SUZUKI said that this message meant that the Japanese Fleet was to attack Pearl Harbor 1208 unless the following message was received, "Niitake Yama Nobore (with another date to be given)".

On 6 December 1941 he received a message from Naval Intelligence in Tokyo which told about number of sailors on shore leave in Pearl Harbor; that there was no blackout preparation; that the streets were brightly lighted; and that there was much gaiety of the coming celebration for Christmas. That this message stated the source of the information had been a telephone conversation between two newspaper correspondents, one of whom was in Hawaii and the other was in Japan.

He received another message on 6 December 1941 from [13673] Naval Intelligence in Tokyo giving the number of ships of the various classes that were in Pearl Harbor; the number of men on shore leave; and stating that an aircraft carrier was not in. This message gave as its source of information a consul who had flown over Pearl Harbor.

On the night of 7 December 1941 he got a message stating that Oklahoma or Nevada had entered Pearl Harbor. By noon 7 December 1941 the message "Niitake Yama Nobore" (with another date) had not been received by the Japanese Fleet and Vice Admiral Nagumo, Shuichi on board the aircraft carrier Akagi, flagship of task force flashed the message to the fleet that they would attack Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941.

SUZUKI informed this agent that he didn't know that there was going to be any commercial broadcast of Intelligence information by means of any coded advertisement or anything else of that nature before 8 December 1941. SUZUKI stated further that he had no code on his ship that was designed to decode any messages that might be sent out over the commercial radio. SUZUKI informed this agent that he found out when the Japanese fleet was returning from Pearl Harbor from Lt. Commander Iwasa, Kiyosuke, communication staff officer for 6th Destroyer Group on board the light cruiser Abukuma that several messages had been sent out from Hawaii by means of commercial radio advertisements and gave as an [13674] example this message:

"I lost my black dog. If anyone finds it for me he will get a reward of \$5.00"—and then the owners address was given. SUZUKI said that the size of the reward meant something and the number in the address meant something else. SUBJECT states that although he didn't have the code for this type of message Iwasa, Kiyosuke might have had it.

SUZUKI also stated that he heard later that some submarines had sent out some intelligence messages concerning American forces in Pearl Harbor. He did pick up a message from Japan on 7 December 1941 stating that there was no American Fleet at Lahaina Anchorage. This message gave as its source of information a report from a submarine.

SUZUKI claimed somebody (he doesn't remember who) told him sometime after 8 December 1941 that if a poem by General Nogi entitled "Made out of the Castle Kinshu" were broadcast from Tokyo three times in one day that that meant that the spies in Hawaii were supposed to send out intelligence information. He stated that he did not know about the other poem by General Nogi con-

cerning bill 203 being broadcast and having any special meaning. SUBJECT stated that he didn't remember of any other example of messages being sent in this manner.

Personal History of SUZUKI, Saddaki:

[13675] 13 April 1914—Born in Yokohama.

1927—1932—Attended Yokosuke Middle school.

1932—1937—Attended Naval College. Did not specialize in any field.

1937—Graduated from Naval College as a midshipman and was stationed on board heavy cruiser Iwate for ten (10) months for training in navigation.

November 1937—June 1938—Stationed on board light cruiser Kinu as deck officer; assistant torpedo officer; and assistant communications officer.

July 1938—November 1938—Stationed on board 2nd class destroyer Susuki as junior officer in charge of gunnery and communications.

December 1938—October 1939—Stationed on 1st class destroyer Asauagi as officer in charge of communications and as assistant navigation officer.

October and November 1939—Stationed on board battleship Yamashiro as assistant communications officer.

November 1939—April 1940—Stationed on board heavy cruiser Ashigara [13676] as communications officer.

May 1940—April 1941—Worked in communication section of Tokyo Main Naval Bureau making codes; deciphering codes; and delivering messages that came in. While here SUZUKI first learned about an electric machine that was used to encode and decode messages. SUZUKI stated that he did not learn anything about invisible inks during the time he was at Tokyo Main Naval Bureau and that all he knows about invisible inks is what he has read in detective stories.

April 1941—March 1942—Stationed on board light cruiser Abukuma, flagship of 1st destroyer group, as communications officer.

September 1941—Light cruiser Abukuma was in Ariake Bay Kyushu participating in Fleet training.

October 1941—Abukuma was at Kure Naval Base.

November 1941—Abukuma was in vicinity of Kure Naval Base participating in fleet training. [13677] Abukuma and remainder of 1st destroyer group left vicinity of Kure Naval Base when commander of the 1st destroyer group, Rear Admiral Oomori, Sentaro announced that war might start between Japan and the United States.

22 November 1941—1st destroyer group arrived in Chishima, Kurile Islands. During this time preparations for battle were made.

26 November 1941—1st destroyer group left Chishima following a zig zag course in direction of Hawaii.

April 1942—June 1942—SUZUKI was stationed on board heavy cruiser Mikuma as communications officer.

July 1942—October 1943—SUZUKI was stationed in communication section of Tokyo Main Naval Bureau supervising young officers.

November 1943—March 1944—Stationed at Yokosuka Naval wireless communication school as student. The course consisted of a review of communication [13678] principles and instruction in radar.

March 1944—January 1945—Stationed on board heavy cruiser Miyoko as communications officer.

January 1945—March 1945—SUZUKI was at Singapore awaiting a ship.

March 1945—Until end of war—SUZUKI was at Yokohama Naval Headquarters making code books.

Evaluation

—of source----- D

—of information----- 4

Previous Distribution:

441st CIC Det.

Sixth CIC Region.

Distribution:

MIS War Department—2 copies.

G-2 AFPAC—2 copies.

G-2 AFMIDPAC—2 copies.

File—1 copy.

[13679] Mr. MASTEN. At page 8635 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested information with respect to the planes which were

sent through Hawaii to the Philippines from July to December 7, 1941.

We have received a memorandum from the War Department in this connection, which we request be spread in the record at this point, together with the enclosures.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[13680]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
ROOM 4D757, THE PENTAGON,  
Washington, D. C., 6 February 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.

At page 8635 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for information on what planes were sent through Hawaii to the Philippines from July to 7 December 1941, what planes stopped in Hawaii, and how they completed their journey.

War Department records show that the only planes flown from the United States through Hawaii to the Philippines during the period in question were 26 B-17's. A detailed description of their transfer is contained in a 19 November 1941 report by the Commanding Officer of the 19th Bombardment Group, inclosed herewith.

/S/ Harmon Duncombe,  
HARMON DUNCOMBE,  
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

[13681] HEADQUARTERS—19TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H), AF USAFFE  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

CLARK FIELD, P. I., November 19, 1941.

Subject: Ferry Flight of B-17 Airplanes to the Philippines.

To: Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command,

Bolling Field, Washington, D. C.

1. In compliance with Paragraph 2 *m.*, Letter, W. D. File AG 370.5 (10-7-41) MC-C-M, Subject: Movement of Air Corps Units, dated October 9, 1941; the following report is submitted.

2. On October 17, 1941, twelve (12) airplanes were ferried from Hamilton Field to Hickam Field. For purposes of control the flight was divided into two elements of six planes each. The second element took off 30 minutes behind the first and planes within elements took off at two-minute intervals. After a study of the weather it was decided that it was better to fly from Hamilton Field to Latitude 28° N Longitude 135° W to Hickam Field rather than the great circle course. This added 140 miles to the total distance but favorable winds more than offset this extra distance. Each airplane commander reported his position to his element leader hourly and each element leader reported hourly to NPG and NPM (see Communication Annex to Operations Order No. 2, [13682] Air Echelon, Hq., 19th Bomb. Gp.). Airplane position reports were made accurately and on schedule. On October 20, 1941 thirteen (13) airplanes left Hamilton Field and arrived at Hickam Field after traversing the same route taken by the first flight. The same radio procedure was used by both flights. On October 21, 1941 the 26th airplane, which had been left behind to complete fuel consumption test, took off for Hickam Field. It arrived on the morning of October 22, 1941. All airplanes arrived at Hickam Field on schedule. The navigation was excellent. No mechanical difficulties were encountered.

3. From Hickam Field to Clark Field it was planned to operate with three flights of nine, nine, and eight airplanes. Because of minor mechanical difficulties and adverse weather, maintenance of this flight organization became impracticable. Airplanes were located in the following places on the following dates:

Oct. 17-----12 planes took off for Hickam.  
                  14 planes at SAD or Albuquerque.  
Oct. 20-----12 planes at Hickam.  
                  13 planes took off for Hickam.  
                  1 plane at Hamilton (fuel consumption doubtful).  
Oct. 21-----25 planes at Hickam.  
                  1 plane took off for Hickam.  
Oct. 22-----7 planes took off for Midway.

- [13683] 19 planes at Hickam.  
 Oct. 23-----7 planes took off for Wake.  
                   2 planes took off for Midway.  
                   17 planes at Hickam.  
 Oct. 24-----7 planes at Wake.  
                   1 plane took off for Wake.  
                   10 planes took off for Midway (1 returned—broken oil tank).  
                   1 plane at Midway (tail tire flat).  
                   7 planes at Hickam.  
 Oct. 25-----6 planes took off for Port Moresby.  
                   2 planes at Wake (1 broken aileron).  
                   10 planes took off for Wake.  
                   8 planes at Hickam.  
 Oct. 26-----6 planes at Port Moresby.  
                   3 planes took off for Port Moresby (1 turned back—Weather).  
                   9 planes at Wake.  
                   8 planes took off for Midway.  
 Oct. 27-----8 planes took off for Darwin.  
                   10 planes at Wake.  
                   8 planes at Midway.  
 Oct. 28-----8 planes at Darwin.  
                   10 planes at Wake (Weather).  
                   8 planes at Midway.  
 [13684] Oct. 29—8 planes took off for Clark Field.  
                   10 planes at Wake (Weather).  
                   1 plane took off for Wake.  
                   7 planes at Midway.  
 Oct. 30—8 planes at Clark Field.  
                   11 planes at Wake (Weather).  
                   1 plane took off for Wake (bringing parts).  
                   6 planes at Midway.  
 Oct. 31—8 planes at Clark Field.  
                   8 planes took off for Port Moresby (1 turned back—engine trouble) (1  
                   landed—Rabaul).  
                   4 planes at Wake.  
                   6 planes took off for Wake.  
 Nov. 1—8 planes at Clark Field.  
                   6 planes took off for Darwin.  
                   1 plane took off for Port Moresby from Rabaul.  
                   11 planes took off for Port Moresby (1 turned back—engine trouble)  
                   (2 landed at Rabaul and then continued on to Port Moresby) (2  
                   continued on to Darwin after landing at Port Moresby).  
 Nov. 2—8 planes at Clark Field.  
                   3 planes took off for Clark Field.  
                   5 planes at Darwin.  
                   9 planes took off for Darwin.  
                   1 plane took off for Port Moresby.  
 Nov. 3—11 planes at Clark Field.  
 [13685] 8 planes took off for Clark Field.  
                   6 planes at Darwin.  
                   1 plane took off for Darwin.  
 Nov. 4—19 planes at Clark Field.  
                   5 planes took off for Clark Field.  
                   2 planes at Darwin (engine changes).  
 Nov. 5—24 planes at Clark Field.  
                   1 plane at Darwin (2 engines out).  
                   1 plane took off for Clark Field.  
 Nov. 6—25 planes at Clark Field.  
                   1 plane at Darwin (2 engines out).

4. Several minor incidents occurred on the entire flight from Albuquerque to the Philippines. At Hickam Field one airplane scraped the wing tip of another while taxiing, due to a sudden loss of brake pressure. The wing tip was repaired locally. One airplane had an engine changed at Hickam Field and another had a broken oil tank replaced. At Midway Island one plane was held up one day with a flat tail tire. A spare arrived in the following flight. At Wake a truck backed into the aileron of one plane causing considerable damage. The

broken aileron and two sections of cracked engine cowling from two other ships were repaired at Wake with the aid PAA and the Contractors. The battery charger at the Marine Detachment at Wake was also used. Three airplanes returned to Wake Island after starting for [13686] Port Moresby. One returned because of weather and the other two returned because of ignition trouble encountered at high altitudes while trying to fly over the equatorial front. At Darwin two airplanes developed trouble in the internal blower sections of one engine each. This necessitated sending two replacement engines from Manila. One of the two airplanes took a good engine from the other and continued on to Clark Field. The airplane which remained at Darwin had both bad engines replaced and at present is held at Darwin because of poor field conditions due to rain.

5 Statistics of the flight :

*Average Flight Time*

Hamilton Field—Hickam Field.....	13: 20 hours.
Hickam Field—Midway Island.....	7: 10 hours.
Midway Island—Wake.....	7: 10 hours.
Port Moresby—Darwin.....	5: 50 hours.
Darwin—Clark Field.....	11: 00 hours.
Wake Island—Port Moresby.....	13: 30 hours.
Total Time.....	58: 00 hours.
Average Gasoline Consumption.....	157 gal./hr.

6. Notes and comments on Landing Fields and Facilities.

a. Midway Island. An excellent field with three hard-surfaced, all-weather runways. Parking area and tie-down rings sufficient to accommodate twenty-five (25) heavy bombardment airplanes. Parking area is crushed, graded coral and will hold an airplane in any weather. Facilities available for gassing three airplanes at a time from pits. Accommodations ample for twenty-five (25) crews. Cost: one dollar (1.00) per day for officers. Sixty cents (60¢) per day for enlisted men. Officers stay at Navy Base, men at Marine Detachment.

b. Wake Island. One crushed, graded coral and shell runway. Parking area crushed, graded coral and shell sufficient for twenty-five (25) heavy bombardment airplanes. Tie-down rings not spaced properly to accommodate B-17 type airplane. Landing and parking areas good in any weather. One 1500 gallon gas truck is available but it requires two hours to refill. Six portable gasoline-powered pumps were left at Wake and the majority of the refueling must be done from drums with the aid of these pumps. Caution should be exercised to avoid water as gassing is from unsealed drums. Facilities for accommodation of crews vary due to turnover of contractors' personnel. Should be O. K. on completion of Navy and Marine Base buildings. Cost: One dollar (1.00) per day for both officers and enlisted men. Both officers and men stay in Contractors' barracks and eat at Contractors' mess. Can always accommodate nine (9) crews. Inquiry should be made beforehand if it is contemplated taking in more than [13688] nine (9) airplanes.

c. Rabaul, New Britain. The field is located approximately ten (10) miles south and slightly west of the Town of Rabaul. The field is one strip, 5,000 feet by 300 feet. Both ends slope slightly towards the center. The northwest 3,000 feet is sod over pumice, the southeast 2,000 feet is newly graded pumice, and is soft. Hills to the southeast are definite obstacles on takeoffs to the southeast. Approaches are clear to the northwest. Prevailing winds from southeast. At present a company of Australian infantry is camped along the edge of the field. No parking space is available for airplanes other than on the landing strip. The field is definitely suitable for operation of only lightly loaded B-17s. Landings must be confined to the sod portion of the field. Full load operation should not be attempted at Rabaul even if the landing strip were hard surfaced, because of hills to southeast. Refueling is from drums and must be accomplished by use of the emergency hand pump installed in the bomb-bay. Personnel accommodations are extremely limited. Food can be provided for possibly six (6) airplane crews by the Australian Army Company. Several members of the crews which stopped at Rabaul suffered intestinal upsets which were caused by poor water or food or both. [13689] No sleeping accommodations available. Personnel accommodations at the town of Rabaul, 15 miles over very primitive road, very meagre. A limited supply of 100-octane gasoline available in drums.

d. Port Moresby, New Guinea. Landing Field at Port Moresby is one hard surfaced strip, 3,600 feet by 180 feet, running northwest, southeast. There is no hard surfaced parking area. There are hills on both sides of runway but approaches are clear. The runway could be easily extended at least a thousand feet. Area off runway would be soft during wet weather and it is believed that it would not support a fully loaded B-17 then. Four portable gasoline-powered gas pumps were left there. 100 Octane gasoline available in drums. Port Moresby is poor to approach in bad weather because of hills in immediate vicinity of field and high mountains to the northeast, and east. The homing beacon is low powered and not reliable except very close to field. Due to a haze condition which exists on the south coast of New Guinea the field is hard to locate and it is recommended that flights be timed to arrive there not earlier than 10:00 A. M. local time. Personnel accommodations are furnished by the R. A. A. F. in the town of Port Moresby. Accommodations are not available for more than ten (10) B-17 crews at present. The officers were charged \$2.00, [13690] and the enlisted men \$1.00, a day. Sanitation is primitive and health conditions are very poor.

e. Darwin, Australia. Four graded, dirt runways. Not good during rainy season. Extremely dusty during dry season. Could accommodate twenty-five (25) heavy bombardment airplanes. Ample grassed parking area. Hard-surfaced runways are under construction. 100 Octane gasoline is available in drums. One portable pump was left at Darwin, others were available from the R. A. A. F. Accommodations sufficient for twenty-five (25) crews. Cost: Two dollars (\$2.00) for officers, one dollar (\$1.00) for men, per day. Officers stay at officers' mess. Men stay at R. A. A. F. barracks.

#### 7. Recommendations.

a. That future flights not be dispatched on such short notice. The requirement for an earlier departure than originally planned entailed hardships on the crews, many of whom departed from Hamilton Field in a fatigued condition. It also disrupted squadron organization which should be maintained as near as possible. Careful planning was difficult and orders and instructions were necessarily hurried. Some airplanes arrived at Hamilton Field as late as 7:00 P. M. on the evening of take-off, which was at 8:30 P. M. One airplane had to make the flight from Hamilton to Hickam individually because sufficient time was not [13691] available to test it prior to the departure of the flight. If at all possible, the crews should be given twenty-four (24) hours complete rest prior to the Hamilton to Hickam flight. The Hamilton-Hickam flight should be timed so as to arrive at Honolulu between dawn and sunrise plus one hour.

b. That an airport be constructed at Guam as soon as possible. This would shorten the trip by more than three thousand (3,000) Nautical miles and, in addition, would give a route over which better weather and better weather information are available. By use of this route it would be possible to fly from San Francisco to Manila in six (6) days, and in easy stages. For example: First night—Hamilton to Hickam. Second day—rest. Third day—Hickam to Midway. Fourth day—Midway to Wake. Fifth day—Wake to Guam. Sixth day—Guam to Manila. In case of emergency it would be possible to make the trip in four days, if competent ground servicing and maintenance crews were available at each stop. For example: Sunday night—Hamilton to Hickam. Monday—rest. Tuesday—either Hickam to Midway to Wake or Hickam to Wake, direct. Wednesday—Wake—Guam. Thursday—Guam—Philippines.

c. That no airport be used which has not at least one 5,000 feet runway (preferable hard-surfaced) and ample parking area for the airplanes.

[13692] d. That army radio facilities (homing, direction finding, and communications) be installed at all stops along the route if it is planned to make frequent flights of this sort. The Navy and PAA cooperated willingly but their facilities were severally overtaxed. At Wake Island especially the communications load was too great for the equipment and personnel. Weather forecasts arrived too late for adequate planning. If use of Navy facilities is to be continued an extra frequency should be assigned for flight communications only.

e. That a substantial supply of spare parts, jacks, energizers, oxygen, etc., be stationed at each stop along with a substantial ground crew. In this way the load carried in each airplane could be considerably lessened both in parts carried and personnel.

f. That more detailed maps of stopping places and auxiliary fields be obtained. These maps should be of a large scale (Similar to our sectional aeronautical charts of the U. S.) and cover the area within 100 miles of the airport.

g. That qualified weather officers be sent to Midway and Wake at least a week prior to any projected flight in order to keep an accurate check on the weather. The equatorial front, and ever-present weather phenomenon between Wake and Port Moresby, offers a flight problem [13693] worthy of much consideration. This front was successfully penetrated by this Group at altitudes from 1,000 to 28,000 feet. Clouds in this front are characterized by severe turbulence at intermediate altitudes and are to be avoided. Moonlight aids in the perception and avoidance of these clouds.

h. The G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force compiled a route book and communications annex which is far superior to the route book supplied by the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. It is much more detailed and contains maps, drawings, photographs, and other valuable information. In view of the very great assistance this book gave on this flight, it is recommended that every effort be made to keep the information contained therein up to date.

DAVID R. GIBBS,  
Major, Air Corps,  
Commanding.

FAF File:  
373x452-1 Ferry Flight of B-17 Airplanes to the Philippines B-17D/34.  
Secret.

[13694] Mr. MASTEN. At page 7693 of the transcript Mr. Murphy requested information as to whether or not the files of the Navy Department reveal the sending of a message to Hawaii on 6 December.

We have received a memorandum dated January 24, 1946, from the Navy Department which we request be spread on the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be so ordered.  
(The document referred to follows):

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
Washington, 24 January 1946.

1083A (HLB).

R#114.

Memorandum.

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Subject: Search for dispatches sent from the Navy Department to naval commanders in the field between noon, Eastern Standard Time, on 6 December 1941 and 2:30 p. m., Eastern Standard Time on 7 December 1941.

1. In response to the suggestion to the Committee that a dispatch may have been sent from the Navy Department on the evening or during the late hours of 6 December 1941, or during the early hours of 7 December 1941, released either by the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations, [13695] to some of the naval commanders in the field, including possibly Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of a warning of war nature, please be advised as follows:

2. All appropriate files of the Navy Department have been searched for any dispatches of a war-warning nature from the Navy Department to naval commanders in the field between noon, Eastern Standard Time, on 6 December 1941 and 2:30 P. M., Eastern Standard Time, on 7 December 1941, inclusive. This will certify that no such dispatches are contained in those files.

3. There is no record or notation in the files of the Chief of Naval Communications of any telephone warning message that may have been phoned to Admiral Kimmel.

(Signed) JOHN FORD BAECHER,  
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R.

Mr. MASTEN. We have received another memorandum from the Navy Department in response to a request of Senators Ferguson and Brewster regarding the governmental authority of the United States and Great Britain during 1941 over Johnston, Canton, and Christmas Islands and we would request that that also be spread in the record.



The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.  
(The document referred to follows):

[13696]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
Washington, 25 January 1946.

Memorandum.

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

1. In response to the request of Senators Ferguson and Brewster regarding the governmental authority of the United States and Great Britain in 1941 over Johnston, Canton and Christmas Islands, the following information is submitted:

(a) Johnston Island was under the sole jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) Canton Island was the subject of an exchange of notes between the governments of Great Britain and the United States published on April 1939 (Executive Agreement series #145). These notes provide for the joint administration of Canton Island and Endurberry Island, without prejudice to claims of sovereignty for fifty years and thereafter indefinitely unless the agreement is changed, modified, or terminated. Under the terms of the agreement these islands are subject to such joint *ad hoc* regime, the details of which are determined by the two governments in consultations from time to time. Each government is represented by an administrative official and the islands are available for communications and use as airports for international aviation, but [13697] only commercial aviation companies incorporated in the United States or in any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, for purposes of scheduled air services.

(c) Christmas Island came under the jurisdiction of the British High Commissioner of the Pacific (also called the Acting Administrative Office of the Ellice and Gilbert Island Colonies) whose headquarters are in Suva. The United States had and has no part in the government but claimed a sea plane base. The United States and Britain both claimed sovereignty based on occupancy. The British, however, have administered the island from 1919 through 1941.

(Signed) JOHN FORD BAECHER,  
Lt. Comdr. USNR.

Mr. MASTEN. On February the 5th a memorandum was read into the record regarding the burning of all codes in Washington by the Japanese consulate.

The War Department in response to a request made by Senator Ferguson advises that the Colonel Holbrook referred to in the memorandum was the head of the Administrative Section of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the War Department Military Intelligence Division, and that the initials "JTB" which appear over the date line in the lower right-hand corner of the memorandum are the initials of Colonel Bissell, who was the head of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the War Department Military Intelligence Branch.

[13698] The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that spread on the record?

Mr. MASTEN. I have read the substance of it into the record, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. MASTEN. At page 7868 of the record Senator Ferguson asked whether or not a memorandum prepared, I believe, by Mr. Max Hamilton in the State Department, regarding a proposal that New Guinea be transferred to the Japanese, ever reached the President.

The State Department advises as follows:

It is the recollection of Secretary Hull and of other officers who were in the Department at the time that no action was taken on this memorandum and that it did not reach the President.

At page 11261 of the transcript Mr. Murphy requested that any information available in the State Department regarding the substance of the intercept (No. 104) which appears at the bottom of page 252 of Exhibit 1 be obtained.

We have received from the State Department a photostat of a message sent from Washington to the American Legation in Budapest which reads as follows. The message is dated December 5, 1941:

Please transmit secretly at the earliest possible moment a note verbale with the following wording to the Hungarian Government:

[13699] "The American Minister presents his compliments to His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Hungarian Government and, at the request of His Britannic Majesty's Government, has the honor to transmit to the Hungarian Government the attached communication from the British Government:

"On November 29th His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom conveyed to Hungarian Government through the United States Minister Budapest, a message to the effect that unless by December 5th the Hungarian Government had ceased military operations and had in practice withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities against the U. S. S. R., His Majesty's Government would have no choice but to declare existence of a state of war between the two countries. Since Hungarian Government have returned no reply to this communication and since information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government affords no indication that they intend to comply with above conditions a state of war will exist between the two countries as from 12:01 a. m., Greenwich Mean Time on December 7th."

That is the message, we understand, which is referred to in the intercept (No. 104) at the bottom of page 252 of Exhibit 1.

Senator LUCAS. Did you say that was a verbal message or a garbled message?

Mr. MASTEN. A verbal message.

[13700] Senator LUCAS. A what?

Mr. MASTEN. A verbal message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. An oral message.

Mr. MASTEN. The Navy Department has furnished us the exact transmission times of three dispatches which are referred to on pages 6714 and 6713 of the transcript. These messages are the Navy war warning message of November 27 and two other messages which were sent just prior to the sending of that message.

These memoranda show that message No. 270038, which appears in the transcript at page 6714, was sent from Washington on November 26 at 9:09 p. m., Washington time; that message No. 270040, which also appears in the transcript at page 6714, was sent from Washington on November 27 at 12:58 a. m., and that message 272337, which is the war warning message of November the 27th and appears at page 36 of Exhibit 37, was sent from Washington on November 27 at 8:06 p. m.

At page 12180 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested a report that had been made by Colonel Pettigrew in 1941. That has been delivered to Senator Ferguson and is the report which he has now requested be made an exhibit.

To complete the record with respect to the Hewitt investigation we would like to include in the transcript the following two memoranda.

(The memoranda referred to follow:)

[13701]

18 MAY 1945.

From: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

To: Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Subject: Preliminary investigation at Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) Precept from SecNav to Adm. H. Kent Hewitt, USN, dated 2 May 1945.

1. Upon your arrival at Pearl Harbor you will conduct preliminary investigation as set forth herein in connection with the further Pearl Harbor Inquiry directed by reference (a).

2. You will determine what information the CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN records and files contain concerning: (1) Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal Defense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate; (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941, and the Secretary of War's reply; (3) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack; (4) the date when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 November 1941 to 31 December 1941.

3. You will determine what information the CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN records and files contain concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces during the period 14 October 1941 to 7 December 1941.

4. You will determine what information the records of [13702] CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN contain concerning the movements of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on or prior to 7 December 1941.

5. You will determine what information the CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN records contain which was received through the interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages prior to 7 December 1941.

6. You are authorized to obtain copies of any of the records relating to the foregoing matters, for delivery to me.

7. You will report the results of this preliminary investigation to me at Pearl Harbor on or about 28 May 1945.

H. KENT HEWITT.

[13703]

6 JUL 1945.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.

Subject: Modification of precept.

Reference: (a) Precept of 2 May 1945, directing further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.

1. Paragraph 7 of reference (a) is hereby modified as follows:

Upon completion of your examination, you will submit the record direct to the Secretary of the Navy, attaching thereto a report stating your findings and conclusions.

James Forrestal.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

[13704] Mr. MASTEN. That, I think, is all we have.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, there are two things that I want to have in the record before you pause.

The first was that I wanted to express for myself and my associates our very great obligation to Commander Baecher and to Colonel Duncombe for the aid which they and their liaison staff in the Army and Navy, respectively, have given to us. I know of no time when we have made a request of them where there has not been what we were satisfied constituted the very fullest response. It has not been without difficulties on their part because at times I feel that I was rather irascible in dealing with them. I do not know how we could have carried on without their cooperation.

Second, I wanted the record to show particularly that all of us on our counsel's staff feel that it would have been exceedingly difficult

to have gone through with this hearing had we not had the advantage of the extraordinary preparation in detail and extent which was bequeathed to us by Mr. Mitchell and his staff and the effort that Mr. Mitchell made during the last week he was here to get this testimony in shape and to give us the benefit of the numerous memorandums which he made to aid us, which each day became more definite in our minds as a very extraordinary help to us, and I wanted to give voice to our appreciation of that aid that we had from Mr. Mitchell before you formally closed your record.

[13705] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to make a statement at this time with reference to the proceedings of this committee.

It was created by a concurrent resolution adopted in the Senate on the 6th of September and a day or two later in the House of Representatives. It went immediately to work to prepare for the open hearings which we have been holding and on the 15th of November 1945 this committee began the open hearings and it has been conducting them daily morning and afternoon, and on some occasions at night.

The committee had some differences within the committee with respect to procedure but those differences were no doubt inherent in the situation; but they have not been too serious, and I want to congratulate this committee upon the diligence that the committee has shown in attending these hearings and has participated in this investigation.

I have been a Member of the two Houses of Congress for a long time. I have served on many special committees and many standing committees. I do not recall in my entire service where a committee, either special or standing, has consistently and daily held open hearings and has enjoyed such a full attendance of members as has been the case in this investigation and of this committee.

[13706] Some of the members have had to be absent now and then on account of other committees and other work, but on the whole the attendance of this committee and the interest it has manifested in the testimony of all the witnesses has been extraordinary, and I want, as chairman, to thank the committee for that manifestation of their interest in this important job which was wished upon all of us.

I wish also to add my thanks, and I am sure the thanks of the committee, to the liaison officers of the War Department, the Navy Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for the valuable assistance which they have rendered to us.

I would also like to express the appreciation of the committee to the press and radio and photographers and all others who have been as diligent in their attendance as the committee itself.

I wish also to thank the officers here who have been waiting on us during the weeks in which we have been holding these hearings.

I might say that the committee and counsel have a vast amount of work yet to do before we get our report ready for the Congress, and I am sure we will pursue that phase of this task with the same diligence and I hope the great thoroughness with which we have conducted the hearing. I wanted to make that statement publicly before we conclude [13707] today's session.

If I have omitted anybody who ought to be mentioned or thanked I would be glad to be reminded of it.

I wish also, of course, to thank not only the present counsel, but their predecessors for their cooperation. You still have got quite a lot of work to do, but most of that will probably be done behind closed doors or in executive session or in working rooms, and I may not have another public opportunity to thank the counsel for the outstanding work, the tremendous, almost superhuman task of going through all the records of all the investigations and all the transactions to bring to the committee's attention this evidence.

That not only applies to the present counsel, but it applies with equal force to their predecessors.

I think it is a tribute to the ability and the understanding and comprehension of those of our present counsel who succeeded the former counsel that they were able, after a short time, to pick up the broken threads and go on with it.

I would not want to conclude this brief tribute without a special tribute to the counsel, Mr. Masten, who has been with us from the beginning, for whom we have contracted an unbounded regard, and I hope he will be able to cooperate with us further.

[13708] I also want to thank the official reporters who have taken this vast amount of testimony not only for the efficiency with which they have done it but the rapidity with which they have made it available to us. I do not think I have ever observed a more competent corps of stenographic reporters. I am sure the committee has the same opinion of them that I have.

I wanted to say this at this public meeting, as we now conclude this phase of our work.

Senator LUCAS. I just want to concur in everything that the chairman has said.

I also want to add this: When General Mitchell left I made some remarks in the record as to what I thought with reference to his service. I think the committee should be grateful to Mr. Richardson and Mr. Kaufman who have come into the middle of this lengthy and important hearing and carried on the tremendous burdens which they have had. They have done a magnificent job.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., February 20, 1946, the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

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Part 11—April 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946—follows.

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